THOMAS A. VARLAN, Chief District Judge.
Before the Court is Athena of S.C. LLC's, American Harper Corporation's and Ted Doukas's appeal of Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton's February 2, 2014 memorandum and order [Doc. 1226]. In the magistrate judge's memorandum and order [Doc. 1202], the magistrate judge considered the receiver's motion for an order requiring Ted Doukas and his related entities, representatives, and agents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the Court's memorandum and order of July 29, 2013, and respond to the receiver's outstanding requests for documents [Doc. 1026]. The receiver requested that the Court impose any appropriate and necessary sanction for such failure [Id.].
In addressing the receiver's motion, Magistrate Judge Guyton found that appellants had not provided the receiver with documents responsive to certain requests and that, with respect to certain documents provided in response, the documents were incomplete [Doc. 1202]. Due to this factual finding, and his further findings that appellants delayed in responding to the receiver's requests in "exorbitant" fashion, he determined that appellants had failed to comply with the Court's July 29 order [Id.]. Magistrate Judge Guyton also imposed sanctions against appellants, including that they pay the receiver $21,500.00, an amount representative of the fees and expenses
Appellants take issue with Magistrate Judge Guyton's order, asserting that he exceeded his authority in issuing the order [Doc. 1226]. Yet, as this Court has stated before, this argument need not distract the Court for long because regardless of whether the magistrate judge had the authority to dispose of the receiver's motion, post-judgment matters are ultimately subject to de novo review by the district court. See Gaiters v. City of Catoosa, 226 F. App'x 826, 829 (10th Cir. 2007) ("We have previously held that a district court may refer post-judgment matters to a magistrate judge under the `additional duties' provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), so long as the district judge retains the ultimate responsibility for decision making." (citation omitted)); see also Davet v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:03CV1623, 2011 WL 4729930, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2011) (finding same). The Court thus construes the order of the magistrate judge as a report and recommendation and reviews the order de novo.
While the Court assumes familiarity with this case, some background is needed here. On June 18, 2013, the receiver filed a motion to compel [Doc. 961], in which the receiver moved the Court to order Doukas, American Harper, and Athena, and their related entities, agents, and representatives, to produce documents that Doukas, his related entities, agents, and representatives were withholding from the receiver. In granting the receiver's motion [Doc. 983], Magistrate Judge Guyton noted that no party filed a response in opposition, which alone served as a basis to grant the motion. Yet, he went on to note that American Harper and Athena had filed a notice, which stated they had "provided all or substantially all documents requested to be produced by the Receiver" [Id. (citing Doc. 968)]. That notice, though, according to the magistrate judge, did not render the motion to compel moot because the notice did not detail the categories of documents produced to the receiver in order for the Court to evaluate the extent of the compliance [Id.]. Magistrate Judge Guyton thus ordered Doukas, American Harper, and Athena, and their related entities, agents, and representatives, to produce any and all documents relating to:
[Id.].
On July 31, 2013, the receiver requested that Doukas, and his related entities, agents, and representatives, respond to the items set forth in the Court's July 29 order because, while counsel for the receiver had received certain documents from American Harper, Doukas had not provided him with documents or records relating to the properties listed in the Court's July 29 order. Then, because this request and other requests did not elicit the information sought by the receiver [see, e.g., Doc. 1247], on September 9, 2013, the receiver moved the Court to order Doukas and his related entities, representatives, and agents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their failure to comply with the Court's July 29 order [Doc. 1026]. The receiver identified twelve categories of documents that had not been produced:
[Doc. 1027].
On September 22, 2013, Athena, American Harper, and Doukas filed a response [Doc. 1038], in which they asserted the documents were to be scanned into electronic form and made available to the receiver, that Capital Bank would produce discovery directly to the receiver, and that hard drives were made available to the receiver. They further asserted that "there are no additional documents responsive to the Receiver's request that have not been produced, or to which the Receiver has not had access, such as documents filed in the Tellico Properties L.P bankruptcy" [Id. (footnote omitted)].
The parties filed supplemental briefs [Docs. 1052, 1061], but it was unclear whether Athena, American Harper, and Doukas had followed through on their representations to the Court, so on January 2, 2014, the magistrate judge ordered that the receiver and/or his counsel submit a sworn statement describing the current status of the twelve categories of discovery addressed in the motion for order to show cause [Doc. 1157]. He also afforded Athena, American Harper, and Doukas, and related entities, an opportunity to file a sown statement in rebuttal [Id.]. The receiver filed the affidavit of his counsel [Doc. 1174-1] and his own affidavit [Doc. 1174-6], along with exhibits thereto. Athena, American Harper, and Doukas, and related entities, filed a response, which included the affidavit of Greg Baker [Doc. 1181].
As noted, Magistrate Judge Guyton found that appellants had not provided the receiver with documents responsive to certain requests and that, with respect to certain documents provided in response, the documents were incomplete [Doc. 1202]. To this end, he determined that appellant's sworn testimony that they complied with the discovery requests of the receiver, complied with the Court's order, and acted in a manner consistent with their representations to the Court did not discredit the sworn testimony of the receiver and the receiver's counsel to the contrary [Id.]. Moreover, he found that appellants delayed in responding to the receiver's requests in "exorbitant" fashion [Id.]. The magistrate judge thus imposed sanctions against appellants, including that they pay the receiver $21,500.00, an amount representative of the fees incurred in litigating the issue [Id.].
With this background in mind, the Court turns to the appeal [Doc. 1226], which the Court construes an objection to the magistrate judge's order, which the Court is construing as a report and recommendation. In their own words, appellants assert that the magistrate judge's order is "contrary to the facts," "contrary to the documents produced," "contrary to the Greg Baker affidavits," and "contrary to the Receiver's own admission in his testimony on May 8, 2013 that he was granted unencumbered access to all records and all personnel" [Doc. 1226]. These arguments are, indeed, reiterations of the arguments presented to the magistrate judge.
The function of contempt proceedings is "to enforce the message that court orders and judgments are to be taken seriously." Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund of Local Union # 58, IBEW v. Gary's Elec. Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). While a court should not use its contempt power lightly, it "is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law. Without it they are mere boards of arbitration, whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory." Id. at 378 (quoting Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911)). It is within the trial court's sound discretion to hold someone in contempt. Id. (citing Peppers v. Barry, 873 F.2d 967, 968 (6th Cir. 1989)).
A court may hold someone in contempt if there is "clear and convincing evidence that shows that `[person] violated a definite and specific order of the court requiring [that person] to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of the court's order.'" Id. at 379 (citation omitted). Once the moving party establishes a violation, "the burden shifts to the contemnor who may defend by coming forward with evidence showing that he is presently unable to comply with the court's order." Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng'g, LLC, 323 F. App'x 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The contemnor "must show categorically and in detail why he or she is unable to comply with the court's order." Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund, 340 F.3d at 379 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rolex Watch U.S.A. v. Crowley, 74 F.3d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1996)). Courts will consider "whether the [contemnor] took all reasonable steps within [his] power to comply with the court's order." Id. (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court has reviewed the record underlying the issues presented by the receiver's motion for order to show cause, along with the objections and response to the objections, and the Court is in full agreement with Magistrate Judge Guyton's findings, which the Court adopts herein. Representations that documents will be produced, have been produced by other individuals or entities, or are privileged are insufficient responses to the receiver's requests, and the appellants have, without doubt, delayed in responding to the receiver's requests. The Court thus finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Ted Doukas and his related entities have failed to fully comply with the Court's order of July 13, 2013 [Doc. 983]. And appellants have not asserted that they are presently unable to comply with the Court's order.
The Court further agrees with Magistrate Judge Guyton that sanctions are warranted for this failure. "Judicial sanctions . . . may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes; to coerce . . . compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.'" United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). Appellants have "continued [to] fail[] to produce responsive documents in the six plus months that have elapsed since entry of the Order ruling upon the Motion to Compel, and their failure to fulfill their representations to the Court with regard to this issue, now support[s] an award of fees" [Doc. 1202]. The Court finds that a conservative estimate of the time spent addressing appellants' failure to comply with the Court's order results in an award of twenty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($21,500.00). This amount represents sixty hours of the receiver's time expended at a reasonable rate of $175.00 per hour, yielding $10,500.00, and forty hours of time expended by the receiver's counsel at an average reasonable rate of $275.00 per hour, yielding $11,000.00. See Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, No. 1:06-cv-01207, 2010 WL 99404, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2010) ("Upon a finding of contempt, a court has broad discretion in assessing sanctions to protect the sanctity of its decrees and the legal process, including allowing a movant to recover attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting a contempt motion."); Bd. of Supervisors of the La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 574 F.Supp.2d 601, 606 (E.D. La. 2008) (awarding, among other things, attorney's fees and costs related to civil contempt).
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, the Court hereby
IT IS SO ORDERED.