Filed: Nov. 07, 2016
Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2016
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION CURTIS L. COLLIER , District Judge . Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 [Doc. 243]. 1 He bases his request for collateral relief on Johnson v. United States , 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [ Id. ]. The United States responded in oppositio
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION CURTIS L. COLLIER , District Judge . Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 [Doc. 243]. 1 He bases his request for collateral relief on Johnson v. United States , 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [ Id. ]. The United States responded in opposition..
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
CURTIS L. COLLIER, District Judge.
Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 243].1 He bases his request for collateral relief on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [Id.]. The United States responded in opposition [Doc. 245]. Petitioner did not reply and the time for doing so has now passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1, 7.2. For the reasons below, the petition for collateral relief [Doc. 243] will be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 942(c). He was subsequently sentenced to the statutorily-mandated minimum term of imprisonment: 120 months for the drug offense, followed by 60 months for the firearms offense. On June 24, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant petition challenging his sentence in light of Johnson [Doc. 243].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Petitioner must demonstrate "(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law . . . so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid." Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). He "must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal" and establish a "fundamental defect in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error violative of due process." Fair v. United States, 157 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. ANALYSIS
To the extent Petitioner argues that the Johnson decision invalidated the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B)'s definition of crime of violence and that the absence of that provision requires vacatur of his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A), the argument fails for two reasons.
First, binding Sixth Circuit precedent holds that while Johnson invalidated the residual provision of the ACCA and the identically worded clause in Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 924(c)(3)(B)'s definition of crime of violence remains unaffected.2 See United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding "rationale of Johnson applies equally" to the Guidelines' definition of crime of violence); United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376-79 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing at least four "significant differences" between the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) and the ACCA's residual clause and noting "the argument that Johnson effectively invalidated [the former] is . . . without merit").
Second, even if Johnson's reasoning could be used to invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause, Petitioner's conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) did not rely on that provision. To the contrary, Petitioner was convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, not crime of violence. The statute defines "drug trafficking crime" as "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq., [or] the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951, et seq." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). Johnson has no bearing whatsoever on the scope of that definition. Accord United States v. Jenkins, 613 F. App'x 754, 755 (10th Cir. 2015) (deeming Johnson irrelevant to drug offenses). As such, Petitioner has failed identify a viable basis for vacating his § 924(c) conviction.
To the extent that Petitioner seeks relief based on the fact that he no longer possesses predicate offenses sufficient to support categorization as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, career-offender under Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, or an enhanced base offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) of the same, the argument fails because the record demonstrates that he was never subjected to any of those provisions [See generally E.D. Tenn. Case No. 2:07-cr-88-CLC-CHS-1; E.D. Tenn. Case No. 1:08-cr-1-CLC-WBC-1].
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Petitioner's § 2255 motion [Doc. 243] will be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court will CERTIFY any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Therefore, this Court will DENY Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P 24. Petitioner having failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability SHALL NOT ISSUE. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P Rule 22(b).
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
