THOMAS A. VARLAN, District Judge.
Petitioner Augustus Young has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 1].
Young pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951, and aiding and abetting the use, carrying, and brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) [Doc. 56, No. 3:16-cr-145]. Young was classified as a career offender with an accordant guideline range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment [Doc. 66, No. 3:16-cr-145]. He was sentenced, below that range, to 204 months' imprisonment: 120 months for the robbery, followed by the 84-month mandatory minimum for the § 924(c) offense [Doc. 98, No. 3:16-cr-145]. Young waived his right to appeal and thus did not [Doc. 56, No. 3:16-cr-145], but he now brings this § 2255 motion disputing his § 924(c) conviction and sentence in light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), which held unconstitutional the so-called residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
Section 924(c) contains a similar residual clause. That statute makes it a federal crime to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which is defined as a federal felony offense that:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Dimaya could only impact (B), the residual clause; clause (A), the use-of-force clause, is not going anywhere.
Thus, regardless of whether the similarly worded residual clause of § 924(c) is also unconstitutional—a question currently before the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 782 (') (granting certiorari)—Young's conviction must still stand because Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the use-of-force clause. The Sixth Circuit has held exactly that:
United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 291-92 (6th Cir. 2017). In light of this precedent, Young pleaded guilty to a crime of violence regardless of what happens to the residual clause of § 924(c). Young disagrees. He maintains that Hobbs Act robbery requires only "common-law force," which can apparently be applied by even the slightest touch [Doc. 6], and thus does not count as a crime of violence. But Gooch—especially when read alongside United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2016), which held that § 924(c)(3)(A) requires at least the threatened use of "force capable of causing physical pain or injury," a la Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)—says essentially the opposite. And this Court has no choice but to follow these binding appellate precedents.
For all of these reasons, Young is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and his motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence [Doc. 1] will be