MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEON JORDAN, District Judge.

Before the Court is Petitioner Jesse M. Neal's notice of voluntary dismissal of his pending motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc.11].1

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner pled guilty to two methamphetamine conspiracy counts and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm as charged in the indictment. He was sentenced in 2013 as a career offender to serve 210 months' incarceration [Docs. 204, 234, Case No. 2:12-CR-122].

Petitioner filed his § 2255 motion in reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which struck down the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") as unconstitutionally vague [Doc. 1]. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563 (holding "that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process"). Petitioner argued that Johnson's reasoning invalidated his career-offender classification under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), thus entitling him to a reduced sentence [Id.]. On August 29, 2016, the United States successfully moved to defer ruling on the motion pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017), which was poised to address whether Johnson applied to the Guidelines' residual clause, and if so, whether it also applies retroactively on collateral review [Docs. 6, 9]. On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Beckles, holding that the advisory sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 895. On March 31, 2017, Petitioner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and, the next day, the United States filed a motion to deny Petitioner's § 2255 motion and dismiss this action with prejudice, based on Beckles [Docs. 11-12].

II. DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i)2 provides that a movant is permitted to voluntarily dismiss an action without a court order by filing "a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated, such a dismissal is without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). A properly filed notice of voluntary dismissal, such as Petitioner's, is self-effectuating. Aamot v. Kassel, 1 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir. 1993). Because the instant action was "no more" after Petitioner's submission of the notice of voluntary dismissal, see Ames v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., No. 11-2942, 2012 WL 215234, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Rule 41(a)(1) explicitly leaves the option to dismiss in the plaintiff's hands: once [a] plaintiff gives his notice, the lawsuit is no more.") (quoting Aamot, 1 F.3d at 444)), the United States' motion to deny and dismiss [Doc. 12] must be denied as moot.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the above reasoning, the Clerk's Office will be DIRECTED to terminate Petitioner's § 2255 motion and to close the civil action associated with it. The dismissal will be without prejudice. The United States' motion to deny and dismiss the § 2255 petition will be DENIED as moot, as will Petitioner's motion to supplement his § 2255 motion [Doc. 4].

A separate judgment will enter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.