E. CLIFTON KNOWLES, Magistrate Judge.
This is a civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), as provided under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). The case is currently pending on Plaintiff's "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," which the Court will construe as Plaintiff's "Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record." Docket No. 13. Defendant has filed a Response, arguing that the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Docket No. 15.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's "Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record" be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff filed his application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") on April 4, 2012, alleging that he had been disabled since November 17, 2011, due to migraines, dizziness, left sided numbness and weakness, claudication in legs, and blurred vision. See, e.g., Docket No. 10, Attachment ("TR"), pp. 120, 134. Plaintiff's application was denied both initially (TR 58) and upon reconsideration (TR 56). Plaintiff subsequently requested (TR 69) and received (TR 28) a hearing. Plaintiff's hearing was conducted on January 17, 2014, by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Renée S. Andrews-Turner. TR 28. Plaintiff and vocational expert ("VE"), Rebecca Williams, appeared and testified. Id.
On March 28, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. TR 11. Specifically, the ALJ made the following findings of fact:
TR 16-23.
On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of the hearing decision. TR 8. On May 27, 2015, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case (TR 1), thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, based upon the record as a whole, then these findings are conclusive. Id.
The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and testimonial evidence of record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties' arguments.
This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to the record made in the administrative hearing process. Jones v. Sec'y, Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). The purpose of this review is to determine: (1) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether any legal errors were committed in the process of reaching that decision. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986).
"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1999), citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). "Substantial evidence" has been further quantified as "more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance." Bell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.3d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996), citing Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
The reviewing court does not substitute its findings of fact for those of the Commissioner if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings and inferences. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). In fact, even if the evidence could also support a different conclusion, the decision of the ALJ must stand if substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached. Her, 203 F.3d at 389, citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). If the Commissioner did not consider the record as a whole, however, the Commissioner's conclusion is undermined. Hurst v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985), citing Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980).
In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner, courts look to four types of evidence: (1) objective medical findings regarding Plaintiff's condition; (2) diagnosis and opinions of medical experts; (3) subjective evidence of Plaintiff's condition; and (4) Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience. Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361, 374 (6th Cir. 1965).
The claimant carries the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving his or her "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). "Substantial gainful activity" not only includes previous work performed by Plaintiff, but also, considering Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which Plaintiff lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether Plaintiff would be hired if he or she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
At the administrative level of review, the claimant's case is considered under a five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:
The Commissioner's burden at the fifth step of the evaluation process can be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as "the grid," but only if the claimant is not significantly limited by a nonexertional impairment, and then only when the claimant's characteristics identically match the characteristics of the applicable grid rule. Moon, 923 F.2d at 1181; 20 CFR § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 200.00(e)(1), (2). See also Damron v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.2d 279, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1985). Otherwise, the grid cannot be used to direct a conclusion, but only as a guide to the disability determination. Id. In such cases where the grid does not direct a conclusion as to the claimant's disability, the Commissioner must rebut the claimant's prima facie case by coming forward with particularized proof of the claimant's individual vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs, which is typically obtained through vocational expert testimony. See Varley v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987).
In determining residual functional capacity for purposes of the analysis required at stages four and five above, the Commissioner is required to consider the combined effect of all the claimant's impairments: mental and physical, exertional and nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the March 29, 2012, Medical Source Statement ("MSS") opinion of Dr. Thomas Jaselskis, Plaintiff's treating physician, "without providing sufficient rationale, as required by the regulations." Docket No. 14 at 5. Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner's decision should be reversed, or in the alternative, remanded. Id.
Sentence four of § 405(g) states as follows:
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
"In cases where there is an adequate record, the Secretary's decision denying benefits can be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a court can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (6th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the March 29, 2012, MSS opinion of Dr. Thomas Jaselskis, his treating physician, wherein Dr. Jaselskis "endorses limitations consistent with a finding of disability." Docket No. 14 at 5, referencing TR 238-40. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Jaselskis' opinion is "too cursory to survive scrutiny." Id. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ rejected Dr. Jaselskis' opinion without considering the required factors, Dr. Jaselskis' own treatment notes, or the June 27, 2012, and July 23, 2012, consultative examinations of Dr. Roy Johnson. Id. at 6-7, referencing TR 241-45. Plaintiff maintains that in his consultative examinations, "Dr. Johnson notes decreased range of motion and tenderness of the lumbar spine, positive supine straight leg raise on the left side, and decreased range of motion of the left extremities." Id. Plaintiff further maintains that Dr. Johnson noted Plaintiff's limp and inability to squat or heel-to-toe walk. Id. at 7, referencing TR 241-45. Plaintiff asserts that "Dr. Johnson opined that Plaintiff is limited to lifting five pounds and standing for one hour in an eight hour work day," which Plaintiff argues is consistent with Dr. Jaselskis' opinion that Plaintiff would be limited to standing one hour in an eight hour work day. Id., citing TR 238. Plaintiff concludes that "the ALJ should have better evaluated the medical opinion of Dr. Jaselskis," by either giving his opinion controlling weight or by giving good reasons for discounting it. Id. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did neither, and therefore committed reversible error. Id.
Defendant responds that "the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Jaselskis' opinion in accordance with the regulations." Docket No. 15 at 6, referencing TR 20, 238-40. Defendant argues that "Dr. Jaselskis' opinion would not be entitled to controlling weight," because he saw Plaintiff on only one occasion, which was the same day he rendered the MSS opinion at issue. Id., referencing TR 238-40, 261-62. Defendant further argues that the ALJ properly concluded that Dr. Jaselskis' opinion was "inconsistent with Plaintiff's treatment history and the objective evidence." Id. Specifically, Defendant notes that the MRI report Dr. Jaselskis used to support his opinion could not be correlated to Plaintiff's symptoms, "Plaintiff received minimal and conservative treatment for his allegedly disabling impairment," and Dr. Jaselskis' assessment was based on "Plaintiff's subjective allegations." Id., referencing TR 17, 19-21, 185, 237, 240, 262.
Defendant also contends that the ALJ "properly found Dr. Johnson's opinions entitled no weight," based on the fact that "Dr. Johnson did not review significant medical records and made inconsistent examination findings." Id. at 7, 8, referencing TR 20-21, 241-45. Defendant argues that Dr. Johnson failed to consider Plaintiff's alleged symptom magnification or frank malingering, minimal and conservative treatment, and the fact that the MRI did not correlate to Plaintiff's subjective allegations. Id. at 7-8, referencing TR 17, 19-21, 185, 237, 241. Defendant additionally maintains that Dr. Johnson found inconsistent results during, and rendered inconsistent opinions of, the two examinations he administered such that the ALJ could properly accord the opinions of Dr. Johnson no weight. Id., referencing TR 21, 242-44. Defendant additionally argues that the ALJ's decision is supported by the opinions of State agency medical consultants Dr. Susan Warner and Dr. William Downey, as well as by Plaintiff's treatment records and medication. Id. at 8-10, referencing TR 21, 247-55, 257.
With regard to the evaluation of medical evidence, the Code of Federal Regulations states:
20 CFR § 416.927(c) (emphasis added). See also 20 CFR § 404.1527(c).
The ALJ must articulate the reasons underlying her decision to give a medical opinion a specific amount of weight.
The Sixth Circuit has held that, "[p]rovided that they are based on sufficient medical data, the medical opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians are generally accorded substantial deference, and if the opinions are uncontradicted, complete deference." Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2002), quoting Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). If the ALJ rejects the opinion of a treating source, however, she is required to articulate some basis for rejecting the opinion. Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987). The Code of Federal Regulations defines a "treating source" as:
20 CFR § 404.1502.
The ALJ in the instant action discussed the medical opinion evidence as follows:
TR 20-21, citing TR 238-57, 274-75 (emphasis added).
As can be seen by the ALJ's explicitly articulated rationale, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Jaselskis' opinion without explanation. Rather, as demonstrated, the ALJ explained that she rejected Dr. Jaselskis' opinion because it was based on Plaintiff's subjective complaints, rather than objective medical findings; was inconsistent with Plaintiff's treatment history, essentially normal physical examinations, and negative imaging studies; and was inconsistent with the opinions of the State agency medical consultants. The ALJ further explained that she rejected Dr. Johnson's opinions because they were inconsistent with each other, with Plaintiff's treatment history, with Plaintiff's essentially normal physical examinations, and with Plaintiff's negative imaging studies; and the ALJ properly explained her rationale for according great weight to the contrasting opinions of the State agency medical consultants.
As the Regulations state, the ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a treating physician's evaluation when that evaluation is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 CFR § 416.927(d)(2); 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2). Instead, when there is contradictory evidence, the treating physician's opinion is weighed against the contradictory evidence under the criteria listed above. Id. When the opinions are inconsistent with each other, the final decision regarding the weight to be given to the differing opinions lies with the Commissioner. 20 CFR § 416.927(e)(2).
Because Dr. Jaselskis' opinion contradicts other substantial evidence in the record, including Plaintiff's "treatment history, essentially normal physical examinations findings, and negative imaging studies," as well as the opinions of the State agency medical consultants, as quoted above (TR 20-21, referencing 247-57, 274-75), the ALJ is not required to give Dr. Jaselskis' opinion controlling weight; Plaintiff's argument fails.
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's "Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record," be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72.
