KEVIN H. SHARP, District Judge.
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Docket Entry Nos. 23 and 24). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties.
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance under Title II and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), as provided by the Social Security Act ("the Act"). Upon review of the administrative record as a whole and consideration of the parties' filings, the Court finds that the Commissioner's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Plaintiff, Kimberly A. Urban, filed applications for disability insurance benefits and SSI under Titles II and XVI of the Act on May 29, 2012, alleging an onset date of July 11, 2011. (Tr. 121-35). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") initially denied Plaintiff's applications on July 26, 2012. (Tr. 77-84). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 86-87). The hearing took place before the ALJ on March 22, 2013. (Tr. 32-56). On April 4, 2013, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims. (Tr. 17-28). On May 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a request for a review of the ALJ's hearing decision. (Tr. 7-11). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 3, 2013, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6). This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 4, 2013. (AR p. 17). Based upon the record, the ALJ made the following enumerated findings:
(AR pp. 22-28).
The following summary of the evidence of record is taken from Plaintiff's brief, Docket Entry No. 25 at pp. 2-4:
The determination of disability under the Act is an administrative decision. The only questions before this Court are: (i) whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence; and (ii) whether the Commissioner made any legal errors in the process of reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (adopting and defining substantial evidence standard in context of Social Security cases); Kyle v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010); Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986).
Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla" and "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, "even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion." Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003); Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999)).
The Court must examine the entire record to determine if the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Sec'y, Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). A reviewing court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)). The Court must accept the ALJ's explicit findings and final determination unless the record as a whole is without substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See, e.g., Houston v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1984).
The claimant has the ultimate burden of establishing her entitlement to benefits by proving her "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The asserted impairment(s) must be demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3) and 1382c(a)(3)(D); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), (c), 404.1513(d). "Substantial gainful activity" not only includes previous work performed by the claimant, but also, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which the claimant lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired if she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In the proceedings before the SSA, the Commissioner must employ a five-step, sequential evaluation process in considering the issue of the claimant's alleged disability. See Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); Abbot v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must show that she is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" at the time disability benefits are sought. Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must show that she suffers from a severe impairment that meets the twelve month durational requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also Edwards v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 113 F. App'x 83, 85 (6th Cir. 2004). Third, if the claimant has satisfied the first two steps, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry, regardless of age, education or work experience, if the impairment at issue either appears on the regulatory list of impairments that are of sufficient severity as to prevent any gainful employment or equals a listed impairment. Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). A claimant is not required to show the existence of a listed impairment in order to be found disabled, but such a showing results in an automatic finding of disability that ends the inquiry. See Combs, supra; Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122 (6th Cir. 1989).
If the claimant's impairment does not render her presumptively disabled, the fourth step evaluates the claimant's residual functional capacity in relationship to her past relevant work. Combs, supra. "Residual functional capacity" ("RFC") is defined as "the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In determining a claimant's RFC, for purposes of the analysis required at steps four and five, the ALJ is required to consider the combined effect of all the claimant's impairments, mental and physical, exertional and nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B), (5)(B); Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 1988). At the fourth step, the claimant has the burden of proving an inability to perform past relevant work or proving that a particular past job should not be considered relevant. Cruse, 502 F.3d at 539; Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. If the claimant cannot satisfy the burden at the fourth step, disability benefits must be denied because the claimant is not disabled. Combs, supra.
If a claimant is not presumed disabled but shows that past relevant work cannot be performed, the burden of production shifts at step five to the Commissioner to show that the claimant, in light of the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, can perform other substantial gainful employment and that such employment exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997)). See also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). In order to rebut a prima facie case, the Commissioner must come forward with proof of the existence of other jobs a claimant can perform. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595. See also Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1315 (1983) (upholding the validity of the medical-vocational guidelines grid as a means for the Commissioner of carrying his burden under appropriate circumstances). Even if the claimant's impairments prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Tyra v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990); Farris v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1985); Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1985).
If the question of disability can be resolved at any point in the five-step sequential evaluation process, the claim is not reviewed further. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). See also Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that resolution of a claim at step two of the evaluative process is appropriate in some circumstances).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred (1) by improperly evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain; (2) by making an RFC finding that is unsupported by substantial evidence, and relying on the vocational expert's answer to his hypothetical question that incorporated his deficient RFC assessment; and (3) by failing to consider the effect of Plaintiff's obesity on her other impairments as required by SSR 02-1p. (Docket Entry No. 25 at pp. 6-16). Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed, or in the alternative, remanded for review. (Id. at 16).
Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "In cases where there is an adequate record, the [Commissioner's] decision denying benefits can be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Mowery, 771 F.2d at 973. Additionally, a court can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a claimant's entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (1994). Plaintiff's assertion of error is addressed below.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints. (Docket Entry No. 25 at pp. 6-9). Plaintiff's argument is as follows:
(Id. at 7, 9).
The Commissioner contends, however, that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff's allegations of pain. (Docket Entry No. 31 at pp. 6-8). The ALJ found the following with respect to Plaintiff's alleged pain and credibility:
(AR at pp. 25-27 (internal citations omitted)).
The evaluation of Plaintiff's alleged symptoms rests with the ALJ, and "[a]s long as the ALJ cite[s] substantial, legitimate evidence to support his factual conclusions, we are not to second-guess." Ulman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2012). The ALJ found that the record reflects improvement in Plaintiff's symptoms with treatment, that Plaintiff's daily activities reflect that her pain was not as severe as alleged, that Plaintiff's hearing testimony was inconsistent with her May 2012 pain clinic treatment notes, and that Plaintiff's contemporaneous reports to different medical providers in the record were inconsistent. "Discounting credibility to a certain degree is appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant's testimony, and other evidence." Walters, 127 F.3d at 531-32 (internal citations omitted). The ALJ may also consider daily activities as one factor in the evaluation of subjective complaints. See Temples v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 515 F. App'x 460, 462 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Further, the ALJ did not give undue consideration to Temples' ability to perform day-to-day activities. Rather, the ALJ properly considered this ability as one factor in determining whether Temples' testimony was credible."); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16-3p.
Here, the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Consequently, the ALJ's decision is conclusive and must be affirmed. Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's RFC assessment is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. (Docket Entry No. 25 at pp. 10-14). Plaintiff also contends that, because the ALJ's RFC assessment was inadequate, the vocational expert's answer to the ALJ's hypothetical question incorporating his RFC assessment cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's disability determination. (Id. at 14).
The residual functional capacity is the most an individual can still do despite the work related limitations that arise from his or her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. However, the RFC need only include those limitations that the ALJ found credible. See Justice v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 515 F. App'x 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the ALJ is not required to discuss all of the evidence submitted, and his or her failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that is was not considered. Daniels v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 152 F. App'x 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)).
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform
(AR at p. 24). Based on Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 27). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including bench work assembly, inspector, and lobby attendant or gate guard. (Id. at 28).
In his analysis of Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's testimony, treatment notes, and objective medical evidence documented by Plaintiff's medical providers. The ALJ noted treatment notes from Charles Kissel, a doctor of podiatric medicine, and from Plaintiff's visits to a pain clinic. Dr. Kissel's treatment notes and his February 2013 physical RFC questionnaire reflect that Plaintiff suffered from severe limitations. (Id. at 217-18, 224-30, 297-304). Pain clinic treatment notes from the same period reflect that, while Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain, her limitations were less severe. (Id. at 241-60; 282-96). The ALJ gave the pain clinic treatment notes greater weight because they contained regular physical exams and system reviews. (Id. at 26).
The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's treatment notes and relevant opinion evidence, as well as her hearing testimony. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's RFC is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, the Court also finds that the hypothetical question incorporating Plaintiff's RFC that the ALJ posed to the vocational expert at Plaintiff's hearing adequately described Plaintiff's limitations, and the vocational expert's subsequent testimony constitutes substantial evidence on which the ALJ properly relied in determining that Plaintiff is not disabled.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider Plaintiff's obesity as required by SSR 02-1p. (Docket Entry No. 25 at pp. 14-16). However, the ALJ listed obesity as one of Plaintiff's severe impairments and specifically found the following:
(AR at pp. 22-23).
Social Security Regulation 02-1p describes how to consider a claimant's obesity in determining eligibility for Social Security benefits. Yet, "Social Security Ruling 02-01p does not mandate a particular mode of analysis. It only states that obesity, in combination with other impairments, `may' increase the severity of the other limitations. It is a mischaracterization to suggest that Social Security Ruling 02-01p offers any particular procedural mode of analysis for obese disability claimants." Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App'x 408, 411-12 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff's obesity in the RFC by restricting Plaintiff to two hours of standing and/or walking in an eight-hour day and allowing her the option to sit or stand at her own discretion. (AR at p. 24). Thus, the ALJ did not err in his consideration of Plaintiff's obesity.
In sum, the Court concludes that the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and are free from legal error. With such support, the ALJ's decision must stand, even if the record also contains substantial evidence that would support the opposite conclusion. E.g., Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005).
For all of the reasons stated, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Docket Entry Nos. 23 and 24).
An appropriate Order shall be entered.
