MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Pending before the court are the Petitioner's Motion To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence In Accordance With 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1), the Government's Response (Docket No. 4), and the Petitioner's Reply (Docket No. 7). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence In Accordance With 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED.

II. Procedural Background

The Petitioner pled guilty to five counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), pursuant to a Plea Agreement. (Docket Nos. 14, 20, 25 in Case No. 3:06cr00119). The Petitioner acknowledged in the Plea Agreement that he was a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and that he had a prior state conviction for simple robbery and a prior federal conviction for three counts of bank robbery. (Docket No. 25 in Case No. 3:06cr00119). The parties did not have an agreement as to the length of sentence, but did agree to recommend a sentence within the sentencing range ultimately determined by the court. (Id.) At the subsequent sentencing hearing, on December 18, 2006, the court determined that the applicable sentencing range was 151 to 188 months of imprisonment, and imposed a total sentence of 151 months. (Docket Nos. 24, 26, 27, 28 in Case No. 3:06cr00119). The record reveals that no appeal was taken.

III. Analysis

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The Petitioner has brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 provides a statutory mechanism for challenging the imposition of a federal sentence:

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In order to obtain relief under Section 2255, a petitioner "`must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict.'" Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2005)(quoting Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003)).

If a factual dispute arises in a § 2255 proceeding, the court is to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute. Ray v. United States, 721 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 2013). An evidentiary hearing is not required, however, if the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Ray, 721 F.3d at 761; Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999). A hearing is also unnecessary "if the petitioner's allegations `cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.'" Id.

Having reviewed the pleadings, briefs, and records filed in the Petitioner's underlying criminal case, as well as the filings in this case, the court finds it unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing because the records conclusively establish that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the issues raised.

B. Johnson v. United States

The Petitioner claims that his sentence should be vacated because the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015) undermines the validity of Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, the career offender guideline, which was applied to him at sentencing. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the so-called "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague. The ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of certain firearms offenses who have three previous convictions for a "violent felony" or a "serious drug offense." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The "residual clause" is part of the definition of "violent felony," as set forth below in italics:

(Emphasis added). After the Johnson decision was issued, several courts applied its reasoning to invalidate the identically-worded portion of the definition of "crime of violence" set forth in the career offender guideline.1 See, e.g., United States v. Pawlek, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016). The Petitioner relies on the reasoning of these decisions in arguing that the career offender guideline is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. More specifically, the Petitioner argues that his sentence was enhanced under the career offender guideline because his bank robbery convictions were improperly considered to be "crimes of violence" under the residual clause of the definition.

In its Response, the Government argues that the crime of bank robbery "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" (the use-of-force clause), and therefore, satisfies the "crime of violence" definition without regard to the residual clause. In his Reply, the Petitioner contends that the Government's argument misconstrues the meaning of the use-of-force clause.

The court need not resolve this issue, however, because, on March 6, 2017, while the Petitioner's Motion was pending, the Supreme Court issued a decision that precludes his claim. In Beckles v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 886, 891, 197 L. Ed. 2d 145 (2017), the Court held that, unlike the statute at issue in Johnson, the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and therefore, the definitions in the Guidelines, including the residual clause, are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. Thus, even if the Petitioner's bank robbery convictions qualified as "crimes of violence" under the career offender guideline's residual clause, application of that provision was not unconstitutional. The Petitioner has not suggested that the Beckles decision is inapplicable to his claim, nor has he raised an alternative challenge to his conviction or sentence. Accordingly, the Petitioner's Motion To Vacate is without merit.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes that the Petitioner's request for Section 2255 relief is without merit. Accordingly, the Petitioner's Motion To Vacate is denied and this action is dismissed.

If the Petitioner gives timely notice of an appeal from the court's Memorandum and Order, such notice shall be treated as an application for a certificate of appealability, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which will not issue because the Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 2002).

It is so ORDERED.