ALETA A. TRAUGER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Steven Joseph brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security insurance ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
On June 13, 2017, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. No. 20), recommending that the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 13) be denied and that the decision of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") be affirmed. The plaintiff has filed timely Objections (Doc. No. 21), to which the SSA has responded (Doc. No. 22). For the reasons discussed herein, the court will overrule the Objections, accept the R&R, and deny the plaintiff's motion.
The plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI on June 27, 2013, with a protective filing date of June 4, 2013, claiming that he had been disabled since November 1, 2007. (See Administrative Record (AR)
The SSA denied the application initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 102-59, 163-68, 174-81.) The plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was conducted on October 30, 2015. (AR 46-101.) The plaintiff and a vocational expert appeared and testified at the hearing. The plaintiff was represented at the hearing by a non-attorney representative.
The ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to the plaintiff on December 11, 2015, finding that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. (AR 24-40.) The ALJ made the following specific findings:
(AR 26-40).
The Appeals Council declined review of the case (AR 1), thus rendering the ALJ's decision the "final decision" of the Commissioner.
The plaintiff filed his Complaint initiating this action on June 11, 2016. (Doc. No. 1.) The SSA filed a timely Answer (Doc. No. 10), denying liability, and a complete copy of the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 11). On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed his Motion for 4 Judgment on the Administrative Record and supporting Brief (Doc. Nos. 13, 14), which the SSA opposed (Doc. No. 17). The plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 18.) On June 13, 2017, the magistrate judge issued his R&R (Doc. No. 20), recommending that the plaintiff's motion be denied and that the SSA's decision be affirmed.
The plaintiff filed Objections to the R&R (Doc. No. 21); the SSA has filed a Response in opposition to the Objections (Doc. No. 22).
When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive pretrial matter, the district court must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001); Massey v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 1993). Objections must be specific; a general objection to the R&R is not sufficient and may result in waiver of further review. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). In conducting its review of the objections, the district court "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
In Social Security cases under Title XVI, like those under Title II, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and, as such, entitled to benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c), 405(h). The court's review of an ALJ's decision is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence. Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009)). The substantial evidence standard is met if a "reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion." Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "The substantial evidence standard . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the decision makers can go either way, without interference by the courts." Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)). "Therefore, if substantial evidence supports an ALJ's decision, the court defers to that finding, `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)).
The plaintiff's specific objections to the R&R are as follows:
1. The magistrate judge erroneously concluded that the ALJ gave good reasons for discounting the opinion of the treating physician, and the magistrate judge improperly supplied post hoc reasoning in support of the ALJ's decision.
2. The magistrate judge erred in finding that the ALJ's evaluation of impairment severity is supported by substantial evidence.
3. The magistrate judge erred in finding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination.
The magistrate judge incorporated a very detailed summary of the plaintiff's medical history into the R&R, which the court adopts and incorporates herein in its entirety.
"The Commissioner has elected to impose certain standards on the treatment of medical source evidence." Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011)). Medical opinions are to be weighed by the process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Generally, a treating-source opinion must be given "controlling weight" if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques"; and (2) the opinion "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the ALJ finds, based on these criteria, that a treating-source opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, then the ALJ must weigh the opinion based on the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, id., as well as the treating source's area of specialty and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant evidence, id. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). Even if the treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, "there remains a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great deference." Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007)).
If the treating source's opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must give "good reasons" for discounting the weight given. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). These reasons must be "supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996). This procedural requirement "ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). Because the reason-giving requirement exists to "ensur[e] that each denied claimant receives fair process," the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ's "failure to follow the procedural requirement of identifying the reasons for discounting the opinions and for explaining precisely how those reasons affected the weight" given "denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record." Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243).
In this case, the treating psychiatrist, Dr. Shabeer Abubucker, opined that the plaintiff met the requirements of a listed impairment and also provided an assessment of his residual functional capacity. The ALJ considered both, at length. First, regarding the listing requirements, the ALJ stated as follows:
(AR 30.)
In assessing Dr. Abubucker's opinion regarding the plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ stated as follows.
(AR 36-37.)
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision to accord little weight to his treating physician's opinions is not supported by good reasons and that the magistrate judge erred in concluding to the contrary and in supplying post hoc reasoning to support that conclusion. The court has reviewed de novo the ALJ's opinion and the underlying medical record and finds, as did the magistrate judge, that the ALJ gave good reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion—namely that Dr. Abubucker's opinion was not fully consistent with his own treatment notes or with the plaintiff's own statements and testimony about his daily activities, which the R&R summarizes comprehensively. The ALJ also went through the listing factors, pointing to specific evidence in the record in support of her conclusions that the plaintiff had no restrictions in the activities of daily living and only moderate, rather than marked, restrictions in the areas of social functioning and maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. (AR 29.) She further noted, contrary to Dr. Abubucker's contention, that the record reflected only one episode of decompensation in the recent past, not multiple episodes. (AR 30.)
Although the ALJ did not expressly reference the length, frequency, nature, and extent of Dr. Abubucker's treatment relationship, the detailed nature of her summary of the medical record reflects that she was aware that Dr. Abubucker was the treating psychiatrist and that he had a significant treatment relationship with the plaintiff. Moreover, the ALJ clearly considered the extent to which Dr. Abubucker's opinions were consistent with the record as a whole and whether they were supported by relevant evidence. The ALJ satisfied the requirement that she give good reasons for according little weight to Dr. Abubucker's assessment of whether the plaintiff met a listed mental impairment. Further, the ALJ's reasons are "supported by the evidence in the case record, and [are] sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5.
The plaintiff is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
The plaintiff argues, as he did in his Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, that the ALJ erred in finding that the plaintiff's ulcerative colitis was a non-severe impairment and that the magistrate judge erred in his consideration of this claim.
The ALJ found that the plaintiff suffered from numerous severe impairments at step two of the disability evaluation. As the magistrate judge correctly noted, whether the plaintiff has additional severe impairments is "legally irrelevant," because the finding of at least one severe impairment required the ALJ to consider all of the plaintiff's impairments—severe and non-severe—in the remaining steps. Kepke v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 636 F. App'x 625, 634 (6th Cir. 2016). Moreover, upon review of the record as a whole, the court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's ulcerative colitis is well reasoned and supported by substantial evidence. This assignment of error is without merit.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that the ALJ's credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, he complains that the ALJ's reasons for finding him not fully credible were based on "isolated instances of things the Plaintiff can supposedly do despite his disability" that were "taken out of context" and "exaggerated." (Doc. No. 21, at 4.)
The ALJ's credibility evaluation must be supported by specific reasons that are grounded in evidence. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). So long as the ALJ's credibility decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must "be given great weight, `particularly since the ALJ is charged with observing the claimant's demeanor and credibility.'" Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997)). Here, the ALJ found the claimant to be a "sincere witness" and that his description of his symptoms and daily activities was generally careful and accurate, but she nonetheless also found that the plaintiff's own testimony failed to support his allegations of disability. Specifically, he testified that he was able to spend up to eight hours per day on the internet, that he lived alone and was able to care for his personal needs without assistance, that he could shop, attend church, participate in a men's group, maintain a few close friendships, and drive his car. She therefore found that the functional limitations he alleged were "not entirely credible." (AR 38.)
Again, upon de novo review of the record as a whole, the court finds that the ALJ's credibility determination is adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence in the record.
For the foregoing reasons, the court will overrule plaintiff's Objections (Doc. No. 21); accept and adopt the magistrate judge's R&R (Doc. No. 20); deny the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Administrative Record (Doc. No. 13); and affirm the SSA's decision. An appropriate order is filed herewith.