J. DANIEL BREEN, Chief District Judge.
On January 29, 2015, the Plaintiff, Jason Ray, brought this action against the Defendants, Madison County, Tennessee (the "County"); David Woolfork, former sheriff of the County; jail administrator Captain Tom Rudder, and corrections officer Sergeant Chester Long, Jr., alleging violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as false imprisonment in violation of Tennessee law. (Docket Entry "D.E." 1.) Before the Court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (D.E. 21.)
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2015). "There is a genuine issue of material fact only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The test is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52) (internal quotation marks omitted). The moving party must initially show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). It is then incumbent upon the nonmoving party to "present significant probative evidence to do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts to defeat the motion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
In a declaration submitted to the Court contemporaneously with the instant motion, the judge recalled that Ray's sentence was for "split confinement" under Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-306. This type of sentence, known as "shock probation," requires an offender to serve a period of continuous confinement of up to one year in a local jail before being placed on probation. Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 275 (Tenn. 2009). Allen also averred that
(D.E. 21-3 ¶ 6.)
Ray began serving his sentence at the Madison County Jail (the "Jail") on July 18, 2013. Inmates enter the Jail with a disposition sheet, a written form meant to ensure information concerning what occurred in the courtroom is accurately transmitted to the incarceration facility. Although not an official court document, it has a signature line for the presiding judge. The form is reviewed by Jail personnel and the sentence entered into the facility's computer system. Sometime, and often weeks, thereafter, the actual judgment is forwarded to Jail officials. The parties are in agreement that the judgment form is then compared to the disposition sheet. If there are discrepancies between the forms or questions about the sentence, the attorneys or the judge are contacted for clarification. It is undisputed that Ray's disposition sheet, signed by Judge Allen, contained no indication that he could not be designated as a trusty or receive trusty credits.
It is also undisputed that the County had policies governing eligibility for the trusty program. In his declaration, Defendant Rudder further related that "[i]t is the policy of the Madison County Sheriff's Department to appropriately calculate inmates' release dates, correctly apply jail credits and timely release inmates pursuant to Tennessee state statutes, cases, Attorney General Opinions and in accordance with the judgments of the Courts." (D.E. 21-4 ¶ 4.) He articulated that "[a]ll correctional officers who deal with calculating inmates' release dates are trained on how to accurately enter sentences into the Madison County Sheriff's Department computer system, calculate sentence release dates, and apply jail credits in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Sheriff to ensure the timely release of inmates." (Id. ¶ 5.) According to his deposition, this training consisted of discussions between him and Defendant Long relating to how sentences were calculated. (D.E. 24-13 at PageID 382-84.) In his deposition, Long recalled receiving in-house, on-the-job training, but could not remember the dates or specific content thereof. (D.E. 24-12 at PageID 350-55.) Ray disputes the assertions that the County has any written policy whatever relative to the calculation of work credits.
The Jail's trusty program permitted eligible inmates to work in the kitchen and laundry room, and to clean cells. For purposes of summary judgment, it is undisputed that, once an inmate is nominated for trusty status, the final decision on whether such nomination will be approved is delegated by the sheriff to Long or, if there is a question about eligibility, to Rudder. Five days after his arrival at the Jail, Ray was designated as a trusty inmate worker and assigned to the kitchen. On July 23, 2013, he signed an Inmate Worker Policy Contract. Trusty status brought with it certain privileges, including a white jumpsuit instead of the blue one worn by the general population, residence in a trusty-only pod, permission to wear tennis shoes, extra food, special dining times and as much tea as one wanted. In his particular job, Ray cooked, cleaned and passed out meal trays throughout the day. His work required him to rise at between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. in order to serve breakfast at 4:30.
On October 24, 2013, he was mistakenly released as a result of a miscalculation of his sentence by a corrections officer.
The judge directed Long to have Ray picked up and returned to the Jail to serve the balance of his sentence. Long went to Rudder, his supervisor, to discuss his conversation with Allen and his instructions. It is undisputed that, pursuant to County policy to ensure inmates' sentences were adequately recorded into the Jail's computer system, Long and Rudder went to Allen's office to discuss the sentence. In his declaration, Judge Allen recalled that he "explained to Captain Rudder and Sergeant Long that pursuant to [the seventy-five percent] provision [contained in the judgment order], Plaintiff was not entitled to work credits until he served 75% of his sentence. Both Sergeant Long and Captain Rudder stated that they understood [Allen's] orders and pursuant to [his] orders would not apply work credits to Plaintiff's sentence." (D.E. 21-3 ¶ 8.) After the meeting, Long phoned the Plaintiff and instructed him to return to the Jail, as he had been released too early. Ray voluntarily complied on November 17, 2013.
Upon his reincarceration, Ray continued to work as a trusty. On November 24, 2013, through his attorney, Jennifer Free, Plaintiff moved before Judge Allen to suspend the balance of his sentence or, in the alternative, for work release. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, at which Plaintiff was present, Allen denied the relief sought on the grounds that Ray was not permitted to receive work credits until he had served seventy-five percent of the sentence. He stated from the bench as follows:
(Id. at PageID 118.) According to his declaration, it was Judge Allen's opinion that, if the County had applied work credits to Ray's sentence prior to his serving seventy-five percent, it would have been a violation of his order. In not applying the credits, the municipality was in compliance with his ruling. In his deposition, Ray admitted that, during the hearing, Allen stated that he "would not be getting trusty time." (D.E. 21-7 at PageID 156-57.) The original judgment was not amended and the decision was not appealed.
After the hearing, Ray returned to work in the Jail kitchen as a trusty, where he remained until his release on April 16, 2014.
At the outset, the Court notes that, in his response to the dispositive motion, the Plaintiff concedes that Sheriff Woolfork should be dismissed as a Defendant in this matter. Accordingly, the claims against him are DISMISSED. The remaining individuals, Long and Rudder, are referred to herein as the "Individual Defendants."
Section 1983 provides a private right of action against any person who subjects "any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights[ or] privileges . . . secured by the Constitution and laws[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). The statute "creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere." Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)). A plaintiff suing under the statute must demonstrate the denial of a constitutional right caused by a defendant acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
Long and Rudder have been sued in their official and individual capacities. Official capacity claims "are the equivalent of claims brought against the county as a government entity." Coley v. Lucas Cty., 799 F.3d 530, 542 (6th Cir. 2015). Because these claims as to the Individual Defendants are redundant, they are DISMISSED. See Holmes v. City of Jackson, No. 15-1253, 2016 WL 379799, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016) (where official capacity claims against individual officers were in effect a suit against the city, dismissal was warranted).
The Individual Defendants have invoked the doctrine of qualified immunity, which protects officials from damages liability in their individual capacities. See Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015). Qualified immunity "shields government officials in the performance of discretionary functions from standing trial for civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights." McDonald v. Flake, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 767312, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "A plaintiff who brings a § 1983 action against such an official bears the burden of overcoming the qualified immunity defense" once it is invoked by the defendant. Id.; Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013). "At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant[s] violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established. In so doing, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact, that is, evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." McDonald, 2016 WL 767312, at *4 (internal citation & quotation marks omitted). The elements may be addressed in any order. Brown v. Chapman, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 683260, at *6 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016). If the court determines that "either one is answered in the negative, then qualified immunity protects the official from civil damages. Id.
"A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A "case directly on point" is not required; rather, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. "The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. (internal citation & quotation marks omitted). "This exacting standard gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Plaintiff has identified the Defendants' actions in holding him beyond his sentence as a deprivation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He alleges that the Individual Defendants knew or should have known it was within the sole discretion of the sheriff to allow him to participate in a work program and that County officials had the concomitant responsibility to apply the appropriate credits to his sentence. Therefore, he contends, he had a liberty interest in the work credits that Judge Allen's order and instructions could not defeat.
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Shorts v. Bartholomew, 255 F. App'x 46 (6th Cir. 2007), "[it] is beyond dispute[ that] when a prisoner's sentence has expired, he is entitled to release." Shorts, 255 F. App'x at 51. "This liberty interest is most often attributed to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
A state may create a liberty interest through its enactment of statutory or regulatory measures. Hansard, 980 F.2d at 1062; see also Shorts, 255 F. App'x at 59 ("when the state itself creates a statutory right to release from prison, the state also creates a liberty interest and must follow minimum due process appropriate to the circumstances to ensure that liberty is not arbitrarily abrogated," quoting Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Shorts, the Sixth Circuit adopted the three-part deliberate indifference analysis applied by the Third Circuit in Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989), to claims of over-detention. Shorts, 255 F. App'x at 54-55. Under this test, the plaintiff must show "that a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk an unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted"; (2) "the [defendant] either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under circumstances indicating that his or her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight" and (3) "a causal connection between the [defendant]'s response to the problem and the infliction of the unjustified detention." Id. at 55. Deliberate indifference "is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The state actor must have been deliberately indifferent "to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision." Id. at 411.
Plaintiff maintains that the State of Tennessee created a statutory right to work credits through the enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-2-147, which provides:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-147(a)-(b). Because the two-for-one credits are mandatory and affect an inmate's release date from custody, he submits, the statute creates a liberty interest for individuals such as himself who participate in the Jail's trusty program.
He also cites § 40-35-302, which governs misdemeanor sentencing
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(c)-(d).
In addition, Ray refers the Court to the unreported Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in State v. Coley, No. W2012-01122-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 2423932 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2013), which discussed the interplay between § 40-35-302 and the work credit statutes. Coley was convicted of felony and misdemeanor offenses by the same judge who sentenced Ray. Coley, 2013 WL 2423932, at *1. Typed under the heading "Special Condition" on the judgments for misdemeanor convictions was a requirement that incarceration be served in the Madison County jail rather than the county's penal farm and that he was not eligible for work release or "any other special jail credits." Id. Handwritten on one of the misdemeanor judgments was added "(other than good behavior credits)." Id. (alterations omitted). On direct appeal, Coley argued that the trial court lacked authority to place restrictions on the earning of credits and the manner in which they were earned. Id. Specifically, he asserted that he should have been entitled to sentence credits under § 41-2-147. Id.
The appellate court interpreted §§ 40-35-302 and 41-2-147 "to provide for a sheriff in whose custody a defendant is placed, to have the discretion and authority to determine if the defendant can participate in work related programs pursuant to [§] 41-2-147 and receive the `2 for 1' sentence credits allowed by subsection (b) of that statute." Id. at *3. As § 41-2-147 "clearly delineates the sheriff's authority as it relates to inmates," the court found it "error for the trial court to impose a special condition in the misdemeanor judgments which in effect prohibited the sheriff of Madison County from carrying out his statutory responsibilities as to the [d]efendant, as they relate[d] to [§] 41-2-147." Id. Coley has not been cited in any subsequent cases.
Ray maintains that, under § 40-35-302, § 41-2-147 and Coley, he was eligible to be placed in a work program at the discretion of County officials. Once a trusty, he was entitled to two-for-one credit. Further, based on Coley, he insists that it was "well-settled" and "abundantly apparent" to Jail officials in July 2013 that their statutory responsibility was clearly defined by Tennessee statute and that, despite Judge Allen's order and instructions, discretion in matters involving an inmate's participation in work crews and receipt of credits for performing such work lay solely with the County official.
The Individual Defendants do not dispute that a county official has a duty to calculate sentence credits or that inmates eligible for trusty status and trusty credits who then work as trusties at the Jail are generally entitled to two-for-one credits. Their position is that nothing prohibits a judge from forbidding an inmate from receiving such credits and Judge Allen did just that. They point to a previous unreported Tennessee Court of Appeals case, State v. Lewis, No. M2004-02450-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1816317 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2006),
Id. at *7 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted); see also Tenn. Handbook Series: DUI: Crime & Consequences in Tenn. § 8.12 (2015-16 ed.) ("[t]he phrase `has become eligible for work-related programs' has been interpreted to mean that the inmate may be authorized to participate in such programs only after he or she has served the fixed percentage of the sentence as set by the court. Accordingly, the trial court controls the offender[`]s eligibility to participate in these programs by fixing the percentage of confinement required before participation in this program is permitted," citing Lewis). Coley made no mention of Lewis and no later cases have discussed the relationship, if any, between the two. The Individual Defendants argue that, in light of Lewis and its interpretation of Tennessee law, a reasonable officer could have concluded that, if Ray was not eligible for trusty credits until he had served seventy-five percent of his sentence, as determined by the trial judge who controlled that eligibility, he had no liberty interest in those credits even if he worked while in jail. Considering the apparent contradiction created by the two cases, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that Coley placed the question of whether the Individual Defendants' actions were deliberately indifferent "beyond debate."
Plaintiff also submits that the Tennessee Supreme Court's determination in Shorts supports his position. That decision addressed the specific question, certified by a federal court in this district, of whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-201(a)(3), which sets forth the duties of a county sheriff, requires a person in that position to calculate the release date and order the release of a prisoner serving a period of incarceration in a county jail. Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 270. The statute provides in pertinent part that a sheriff is to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(a)(3).
In analyzing the issue before it, the state's highest court noted that subsection (a)(1) of the same statute articulates that it is the duty of the sheriff to "[e]xecute and return, according to law, the process and orders of the courts of record of this state, and of officers of competent authority, with due diligence, when delivered to the sheriff for that purpose." Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 281. "Under this subsection," the court recognized, "a sheriff has the duty to see that the orders of the courts, including judgment orders, are enforced." Id. The court also observed that
Id. (emphasis added). The court held:
Id. at 282 (alterations omitted). Ray asserts that, based upon Shorts, it was clearly established in 2013 that Tennessee sheriffs and their designees had an obligation to calculate credits earned by inmates serving split confinement sentences, apply those credits and release them in a timely fashion.
However, as noted above, the court based its decision on Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-201, a statute not relied upon or discussed in Plaintiff's briefs. Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision clearly recognized an officer's duty to enforce a judgment, which appears to undercut Plaintiff's suggestion that the officers should have applied the credits despite Judge Allen's instruction. As was the case with Coley. Ray has failed to demonstrate that Shorts has placed the statutory or constitutional question before the Court "beyond debate."
Finally, the Individual Defendants offer the declaration of Rudder, who stated therein:
(D.E. 21-4 ¶¶ 10-12.) However, Plaintiff objects to the proffer of the final paragraph of the declaration on admissibility grounds. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), "[a] party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. . . . A . . . declaration used to . . . oppose a motion must . . . set out facts that would be admissible in evidence . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) & (4). Ray insists that the statement constitutes hearsay, defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence as "a statement [which may include a written assertion] that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) & (c). Hearsay is not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
The Court assumes the Plaintiff challenges the admissibility of what Long was told by the TCSA. The statement is inadmissible, and may not be considered by the Court, to the extent it is submitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. Hearsay evidence must be disregarded."). However, it seems admissible to show that he attempted to obtain clarification on the issue. The remainder of the quoted statement appears to the Court to not be hearsay.
In sum, and for the reasons articulated in this section, Ray has failed to establish that the Individual Defendants were in contravention of clearly established law. Therefore, they are entitled to qualified immunity. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (where defendants did not flout clearly established law, qualified immunity was warranted). The federal claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED.
The Court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against the individual officers does not necessarily resolve his claims against the County. "To prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the alleged violation occurred because of a municipal policy, practice, or custom; a municipality may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Brown, 2016 WL 683260, at *10 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Beyond having to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged." Id. (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In other words, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Shorts, the Sixth Circuit addressed a municipality's failure to implement procedures necessary to protect an inmate's right to due process in a case of over-detention. Shorts, 255 F. App'x at 59-60. Shorts, like Ray, was sentenced to split confinement under Tennessee law. Id. at 47. After a period of time at the Carroll County, Tennessee, jail, he began to inquire of the chief jailer, Sue Barnes, as to his release date. Id. at 48. She contacted a state parole officer several times but received no reply. Id. Two months later, he was still in jail with no prospects of release. Id. Almost a year after his initial inquiry, Shorts' family hired an attorney and he was released shortly thereafter. Id. at 48-49.
The court found as follows:
Id. at 60.
Here, evidence has been presented by the County that, pursuant to its general policy to ensure inmates' sentences were adequately recorded into the Jail's computer system, Long and Rudder went to Allen's office to obtain clarification of the sentence. However, there is no proof of a process by which Jail officials could attempt to overcome any disagreement with Judge Allen, such as contacting the state attorney general for instance; or of any procedure for Ray himself to surmount any indifference or incompetence on the part of Long or Rudder. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable finder of fact could determine that the procedures afforded by the County, or lack thereof, failed to provide Ray due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. On this basis, the Court cannot grant summary judgment for the County. See id.
State law claims against governmental entities and their employees are governed by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the "GTLA"). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101; Tillman v. Decatur Cty., No. 15-01068 JDB-egb, 2015 WL 5675843, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015). Plaintiff's state law claim would ordinarily confer supplemental jurisdiction in this Court because it arises out of the same facts and forms part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, GTLA claims must be brought in "strict compliance" with the terms of the state statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c). The GTLA expressly states that Tennessee "circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" over claims brought pursuant to its provisions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307. A district court may, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under § 1367(a). Section 1367(c)(4) allows a district court to "decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .[,] in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." The Sixth Circuit has held that "the Tennessee legislature expressed a clear preference that [GTLA] claims be handled by its own state courts. This unequivocal preference of the Tennessee legislature is an exceptional circumstance [under § 1367(c)(4) ] for declining jurisdiction." Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000). Consequently, district courts in Tennessee have regularly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over GTLA claims, and this Court finds no compelling reason to act differently in this case. See, e.g., Tillman, 2015 WL 5675843, at *5; Hill v. Blount Cty. Sch., No. 3:14-CV-96-PLR-HBG, 2015 WL 729547, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2015); Woodward v. City of Gallatin, No. 3:10-1060, 2013 WL 6092224, at *9-10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 19, 2013). Therefore, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim.
The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Woolfork, Long and Rudder are DISMISSED, as is his claim under state law. The claims against Madison County will proceed to trial.
(D.E. 24-4 at PageID 265.)
