PER CURIAM.

Rebecca Ramirez Palomo and Fernando Sanchez each applied to the chair of the Webb County Democratic Party to be placed on the general primary election ballot as a candidate for the office of judge of the 341st Judicial District Court.1 Sanchez requested the chair to declare Ramirez ineligible,2 asserting that she had not been "a practicing lawyer ... for four (4) years next preceding" this year's general election, as required by Article V, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution.3 Specifically, Sanchez contended that Ramirez could not practice law from November 2008 to November 2009, during which she claimed a non-practicing-attorney exemption from the State Bar's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirements. When the chair refused Sanchez's request, he petitioned the court of appeals for mandamus relief,4 which it granted, concluding that Ramirez is ineligible to serve in the office she seeks and directing that her name be removed from the ballot.5 We then granted Ramirez's petition for mandamus relief and directed the county chair to place Ramirez's name on the ballot.6 We issued our order without opinion so as not to delay printing of the ballots.7 We now explain the basis for the order. We conclude that the county chair did not violate any duty imposed by law and that the court of appeals therefore exceeded its writ power.8

A party officer responsible for certifying a candidate's name for placement on the general election ballot must declare the candidate ineligible if "facts indicating that the candidate is ineligible are conclusively established by [a] public record."9 The issue in this case is whether public records conclusively establish that Ramirez has not been continuously in practice since November 6, 2008.

Ramirez has been licensed to practice law in Texas since 1999. To practice law in Texas, a lawyer must be a member of the State Bar of Texas.10 Every member of the State Bar must complete fifteen hours of MCLE each year.11 A "compliance year" begins on the first day of the member's birth month,12 but every member gets a one-month automatic grace period after the end of the compliance year to complete the requirements.13 Failure to comply with the annual requirement results in automatic suspension.14

MCLE regulations recognize several exemptions to MCLE requirements. An exemption is good for an entire compliance year or not at all:

One exemption is for lawyers who are not practicing:

MCLE rules and regulations do not impose a deadline for claiming an exemption other than the deadline for compliance.

Ramirez was born in November. State Bar records establish that she claimed the non-practicing exemption on November 21, 2008, and ceased to claim it on November 3, 2009, after having fully satisfied her MCLE requirements for her compliance year ending October 31, 2009 ("CY 2009"). Ramirez contends that the exemption was for the compliance year ending October 31, 2008 ("CY 2008"), just prior to her claim for exemption, and thus does not preclude her from meeting the constitutional practice requirement. Sanchez argues that Ramirez was ineligible to practice law from the date she claimed the exemption until she changed her status, and is estopped from asserting otherwise.

The other public record evidence cited to us comes from two sworn statements provided to the parties by the Clerk of this Court and two published State Bar lists of licensed lawyers not eligible to practice law in Texas. The Clerk stated that records in his custody reflected that Ramirez "has never been administratively suspended from the practice of law since she was first licensed" and that

The two State Bar lists, one dated December 31, 2008, and the other July 2, 2009, both within CY 2009, include Ramirez's name.18

The court of appeals noted the parties' "disagreement [about] the time period that the [exemption] applied to" but concluded, based on the Clerk's statement, that the exemption covered the period between the date Ramirez claimed it and the date she relinquished it.19 We think this conclusion misconstrues the Clerk's statement and the rules and regulations governing MCLE requirements.

The Clerk's statements that Ramirez's claim of exemption was "effective" from the date she made it until she lifted it, and that she was ineligible to practice "while claiming" the exemption, are both literally correct but do not resolve the disagreement over the period covered by the exemption. Specifically, the statements do not foreclose the conclusion that the claim made during CY 2008's grace period covered that compliance year, or that the revocation made during CY 2009's grace period did not reinstate Ramirez's MCLE requirements for that compliance year. The statements establish only the time period during which the claim was being made. To read the statements to mean that Ramirez was ineligible to practice law from the time she claimed the exemption until she lifted it is inconsistent with MCLE rules and regulations.

Under those rules and regulations, a claim of exemption has no effect on a lawyer's obligation to comply with MCLE requirements until the deadline for their completion, which is the end of the grace period — the lawyer's birth month — after the compliance year.20 The regulations expressly contemplate that a lawyer's status may change during the year.21 A lawyer might claim the non-practicing exemption early in the compliance year, fully intending not to practice, yet change her mind before the compliance deadline, withdraw the claim, and complete all MCLE requirements for the year. Or a lawyer can wait until the compliance deadline — or perhaps even later — to claim an exemption from MCLE for the preceding year. All that matters is whether the lawyer is entitled to an exemption from MCLE requirements by the deadline for completion.

Because a compliance year's grace period overlaps the following compliance year, a claim of exemption made during the grace period could cover either year, but only if the lawyer did not practice during any part of that year.22 A claim during the grace period cannot relate to the compliance year just ended if the lawyer practiced at all during that year, or to the compliance year just beginning if the lawyer practices at any time during that year.

A lawyer claiming the MCLE non-practicing exemption is not classed as an inactive member of the State Bar. A lawyer who "file[s] with the executive director and the clerk of the supreme court written notice requesting enrollment as an inactive member",23 by statute, "may not practice law in this state".24 No such prohibition is associated with a claim for the MCLE non-practicing exemption. A lawyer may claim the exemption prospectively in good faith yet return to practice at will, so long as she then complies with MCLE requirements. An inactive member may return to active status only "upon written application to the clerk and payment of fees for the current year."25 No such formality is required for revoking the MCLE exemption. MCLE regulations require that a change in status be "promptly reported",26 but delay is not penalized. Not until all deadlines for completing requirements have passed is the penalty of suspension for non-compliance imposed.

The public records before us do not indicate that Ramirez was ever suspended from practice. They indicate only that Ramirez might have claimed the MCLE non-practicing exemption for CY 2009 — a year in which she actually met her MCLE requirements — but probably intended to claim the exemption for CY 2008. The State Bar records showing Ramirez listed among suspended lawyers on two dates during CY 2009 raise a question whether she was eligible to practice, but the only apparent basis for such suspensions would have been that she failed to meet MCLE requirements in CY 2008, which could have been covered by her non-practicing exemption. Public records certainly do not "conclusively establish[]" that she did not practice law during that period. The county chair was therefore not authorized, let alone required, to declare Ramirez ineligible,27 and the court of appeals clearly abused its discretion in reaching the contrary conclusion.

Accordingly, we grant Ramirez's petition for mandamus and, without hearing oral argument,28 direct the court of appeals to vacate its order of March 9, 2012. We are confident the court of appeals will promptly comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not. We have already ordered the county chair to take all actions necessary for Ramirez's name to be placed on the ballot, and the chair has complied.