Justice WILLETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
Texas legal rules governing real-estate transactions demand assiduousness, lest
In 2005, TxDOT began its drainage project, and API, relying on the 2004 Judgment, brought a takings claim for the value of the removed soil. TxDOT counters that API lacks any ownership interest because the 2004 Judgment, which purports to declare the 2003 Judgment "null and void," is itself void — to which API replies, even if the 2003 Judgment controls, API is an "innocent purchaser" entitled to ownership under Property Code section 13.001.
We agree with TxDOT. The void 2004 Judgment cannot supersede the valid 2003 Judgment; API is statutorily ineligible for "innocent purchaser" status; and equitable estoppel is inapplicable against the government in this case. Because API's takings claim fails, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss the suit.
The chain of title contains conflicting records, so we first describe how the City, TxDOT, and API obtained their purported interests in the land.
Herschell White originally owned the land, and the City brought a condemnation action so it could dig a drainage channel. As compensation for the land, the commissioners awarded, and White accepted, $207,249 (plus $17,000 for damage to the remainder of the property). The special commissioners' report described the interest conveyed as a "right-of-way" but also incorporated by reference the City's original petition for condemnation, which described the interest sought as a "fee title." No one objected to the special commissioners' award, and the trial court adopted it as the judgment of the court (the 2003 Judgment).
A year later, the same trial court entered a "Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc" (the 2004 Judgment), which was agreed to by the City's and White's attorneys. A TxDOT employee apparently also approved the 2004 Judgment by email.
The 2004 Judgment purported to render the 2003 Judgment "null and void." The 2004 Judgment states that the City's interest in the land was a "right of way easement" obtained "for the purpose of opening, constructing and maintaining a permanent channel or drainage easement.
Three months after the trial court signed the 2004 Judgment, White sold the ten acres and some surrounding property to API.
When TxDOT started digging, API filed an inverse-condemnation action against the City and TxDOT over the removed dirt. TxDOT and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the 2004 Judgment was void but saying the record was unclear as to whether API had notice of the 2003 Judgment.
Upon remand to the trial court, TxDOT and the City produced evidence that the 2003 Judgment was indeed recorded in the county registry. TxDOT and the City filed a second plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that, because the 2004 Judgment was void and API had notice of the 2003 Judgment, the City held fee-simple title to the land, subject only to TxDOT's easement. The trial court denied the second plea to the jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that API was a good-faith purchaser for value since the 2004 Judgment superseded the 2003 Judgment.
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a matter of law we decide de novo.
A trial court lacks jurisdiction and should grant a plea to the jurisdiction where a plaintiff "cannot establish a viable takings claim."
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that API does not own the land and cannot assert the good-faith purchaser
A judgment nunc pro tunc can correct a clerical error in the original judgment, but not a judicial one.
Here, the change was undeniably significant. The 2003 Judgment granted a fee simple to the City, while the 2004 Judgment purported to turn the City's outright ownership into a mere easement. Again, the fact that the change was significant is not fatal to the 2004 Judgment's nunc pro tunc status. However, TxDOT and the City produced evidence showing that the 2003 Judgment correctly reflected the underlying judicial determination,
Further, the trial court in this case was by law required to adopt the award of the special commissioners, who in turn granted the fee-simple title the City sought in its condemnation petition. If parties do not timely object to a special commissioners' report, the trial court is required to enter "the [special] commissioners' findings as the judgment of the court."
One more timing issue cuts against API: the expiration of the trial court's plenary power. Such power usually lasts 30 days.
Because the 2004 Judgment was void, it did not convey anything to anyone. Instead, under the 2003 Judgment, the City continued to hold fee-simple title. White continued to have no interest in the land, and API could not buy from White what White did not own.
API urges that, even if the 2004 Judgment is void such that White had no interest to convey, API should still prevail because it depended on the 2004 Judgment when it bought the land from White. API presents two theories, neither persuasive.
The court of appeals held that API was a good-faith purchaser for value. However, we refused the writ of error in a case holding that this doctrine does not protect a purchaser whose chain of title includes a void deed: "One holding under a void title cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser."
Codified at Property Code section 13.001, the innocent-purchaser doctrine is simply inapplicable here:
By its terms, the statute protects purchasers from unrecorded property conveyances — covert, off-the-books transfers that leave buyers unaware of adverse interests. But one cannot be "innocent" of a recorded judgment, and here, API concedes it knew of the recorded 2003 Judgment before it purchased the property.
API essentially argues that the 2003 Judgment was superseded by the 2004 Judgment because the latter purported to nullify the former. But our caselaw does
In other words, API, constructively and actually aware of the recorded 2003 Judgment, was responsible for squaring it with the contradictory 2004 Judgment.
Slaughter v. Qualls,
API argues that TxDOT's acquiescence to the 2004 Judgment bars it from objecting now to what it accepted then. While the argument has a certain force — purchasers should be able to rely upon facially valid judgments — this argument goes to equitable estoppel, a doctrine inapplicable against the government in this case.
For estoppel to apply against the government, two requirements must exist: (1) "the circumstances [must] clearly demand [estoppel's] application to prevent manifest injustice,"
As to the first requirement, we have applied estoppel to prevent manifest injustice if, "officials acted deliberately to induce a party to act in a way that benefitted the [government]."
We have also held that the fact that a governmental error was "discoverable" militates against applying estoppel.
The 2004 Judgment was void. The pleadings and evidence establish that API holds no interest in the land and thus "cannot establish a viable takings claim,"
Justice LEHRMANN filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice GUZMAN joined.
Justice LEHRMANN, joined by Justice GUZMAN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion because I agree that the 2004 Judgment, which was issued after the expiration of the trial court's plenary power, makes a judicial change to the 2003 Judgment and is therefore void. I write separately to clarify why I agree.
As the Court notes, "a significant alteration to the original judgment may be accomplished through a judgment nunc pro tunc so long as it merely corrects a clerical error." 397 S.W.3d at 167 (citing Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 584-86 (Tex.1986) (per curiam)). Indeed, clerical errors frequently concern matters of substance; they are simply errors "made in entering final judgment" and not "in rendering a final judgment." Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex.1986). Thus, the fact that the change made in the 2004 Judgment — which awards the City an easement as opposed to the fee simple interest awarded in the 2003 Judgment — is undeniably significant has no bearing on the validity of the nunc pro tunc judgment. Rather, the change was invalid because the 2003 Judgment correctly reflects the true decision of the court, and the 2004 Judgment therefore improperly makes a judicial
In many cases, depending on the state of the record, it may be difficult for an appellate court to discern which of two conflicting judgments accurately "reflects the true decision of the [trial] court," 397 S.W.3d at 167 (quoting Andrews, 702 S.W.2d at 586) (internal quotation marks omitted), and, in turn, whether a judgment nunc pro tunc is valid. However, this case does not present such a dilemma. The evidence establishing the fee simple nature of the conveyance reflected in the 2003 Judgment is conclusive. In that judgment, the trial court ordered that the special commissioners' award "is hereby made[] the judgment of this [c]ourt." In turn, the special commissioners "award[ed] to [the City] all rights described and prayed for in [the City]'s Original Statement and Petition for Condemnation." And the City's condemnation petition requested "a final judgment of condemnation vesting in the City of Edinburg the fee title to said land and the rights therein." Further, as noted by the Court, the trial court in this case essentially conducted a ministerial duty in entering judgment on the special commissioners' findings, to which no one had objected. 397 S.W.3d at 167-68. In light of this evidence, there is no question that the "true decision of the court" was to award fee simple title. Thus, the 2004 Judgment's award of an easement to the City did not merely correct a clerical error and could not be accomplished through a judgment nunc pro tunc.
API contends the use of the term "right-of-way" in the City's condemnation petition and the 2003 Judgment renders it unclear whether the 2003 Judgment was awarding fee simple title or an easement. For example, the 2003 Judgment awards the City "title (right of way) described in attached Exhibit `A' [the special commissioners' award] and `B' [condemnation petition]," and orders issuance of a writ of possession to allow the City to "enter upon said right-of-way." The commissioners' award notes that the City sought a decree "vesting in [the City] a right-of-way ... more fully described in [the City]'s [p]etition." The condemnation petition, in the paragraph setting out the purpose for the action, alleges that the land is sought for the purpose of "laying out, opening, constructing, reconstructing, maintaining, and operating ... a certain right-of-way," specifically the U.S. Highway 281 Drainage outfall ditches project.
However, such language does not call into question the effect of the 2003 Judgment. The term "right-of-way," used alone, may mean either a "right of passage" over a parcel of land or the parcel of land itself that "is to be used as a right of way." Tex. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 252 S.W.2d 451, 454 (1952); see also Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied). There is no indication that the condemnation petition, the special commissioners' award, or the 2003 Judgment used the term "right-of-way" synonymously with an easement or right of passage; rather, it was used to denote the property itself.
Further, the City's agreement with the issuance and recording of the 2004 Judgment nunc pro tunc, while potentially relevant to an equitable claim, does not call into question the true decision of the trial court in entering the 2003 Judgment. At that time, the trial court had before it the City's request for a judgment for "fee title" in the property and the unobjected-to special commissioners' award, which awarded all rights prayed for in the petition. Again, because the 2003 Judgment adopted the award as the judgment of the
It bears repeating that the invalidity of the 2004 Judgment is not evident from the fact that the two judgments are facially in conflict, which in and of itself does not raise suspicion. In reality, most nunc pro tunc judgments conflict substantively with the underlying judgments they are entered to correct. The nunc pro tunc judgment that merely corrects a misspelled word or a grammatical error is an anomaly. After all, reasonable parties do not generally file lawsuits to correct trivial mistakes such as missing commas or misspelled words. Rather, reasonable litigants go to court to correct clerical errors affecting substantive rights. A thorough review of this record, however, conclusively shows that the true decision of the trial court, as reflected in the 2003 Judgment, was to award fee simple title to the City.
Given that the 2004 Judgment was void, API could not acquire legal title from White because the City owned the land. I agree with the Court that any recovery against TxDOT and the City would necessitate application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which does not apply against the government under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment.
Id. at 675 (emphases added).