MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BILL PARKER, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.

ON THIS DATE the Court considered the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff, the State Bar of Texas Client Security Fund ("Plaintiff"), in the above-referenced adversary proceeding and the response in opposition to the Motion filed by the Defendants, Dell Edward James II and Miki Lu James, in the above-entitled adversary proceeding ("Defendants" or "Debtors"). The complaint in this action alleges that a judgment debt based upon a restitution award allegedly owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendants should be excepted from the Defendants' Chapter 7 discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). The following memorandum of decision disposes of all issues before the Court.1

Summary Judgment Standards and Process

Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."2 The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, identifying those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.3 The manner in which the necessary summary judgment showing can be made depends upon which party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. If, as in this case, the burden of persuasion at trial is on the moving party, "that party must support its motion with credible evidence—using any of the materials specified in Rule 56(c)—that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial."4 If a summary judgment motion is properly supported, a party opposing the motion may not merely rest upon the contents of its pleadings, but rather must demonstrate in specific responsive pleadings the existence of specific facts constituting a genuine issue of material fact for which a trial is necessary.5 In so demonstrating, the non-movant must show more than a "mere disagreement" between the parties,6 or that there is merely "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."7 Neither are unsubstantiated, conclusory assertions in the response sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.8 However, "[t]he issue of material fact which must be present in order to entitle a party to proceed to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial."9

The record presented is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.10 "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'"11 Further, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The Defendants have admitted the following material facts asserted by the Plaintiff:

1. Plaintiff State Bar of Texas Client Security Fund is a governmental unit in that it is an agency of the State of Texas administered by the Supreme Court of Texas.12

2. Defendants Dell James II and Miki Lu James are individuals and debtors in their underlying bankruptcy case.

3. Defendant Dell James II has been disbarred and is not licensed to practice law as an attorney in the State of Texas.

4. On or about July 16, 2007, the State Bar of Texas initiated disciplinary proceedings against Dell James II in case no. D0120631179, styled Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Dell Edward James II before an evidentiary panel of the District 6 Grievance Committee.

5. On September 15, 2009, the Evidentiary Panel entered a Judgment of Disbarment against Dell Edward James II.13

6. Defendants Dell Edward James II and Miki Lu James filed for relief under Chapter 7 on April 22, 2016. Mark A. Weisbart is the duly appointed Chapter 7 Trustee.

7. The State Bar of Texas Client Security Fund filed a proof of claim on June 14, 2006, listing $16,018.85, owed as a result of payments [by the Plaintiff] to a former client of Dell Edward James II after his disbarment.

8. Defendants Dell James II and Miki Lu James have listed the State Bar of Texas as a creditor relative to amounts owed in Case No. D0120631179.

The following additional material fact asserted by the Defendants14 and supported by admissible evidence has not been controverted by any summary judgment evidence tendered by the Plaintiff and has therefore been "admitted to exist without controversy." E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-56(c):

9. Dell Edward James II and Miki James were married on May 4, 2011.

The summary judgment evidence further establishes the following material facts:

10. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Respondent [Dell Edward James II] failed to keep [his client] George S. Chapman reasonably informed about the status of the wrongful death claim involving Chapman's mother."15

11. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Upon conclusion of Chapman's wrongful death matter, Respondent [Dell Edward James II] failed to provide Chapman with a written statement showing the remittance to Chapman and the method of its determination."16

12. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Upon receiving funds in which Chapman had an interest, Respondent [Dell Edward James II] failed to promptly notify Chapman."17

13. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Respondent [Dell Edward James II] failed to promptly deliver to Chapman funds that Chapman was entitled to receive."18

14. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Respondent [Dell Edward James II] failed to keep separate from his own funds the funds that belonged to Chapman and disbursed Chapman's funds to persons not entitled to receive them by virtue of the representation or by law."19

15. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Respondent [Dell Edward James II] engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."20

16. The Judgment of Disbarment contained a factual finding that "Respondent [Dell Edward James II] owes restitution in the amount of Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Eight and 85/100 Dollars ($16,108.85) payable to George S. Chapman."21

17. The Judgment of Disbarment required Dell James II to pay his restitution payment to George S. Chapman by delivery of the required sum to the State Bar of Texas, Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office in Austin.22

18. The Judgment of Disbarment contained the following decree:

19. In light of the Defendant Dell James' failure to tender any restitution payment to George Chapman from September 2009 to February 2011, the State Bar of Texas Client Security Fund tendered a payment of $16,018.85 to the injured client, George Chapman, and was assigned all of Chapman's rights with regard to receipt of any restitution payment pursuant to the Judgment of Disbarment.24

In response to the Plaintiff's motion, the Defendants assert that the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff is precluded against Mr. James and Ms. James, respectively, on different grounds.

Cause of Action against Defendant Dell Edward James II

Defendant Dell Edward James II first contends that the restitution award entered against him in the Judgment of Disbarment cannot constitute a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to or for the benefit of a governmental unit" that could be rendered nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.25 Mr. James correctly notes that the Disbarment Judgment recites that he owes restitution to his former client, George S. Chapman, and it is undoubtedly true that George Chapman is an individual and not a governmental unit. Mr. James does not dispute that his former client was subsequently made whole through the auspices of the State Bar of Texas' Client Security Fund (the "CSF"),26 that the CSF took an assignment of the restitution claim from Mr. Chapman, and that the State Bar and its CSF constitute a "governmental unit" for the purposes of the statute. However, he contends that the assessment in the Judgment was not a fine or penalty, and that the nature of the obligation must be characterized as it existed on the date of its entry. Further, Mr. James contends that the restitution award constitutes "compensation for an actual pecuniary loss" because it is pecuniary in nature and the amount matches the economic damages which his professional misconduct inflicted upon his former client, Mr. Chapman.

Under Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 1.06(Z),27 an award of restitution is one of many "sanctions" that the disciplinary board (or district court) can assess based upon the circumstances of the particular case. While the precise term "fine" or "penalty" is not utilized in the statute, it is widely recognized that such precision is not required28 and that sanctions such as civil restitution, attorneys' fees and other cost assessments that arise in attorney disciplinary proceedings are properly viewed as penalties under § 523(a)(7). Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa. v. Feingold (In re Feingold), 730 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013); Richmond v. N.H. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 542 F.3d 913, 919-920 (1st Cir. 2008) and the numerous cases cited therein. Premised upon the rationale for restitution expressed in a criminal context in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51-53 (1986), which held that § 523(a)(7) created "a broad exception for all penal sanctions" and that a criminal restitution order, though payable to the criminal victim, was sufficiently penal to warrant nondischargeability under § 523(a)(7), these cases recognize that attorney disciplinary proceedings are ultimately designed to protect the public. As one court described it,

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Smith (In re Smith), 317 B.R. 302, 309 (Bankr. D. Md. 2004); see also, Supreme Court of Ohio v. Bertsche (In re Bertsche), 261 B.R. 436, 437 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) ["Kelly is predicated upon the principle that the right to formulate and enforce sanctions designed to protect the public interest is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by states"]. Thus, the imposition of a restitution sanction is sufficient to constitute a penalty for the purposes of § 523(a)(7).

Though at first glance the Defendants' argument that the restitution judgment as originally rendered was not "payable to or for the benefit of a governmental unit" may be facially appealing, one must look beyond general concepts of assignment and subrogation law, and focus instead upon the purpose of the restitution award in the context of a Texas attorney disciplinary proceeding.29 With regard to a trial conducted before an evidentiary panel of the district grievance committee, as has occurred in this case,30 the panel is directed by the statute to impose appropriate sanctions when it finds that professional misconduct has occurred.31 As previously stated, § 1.06(Z) of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure offers various sanction alternatives. The determination of the appropriate sanction(s) by the evidentiary panel is informed by consideration of the following enumerated factors:

(1) the nature and degree of the professional misconduct for which the attorney is being sanctioned;

(2) the seriousness of and circumstances surrounding the professional misconduct;

(3) the loss or damage to clients;

(4) the damage to the profession;

(5) the assurance that those who seek legal services in the future will be insulated from the type of professional misconduct found;

(6) the profit to the attorney;

(7) the avoidance of repetition;

(8) the deterrent effect on others;

(9) the maintenance of respect for the legal profession;

(10) the conduct of the Respondent during the course of the disciplinary proceedings; and

(11) the attorney's disciplinary record.

TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.18. The designated trial court — whether an evidentiary panel or a district court — has broad discretion in evaluating the factors to determine the consequences of professional misconduct. In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. 2001); State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1994).

Even a cursory review of the designated considerations reveals the significant penal, rehabilitative and protective policies that the Texas attorney disciplinary procedures are designed to promote. That conclusion is further compelled by the fact that in this case, as in all cases of misconduct resulting in disbarment or suspension based upon a misappropriation of funds, the disciplinary rules require the fulfillment of restitution as a condition for reinstatement from disbarment or the termination of any suspension.32 Indeed, payment of the restitution obligation is expressly required by the Judgment itself as a condition precedent to any reconsideration of Mr. James' disbarment.33 The restitution obligation serves as a protective measure designed not primarily to remedy the impact of Mr. James' malfeasance,34 but rather to demonstrate James' fitness to resume the proper practice of law in the event that he applies for reinstatement. The primary point of the requirement is public protection while confirming a disbarred attorney's rehabilitation prior to his readmittance to the bar.

Thus, as was true in the context of criminal restitution to a victim in Kelly, the significant public policies undergirding the Texas attorney disciplinary system are at stake regardless of the specific restitution recipient identified in the judgment.35 This restitution obligation, and the discretion of the disciplinary panel to impose it, impacts far more than mere compensation for a monetary loss. To allow a bankruptcy discharge to thwart the legitimate state objectives outlined in the disciplinary scheme and to jeopardize the state's ability to protect its citizens from unscrupulous attorneys violates the sovereignty concerns expressed in Kelly. The general availability of a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code is not designed to interfere with Texas' efforts to provide that protection through its attorney disciplinary process. To ensure the integrity of those penal and rehabilitative objectives, the restitution obligation imposed upon Mr. James through the attorney disciplinary process can be properly characterized as payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit that did not constitute compensation for actual pecuniary loss. The Court therefore concludes that the restitution obligation owed to the CSF by Dell Edward James II is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7).

Cause of Action against Defendant Miki Lu James

As for the § 523(a)(7) count against Miki Lu James, the summary judgment record fails in its entirety to establish that the referenced restitution indebtedness is owed by Miki James to the Plaintiff, nor does it establish any ground for nondischargeability were such debt to exist. The summary judgment record establishes that the respective entry dates of the disciplinary judgments against Dell Edward James II predates his marriage to Miki Lu James. Additionally, the Plaintiff failed to tender any summary judgment evidence regarding Ms. James in any respect. A plaintiff in this context must make a proper showing as against each individual debtor. There has been no showing of the existence of a debt owed by Ms. James. Further, even if she owed a liability, a debt which is nondischargeable against one spouse cannot be properly imputed to the other spouse based solely upon the existence of a marital relationship. Tower Credit, Inc. v. Gauthier (In re Gauthier), 349 Fed. App'x. 943, 945 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, in the light of the failure of the summary judgment evidence to establish Ms. James' culpability in any respect, the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as against Debtor-Defendant, Miki Lu James, must be denied.

Accordingly, upon due consideration of the pleadings, the proper summary judgment evidence submitted by the parties, the material facts admitted to exist under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 56, the relevant legal authorities and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that, as to the Plaintiff's cause of action against Defendant Dell Edward James II, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant Dell Edward James, II as a matter of law. Thus, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff, the State Bar of Texas Client Security Fund, is entitled to summary judgment that the restitution debt owed to it by the Debtor-Defendant, Dell Edward James, II, should be declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Debtor-Defendant, Miki Lu James, should be denied in all respects. An appropriate order will be entered which is consistent with this opinion.