MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The above cases have been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Caroline M. Craven pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. The September 19, 2014 Report of the magistrate judge which contains her proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of such actions has been presented for consideration. Before the Court are the following:
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff Adaptix, Inc. ("Plaintiff") brings suit alleging infringement of United States Patents No. 6,947,748 ("'748 patent") and 7,454,212 ("'212 patent") (collectively, the "patents-in-suit"). On August 15, 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting claims 8, 11, 19, and 21 of the '748 patent, and claims 9, 11, 18, and 26 of the '212 patent are indefinite and therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Defendants presented three indefiniteness arguments, two of which were presented in Adaptix, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, et al., and related cases. Cause No. 6:12cv17; see also Cause Nos. 6:12cv20, -120 ("AT & T").
In Nautilus, the Supreme Court held that the claims, read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, must inform a person of skill in the art of the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. Id. at 2129. Nautilus rejected the Federal Circuit's "amenable to construction" and "insolubly ambiguous" tests, holding that a standard which "tolerates some ambiguous claims but not others[] does not satisfy the statute's definiteness requirement." Id. at 2130. Nautilus makes clear that "[i]t cannot be sufficient" to "ascribe some meaning to a patent's claims; the definiteness inquiry trains on the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application, not that of a court viewing matters post hoc." Id.
Pursuant to the definiteness requirements set forth in Nautilus, Defendants sought summary judgment that the term "each cluster" in claim 8 of the '748 patent and claim 9 of the '212 patent lacks an antecedent basis and does not, when "viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty." Cause No. 6:13cv438, Dkt. No. 81 at pgs. 4-5. Specifically, Defendants argued that "the claims do not describe which `subcarriers' belong to `each cluster.'"
In Section IV.A of the Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge found ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374 (Fed.Cir.2003) weighed against finding that the term "each cluster" can stand on its own, without any antecedent basis, particularly in the absence of any "narrowing construction" under Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. U.S., 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
In light of Nautilus having abrogated the "narrowing construction" portion of Exxon upon which the Court relied in AT & T, the magistrate judge concluded that
Defendants also argued with respect to "the indication" limitation that claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent are indefinite for the same reason the Court rendered claim 2 of the '212 patent insolubly ambiguous in the AT & T decision — the lack of clear antecedent basis. In Section IV.C, the magistrate judge agreed with Defendants, finding claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent suffer from the same antecedent basis ambiguity as claims 2-4. For the same reasons the Court in AT & T found claims 2-4 of the '212 patent invalid as indefinite, the magistrate judge recommended the Court find claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent invalid as indefinite.
With regard to "each cluster," discussed in Section IV.A of the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff relies on the Court's earlier ruling in the AT & T cases, wherein it adopted the magistrate judge's contrary recommendation that the claim was not indefinite because the term "each cluster" does not require any antecedent basis. Noting the magistrate judge appears to base her change of opinion on the Supreme Court's abrogation of a court's ability to make a narrowing construction, Plaintiff asserts Nautilus did not abrogate, or even mention, narrowing constructions. According to Plaintiff, Nautilus does not prohibit the Court from making a narrowing construction in these cases, even were such a construction required. In any event, Plaintiff asserts the Court's prior construction ("a logical unit that contains at least two physical subcarriers") satisfies the "reasonable certainty" requirement of Nautilus.
According to Plaintiff, each "cluster" of subcarriers sending feedback information to the base station has an antecedent basis in the "candidate subcarriers." Plaintiff argues ResQNet's construction of "each," as used in that case to mean "every" (or "all"), does not alter the fact that "each cluster" is still able to stand on its own and is understandable to one of ordinary skill with "reasonable certainty" as required by Nautilus. Plaintiff also takes issue with the Report and Recommendation's failure to mention how one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret "each cluster."
Regarding the magistrate judge's recommendation that the term "indication" in claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent is indefinite for the reasons set forth in the AT & T decision with respect to claims 2-4 of the '212 patent, Plaintiff argues the Court's prior reasoning with respect to claims 2-4 does not control with respect to claims 11 and 26. According to Plaintiff, the references to "indication" in claims 11 and 26 are to indications that are sent in the "downlink" direction, whereas the references in claims 2-4 are to indications being sent from the subscriber unit to the base station. Plaintiff therefore urges that "the indication" has its antecedent in the independent claims wherein "an indication" and "another indication" refer to the same iterative step of notifying the subscriber unit of the designated set of subcarriers.
Finally, Defendants sought summary judgment that the terms "desired for use" in claims 11, 19, and 21 of the '748 patent
Defendants object to Section IV.B of the Report and Recommendation. According to Defendants, although the Report and Recommendation nominally cites to the Nautilus standard, it does not apply the new standard but uses the analysis from the pre-Nautilus AT & T decision. Defendants assert as an initial matter that the Report and Recommendation's interpretation of "selecting a set of subcarriers/clusters" as "requesting/requesting use of those subcarriers or clusters" improperly reads the term "desires/d" out of the claim.
Defendants further assert the magistrate judge, contrary to Nautilus, effectively rewrote the claims to require "requested for use/requests to employ" rather than "desired for use/desires to employ." According to Defendants, if invalidity can be avoided only by redrafting an otherwise indefinite claim, then the courts would "tolerate imprecision" and "diminish the definiteness requirement's public-notice function and foster the innovation-discouraging `zone of uncertainty,' ... against which [the] Court has warned." Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2123. Defendants contend the specification does not disclose how the subscriber would go about determining a desired coding/modulation rate, only that it does so.
Relying on Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir.2014), Defendants assert the specification does not provide "a reasonably clear and exclusive definition" to provide an objective boundary. Defendants argue there is no "objective anchor" for "desires to employ," making this term indefinite.
To the extent the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment of Indefiniteness, Defendants request that the Court clarify whether the issue of indefiniteness of the terms "desires to employ" and "desired for use" remains an issue for trial or whether the Court will enter Judgment as a Matter of Law against Defendants on these issues.
In their objections to the Report and Recommendation, Defendants present the same arguments regarding "desired for use" and "desires to employ" that were presented to the magistrate judge. The Court finds that the Report and Recommendation did not improperly rewrite the claims, read out the "desired" limitation, or engage in a "narrowing construction." The magistrate judge expressly applied the Nautilus standard and found these claim terms, viewed in the light of the specification, inform those skilled in the art regarding the scope of the '748 patent and the '212 patent with "reasonable certainty." Indeed, Nautilus itself acknowledged that "absolute precision is unattainable." 134 S.Ct. at 2129.
The Court also agrees with the magistrate judge that "[c]onstruing a term so as to steer clear of subjectiveness or indefiniteness does not ... amount to a finding that the word `desired' necessarily renders a claim indefinite." Report and Recommendation at pg. 845. The magistrate judge properly found the claims and the specification provide context in which "desired" refers to what is being requested.
Turning to Plaintiff's objections, regarding "each cluster," Nautilus abrogated the use of a "narrowing construction" to avoid a finding of indefiniteness. Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly identified the "narrowing construction" standard in a footnote when finding that the standards set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit were "falling short." See 134 S.Ct. at 2130 n. 9. Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Applying the new standard under Nautilus, the recited "set of candidate subcarriers" is not an explicit antecedent basis and is not a reasonably clear implicit antecedent basis. Thus, "each cluster" lacks any clear antecedent basis. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any requirement for deference to expert opinions as to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would find a claim indefinite. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed.Cir. 2005) ("[A] court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history, in other words, with the written record of the patent.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As to Plaintiff's objections regarding the term "the indication," Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent are distinguishable from claim 2 of the '212 patent in any relevant manner. In particular, although Plaintiff argues that claim 2 refers to uplink but claims 11 and 26 refer to downlink, any such distinction does not ameliorate the facial ambiguity as to whether the antecedent basis for "the indication" in the dependent claims is "an indication" or "another indication" in the independent claims. Plaintiff's argument that "an indication" and "another indication" refer to the same step in an iterative process is unavailing because even under Plaintiff's interpretation, different iterations may yield different indications.
The Court, having reviewed the relevant briefing, the Report and Recommendation, the objections, and the responses to the objections, is of the opinion the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct. Therefore, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of this Court. Accordingly, it is hereby
CAROLINE M. CRAVEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the following pending
Plaintiff Adaptix, Inc. ("Plaintiff") brings suit alleging infringement of United States Patents No. 6,947,748 ("'748 patent") and 7,454,212 ("'212 patent") (collectively, the "patents-in-suit"). Defendants move for summary judgment, asserting claims 8, 11, 19, and 21 of the '748 patent, and claims 9, 11, 18, and 26 of the '212 patent are indefinite and therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Defendants present three indefiniteness arguments,
In their current motion, Defendants argue, among other things, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2120, 189 L.Ed.2d 37 (2014), which was handed down after AT & T, "modified the analysis and increased the level of specificity required to overcome a challenge for indefiniteness." Dkt. No. 81 at 5.
Title 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) articulates that patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention. "Whether a claim meets this definiteness requirement is a matter of law." Net Navigation, LLC v. Cisco Systems, No. 4:11-cv-660, 662, 2012 WL 6161900, at *2 (E.D.Tex. Dec. 11, 2012) (citing Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir.2007)). A party challenging the definiteness of a claim must show it is invalid by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1345.
The Supreme Court has recently held that the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 "require[s] that a patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty." Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2129. "The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable." Id.
"The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." 35 U.S.C. § 282. A "determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court's performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims." Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1376.
It is with these principles in mind the Court considers whether Defendants have demonstrated that the pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence available to the Court establish there are no genuine issues of material fact, and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these specific issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Defendants argue "the use of the term `each cluster' lacks an antecedent basis and does not, when `viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.'" Dkt. No. 81 at 4-5 (citing Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2129). Specifically, Defendants argue "the claims do not describe which `subcarriers' belong to `each cluster.'" Dkt. No. 81 at 5.
In AT & T, the Court found that "each cluster" did not render the claims indefinite, relying upon a "narrowing construction" under Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1375. Defendants submit that Nautilus abrogated Exxon, thus rendering the "each cluster" term indefinite.
In its response, Plaintiff asserts the indefiniteness standard applied by the Court in AT & T comports with Nautilus. Dkt. No. 87 at 4 (citing Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2001)). Plaintiff also notes that in AT & T, based on a "narrowing construction" of "cluster" as meaning "a logical unit that contains at least two physical subcarriers" (Dkt. No. 87 at 5 (quoting AT & T, Dkt. No. 182 at 16)), "this Court has already determined that `each cluster' does not require antecedent basis." Dkt. No. 87 at 6.
The requirement for antecedent basis is a rule of patent drafting, administered during patent examination. Konami Corp. v. Roxor Games, Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 725, 737 (E.D.Tex.2006). However, the failure to provide explicit antecedent basis for terms does not always render a claim indefinite. Id. (quoting Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2173.05(e) (8th ed. Rev.2, May, 2004)). Antecedent basis can be present by implication. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1987); see Energizer Holdings Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding
Here, claim 8 of the '748 patent recites (emphasis added):
Claim 9 of the '212 patent depends from claim 8, which in turn depends from claim 1. Claims 1, 8, and 9 of the '212 patent recite (emphasis added):
In AT & T, the Report and Recommendation found as follows:
AT & T, Dkt. No. 182 at 15-16.
In overruling the objections to the Report and Recommendation in AT & T on this issue, the Court noted:
AT & T, Dkt. No. 197 at 3.
On one hand, what the Court construed "narrow[ly]" in AT & T was the term "cluster," which the parties in AT & T agreed refers to a logical unit that contains at least two physical subcarriers. The Court in AT & T concluded the term "each cluster" did not suffer from any lack of antecedent basis because no antecedent basis was required. AT & T, Dkt. No. 197 at 3.
On the other hand, in ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that "each" means "every" or "all" as opposed to merely "a":
346 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2003) (emphasis added; specification citations omitted); see id. at 1378-82.
On balance, in light of Nautilus having abrogated the portion of Exxon upon which the Court relied in AT & T, the disputed term "each cluster" requires an antecedent basis but lacks any clear antecedent basis. This lack of clear antecedent basis for "each cluster," which has been further explained in AT & T, as quoted above, renders the claims indefinite as failing to "inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty." Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2129.
There being no genuine issues of material fact on this issue, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to claim 8 of the '748 patent and claim 9 of the '212 patent.
Defendants argue the terms "desired" and "desire" are analogous to the term "aesthetically pleasing" that was found to be "completely dependent on a person's subjective opinion," and therefore indefinite, in Datamize. Dkt. No. 81 at 7 (citing Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed.Cir.2005)). Specifically, Defendants argue (citing the declaration of their expert, Dr. Vijay Madisetti, Dkt. No. 81-1):
Dkt. No. 81 at 8.
Plaintiff responds that referring to "desire" does not automatically render a claim indefinite as Defendants appear to suggest. Dkt. No. 87 at 7. According to Plaintiff, the specification contains support and clarity on what is desired.
The disputed terms appear in claims 8, 11, 19, and 21 of the '748 patent and claim 18 of the '212 patent. Claims 8, 11, 19, and 21 of the '748 patent recite (emphasis added):
Claim 18 of the '212 patent recites (emphasis added):
Defendants submit a definition of "desire" as: "to wish or long for; crave; want;" or "to express a wish to obtain; ask for; request." Dkt. No. 81-6, 8/15/2014 Madisetti Decl., Ex. E, Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 539 (2d ed.1998).
In AT & T, the Court noted that including the word "desired" in the construction of "select[ing] a set of candidate subcarriers" "would tend to render the claims subjective." AT & T, Dkt. No. 180 at 10. The Court concluded that "[s]ubjectiveness or indefiniteness can be readily avoided by focusing on subscriber actions rather than subscriber `desires.' By selecting a set of subcarriers or clusters, the subscriber is requesting use of those subcarriers or clusters, as disclosed in the specification." Id.
Construing a term so as to steer clear of subjectiveness or indefiniteness does not, however, amount to a finding that the word "desired" necessarily renders a claim indefinite. See, e.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1316-17 (Fed.Cir.2007) (construing claims reciting "desired" tooth positions). Instead, as found in AT & T, the claims and the specification provide context in which "desired" refers to what is being requested. See AT & T, Dkt. No. 180 at 10; see also '748 patent, 9:37-40 ("Using the ordered list of clusters, the subscriber requests the desired clusters along with coding and modulation rates known to the subscriber to achieve desired data rates.") (emphasis added); id. at 9:61-64 & Fig 4 (similar); id. at 6:42-54 ("For example, the base station first ensures the assignment of the basic clusters to the subscribers and then tries to satisfy further requests on the auxiliary clusters from the subscribers.... In one embodiment, the base station allocates basic clusters to a new subscriber and then determines if there are any other subscribers requesting clusters. If not, then the base station allocates the auxiliary clusters to that new subscriber.") (emphasis added).
Thus the "claims, viewed in light of the specification ..., inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty." Nautilus, 134
Defendants argue "Claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent are indefinite for the same reason the Court rendered claim 2 of the '212 patent insolubly ambiguous — the lack of clear antecedent basis for the term `the indication.'" Dkt. No. 81 at 9. Plaintiff responds that claims 11 and 26 are different from claim 2 because "they do not include the limitation `the subscriber unit sending `the indication' to the base station.' Instead, the `indication of subcarriers' in claims 11 and 26 `is received via a downlink control channel.'" Dkt. No. 87 at 9. Plaintiff argues "[t]he `indication' in claims 11 and 26 refers to both indications — the first and second — in claims 1 and 18." Id.
The claims at issue in AT & T, namely claims 2-4 of the '212 patent, depend from claim 1. Claims 1 and 2 of the '212 patent recite (emphasis added):
In AT & T, the Court found claim 2 fails to specify whether "the indication" to be sent by the subscriber is "an indication of subcarriers of the set of subcarriers selected by the base station for use by the subscriber unit" or "another indication of the updated set of subcarriers" recited in claim 1. AT & T, Dkt. No. 182 at 17-18.
The claims challenged by Defendants here, namely claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent, depend from claims 1 and 18, respectively. Claim 1 is quoted above. Claims 11, 18, and 26 of the '212 patent recite (emphasis added):
On balance, Defendants have demonstrated that claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent suffer from the same antecedent basis ambiguity as claims 2-4. Thus, for the same reasons the Court in AT & T found claims 2-4 of the '212 patent invalid as indefinite, the Court likewise finds claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent invalid as indefinite. See AT & T, Dkt. No. 182 at 17-18. Therefore, the Court recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to claims 11 and 26 of the '212 patent. For the above reasons, it is
Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.A. 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings accepted or adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir.1988).