RON CLARK, District Judge.
Petitioner Alto V. Watson, III, proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner filed this petition challenging his conviction in the 252nd District Court of Jefferson County, Texas in cause number 12-14962. On April 1, 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty to theft pursuant to a plea agreement and was later sentenced to five years of deferred adjudication community supervision. The Ninth Court of Appeals summarized the facts surrounding the plea and sentence as follows:
Ex parte Watson, No. 09-15-00333-CR, 2016 WL 908258, at *2-4 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Sept. 14, 2016, pet. ref'd).
Petitioner filed a state application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court, with a new judge presiding over the habeas proceeding, denied relief. On September 14, 2016, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
Petitioner raises three grounds for review. First, petitioner contends the trial judge should have recused himself or been disqualified from presiding over petitioner's criminal case because the judge initiated ex parte contact with the victims of a different crime that took place after petitioner pleaded guilty. Petitioner contends his guilty plea was involuntary because he was unaware of the ex parte contact when he pleaded guilty. Finally, petitioner alleges he was deprived an evidentiary hearing and discovery in the state court habeas proceedings.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 authorizes the District Court to entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment if the prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Court may not grant relief on any claim that was adjudicated in state court proceedings unless the adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
The question for federal review is not whether the state court decision was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable, which is a substantially higher threshold. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Federal courts look to the "last reasoned opinion" as the state court's "decision." Salts v. Epps, 676 F.3d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 2012). If a higher state court offered different grounds for its ruling than a lower court, then only the higher court's decision is reviewed. Id. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Harrington v. Richter, 526 U.S. 86, 98 (2011); see also Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013) (holding there is a rebuttable presumption that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits when the state court addresses some claims, but not others, in its opinion).
This Court must accept as correct any factual determinations made by the state courts unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The presumption of correctness applies to both implicit and explicit factual findings. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The presumption of correctness not only applies to explicit findings of fact, but it also applies to those unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusions of mixed law and fact."). Deference to the factual findings of a state court is not dependent upon the quality of the state court's evidentiary hearing. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 951 (holding that "a full and fair hearing is not a precondition to according § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness to state habeas court findings of fact nor to applying § 2254(d)'s standards of review.").
Petitioner contends his guilty plea was rendered involuntary as a result of the trial judge's ex parte communications with victims of an alleged crime.
A guilty plea must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently to be constitutionally valid. United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). When determining whether a plea is voluntary, the court considers all relevant circumstances, including whether the defendant: (1) had notice of the charges against him; (2) understood the constitutional protections he was waiving; and (3) had access to competent counsel. Id. Declarations of voluntariness made under oath in open court carry a strong presumption of truth, forming a "formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
During the state habeas proceedings, the trial court found that petitioner's guilty plea was a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act. State Court Habeas Record, Docket Entry #2-2 at 21-22. The trial court found that the ex parte communications did not affect petitioner's guilty plea because they took place after petitioner and his counsel negotiated a plea agreement with the State and after petitioner had entered his guilty plea. Id. at 22. Thus, the trial court found that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on the ground that his guilty plea was involuntary. Id. This finding was affirmed on appeal. The Ninth Court of Appeals explained its reasoning as follows: "Given the lack of a temporal relationship between the plea-bargain agreement and the hearing on Watson's plea, Judge [Raquel] West finding the extrajudicial contact could not have affected the voluntariness of Watson's plea is reasonable and finds sufficient support in the evidence in the record. . . ." Ex parte Watson, 2016 WL 908258, at *6.
The record conclusively shows that the ex parte communications took place after petitioner pleaded guilty, and, thus, had no bearing on his guilty plea. Therefore, the state courts' conclusion that petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary is not contrary to, and does not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor is the decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this ground.
Petitioner argues that the trial judge should have recused himself or he should have been disqualified from hearing further proceedings in petitioner's criminal case because of his ex parte communications with victims of another alleged crime involving petitioner.
Petitioner raised this issue in his state habeas application, which was reviewed by the new presiding judge of the 252nd District Court, Judge Raquel West. The judge found that the communications were not ex parte because the burglary offense had not been indicted or filed in the 252nd District Court when the communications were made. SCHR, #2-2 at 24-25. The judge made a factual finding that Judge Walker did not consider any information regarding the burglary in determining the appropriate conditions of petitioner's community supervision at the sentencing hearing on August 5, 2013. SCHR, #2-2 at 26. The judge concluded that the evidence did not establish an appearance of bias or prejudice such that Judge's Walker's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. SCHR, #2-2 at 27. The judge also found that the credible evidence did not show that Judge Walker was unable to render a fair judgment in petitioner's theft case. SCHR, #2-2 at 27.
On appeal, the Ninth Court of Appeals found that Judge West did not abuse her discretion by finding that petitioner had not met his burden of proving that Judge Walker was biased or prejudiced against him, such that recusal or disqualification was required. Ex parte Watson, 2016 WL 908258, at *8-9. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:
Ex parte Watson, 2016 WL 908258, at *8-9 (citations omitted).
Generally, the constitutional standard for judicial impartiality is narrower than the standards set by state and federal recusal statutes. Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 474 n. 4 (5th Cir. 2008). Due Process requires a fair trial before a judge with no actual bias or interest in the outcome of the case. Id. at 474. Because of the difficulty of proving actual bias, the Due Process Clause also requires recusal if the judge is presumptively biased. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883-84 (2009); Richardson, 537 F.3d at 475. "Presumptive bias occurs when a judge may not actually be biased, but has the appearance of bias such that `the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'" Richardson, 537 F.3d at 475 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). The Supreme Court has found presumptive bias in three situations: (1) when the judge has a substantial interest in the outcome of the case; (2) when the judge has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from a party; or (3) if the judge has the dual role of investigating and adjudicating the dispute. Id.
This Court must presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct unless petitioner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the communications regarding the burglary case affected Judge Walker's decisions in the theft case. Therefore, the state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct. Petitioner has not demonstrated that Judge Walker was actually biased or had an interest in the case. In addition, petitioner's argument for recusal does not fall within the three situations where bias is presumed. Under the highly deferential standard of review applicable to state court determinations, this court cannot conclude the state court's findings were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. Therefore, this ground for review lacks merit.
Petitioner contends his rights were violated when he was denied an evidentiary hearing and discovery by the state courts. This issue was raised, and rejected, on direct appeal. The Ninth Court of Appeals found that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or discovery under state law. Ex parte Watson, 2016 WL 908358, at *10-11. A state court's interpretation of state law is not reviewable by a federal court Wood v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2007); Dickerson v. Guste, 932 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991). Further, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground because "infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for relief in federal court." Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997)).
In this case, the petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a certificate of appealability. An appeal from a judgment denying federal habeas corpus relief may not proceed unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). The standard for granting a certificate of appealability, like that for granting a certificate of probable cause to appeal under prior law, requires the petitioner to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000); Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1982). In making that substantial showing, the petitioner need not establish that he should prevail on the merits. Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are subject to debate among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions presented are worthy of encouragement to proceed further. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84; Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2009). If the petition was denied on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the petition raises a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; Elizalde, 362 F.3d at 328. Any doubt regarding whether to grant a certificate of appealability is resolved in favor of the petitioner, and the severity of the penalty may be considered in making this determination. See Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2000).
In this case, petitioner has not shown that any of the issues raised by his claims are subject to debate among jurists of reason, or that a procedural ruling was incorrect. In addition, the questions presented are not worthy of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing to merit the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
For the reasons set forth above, this petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied. A certificate of appealability will not be issued. A final judgment will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
