ROY S. PAYNE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Before the Court is the opening claim construction brief of Alacritech, Inc. (Plaintiff) (Dkt. No. 181, filed on April 4,
I. BACKGROUND ...857 II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ...861 A. Claim Construction ... 861 B. Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term ... 863 C. Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA)/§ 112(f) (AIA) ... 863 D. Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA)/§ 112(b) (AIA) ... 865III. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ...865 A. "fast-path processing," "slow-path processing," "substantially no network layer or transport layer processing," and "significant network layer or significant transport layer processing" ... 865 B. "a destination memory," "a destination in memory," and "a destination [for the data] in a memory of the computer" ... 870 C. "context [for communication]," "context," and "status information" ... 873 D. "prepend," "prepended," and "prepending" ... 876 E. "without an interrupt dividing" ... 877 F. '104 Patent: "means for receiving ... a command ...," "means for sending ... data ...," and "means for sending ... an indication ..." ... 879 G. '205 Patent: "means ... for receiving ... a response ..." ... 882 H. '241 Patent: Mechanism Terms ... 884 I. "flow key" and "flow re-assembler" ... 889 J. "operation code" ... 892 K. "database" ... 893 L. "packet batching module" ... 894 M. "traffic classifier" ... 896IV. CONCLUSION ...898
Plaintiff alleges infringement of eight U.S. Patents: No. 7,124,205 (the '205 Patent), No. 7,237,036 (the '036 Patent), No. 7,337,241 (the '241 Patent), No. 7,673,072 (the '072 Patent), No. 7,945,699 (the '699 Patent), No. 8,131,880 (the '880 Patent), No. 8,805,948
The abstracts and exemplary claims of the Asserted Patents provide as follows: The abstract of the '205 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '036 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '241 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '072 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '699 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '880 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '948 Patent provides:
The abstract of the '104 Patent provides:
Claim 1 of the '205 Patent, an exemplary apparatus claim, recites:
Claim 1 of the '072 Patent, an exemplary method claim, recites:
Claim 1 of the '104 Patent, an exemplary method claim, recites:
"It is a `bedrock principle' of patent law that `the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.'" Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. The general rule — subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra — is that each claim term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("There is a heavy presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.") (vacated on other grounds).
"The claim construction inquiry ... begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "[I]n all aspects of claim construction, `the name of the game is the claim.'" Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). First, a term's context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim's meaning, because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term's meaning.
"[C]laims `must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.'" Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). "[T]he specification `is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.'" Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, "`[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.'" Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. "[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification — even if it is the only embodiment — into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited." Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. However, "because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes." Id. at 1318; see also Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution history may be "unhelpful as an interpretive resource").
Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is "`less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.'" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert's conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term's definition are not helpful to a court. Id. Extrinsic evidence is "less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms." Id. The Supreme Court recently explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 831, 841, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2015).
There are "only two exceptions to [the] general rule" that claim terms are construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning: "1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution."
To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must "clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term," and "clearly express an intent to define the term." Id. (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee's lexicography must appear "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision." Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee's statements in the specification or prosecution history must amount to a "clear and unmistakable" surrender. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 ("The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope."). "Where an applicant's statements are amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable." 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). Section 112, Paragraph 6, provides that a structure may be claimed as a "means ... for performing a specified function" and that an act may be claimed as a "step for performing
But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes "means" or "step for" terms, and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326; Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context of the entire specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when "the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently definite structure" (quotation marks omitted) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when "the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure"); Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes an "act" corresponding to "how the function is performed"); Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes "sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited function ... even if the claim uses the term `means.'" (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
When it applies, § 112, ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term "to only the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof." Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation involves multiple steps. "The first step ... is a determination of the function of the means-plus-function limitation." Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). "[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof." Id. A "structure disclosed in the specification is `corresponding' structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim." Id. The focus of the "corresponding structure" inquiry is not simply whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function, but rather whether the corresponding structure is "clearly linked or associated with the [recited] function." Id. The corresponding structure "must include all structure that actually performs the recited function." Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit "incorporation of structure from the written description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function." Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
For § 112, ¶ 6 limitations implemented by a programmed general purpose computer or microprocessor, the corresponding structure described in the patent specification must include an algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose computer but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence, must "inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty." Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129, 189 L.Ed.2d 37 (2014). If it does not, the claim fails § 112, ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 2124. Whether a claim is indefinite is determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application for the patent was filed. Id. at 2130. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 2130 n.10. "[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of claim construction." ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
When a term of degree is used in a claim, "the court must determine whether the patent provides some standard for measuring that degree." Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective term is used in a claim, "the court must determine whether the patent's specification supplies some standard for measuring the scope of the [term]." Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The standard "must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art." Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In the context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the claim is invalid as indefinite if the claim fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351-52. The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary skill in the art "would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim." Id. at 1352.
Plaintiff's Defendants' Disputed Term 6 Proposed Construction Proposed Construction fast-path processing a mode of operation in which the protocol stack of the host the network interface device • '205 Patent Claims 1, 31 computer performs little or no performs all physical layer, network layer or transport MAC layer, IP layer, and TCP layer processing layer processing a mode of operation in which slow-path processing the host performs at least no construction necessary some of the physical layer, • '205 Patent Claim 31 MAC layer, IP substantially no network layer or transport layer processing no construction necessary indefinite • '205 Patent Claim 22 "significant network layer or significant transport layer processing" no construction necessary indefinite • '205 Patent Claim 31
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: "Fast-path processing" is defined in the '205 Patent, "handling the connection such that protocol stack [ ] of the host performs little or no network layer or transport layer processing... is called `fast-path processing.'" Dkt. No. 181 at 7 (quoting '205 Patent 39:39-45). This definition and exemplary embodiments allow that the host may perform some portion of the processing. Id. at 8. Surrounding claim language also allows this. Claim 1 recites "without the protocol stack of the host computer performing any network layer processing or any transport layer processing on the response" (allowing host processing on other than the response), Claim 8 recites "without the protocol stack of the host computer doing any network layer processing on the packet and without the protocol stack of the host computer doing any transport layer processing on the packet" (allowing host processing on other than the packet), and Claim 31 recites "the portion being fast-path processed such that the data is placed into the destination memory on the host computer without the protocol stack of the host computer doing significant network layer or significant transport layer processing" (allowing insignificant host processing in the fast path). Id. at 8. And the '809 Provisional, incorporated into the '205 Patent, expressly teaches the host playing a role in the fast-path processing. Id. at 8-9 & n.2 (citing '809 Provisional at 7-8, 13; Min Opening Decl. ¶ 65, Dkt. No. 181-12 at 24-25). "Slow-path processing" is simply the alternative to "fast-path processing" and need not be separately construed. Id. at 11. And "significant" and
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: Neither the '205 Patent or any parent application to the patent describe an embodiment in which the host does "a little" of the fast-path processing. Dkt. No. 303 at 10. Rather, but for a single unexplained reference to the "host perform[ing] little or no ... processing," the '205 Patent teaches that fast-path processing is performed entirely exclusive of the host. Id. at 10-14 (citing '205 Patent 39:35-45). The disclosures of the '809 Provisional relied upon by Plaintiff disclose either host processing above the network and transport layers, id. at 12-13 (citing '809 Provisional at 7-8), or host processing instead of fast-path processing — i.e., slow-path processing, id. at 13-14 (citing '809 Provisional at 13). The patent provides no guidance regarding how much processing the host may perform yet still be "little ... processing." Id. at 14. Similarly, the patent provides no guidance regarding how much host processing qualifies as "substantially no ... processing" or "significant... processing." Id. at 14-15.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: The patentee's definition of "fast-path processing" provided in the '205 Patent governs. Dkt. No. 307 at 8. While there are some exemplary embodiments that expressly require no host processing, others do not have this requirement. Id. at 9. And the disclosures of the '809 Provisional establish that: (1) "fast-path processing" includes host processing on the rare occasion that the "fast-path [] receive[s] a header and data that is a complete request, but is also too larger for a header buffer" in the fast-path, id. at 9-10, and (2) the host "transport driver performing transport-level processing" may participate in fast-path processing, id. at 10 n.6.
Plaintiff cites further
There are two main issues in dispute. First, whether the host CPU may perform a "little" network layer or transport layer processing in the "fast-path processing." Second, whether it is reasonably certain what it means for the host to perform "little" or "substantially no" or "significant" network layer or transport layer processing. With respect to the first issue, "fast-path processing" is defined in the '205 Patent to include "little" processing by the host. With respect to the second issue, the patent provides examples of host processing in the fast path that are sufficient to reasonably delineate "little" or "substantially no" or "significant" host processing.
The '205 Patent provides a definition of "fast-path processing," which is defined in the alternative to "slow-path processing":
'205 Patent 39:30-45 (emphasis added). This definition comports with use of the terms elsewhere in the patent. For example, the patent provides:
Id. at 37:8-18 (emphasis added). That is, in one embodiment all TCP/IP header processing in the fast path is performed by the INIC, not the host. This suggests that not all embodiments of fast-path processing entirely exclude the host. Similarly, Claim 31 provides:
Id. at 46:12-29 (emphasis added). Again, this does not exclude all transport and network layer processing by the host. This is not inconsistent with exemplary embodiments that state simply that the host does no transport and network layer processing — "little or no" includes "no." Further, recitations in Claim 1 ("performing fast-path processing on the response such that a data portion of the response is placed into the destination memory
In the context of the '205 Patent, the meaning of "little" or "substantially no" or "significant" host processing is reasonably certain. Terms of degree are not indefinite if the patent provides some objective standard for measuring the degree. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "the definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations of language." Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2128, 189 L.Ed.2d 37 (2014). Thus, terms of degree may appropriately be used to "avoid[ ] a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter." Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The scope of the term of degree may be understood with reference to the technological context. Id. Here, the context is the performance improvement gained by shifting host processing to the interface. See, e.g., '205 Patent 3:48-51 ("The host CPU and protocol stack avoid protocol processing for data transfer over the fast path, releasing host bus bandwidth from many demands of the network and storage subsystem."); id. at 43:32-38 ("Protocol processing speed and efficiency is tremendously accelerated by an intelligent network interface card (INIC) containing specially designed protocol processing hardware, as compared with a general purpose CPU running conventional protocol software, and interrupts to the host CPU are also substantially reduced.").
The Court finds Plaintiff's expert more credible than Defendants' expert on this issue of indefiniteness. In opining that these terms are not indefinite, Plaintiff's expert considered the terms in the above-stated technological context. See, e.g., Min Opening Decl. ¶¶ 61-63, Dkt. No. 181-2 at 21-23. In contrast, Defendants' expert appears to be searching for a numerical
Further, the disclosures of host-processing at pages 7 through 8 and 13 of the '809 Provisional, which is incorporated into the '205 Patent, appear to be instances of fast-path processing that provide further technological guidance as to what level of host processing is acceptable in the fast path. The application provides that the host "transport driver" will help route packets through the fast path by communicating — through an existing NT mechanism — "a small amount of data" between the upper layer client and the network interface (INIC) during the fast-path processing to facilitate INIC DMA of the remaining data. '809 Provisional 7-8, Dkt. No. 181-21 at 11-12; Min Opening Decl. ¶ 65, Dkt. No. 181-12 at 24-25. The Court is not persuaded that this processing by the host "transport driver," which involves communication of packet data and memory address with both the INIC and the upper-level client, is not "transport layer processing" because it is "above the transport layer," as Defendants' contend. See, e.g., Lanning Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 20, Dkt. No. 303-6 at 16-18. Likewise, the application provides that in situations in which the size of the incoming request is such that only a single data buffer is used, the fast-path flow for that single buffer will be identical to the slow-path flow — "
Accordingly, the Court determines that Defendants have failed to prove that any claim is rendered indefinite by "substantially no network layer or transport layer processing" or "significant network layer or significant transport layer processing" and construes "fast-path processing" and "slow-path processing" as follows:
Plaintiff's Defendants' Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction a destination memory the location in host memory • '205 Patent Claims 1, 22, a single contiguous block or where data resides when all 31 several associated blocks of MAC layer, network layer, memory in the computer and transport layer processing a destination in memory is complete • '241 Patent Claims 1, 22 a destination [for the data] in a memory of the computer • '699 Patent Claims 1, 7, 13
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: The patents describe that the destination recited in the claims is the place in memory where the information is deposited and may be a single contiguous block of memory or several associated blocks. Dkt. No. 181 at 12 (citing '699 Patent 6:64-7:2). Some claims — but not all — explicitly recite processing limitations related to depositing the information at the memory. These would be rendered superfluous by Defendants' proposed processing limitations. Id. at 12-13. And no claim recites all Defendants' proposed processing limitations. Id. Exemplary embodiments include destinations that are not on the host computer, contradicting Defendants' proposed "location in host memory" limitation. Id. at 13-14. And some claims — but not all — explicitly recite that the destination is on the host computer. Id. at 14 (citing '205 Patent 38:67-39:4). Finally, the destination need not be a final destination, as Defendants' proposed "when all ... processing is complete" limitation demands. Id. Rather, the patents expressly refer to "final destination," which implies that a destination is not necessarily final. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: Plaintiff's proposed construction is simply "memory" and gives no effect to "destination." Dkt. No. 303 at 16. The patents distinguish the "destination" in memory from the "initial landing point" in memory, and this distinction is not captured by Plaintiff's proposed construction. Id. at 16-17 (citing '699 Patent 2:28-43). The '699 and '241 Patents state that the destination is in host memory and the only reference to the contrary is found only in the '205 Patent (the claims of which expressly require the destination be in host memory) and therefore does not apply to the other patents. Id. at 17-18 (citing '699 Patent 6:64-7:2; '241 Patent 14:48-51; '205 Patent 39:2-4). And the patents distinguish the destination from
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: Under its plain meaning, and as used in the patents, "destination" refers to the place to which something travels or is sent, and is a counterpart to "source." Dkt. No. 307 at 11. This is captured in the language of the claims — the information is expressly placed or sent or transferred to the memory "destination." Id. at 12. Thus, the destination is distinct from the "initial landing point" as the initial landing point is a "source." Id. And the statements in the '205 Patent regarding destinations other than in the host are incorporated into the '241 Patent, and the '205 Patent expressly claims such an embodiment — "destination memory that is part of a second host computer." Id. at 12 & nn.9, 10.
Plaintiff cites further
There are three main issues in dispute. First, whether a destination in memory is simply the memory. Second, whether the destination in memory is necessarily in host memory. Third, whether the destination in memory is the location for data after the MAC, network, and transport layer processing is complete. With respect to the first issue, the destination is a specified location in memory. With respect to the second issue, the destination in memory need not be in the host memory. With respect to the third issue, the destination is not necessarily the post-processing destination.
The '205, '241, and '699 Patents each refer to destinations as locations in memory. For example, the '205 Patent describes destinations such as the "location of a file cache [ ] in storage" and "in semiconductor memory." See, e.g., '205 Patent 37:34-37, 39:4-6, 40:6-11, 40:17-19. The '241 includes similar references to, e.g., "in storage" See, e.g., '241 Patent 10:16-18. And the '699 Patent refers to destinations, e.g., "in memory space," "a single contiguous block of host memory," and "several associated blocks ... of host memory." See, e.g., '699 Patent 5:25-29, 6:64-7:2. Indeed, the parties approach the limitations as if "destination in memory" means the same as "destination memory." And the plain meaning of "destination" supports that the destination terms here refer to specific memory rather than just memory in the abstract, as Plaintiff's proposed construction suggests. The Court notes, however that the statements in the '699 Patent regarding contiguous and associated blocks are not definitional. They simply note the destination may be scattered over multiple — associated — locations. Id. at 5:65-67 ("In some embodiments, the second destination 110 is actually made up of a plurality of locations having different addresses of different lengths.").
The destination need not be in host memory. The '205 Patent, the disclosure of which is incorporated into the '241 Patent, provides: "[d]estination 2413 may be on the host computer, or on another computer, or on another device, or elsewhere on network 2403." '241 Patent 39:2-3. The claims of the '699 Patent expressly recite
Finally, the Court is not persuaded that the destination terms necessarily entail the processing Defendants suggest. Even if Defendants' characterization is correct — and every embodiment of a destination is described with reference to data that has undergone Defendants' proposed processing — that alone is not sufficient to limit the claims to that processing. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("we have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment"); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("It is likewise not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation. We do not read limitations from the specification into claims; we do not redefine words. Only the patentee can do that."); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("The law does not require the impossible. Hence, it does not require that an applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention."). And Defendants have not identified any lexicography or disavowal that would limit the broad meaning of destination as they propose. GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting. To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term, and clearly express an intent to define the term." (quotation marks omitted)). Further, Defendants' proposed processing limitation would render explicit limitations superfluous. For example, the claims of the '699 Patent each recite "transferring the data to the destination, without transferring the network layer headers or the transport layer headers of the plurality of packets to the destination." '699 Patent 7:17-19, 7:50-52, 8:27-29. If "destination" necessarily presupposes the transport-layer and network-layer processing, this limitation would be superfluous. But "[c]laims must be interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim." Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, 783 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, the Court construes the destination terms as follows:
Plaintiff's Defendants' Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction context [for communication] data regarding an active connection indefinite • '036 Patent Claims 1 context data regarding an active connection indefinite • '072 Patent Claims 1, 9, 15 status information • '072 Patent Claims 3, 9, no construction necessary indefinite 15
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: The plain meaning of "context" refers to the circumstances surrounding an event or situation and in the context of the exemplary embodiment and claims, the "context" refers to information regarding a connection or communication. Dkt. No. 181 at 14-15. For example, the patents provide "the context summariz[es] various features of the connection, such as protocol type and source and destination addresses for each protocol layer." Id. at 15 (quoting '036 Patent 7:62-8:2). And the patents describe contexts for different types of connections, such as TCP, TTCP, and SPX. Id. Certain claims require "status information" as part of the context, which plainly refers to the status of the connection. Id. at 18.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: The meaning of "context" in the claims is not reasonably certain because "context" is used in the patents and priority documents in a manner inconsistent with its use in the claims. Dkt. No. 303 at 19. "Context" is variably used to refer to a "connection" and information in a Transmission Control Block for TCP connections (TCB). Id. at 19-20. In previous litigation, Plaintiff represented "context" as something analogous to TCB and in an interference proceeding involving a related but unasserted patent, inventors referred to "context" as TCB. Id. at 20-21. In the '036 and '072 Patents, however, "context" is used to refer to information in a Communication Control Block (CCB), which is a generalization of TCB that is not limited to TCP and includes UDP. Id. at 21. Yet the '809 Provisional specifically excludes UDP. Id. at 21-22. And Plaintiff's proposed construction covers information "clearly hav[ing] no relation
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: When considered in the context of the surrounding claim language and description of the '036 and '072 Patents, the meaning of "context" is reasonably certain. Dkt. No. 307 at 13-16. That "context" may be satisfied by various and diverse pieces of information goes to the term's breadth, not its definiteness. Id. at 14. Whether a term is used differently in a priority document than in the issued patents is irrelevant to the indefiniteness analysis. Id. And Defendants' cited priority documents refer to protocols other than TCP or use "context" to describe the state of a TCP connection and thus are consistent with Plaintiff's proposed construction. Id. at 15.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
The issue here is whether the meaning of "context" is reasonably certain in the context of the '036 and '072 Patents. It is.
To begin, Defendants offered no argument in their brief supporting their contention that "status information" renders claims indefinite. A naked assertion of indefiniteness cannot satisfy the burden of proving a patent claim invalid.
The Court is not persuaded the statements in the patents, and extrinsic to the patents, regarding TCB as a context or CCB as context or UDP embodiments of the invention render any claims indefinite. Rather than equating, for example, TCB and context, the patents allow that context may come in the form of TCB, or CCB, or other forms. As explained in the patents:
That said, the Court is sensitive to the potential overbreadth of Plaintiff's proposed construction and prefers the language provided in the patents: "the context summarizing various features of the connection." Id. at 7:62-8:2.
Accordingly, the Court determines Defendants have failed to prove that any claim is indefinite by reason of "context" or "status information," and "status information" need not be construed. The Court construes "context" as follows:
Disputed Term Plaintiff's Defendants'
Proposed Construction Proposed Construction
prepend
no construction necessary add to the front
• '036 Patent Claim 4
prepended
no construction necessary added to the front
• '241 Patent Claims 7, 9
prepending
• '241 Patent Claims 9, 17 no construction necessary adding to the front
• '072 Patent Claims 1, 9,
15
• '104 Patent Claims 1, 22
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: "Prepend" and its variants are used in the claims according to the plain and well understood meaning of the term and thus the terms do not need to be construed. Dkt. No. 181 at 20-21.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendants respond: The '036, '241, and '072 Patents expressly state that "prepends" means "adds to the front." Dkt. No. 303 at 24 (quoting '036 Patent 14:7-11; '241 Patent 13:63-67; '072 Patent 13:68-14:4). And, in the context of combining headers and data, prepending headers to data, as is claimed, is distinct from appending data to headers and from piecemeal assembly of header and data information spread over time. Id. at 24-25.
Plaintiff replies: Prepended header information in a data set simply is positioned in front of other data (i.e., not behind or in the middle of other data) and need not be added only after the other data is added. Dkt. No. 307 at 16-17. The patents describe data sets according to the order of information in the set, not the order in which the information is added to the set. Id. at 17. And if the descriptions can be interpreted to indicate a temporal ordering, the patents disclose placing headers at the front before and after other data has been added to the set. Id. "Prepending" covers both temporal orderings. Id.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
The issue in dispute is whether "prepend" means "add to the front." It does. However, in the context of the '036, '241,- '072, and '104 Patents, the Court does not perceive the temporal limitation proposed by Defendants.
"Prepend" is used in the patents according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., '036 Patent 14:7-11 ("the packet control sequencer 176 adds the status information generated by the fly-by sequencer 178 and any status information generated by the packet control sequencer 176, and
The Court is not persuaded that "prepend" has the temporal limitation that Defendants argue. While "prepend" is the opposite of "append," it is so in a profoundly different manner than what Defendants suggest. Specifically, the opposite of prepending a header to data is appending a header to data — not appending data to a header. Indeed, given the context of packetized data, the Court discerns no meaningful distinction between adding a header to the front of the data and adding data to the rear of the header. The header and data are simply combined with the header in front of the data (i.e., prepended) and, therefore, the data to the rear of the header.
Accordingly, the Court construes "prepend" and its variants as follows:
Disputed Term Plaintiff's Defendants' Proposed Construction Proposed Construction without an interrupt dividing no construction necessary indefinite • '241 Patent Claims 1, 18, 22
Plaintiff submits: There is no dispute regarding the meaning of "interrupt" or "dividing" in the context of an interrupt dividing the processing of a network layer header and transport layer header. Dkt. No. 181 at 22-23. Rather, the dispute appears to be whether it makes sense to require processing not performed by the host not be divided by an interrupt to the host. Id. at 23 (citing Lanning Opening Decl. ¶ 56). But that dispute is not germane to the indefiniteness inquiry — one of skill in the art would know if an interrupt divides the processing, or not. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: During prosecution of the '241 Patent, Plaintiff maintained that it did not know the meaning of "interrupt." Dkt. No. 303 at 25-26 (citing '241 Patent File Wrapper October 2, 2006 Reply at 14, Dkt. No. 303-12 at 15). And it does not make sense for the "interrupt" to be an interrupt to the host processor because the interface device — and not the host processor — performs the header processing. Id. at 26.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: Plaintiff's prosecution position was based not on an inability to understand "interrupt" but rather on "the difficulty involved in formulating such an opinion" and "the lack of relevance of such an opinion." Dkt. No. 307 at 17 (quoting citing '241 Patent File Wrapper October 2, 2006 Reply at 13, Dkt. No. 303-12 at 14). Now, both Plaintiff's and Defendants' experts have formulated and articulated the opinion that "interrupt" is well understood in the art. Id. at 17-18. Moving the header processing to the interface does not render the claims indefinite; rather, "avoiding the host processor is how the invention accomplishes the goal of eliminating host interrupts." Id. at 18.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
The issue in dispute is whether the meaning of "without an interrupt dividing" is reasonably certain in the context of the '241 Patent. It is.
The Court is not persuaded that this term renders any claim indefinite simply because it may be redundant. The claim language at issue provides:
See, e.g., '241 Patent 98:38-42. This encompasses the embodiment of all network layer and transport layer processing being performed outside the host, on the network interface. If such processing is performed solely on the network interface, then, by necessity, there is no host interrupt dividing the process. This is the opposite of the situation in Trustees of Columbia University v. Symantec Corporation, where the limitation could never be met. 811 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, Defendants have failed to prove that "without an interrupt dividing" renders any claim indefinite.
Disputed Term Plaintiff's Defendants' Proposed Construction Proposed Construction not subject to § 112, ¶ 6 means for receiving, by the networkalternative : subject to § 112, ¶ 6 interface device from the computer, a •function : [not disputed] command to transmit data from the •structure : a network interface •function : [not disputed] computer to the network device, a register •structure indefinite on the network interface • '104 Patent Claim 22 device, and equivalents thereof means for sending, by the network interface not subject to § 112, ¶ 6 device to the network, data subject to § 112, ¶ 6 corresponding to the command, includingalternative : means for prepending a •function : [not disputed] •function : [not disputed] transport layer header to at least some •structure : a network interface •structure : indefinite of the data device and equivalents thereof • '104 Patent Claim 22 means for sending, by the network interface device to the computer an indication not subject to § 112, ¶ 6 that the data has been sent from the network interface device toalternative : subject to § 112, ¶ 6 the network, prior to receiving, by the •function : [not disputed] • function [not disputed] network interface device from the network, •structure : a network interface • structure: indefinite an acknowledgement (ACK) device and that the data has been received equivalents thereof • '104 Patent Claim 22
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: The claims of the '104 Patent themselves recite the structure for performing the function and therefore § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Dkt. No. 181 at 30-31. Specifically, each "means for" limitation in Claim 22 of the '104 Patent specifies the "network interface device." Id. at 31. This "network interface device" is informed by the disclosure of the '104 Patent. Id. at 31-32. Specifically, the patent describes the claimed functions as performed by the network interface device. Id. This device is special-purpose hardware, not a general-purpose processor, and therefore the patent need not describe algorithms for the recited functions. Id. at 32-33.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: The claims do not themselves recite sufficient structure because the "network interface device" does not "specif[y] the
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: The "written description [] inform[s] the analysis of whether the claim recites sufficiently definite structure to overcome the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 governs the construction of the claim." Dkt. No. 307 at 19 (quoting Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (modification by the Court)). And the description of the network interface device is legally sufficient. Id. at 19 (citing Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether these terms are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Second, if they are governed by that statute, whether the '104 Patent meets the statutory disclosure requirement. They are governed by the statute and they do not meet the disclosure requirement.
Plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies. Because the terms include the "means for" language, the Court presumes that § 112, ¶ 6 applies. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). This presumption can be overcome if the claim includes "sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited function ... even if the claim uses the term `means.'" Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (citing Personalized Media). Here, the only aspect of structure for the "means for receiving, by the network interface device from the computer" or the "means for sending, by the network interface device to the network" or the "means for sending, by the network interface device to the computer" is the network interface device itself. But that device is an object of the means and cannot itself be the means. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that in "bank computer including means for [performing a function]" the "bank computer" could not itself be the "means" because finding the means to be that which includes the means would be "redundant and illogical"). Here, the syntactic structure of the claim language (reproduced here with emphasis by the Court) strongly suggests that "network interface device," like the "bank computer" in Net MoneyIN, is not coextensive with the "means." Rather, the various means enable the network interface device to receive a command from the computer, send data to the network, and send an indication to the computer. Simply, while the various "means" of the claim may be part of or attached to the network interface device, they are not just the network interface device.
The Plaintiff has not identified adequate structure in the '104 Patent. As just explained, the syntactic structure of the claim language indicates that the various "means" are not simply the "network interface device." Therefore, for the same reason that identifying the "network interface device" of the claims does not take this claim language outside the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6, identifying a "network interface device" as the corresponding structure does not satisfy the disclosure requirements of § 112, ¶ 6.
Accordingly, Court determines that these terms are not adequately supported under § 112, ¶ 6.
Disputed Term Plaintiff's Proposed Defendants' Proposed Construction Construction means, coupled to the host computer, for receiving subject to § 112, ¶ 6 subject to § 112, ¶ 6 from outside the apparatus a response to an ISCSI read request command •function : [not disputed] •function : [not disputed] and for fast-path processing a portion of the •structure : network •structure : indefinite response to the ISCSI read request command, interface device a the portion including data, the portion processor in a being fast-path processed such that the network interface data is placed into the destination memory device, and on the host computer without the protocol equivalents stack of the host computer doing significant thereof network layer or significant transport layer processing, the means also being for receiving a subsequent portion of the response to the ISCSI read request command and for slow-path processing the subsequent portion such that the protocol stack of the host computer does network layer and transport layer processing on the subsequent portion • '205 Patent Claim 31
Plaintiff submits: The structure for performing the functions recited in Claim 31 of the '205 Patent is repeatedly described in the patent as the network interface device. Dkt. No. 181 at 33-34. This meets the statutory disclosure requirement: "all one needs to do in order to obtain the benefit of § 112, ¶ 6 is to recite some structure corresponding to the means in the specification." Id. at 33 (quoting Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: There are four functions recited: (1) "receiving ... a response...,"
(2) "fast-path processing a portion of the response ...," (3) "receiving a subsequent portion of the response ...," and (4) "slow-path processing the subsequent portion...." Dkt. No. 303 at 31-32. And the means for performing these functions must be "coupled to the host computer." Id. at 32. But the '205 Patent does not disclose any structure for performing these functions that is coupled to the host computer. Id. Specifically, the patent discloses that "slow-path processing" is performed by the host computer and not the network interface device. Id. Indeed, Claim 31 itself recites that the "slow-path processing" is performed by "the protocol stack of the host computer." Id. 33. As such, the patent does not satisfy the disclosure requirements of § 112, ¶ 6. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: Claim 31 recites the structure for performing the "slow-path
The issue in dispute distills to whether the '205 Patent adequately discloses structure for a "means, coupled to the host computer, for ... slow-path processing the subsequent portion such that the protocol stack of the host computer does network layer and transport layer processing on the subsequent portion." It does.
The '205 Patent explains — and the claim expressly recites — that the network- and transport-layer processing of the slow-path processing is performed by the host computer. As stated in the claim,
'205 Patent 46:23-29 (emphasis added). That is, a function performed by (and in part defining) the means, is slow-path processing
Accordingly, Court determines that there is adequate disclosure of structure for this term:
Plaintiff's Defendants' Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction [processing the packets by a] first mechanism, [so that ...] not subject to § 112, ¶ 6 [sending, by the] first mechanism [the data from eachalternative : subject to § 112, ¶ 6 packet...] •function : [not disputed] •structure : a network interface •function : [not disputed] divice, a register on •structure : indefinite [processing the second plurality the network interface device, of packets by the] first and equivalents mechanism,[so that...] thereof • '241 Patent Claims 1, 7 not subject to § 112. ¶ 6 subject to § 112, ¶ 6alternative •function : [not disputed] [processing a transport layer •function : [not disputed] •structure : the host CPU header of another packet by •structure : a host CPU operating operating the 1 ware described a] second mechanism [...] a TCP protocol at '241 patent, stack, as detailed in, e.g., 9:34-48, 9:66 to 10:23, • '241 Patent Claim 5 '241 patent, 9:34-48, 9:66 39:32-45, 43:9-35, Fig. to 10:23, 39:32-45. 43:9-35, 4B, and equivalents Fig. 4B, and equivalents thereof thereof not subject to § 112. ¶ 6 subject to § 112, ¶ 6 [providing by a] first mechanismalternative •function : [not disputed] [a block of data and a •function : [not disputed] •structure : the host CPU Transmission Control Protocol •structure : a host CPU operating operating the software de (TCP) connection] a TCP protocol scribed at '241 patent, stack, as detailed in, e.g. 9:34-48, 9:66 to 10:23, • '241 Patent Claim 17 '241 patent, 7:42-58, 39:32-45, 43:9-35, Fig. 17:20-36; Fig 11, and 4B, and equivalents equivalents thereof thereof not subject to § 112, ¶ 6 [dividing, by a] second mechanismalternative subject to § 112, ¶ 6 [, the block of data into •function : [not disputed] multiple segments] •structure : a network interface •function : [not disputed] device, a processor in •structure : indefinite • '241 Patent Claim 17 the network interface device, and equivalents thereof
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: The presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 holds because the claims are method claims, not apparatus claims, and the § 112, ¶ 6 analysis should therefore focus on steps for the recited functions rather than mechanisms for the recited functions. Dkt. No. 181 at 35. Specifically, "the point of novelty resides with the steps of these methods, not with the machine that performs them." Id. at 35-36 (citing Cox Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc'n Co. LP, 838 F.3d 1224, 1229, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). And even if
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendants respond: Method claims may include means-plus-function limitations that are subject to § 112, ¶ 6 — the Federal Circuit has in fact held "mechanism" in a method to be governed by the statute. Dkt. No. 303 at 34-35 (citing Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). The patent fails the disclosure requirement of the statute with respect to the "first mechanism" term of Claims 1 and 7 and the "second mechanism" term of Claim 17 because it does not describe any structures adequate to perform the corresponding functions. Id. at 35-36 (citing Lanning Opening Decl. ¶¶ 169-71, 176-81; Lanning Rebuttal Decl. ¶¶ 131-36). The "second mechanism" of Claim 5 and the "first mechanism" of Claim 17 are restricted to the structure disclosed at '241 Patent fig.4B, 9:34-48, 9:66-10:23, 39:32-45, 43:9-35, and equivalents. Id. at 36.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: Method claims are governed by § 112, ¶ 6 only in unusual circumstances that Defendants have not established; therefore, the presumption against the statute holds. Dkt. No. 307 at 20-21 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). With respect to the network interface device corresponding to the "first mechanism" of Claims 1 and 7 and the "second mechanism" of Claim 17, a "person of skill in the art would understand how [to] create such a device given the disclosures in the specification" and there is no need to disclose an algorithm for the special-purpose hardware. Id. at 21-22. With respect to the CPU operating the TCP protocol stack corresponding to the "second mechanism" of Claim 5 and "first mechanism" of Claim 17, the only software required is the protocol stack, it is not limited to the details provided in the specification. Id. at 22-23.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether these terms are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Second, if they are governed by that statute, whether the '241 Patent meets the statutory disclosure requirement. They are governed by the statute and the '241 Patent satisfies the disclosure requirement.
The "mechanism" terms are structural terms that are meaningful to the scope of the method claims. Method claims may include structural limitations that require the steps of the method be performed in, by, or on a specific structure. See, e.g., Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Direct infringement of claim 1 is clearly limited to practicing the claimed method in a pipelined
The "mechanism" terms are governed by § 112, ¶ 6. The terms do not include the "means" language. Therefore, the Court presumes that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). "[T]he presumption can be overcome and § 112,
The '241 Patent adequately discloses structure for performing the recited functions. To satisfy the structural disclosure requirement of § 112, ¶ 6, "all one needs to do ... is to recite some structure corresponding to the means in the specification, as the statute states, so that one can readily ascertain what the claim means and comply with the particularity requirement of § 112, P 2." Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quotation modification marks omitted). "This is not a high bar." Id. Indeed, the details of how the identified structure performs the recited function need not necessarily be disclosed to satisfy § 112, ¶ 6. See, e.g., Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (linking a "black box" detector with the function satisfied the statute); Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., 319 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (disclosing the "core logic of a computer modified to perform" the function, but without disclosing the details of the modification, satisfied the statute). For the "first mechanism" of Claim 1 and the "second mechanism" of Claim 17, a network interface device is linked to the recited functions. Min Rebuttal ¶ 241, Dkt. No. 181-13 at 127-29. The Court does not understand "network interface device" to denote a general-purpose computer, but rather understands it as a name for specific hardware. As such, it is not subject to the algorithm-disclosure requirements set forth in Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For the "first mechanism" of Claim 17 and the "second mechanism" of Claim 5, the structure linked to the recited functions is the described protocol stack. Min Rebuttal ¶ 243, Dkt. No. 181-13 at 130-33. However, as set forth in the Court's identification of structure below, the structure associated with a particular recited function is not necessarily the entirety of the described protocol stack. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not permit "incorporation of structure from the written description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function").
Accordingly, Court determines that there is adequate disclosure of structure for these term:
Plaintiff's Defendants'
Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction
flow key no construction necessary indefinite
• "880 Patent Claim 32
subject to § 112, ¶ 6
flow re-assembler • function : re-assembling a
no construction necessary data portion of said first
• '880 Patent Claim 41 packet with a data portion
of a second packet in said
communication flow
• structure : Indefinite
Because the parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: In the context of the '880 Patent's disclosure and the surrounding claim language, "flow key" plainly refers to an identifier (key) of a connection or communication flow (as expressly recited). Dkt. No. 181 at 25-26. A "re-assembler," under its plain meaning in the art, is structure for assembling data; thus, the "flow re-assembler" is structure that stores and re-assembles flow data. Id. at 27. This is explicit in Claims 41 and 43. This relates to the frame buffering described in the '880 Patent at column 76, lines 14 through 23 and the frame processing described at column 22, lines 61 through 63. Id. at 27-28. Thus, the term denotes structure and is not governed by § 112, ¶ 6.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: The terms "flow key" and "flow re-assembler" are not found in the patent other than in the claim set, are not terms of art, and "flow" is used in the description to refer to data movement in the fast and slow paths rather than to connections or reassembly of packet data. Dkt. No. 303 at 37. With respect to "flow key," the patent describes neither a key to the fast- or slow-path data flows or a key that contains "a TCP connection for the communication flow and a first hop medium access control (MAC) layer address," as recited in Claim 32. Id. at 38. With respect to "flow re-assembler," the term is simply a verbal construct equivalent to means for performing the recited reassembly function and is thus subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Id. at 39. The patent does not describe a re-assembler for the fast or slow-path data flows, and the only reassembly described concerns reassembly of IP-fragmented packets performed in the
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: The "flow key" of the claims is consistent with the "hash key" of the description. Dkt. No. 307 at 23. "Flow re-assembler" is presumptively not governed by § 112, ¶ 6, and Defendants have not overcome that presumption.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
There are three issues in dispute. First, whether the meaning of "flow key" is reasonably certain. Second, whether "flow re-assembler" is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Third, if subject to § 112, ¶ 6, does the '880 Patent satisfy the disclosure requirement of that statute. Both of these terms were introduced by copying a claim set from another patent in an attempt to force an interference. As part of the request to provoke an interference proceeding, the patentee mapped the claim terms to concepts in the disclosure of the application for the '880 Patent. In the context of the mappings, the meanings of "flow key" and "flow re-assembler" are reasonably certain.
The meaning of flow key as a context identifier is reasonably certain. To begin, "flow key" must be understood in the context of the surrounding claim language:
'880 Patent 93:11-15 (emphasis added). Further, when mapping "flow key" to connection context in the interference request, the patentee identified the '880 Patent's disclosure that (1) CCBs are initialized when the TCP connection is setup, (2) CCBs contain the connection context, including "source and destination IP addresses and source and destination TCP ports that define the connection," and (3) the context is "identified by the IP source and destination addresses and TCP source and destination ports." '880 Patent File Wrapper June 19, 2003 Request to Provoke Interference 58, Dkt. No. 181-23 at 59) (emphasis removed). That is, the patentee stated that the "flow key" that identified "a communication flow" limitation was met by the context identifier. Defendants improperly ignore this intrinsic evidence and instead focus on a use of "flow" that — they argue — is nonsensical in the context of the claims.
With respect to "flow re-assembler," Defendants have not overcome the presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6. The
"Flow re-assembler" connotes structure — software/hardware that includes functionality for reassembling flow data. Claim 41, reproduced here with emphasis by the Court, details how the re-assembler functions in the claim: it is disposed in a network interface, it takes data from a first packet received from a network, it takes data from a second packet received from a network, and it reassembles the data. Further, in the interference request, "flow re-assembler" was mapped to the ordered DMA of data buffers into host memory. See, e.g., '880 Patent File Wrapper June 19, 2003 Request to Provoke Interference 62, Dkt. No. 181-23 at 63. This is in the context of receiving packetized messages over a network and writing the data in those packets to host memory, where "[t]he order in which data is written is important." See '880 Patent 12:14-13:59; see also id. at 76:20-22 ("Incoming frames are processed, assembled then transferred to host memory under the control of the protocol processor."); Min Rebuttal ¶ 94 (noting that "reassembly [is] an inherent part of the process of transmitting certain messages over a network"), Dkt. No. 181-13 at 49. In this context, "flow re-assembler" connotes structure. Ultimately, Defendants have failed to overcome the presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6.
Plaintiff's Defendants'
Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction
the portion of a machine language
or assembly language
operation code instruction that specifies the
status data type of instruction and the
• '880 Patent Claim 32 structure of the data on which
it operates
Plaintiff submits: The claims require that the operation code identifies or indicates the status of a packet and the patent describes an exemplary embodiment of the code as a "status word." Dkt. No. 181 at 20. Defendants' proposed definition of "operation code" should be rejected because it would render the code unable to identify or indicate the status of a packet, as explicitly claimed. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: "Operation code" does not appear in the description of the '880 Patent and therefore the term was not redefined from it ordinary meaning, as provided in Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary (3d ed. 1997). Dkt. No. 303 at 41-42. Therefore, the dictionary definition should be adopted. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: Defendants' proposed construction is improperly divorced from the patent and the surrounding claim language — and would render the claim inoperable. Dkt. No. 307 at 25.
The issue in dispute distills to whether "operation code" should be given the dictionary definition provided by Defendants. It should not.
Defendants' proposed construction — and the dictionary definition on which it is based — is not properly tied to the technological context of the '880 Patent's disclosure, and the intrinsic record. Claim 32 recites "associating an operation code with said packet, wherein said operation code identifies a status of said packet." Thus, the "operation code" is explicitly something that is associated with a packet and identifies the status of the packet. "Operation code" was mapped to the application's "status word" in the interference request. See, e.g., '880 Patent File Wrapper June
Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants' proposed construction and construes "operation code" as follows:
Plaintiff's Defendants'
Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction
a collection of logically related
database data stored together in
collection of organized data one or more computerized
• '880 Patent Claim 32 files
Plaintiff submits: Under the plain meaning of database, it does not need to be data stored as files. Dkt. No. 181 at 19. Indeed, the CCB cache described in the '880 Patent is a database that is not stored as files and would improperly be excluded from Defendants' proposed construction. Id. (citing '880 Patent File Wrapper June 19, 2003 Request to Provoke Interference 51, Dkt. No. 181-23 at 52).
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: The term "database" does not appear in the disclosure of the '880 Patent. Dkt. No. 303 at 42-43. Plaintiff's proposed construction is so broad as to encompass data collections that are not databases, such as a cache. Id. Further, the proposed construction is not supported by Plaintiff's cited dictionaries, which each require data in a database to be related. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following
Plaintiff replies: Defendants' proposed construction is based solely on the conclusory opinion of its expert and is inconsistent
Plaintiff cites further
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether the data of a database is necessarily "logically related." Second, whether the data of a database is necessarily "stored together in one or more computerized files." With respect to the first issue, the Court agrees that the data is related, but declines to require that the data be
Defendants' proposed construction of "database" would improperly exclude from the scope of that word the very embodiment that the patentee identified when mapping the "database" limitation to the patent application in the interference request. Specifically, "database" was mapped to the application's "CCB cache" in the interference request. See, e.g., '880 Patent File Wrapper June 19, 2003 Request to Provoke Interference 58-59, Dkt. No. 181-23 at 59-60. Thus, in the context of the intrinsic record, "database" plainly encompasses a cache. Defendants' extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict this plain meaning. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (extrinsic evidence may not be "used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence").
The extrinsic evidence suggests, however, that a database is not just an organized collection of data, but rather is an organized collection of
Accordingly, the Court construes "database" as follows:
Plaintiff's Defendants'
Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction
subject to § 112, ¶ 6
packet batching module
• function : determining
whether another packet in
no construction necessary said packet memory belongs
• '880 Patent Claim 41 to said communication
flow
• structure : indefinite
Plaintiff submits: The plain meaning of this term in the art refers to software or circuitry used to determine appropriate batches of data packets. Dkt. No. 181 at 28. This meaning is clear from the claims.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: "Packet batching module" is not found in the disclosure of the '880 Patent. Dkt. No. 303 at 43. The term is governed by § 112, ¶ 6 because it does not sufficiently denote structure — "module" is a nonce word. Id. And the patent fails to satisfy the statutory disclosure requirement. Id. at 43-44. Specifically, the disclosure of microcode on the receive sequencer is not structure because there is no disclosure of the algorithm. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following
Plaintiff replies: "Packet batching module" is a structural term and therefore is not governed by § 112, ¶ 6. Dkt. No. 307 at 26. The claim itself conveys this structure in that it provides the objectives and operation of the module. Id.
Plaintiff cites further
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether "packet batching module" is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Second, if it is governed by that statute, whether the '880 Patent meets the statutory disclosure requirement. It is not governed by the statute and therefore is not subject to the disclosure requirement.
Defendants have not overcome the presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6. The Court begins with the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply because the term does not include the "means" language traditionally used to signal application of the statute. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). This "presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." Id. at 1349 (quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendants have not overcome the presumption.
"Packet batching module" connotes structure — software/hardware that includes functionality for determining whether multiple packets belong to the same communication flow. Claim 41, reproduced here with emphasis by the Court, details how the packet batching module functions in the claim: it is disposed in a network interface and it uses information regarding the packet memory and the communication flow to determine if a given packet is associated with the communication flow (and thus belong to the batch of packets associated with the flow). Further, in the interference request, "packet batching model" was mapped to the application's "hash" structure generated by the "receive sequencer" and "used to index directly into
Accordingly, the Court determines that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply and that Defendants have failed to prove that the "packet batching module" renders any claim indefinite.
Plaintiff's Defendants'
Disputed Term Proposed Construction Proposed Construction
subject to § 112, ¶ 6
• function : classifying a
traffic classifier first packet received from
no construction necessary a network by a communication
• '880 Patent Claim 41 flow that includes
said first packet
• structure : indefinite
Plaintiff submits: Under its plain meaning, "traffic classifier" denotes structure comprising software or circuitry that "identifies, groups, and/or prioritizes incoming data." Dkt. No. 181 at 24. An exemplary "traffic classifier" is the receive hardware sequencer described in the '880 Patent. Id. at 24-25 (citing '880 Patent 59:27-33).
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendants respond: "Traffic classifier" is not found in the disclosure of the '880 Patent and was not a term of art in 1997. Dkt. No. 303 at 44-45. Because it is expressed in purely functional terms, it is subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Id. And the patent fails to disclose adequate structure for performing the function. Id. at 45. Specifically, the disclosure of the receive hardware sequencer does not include an algorithm. Id.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendants cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support their position:
Plaintiff replies: "Traffic classifier" is a structural term and therefore is not governed by § 112, ¶ 6. Dkt. No. 307 at 27.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether "traffic classifier" is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Second, if it is governed by that statute, whether the '880 Patent meets the statutory disclosure requirement. It is not governed by the statute and therefore is not subject to the disclosure requirement.
Defendants have not overcome the presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6. The Court begins with the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply because the term does not include the "means" language traditionally used to signal application of the statute. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). This "presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." Id. at 1349 (quotation marks omitted). Defendants have not overcome the presumption.
"Traffic classifier" connotes structure — software/hardware that includes functionality for determining characteristic properties of incoming packets. Claim 41, reproduced here with emphasis by the Court, details how the traffic classifier functions in the claim: it is disposed in a network interface and it processes incoming packets in order to classify the first packet. Further, in the interference request, "traffic classifier" was mapped to the application's
Accordingly, the Court determines that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply and that Defendants have failed to prove that "traffic classifier" renders any claim indefinite.
The Court adopts the constructions above for the disputed and agreed terms of the Asserted Patents. The Court further finds that Claim 22 of the '104 Patent is invalid as indefinite. Furthermore, the parties should ensure that all testimony that relates to the terms addressed in this Order is constrained by the Court's reasoning. However, in the presence of the jury the parties should not expressly or implicitly refer to each other's claim construction positions and should not expressly refer to any portion of this Order that is not an actual construction adopted by the Court. The references to the claim construction process should be limited to informing the jury of the constructions adopted by the Court.
