ROY S. PAYNE, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is the opening claim construction brief of Semcon IP Inc. ("Plaintiff") (Dkt. No. 46, filed on June 12, 2019),
Plaintiff alleges infringement of four U.S. Patents: No. 7,100,061 (the "'061 Patent"), No. 7,596,708 (the "'708 Patent"), No. 8,566,627 (the "'627 Patent"), and No. 8,806,247 (the "'247 Patent") (collectively, the "Asserted Patents"). These patents are related through a series of continuation applications and all ultimately claim priority to the application that issued as the '061 Patent, which was filed on January 18, 2000. The '061 Patent was subject to an inter partes reexamination requested on June 13, 2007 and from which a certificate issued on August 4, 2009.
The Court previously construed terms of the Asserted Patents in Semcon IP Inc. v. Huawei Device USA Inc. et al., No. 2:16-cv-00437-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108040 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2017) ("Huawei"), Semcon IP Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00192-JRG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2019) ("Amazon.com"), and Semcon IP Inc. v. ASUSTeK Computer, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00193-JRG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114957 (E.D. Tex. July 10, 2019) ("ASUSTeK"). Nearly all the terms now before the Court were construed in Huawei, Amazon.com, or ASUSTek.
The Asserted Patents are generally directed to technology for managing a computer system's power consumption by dynamically adjusting the processor's operating frequency and voltage. The technology of the patents may be generally understood with reference to Figure 1 of the '061 Patent, produced below and annotated by the Court. A frequency generator (17) receives an external or "slow" clock (green) and from that generates a processor or "core" clock (purple) for operating the processor's processing unit (16). The generator (17) also provides other clocks for various system-memory and other components. '061 Patent col.3 ll.18-26. As shown in the figure, a voltage generator (12) that is connected to a power supply (13) provides a voltage (blue) to the processor's processing unit 16. See id. at col.2 ll.46-57. The processor's power consumption and operability are related to the voltage and core-clock frequency. See, e.g., id. at col.1 ll.39-47, col.7 ll.39-60.
The abstracts of the Asserted Patents are identical and provide as follows:
Claims 1 and 17 of the '247 Patent, exemplary method and system claims respectively, provide:
"It is a `bedrock principle' of patent law that `the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.'" Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("There is a heavy presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.") (vacated on other grounds).
"The claim construction inquiry ... begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "[I]n all aspects of claim construction, `the name of the game is the claim.'" Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). First, a term's context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim's meaning, because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term's meaning. Id. For example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314-15.
"[C]laims `must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.'" Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). "[T]he specification `is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.'" Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, "`[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.'" Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. "[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited." Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. However, "because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes." Id. at 1318; see also Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution history may be "unhelpful as an interpretive resource").
Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is "`less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.'" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert's conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term's definition are not helpful to a court. Id. Extrinsic evidence is "less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms." Id. The Supreme Court recently explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
There are "only two exceptions to [the] general rule" that claim terms are construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning: "1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution."
To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must "clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term," and "clearly express an intent to define the term." Id. (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee's lexicography must appear "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision." Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee's statements in the specification or prosecution history must amount to a "clear and unmistakable" surrender. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 ("The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope."). "Where an applicant's statements are amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable." 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence, must "inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty." Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). If it does not, the claim fails § 112, ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 901. Whether a claim is indefinite is determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application for the patent was filed. Id. at 911. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). "[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of claim construction." ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
When a term of degree is used in a claim, "the court must determine whether the patent provides some standard for measuring that degree." Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective term is used in a claim, "the court must determine whether the patent's specification supplies some standard for measuring the scope of the [term]." Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The standard "must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art." Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The Parties have agreed to the following constructions set forth in their Joint Claim Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 57).
Having reviewed the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record, the Court hereby adopts the Parties' agreed constructions.
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: Defendant's proposed construction is a construction of "multi-core processor," which does not appear in the claims. Whether a core of a multi-core processor is a CPU is a factual issue of infringement rather than of claim construction. Dkt. No. 46 at 8-9.
Defendant responds: As used in the Asserted Patents, the terms "computer processor," "processor," and "central processor" refer to a CPU and each core in a multi-core processor is a CPU. References in the claims to "the" or "said" processor refer to the CPU, rather than to a component that contains the CPU, such as a multi-core processor. Dkt. No. 48 at 6-10.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Plaintiff replies: The stated purpose of Defendant's proposed construction is to decide as a matter of claim construction an issue of infringement. Dkt. No. 52 at 5.
The issue in dispute distills to whether the Court should construe "multi-core processor." Given that "multi-core processor" is not a term in the Asserted Patents, the Court declines at this stage to rule on whether any claim reads on a multi-core processor.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *18-21. Accordingly, and as explained in Huawei,
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: One of ordinary skill in the art that would understand that something may be determined in a variety of ways, such as through an equation or lookup table. There is nothing indefinite about the Determining terms. Dkt. No. 46 at 9-10.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendant responds: There are many ways by which something may be determined, such as through a random-number generator or throwing darts. One of ordinary skill in the art would not understand what types of determining are encompassed by the claims and what inputs and outputs are associated with the determining. Thus, the claims are indefinite. Dkt. No. 48 at 10-13.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: Defendant's concerns are properly issues of enablement, rather than indefiniteness. Dkt. No. 52 at 5-6.
As in Amazon.com, the issue in dispute distills to whether the Asserted Patents must provide algorithms for the various "determining" functions recited in the claims for the claims to be definite. They do not.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *69-71. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court holds that Defendant has not proven any claim indefinite by reason of including a Determining Term and determines that these terms have their plain and ordinary meanings without the need for further construction.
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: It stands on, and incorporates, the briefing submitted in Amazon.com. Dkt. No. 46 at 10.
Defendant responds: These terms should be construed to clarify that while the voltage is changing, the core clock continues to operate. This is how the patent applicant described the invention and this is how the patent examiner understood the invention. Dkt. No. 48 at 13-15.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: Defendant's proposed construction improperly requires the core clock to be operational at all times during a voltage change and should therefore be rejected. Dkt. No. 52 at 6-7.
There appear to be two issues in dispute. First, whether the claimed execution of instructions during a voltage change necessarily requires operation of the "core clock." It does. Second, whether this clock must continue operating at all times during a recited voltage change. The claims plainly recite that instructions are executed during the voltage change or that the processor is enabled to execute instructions during the voltage change. This means that the clock is necessarily operational at least at some point during the voltage change. But the terms in dispute here do not necessarily require that the clock is operational at all times during the voltage change
These issues were before the Court in Huawei and Amazon.com. Huawei, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108040, at *35-40; Amazon.com, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *21-29. Accordingly, and as explained in Huawei and Amazon.com, the Court rejects the continuous-operation limitation proposed by Defendant and construes these voltage-change terms by construing "executing instructions" and variants in those terms in the claims at issue as follows:
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: The Asserted Patents list exemplary operating conditions, but the claimed operating conditions should not be limited to these exemplary conditions. And while the "instructions to be executed by the processor" are explicitly excluded from certain claimed operating conditions in certain claims, these instructions are listed as an exemplary condition in the patents and should not be excluded from all claimed operating conditions. Dkt. No. 46 at 11-12.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendant responds: During reexamination of the '061 Patent, the patentee disclaimed "instructions to be executed by the processor" from the scope of "operating conditions" by amending claim limitations directed to "determining ... from operating conditions of the processor" to also include "said determination is made independently of instructions to be executed by the processor." Dkt. No. 48 at 15-17
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: If "instructions to be executed by the processor" were not understood to be part of "operating conditions" there would be no need to expressly specify when those instructions are not part of the operating conditions that certain "determining" steps utilize. Dkt. No. 52 at 7.
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether the recited operating "conditions," "characteristics," and "parameters" of the processor are limited to those listed in the Asserted Patents. They are not. Second, whether the recited operating "conditions," "characteristics," and "parameters" of the processor necessarily excludes "instructions to be executed by the processor." They do not.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *42-47. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court rejects Defendant's proposal to limit the terms to "the present frequency and voltage of operation of the processor, the temperature of operation of the processor, or the amount of time the processor spends in one of what may be a number of idle states" and holds that the terms have their plain and ordinary meanings without the need for further construction.
Plaintiff submits: As held in Huawei and Amazon.com, a counter is not limited to a "device" or to something which "counts to a predetermined time." Dkt. No. 46 at 12.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendant responds: The "counter" of the Asserted Patents must count to a predetermined time. For example, Claims 1, 10, and 16 of the '627 Patent expressly require that when the counter reaches a "specified value" clocks are turned on. That is, the counters necessarily count to a specific value, the "specified value." And this value is described in the patents as a predetermined time. This is distinct from a counter that counts random events or "angels dancing on the head of a pin." In fact, the claims were allowed because they were amended to add "counter" and because that counter is for determining an amount of time. Dkt. No. 48 at 17-18.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: The claims do not require the counter to count to a predetermined time. Rather, the claims state that when the counter reaches a predetermined value, an event is triggered. Claim 10 is tied to a time, the others are not. Dkt. No. 52 at 7.
The main issue in dispute is whether the counter of the Asserted Patents necessarily counts to a predetermined time. It does not.
This issue was before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *47-52. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court construes "counter" as follows:
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: With respect to "clock frequency generator," "programmable frequency generator," and "frequency generator," the Parties have agreed to rest on the briefing and argument offered in Amazon.com. With respect to "clock frequency source" and "clock generator," these are not necessarily external to the processor. Construing these to include an "external" limitation would improperly import limitations from embodiments described in the Asserted Patents. Dkt. No. 46 at 13-14.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendant responds: With respect to "clock frequency generator," "programmable frequency generator," and "frequency generator," the Parties have agreed to rest on the briefing and argument offered in Amazon.com. With respect to "clock frequency source" and "clock generator," these correspond to the clock generator in the described embodiments that is uniformly described as external to the processor. There are no described embodiments in which the clock generator is within the processor. Dkt. No. 48 at 18-19.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: Defendant's sole argument to require the "clock frequency source" and "clock generator" to be external to the processor is that the embodiment depicted in Figure 1 of the Asserted Patents has an external clock generator. This is not a sufficient reason to limit the terms to a source/generator that is external to the processor. Dkt. No. 52 at 8.
There are two main issues in dispute, both related to the location of the particular source/generator. First, as presented by the Parties in Amazon.com, whether the frequency generator of the claims is necessarily on the same chip as the processor. It is. Second, whether the clock generator of the claims is necessarily external to the processor. It is not.
These issues were before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *52-61. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court rejects Defendant's "external" construction for "clock frequency source" and "clock generator," determines those terms have their plain and ordinary meaning without the need for construction, and construes the frequency-generator terms as follows:
Plaintiff submits: Some claims expressly recite that the "voltage source includes a power supply"; thus, a voltage source is not necessarily a power supply nor does it necessarily include a power supply. In fact, Figure 1 of the Asserted Patents depicts the voltage source and the power supply as distinct components. Dkt. No. 46 at 14-15.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendant responds: In Huawei, the Court construed "voltage source includes a programmable voltage supply" as "voltage source includes a power supply configured to provide one of a plurality of distinct voltage levels specified by an input" indicating that a voltage source at least includes a power supply. In fact, Plaintiff has not explained what a voltage source that does not include a power supply would be. Further, Claims 10 and 17 of the '247 Patent have a voltage source that is controlled to provide two voltage levels and "voltage source" should be construed to clarify that the voltage levels are distinct and that the control is effected by specifying an input, as described in the patent. Dkt. No. 48 at 19-21.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: The Asserted Patents describe that "voltage source" and "power supply" are distinct concepts and there is no reason to limit a "voltage source" to one that has an output specified by an input. Dkt. No. 52 at 8.
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether a "voltage source" is necessarily a "power supply." It is not. Second, whether a voltage source is necessarily "configured to provide one of a plurality of distinct voltage levels specified by an input." It is not.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *61-66. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court rejects Defendant's proposal to limit a voltage source to a "power supply configured to provide one of a plurality of distinct voltage levels specified by an input" and determines that "voltage source" has is plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: The plain meaning of "causing a change in ... voltage," and variants, requires neither a "voltage generator" nor changing the voltage to a "determined voltage level." Dkt. No. 46 at 15-16.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendant responds: Causing a change in voltage, as described and claimed in the '061 Patent, requires a controlled and purposeful change as opposed to random voltage fluctuations. Thus, and as described in the patent, causing a voltage change requires a voltage generator that provides a determined voltage based on an input. Dkt. No. 48 at 22-23.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: As the Court explained in Amazon.com, the '061 Patent provides several structures other than a "voltage generator" for providing a voltage. Also, as explained in Amazon.com, random voltage changes are not within the scope of these terms. Dkt. No. 52 at 9.
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether causing a voltage change necessarily requires changing the voltage to a determined level as a result of a specified input. It does not. Second, whether causing a voltage change necessarily requires a voltage generator. It does not.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *66-69. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court rejects Defendant's request to read in the limitations of "voltage generator changes the voltage furnished by the voltage generator to the determined voltage level as a result of a specified input" and determines that the causing-a-change-in-voltage terms have their plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: It stands on, and incorporates, the briefing submitted in Amazon.com. Dkt. No. 46 at 16-17.
Defendant responds: These terms require not only that the core clock is shut down, but that the processor does not execute instructions during the frequency change. This is explained in the Asserted Patents and during prosecution of the '708 and '627 Patents. Dkt. No. 48 at 24-25.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: The claims are open ended, therefore changing frequency while execution of instructions is not stopped is not precluded. Dkt. No. 52 at 10.
Given the Parties' references to Amazon.com, there appear to be three issues in dispute. First, whether stopping execution of instructions during a frequency change necessarily means stopping the core clock. It does not. Second, whether the "clock" that is expressly stopped according to the claims is necessarily the core clock. It is. Third, whether the clock/execution of instructions is necessarily stopped for the entire time the frequency is changed. It is not.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *29-35. Accordingly, and as explained in Amazon.com, the Court rejects Defendant's proposals to limit the claims to require stopping the core clock in order to stop execution of instructions and to require that the execution and clock are stopped for all frequency changes. For the terms that do not include the term "clock," the Court holds those terms to have their plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction. For the clock terms at issue in the claims of the '627 Patent identified by the Parties, the Court construes the terms as follows to clarify that stopping the clocks involves stopping the core clock:
Plaintiff submits: As the Court held in Huawei and Amazon.com, the meaning of "level of permitted power" is reasonably certain. In the context of "determining a level of permitted power consumption" (as claimed), the permitted power consumption is "a function of user-setting and device-limit parameters" and whether such is determined is objectively determinable. Dkt. No. 46 at 19.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendant responds: Because what level of power consumption is permitted varies from processor engineer to processor engineer, the meaning of this term is not reasonably certain. Further, while determining a power level based on user settings may be objective, what settings are permitted is subjective. Dkt. No. 48 at 26-27.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: As explained in the '247 Patent, the permitted power is different for different circumstances, and one of ordinary skill in the art would know how to calculate the permitted power level depending on the circumstances. Dkt. No. 52 at 11.
Plaintiff cites further intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
The issue in dispute is whether the meaning of "level of permitted power" of a processor is reasonably certain to one of ordinary skill in the art. It is.
This issue was before the Court in Huawei and Amazon.com. Huawei, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108040, at *31-34; Amazon.com, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *76-78. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in Huawei and Amazon.com, the Court holds that Defendant has failed to prove that any claim is indefinite for including "level of permitted power" and determines the term has its plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: As known in the art, "[w]hen operating above certain frequency thresholds and/or below certain voltage thresholds, processors will cease to function." That standard values for operating voltage and frequency are provided in a processor's data sheet. Whether a particular processor is able to function at a certain voltage-frequency setting is a factual matter. Dkt. No. 46 at 20.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following
Defendant responds: The Asserted Patents provide no examples of what it means for a processor to be incapable of functioning or even what level of dysfunction rises to not functioning. And while data sheets may provide operating settings, they provide only recommended settings. Further, data sheets are not mentioned in the '708 Patent. Thus, whether a processor is incapable of functioning is a purely subjective issue and these terms render claims indefinite. Dkt. No. 48 at 27-28.
In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following
Plaintiff replies: As explained by its expert witness, a processor is not able to function at a particular frequency unless a sufficient voltage is supplied. Dkt. No. 52 at 11-12.
Plaintiff cites further
The issue in dispute is whether what it means that a processor is not capable of functioning or cannot function is reasonably certain to one of ordinary skill in the art. It is.
This is substantially the same dispute as before the Court in Amazon.com. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79846, at *78-82. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in Amazon.com, the Court holds that Defendant has not proven any claim is indefinite for including "is not capable of functioning" or "can not function" and determines that these terms have their plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.
Because the Parties' arguments and proposed constructions with respect to these terms are related, the Court addresses the terms together.
Plaintiff submits: Monitoring a condition or a parameter is not necessarily continuous in nature nor does it necessarily require measuring. For example, as is known in the art, monitoring may be accomplished by reading a value on regular intervals (continuously) or only when certain conditions are met or on an interrupt. Also, as is known in the art, monitoring may be based simply on receiving information without making a measurement. Dkt. No. 46 at 21-22.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendant responds: The Asserted Patents are directed to managing processor power consumption by dynamically adjusting the processor's frequency and voltage, and doing so necessarily requires continuous monitoring of certain operating conditions. Further, monitoring a parameter, condition, or characteristic necessarily requires measuring the condition of that parameter, condition, or characteristic. Dkt. No. 48 at 28-30.
Plaintiff replies: There is no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of record that establishes that monitoring necessarily requires continuous measurement. Rather, the unrebutted expert testimony is that monitoring is not so limited. Even if some monitoring requires measurement of values, the measuring may be performed separately from the monitoring. For example, a processor may monitor a voltage that is measured by a separate component. Dkt. No. 52 at 12-13.
There are two issues in dispute. First, whether the claimed monitoring is necessarily continuous. It is not. Second, whether the claimed monitoring necessarily includes measuring. It does not.
The Court is not persuaded that monitoring is necessarily continuous or necessarily includes measuring. Notably, Defendant has not provided any evidence that the power-management purpose of the inventions is met only if the claimed monitoring is continuous or that monitoring necessarily includes measuring. Simply, there is no evidentiary basis for limiting the broad terms "monitor" and "monitoring" as Defendant proposes.
Accordingly, the Court rejects the "continually measuring" limitation and determines the Monitoring Terms have their plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.
Plaintiff submits: This term refers to moving the operating frequency or voltage closer to a target frequency or voltage. "Magnitude" in the term denotes that when the operating frequency or voltage is lower than the target, the operating frequency or voltage is increased rather than decreased. In such a situation, the magnitude is reduced by increasing the operating frequency or voltage, while the difference would be reduced (made more negative) by decreasing the operating frequency or voltage. Dkt. No. 46 at 22-23.
In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position:
Defendant responds: The meaning of "reducing a magnitude of a difference" is not reasonably certain as it is not clear "what quantitative measure should be applied to the term `magnitude'" nor is it clear what it means for a difference to be "reduced by a `magnitude.'" Specifically, "reducing a magnitude of a difference" is a term of degree and the intrinsic record does not provide the requisite objective standard for measuring the degree. Plaintiff's proposed construction similarly fails. Dkt. No. 48 at 30-33.
Plaintiff replies: The term "magnitude" is inherently objective and thus is distinguishable from terms of degree that have been held to invalidate claims. Dkt. No. 52 at 13-14.
The substantially same issue was before the Court in Huawei and ASUSTeK. Huawei, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108040, at *52-56; ASUSTeK, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114957, at *22-25. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in Huawei and ASUSTeK, Defendant has not proven that "reducing the magnitude of a difference" renders any claim indefinite and construes the terms as follows:
The Court adopts the constructions above for the disputed and agreed terms of the Asserted
Patents. Furthermore, the Parties should ensure that all testimony that relates to the terms addressed in this Order is constrained by the Court's reasoning. However, in the presence of the jury the Parties should not expressly or implicitly refer to each other's claim construction positions and should not expressly refer to any portion of this Order that is not an actual construction adopted by the Court. The references to the claim construction process should be limited to informing the jury of the constructions adopted by the Court.
