JANE J. BOYLE, District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendants' Rule 12 Motions to Dismiss (doc. 19), filed January 1, 2011. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the Motions should be and hereby are
This case involves the alleged miscalculation and underpayment of amounts owed to Plaintiff Lincoln General Insurance Company ("Lincoln General") by Defendant U.S. Auto Insurance Services, Inc. ("U.S. Auto"). Lincoln General is the reinsurer of a variety of auto insurance policies sold by U.S. Auto, as Managing General Agent for State and County Mutual Fire Insurance Company ("State and County"). (Pl.'s Original Compl. ¶¶ 1). Pursuant to General Agency Agreements ("GAAs") and Reinsurance Agreements signed in 2002 and 2003 between the foregoing entities, Lincoln General alleges that it was entitled to a portion of the premiums collected on the policies sold by U.S. Auto. (Id. ¶ 1, 28). U.S. Auto's responsibilities under the Agreements included the "collection and handling of premiums." (Id. ¶ 33). The Agreements "also required U.S. Auto to provide Lincoln General with monthly reports detailing and calculating the amounts owing to Lincoln General." (Id. ¶ 42). In exchange for its services, U.S. Auto was to receive certain commissions. (Id. ¶ 34).
In April, 2007, U.S. Auto transferred its reinsurance business from Lincoln General to one of its own subsidiaries, Santa Fe Auto Insurance Company ("Santa Fe"). (Id. ¶ 46). Around that same time, U.S. Auto also purportedly began withholding premiums due to Lincoln General. (Id. ¶ 59). Lincoln General alleges U.S. Auto, in order to increase its own compensation, stopped using the method it had used for calculating its commissions under the Agreements for the prior four years, instead using a system of calculation that withheld and misappropriated millions of dollars from Lincoln General to U.S. Auto. (Id. ¶¶ 46-56). Two lawsuits followed.
Lincoln General first brought suit against Defendants for the above-described conduct on November 27, 2007.
On November 12, 2010, Lincoln General filed its Original Complaint in the instant action, re-alleging its 2007 claims and adding other claims (doc. 1). On January 10, 2011, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (doc. 19), seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Rules 12(b)(4), (5), and (6). Defendants have since withdrawn their Motions under Rules 12(b)(4)and 12(b)(5).
Lincoln General responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on February 10, 2011 (doc. 29), and Defendants filed their Reply on March 10, 2011 (doc. 37). The Motion thus being ripe, the Court turns to the merits of its decision.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff may support her claim for relief with any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accepts `all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). Such a motion should only be granted when the complaint does not include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,'
In their Joint Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), seek dismissal of certain of Lincoln General's claims on the following grounds:
(Defs.' Reply 3-15).
The Court begins its analysis by addressing the Defendants' second and third grounds, above, regarding whether the MOU precludes certain of Lincoln General's claims and whether the State and County Assignment is valid.
Defendants contend that the MOU's limitation of remedy provision necessitates the dismissal of several of Lincoln General's claims that were not raised in the 2007 suit. (See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 28-30; 35; 40-42). The limitation of remedy provision is located in Section IX of the MOU:
(Mem. of Understanding § IX). Defendants maintain that the language "Lincoln's sole remedy shall be to refile the lawsuit" unambiguously evinces the parties' intent that any subsequent lawsuit only contain the claims of the original 2007 suit. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 30).
Lincoln General responds that other provisions within the MOU would be rendered meaningless were the Court to accept Defendants' construction of Section IX. First, it argues that Section V, dealing with dismissal without prejudice of the 2007 Action,
When construing a written instrument like the MOU, the principal aim of the court is to discern the true intent of the parties as conveyed through the terms of the instrument. Frost Nat'l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311-312 (Tex.2005). In determining the parties' intent, the Court looks to the objective intentions expressed in the contract itself. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.2003). Thus, a contract should be construed according to its plain meaning unless the contract itself shows the parties intended a different meaning. Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996). The Court must be mindful that the parties
If there is no ambiguity in an agreement, the court may construe the agreement as a matter of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983). A contract is ambiguous "when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning." Id. However, when a contract can only be reasonably interpreted one way, "`[t]he failure to include more express language of the parties' intent does not create an ambiguity.'" Instone Travel Tech Marine & Offshore v. Int'l. Shipping Partners, 334 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex.1996)). Neither Lincoln General nor Defendants contend that any provision in the MOU is ambiguous. (See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 29-30; Pl.'s Resp. 26-28).
The parties do not dispute that Texas contract law applies to the instant dispute, nor that parties may limit the available remedies in case of non-performance under a contract. (See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 30 (citing several sources)). Instead, the central dispute is whether the parties intended for Section IX to prohibit Lincoln General from filing any claims that were not a part of the 2007 lawsuit. Based on the plain language of the MOU, the Court concludes that the parties did not intend to so limit a successive suit.
As stated above, the Court is mindful that a proper construction of a contract is one in which the interpretation of any one clause does not render another clause meaningless. See Westwind Exploration, 696 S.W.2d at 382. The Court need only look at Section VI's treatment of tolling to determine that Defendants' interpretation falls far short of this test. First, Section VI establishes tolling for "all causes of action at issue in [the 2007 Action] or otherwise related to the [General Agency Agreements and Reinsurance Agreement]." (Mem. of Understanding § VI (emphasis added)). Limiting the potential causes of action in the instant case would render the "or otherwise related to" language in the tolling provision meaningless. Thus, "otherwise related to the [Agreements]" would include Lincoln General's additional claims for conversion of expiring policies, breach of fiduciary duty, or declaratory and injunctive relief Lincoln General now leveled in the 2010 suit. While Defendants argue that this "otherwise related" language refers to claims that might arise while the MOU is in place and not claims existing prior to the formation of the MOU, Defendants noticeably do not point to any language in the MOU to support this theory. (See Defs.' Reply 6).
Defendants' position is further debunked by other language in Section VI: "[T]his tolling agreement shall extend to, but not be limited to, Lincoln General's `Other Causes of Action' detailed in the April 30, 2008 letter agreement between Lincoln General [and Defendants]." (Mem. of Understanding § VI). The April 30, 2008 letter, which Lincoln General attached to its Response,
Accordingly, the Court finds that the MOU unambiguously refuses to limit the available causes of action in the 2010 suit to those delineated in the 2007 suit. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, to the extent it seeks the dismissal of Lincoln General's claims for conversion of expiring insurance policies, breach of fiduciary duty individually against Doug Maxwell, and declaratory and injunctive relief because of the MOU's limitation of remedy provision, is therefore
Defendants also claim that the "Assignment of Rights" (the "Assignment") between State and County and Lincoln General is invalid, and thus the Court should dismiss any claim asserted by Lincoln General purportedly assigned by State and County. Defendants maintain that the Assignment is void because it contains a "revocability clause," which they claim is impermissible under Texas law. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 31-32). Defendants alternatively contend that public policy grounds also render the Assignment void because State and County's revocation of the Assignment would disrupt the litigation process. (Id. at 32). Lincoln General responds that the language of the Assignment only permits termination of the agreement, not revocation, and that nevertheless Texas Law does not uniformly bar revocable assignments. (Pl.'s Resp. 30-31). Moreover, Lincoln General claims that because the Assignment is not revocable, the Defendants' public policy concerns are unfounded. (Id. at 30-32).
Under Texas law, an assignment is simply a transfer or setting over of property, or some right or interest, from one person to another. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Allan, 777 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ). One such "right or interest" is the assignment of a claim or "chose in action." See PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd., 146 S.W.3d 79, 87 & n. 31 (Tex.2004). An assignment operates as a contract between the assignor and assignee, and thus contract law governs the interpretation of assignments. Id.; Cadle Co. v. Henderson, 982 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). In construing a contract, a court must be mindful that the parties to a writing will not include a clause unless they intend it to have some effect. Westwind Exploration, 696 S.W.2d at 382. Thus, if a certain construction of the contract renders a clause meaningless, that reading is unreasonable and therefore not favored. Id.
Here, State and County agreed to assign to Lincoln General its right to sue U.S. Auto, but retained the ability to terminate the Assignment at will. The Assignment reads:
(Pl.'s Compl. Ex. C. at 2) (emphasis added). Interpreting this provision so as to accord meaning to each phrase, Lincoln General and State and County unequivocally intended to allow State and County to terminate the assignment at will. Defendants contend that this phrase violates Texas assignment law, rendering the assignment invalid, and leaving Lincoln General with no ability to sue on State and County's behalf. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 31-32).
Under Texas law, "[an] assignor, after an unqualified assignment and notice to the obligor, generally loses all control over the chose. . . ." Allan, 777 S.W.2d at 453 (emphasis added). As authority for this proposition, the court in Allan cited § 112 of American Jurisprudence's treatment of assignments. Id. Section 112 warns that "[t]he operation and effect of an assignment may be limited by exceptions, reservations, conditions, or restrictions, so long as the restrictions do not violate any statutory provisions or general rules of policy." 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments § 112 (1963). Thus, while an assignment generally results in a total loss of control by the assignor, the parties may contractually afford the assignor the ability to terminate the assignment. Defendants do not and indeed cannot point to any case or statute that says the Court should ignore the manifested intent of the parties in declaring the assignment void on revocability grounds.
Defendants' alternative contention is that the State and County Assignment should be declared invalid as against public policy. Under Texas law, an assignment becomes invalid whenever it "may increase or distort litigation", and assignments are prohibited when they "may skew the trial process, confuse or mislead the jury, promote collusion among nominal adversaries, or misdirect damages from more culpable to less culpable defendants." PPG Indus., 146 S.W.3d at 90. Defendants argue that if State and County can revoke Lincoln General's right to sue at any time, State and County may sit on the sidelines of litigation and revoke Lincoln General's right to sue at the moment the litigation is going unfavorably. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 32-33). Lincoln General counters that Defendants misunderstand the distinction between termination, the word used in the Assignment, and revocation or recision. (Pl.'s Resp. 30). Lincoln General claims that while revocation or recision restores parties to the position they were in before the contract existed, termination is a prospective remedy that only eliminates rights which have not vested. (Id.). Defendants respond that this alleged distinction does not bear any weight in the instant case because even if State and County can merely "terminate"
Texas courts agree that "[t]he purpose of rescission is to place the parties in the position that they would have occupied if no such contract had ever been made." In re SeaQuest Diving, LP, 579 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 855 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)); see also Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F.3d 746, 754 (5th Cir.1996) ("Under Texas law, parties may mutually agree to `rescind' a contract, restoring the status quo ante."). However, Texas law is unclear as to the precise effect a "termination" has on the parties' rights under a contract. See Sid Richardson, 99 F.3d at 754.
In considering the distinction between "recision" and "termination" at length, the Fifth Circuit in Sid Richardson noted that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code . . . defines `termination' as a prospective remedy only . . .," not a retroactive remedy that extinguishes vested rights. Id. (citing Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 2.106(c)). The court also pointed to several other authorities that similarly distinguish between termination and rescission. See id. at 754 n. 8 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 283 cmt. a (1981) and Corbin on Contracts § 1266 at 66-67 (1962)). Nevertheless, the court, noting that its purpose in interpreting the contract was to "vindicate the intent of the parties," found Texas law to be too ambiguous to establish one uniform definition of "termination." Id. at 754. Instead, the Court looked to the terms of the contract. Id. The contract itself did not create an unambiguous meaning of "terminate," and it was instead found to be ambiguous. Id.
In keeping with the Fifth Circuit's opinion, the Court finds Texas law ambiguous as to the meaning of "terminate," as the parties have not cited, nor has the Court found, a single case since Sid Richardson that sets out the term's meaning. Thus, the Court looks to the terms of the assignment itself to ascertain the intention of the parties. However, here too, the parties have not pointed to, nor has the Court found, any language in the Assignment that would indicate what effect the parties intended the term "terminate" to have, and particularly what rights each party would have concerning litigation commenced prior to such termination. A motion to dismiss is not the proper stage for a court to consider extrinsic evidence of contracting parties' intent, and the parties properly have not offered any. The parties may raise their arguments concerning the State and County Assignment once again, if proper, at summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, in so far as it seeks dismissal of Lincoln General's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion against U.S. Auto, conversion against U.S. Auto, and breach of fiduciary duty against Doug Maxwell because of the State and County Assignment, is
Having considered Defendants' threshold challenges to Lincoln General's claims involving the MOU and the State and County Assignment, the Court now turns to the remaining claims the Defendants move to dismiss.
Lincoln General claims that because U.S. Auto defaulted under the terms of the
In addition to their argument that this claim is precluded by the MOU, Defendants also contend that this claim should be dismissed because U.S. Auto did not owe any duty to Lincoln General. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 28-29). More specifically, Defendants argue that Lincoln General plead only that U.S. Auto and Santa Fe converted policies owing to it, not State and County, the only party to which Defendants might owe a duty with this claim. However, the Court finds that any doubt in this respect is easily resolved in favor of Lincoln General. It is manifest from Lincoln General's Complaint, when viewed in its entirety, that Lincoln General seeks to utilize the rights assigned to it by State and County. (See id. ¶ 6 ("Prior to filing this Second Lawsuit, Lincoln General obtained an assignment of all rights State and County . . . has, or could have, against U.S. Auto arising out of the GAAs and Reinsurance Agreements, at law, and in equity."). Furthermore, Lincoln General's conversion claim is premised on U.S. Auto and Santa Fe's converting property they no longer had use of and control over under the GAAs. (Id. ¶¶ 84-86). It would be unduly burdensome and unnecessary to require Lincoln General to specifically replead that the converted polices were owned by State and County. Indeed, it is evident from Defendants' briefing that they had notice of and anticipated that Lincoln General was likely bringing this claim on State and County's behalf. (See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 29 n. 15).
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Lincoln General's conversion claims is hereby
Lincoln General alleges Doug Maxwell, as director, President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Secretary of U.S. Auto, breached his fiduciary duties arising under the Reinsurance Agreements and GAAs. (Pl.'s Original Compl. ¶¶ 99-103). Defendants move to dismiss this claim, arguing that Lincoln General has failed to adequately plead the existence of any fiduciary owed by Doug Maxwell to Lincoln General or State and County. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 34-35). Lincoln General responds that Maxwell has a fiduciary duty arising from any one of three sources: (1) the Texas insurance code; (2) Texas common law; and (3) bankruptcy law. (Pl.'s Resp. 30-37).
In Texas, the elements for breach of fiduciary duty consist of: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendant; (2) a defendant's breach of the fiduciary duty it owed plaintiff; and (3) the breach either caused injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant. Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied)). Texas law recognizes two types of fiduciary duties. Id. at 283. "The first, a formal fiduciary relationship, `arises as a matter of law and includes the relationships between attorney and client, principal and agent, partners, and joint venturers.'" Id. (quoting Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)). Thus, an agent has a duty to deal fairly with the principal in all transactions between them. Id. The second is created informally, "where there is a close personal relationship
The Court examines each of Lincoln General's three legal bases for Doug Maxwell's fiduciary duty in turn.
Lincoln General first alleges that the Texas Insurance Code gives rise to a fiduciary duty owed by Doug Maxwell to State and County. (Pl.'s Resp. 33-34). Specifically, Lincoln General claims Maxwell held an individual managing general agent's license, which in turn gave rise to a fiduciary duty owed to State and County under the Texas Insurance Code. (Id. at 34). The Texas Insurance Code provides that "[a] managing general agent holds money on behalf of an insured or insurer in a fiduciary capacity. . . ." Tex. Ins. Code § 4053.106. However, Defendants respond that Maxwell did not act as the managing general agent in the contract at issue, and thus § 4053.106 is inapplicable. (Defs.' Reply 11).
Indeed, Lincoln General does not assert anywhere in its Complaint that Doug Maxwell served as either its own or State and County's managing general agent, the only basis for liability under the statute. Accordingly, Lincoln General's argument based on the Insurance Code is fundamentally defective. If Doug Maxwell did indeed serve in such a role, Lincoln General should have the opportunity to amend its Complaint to include that allegation, as described in Section IV below.
Lincoln General also maintains that Texas common law imposes a fiduciary duty on Doug Maxwell as the president and sole shareholder of U.S. Auto. (Pl.'s Resp. 34-35). In support of this position, Lincoln General relies wholly on Colonial Penn Ins. v. Mkt. Planners Ins. Agency, 157 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir.1998). In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that a president of an insurance agency could be held jointly and severally liable for unremitted premiums on insurance. Defendants counter that Colonial Penn turned on the fact that the president was also acting as a local recording agent, not merely the president, while Maxwell was clearly not an agent. (Defs.' Reply 12).
Lincoln General's reliance on Colonial Penn is misplaced. That case does not stand for the proposition that a president of a company may be liable to a third-party for his actions as president, rather liability in that case fundamentally turned on the question of whether the president also served as a local recording agent. See Colonial Penn, 157 F.3d at 1037. In its Original Complaint, Lincoln General alleges that Doug Maxwell, "[b]y virtue of his position as the sole director, President, Vice President, Treasurer and Secretary of U.S. Auto, . . . is charged with fiduciary responsibilities in regards to U.S. Auto's activities arising from the Reinsurance Agreements and GAAs." (Pl.'s Original Compl. ¶ 100). Nowhere does Lincoln General allege that Doug Maxwell served as any type of agent. Thus, there is no allegation that Doug Maxwell's conduct gave rise to any duties not ordinarily owed by corporate officers, directors, or shareholders. Indeed, Lincoln General does not point out, nor could the Court find, any case applying Texas law where an individual officer, director, or shareholder of a company who was not also an agent was found to owe a fiduciary duty to a third-party doing business with that company.
The Court therefore finds no common law basis in Lincoln General's Complaint
Finally, Lincoln General claims that several bankruptcy cases from varying jurisdictions stand for the proposition that an officer of an insurance agency owes a fiduciary duty to the insurance company his agency represents. (Pl.'s Resp. 35). Defendants argue that Lincoln General misunderstands the scope and outcome of these cases, that the cases are non-instructive, and that they are contrary to settled Texas law. (Defs.' Reply 12-15).
The Court once again agrees that Lincoln General's reliance on these cases is misplaced. The bankruptcy cases Lincoln General relies upon involve the application of Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. (See Pl.'s Resp. 34-37). That provision provides that "(a) A discharge under section 727 of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). In other words, a debtor may not discharge debt acquired by fraud or defalcation. See id. The cases cited by Lincoln General arise from situations where a debtor attempted to discharge debts that creditors alleged were acquired by fraudulent acts carried out while the debtor was acting as a fiduciary. See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Interstate Agency, Inc. (In re Interstate Agency), 760 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.1985).
However, none of the five cases cited by Lincoln General applies Texas law. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "`[t]he scope of the concept of fiduciary under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) is a question of federal law; however, state law is important in determining whether or not a trust obligation exists.'" In re Gupta, 394 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th Cir.1993) (citation omitted)). Thus, in order for the statute to apply, there must be a sufficient basis in state law to say a fiduciary duty existed. Id. The fiduciary duty required by Section 523(a)(4) is narrowly defined and only applies to technical or express trusts. In re Bennett, 989 F.2d at 785. "The trust obligations necessary under [S]ection 523(a)(4) can arise pursuant to a statute, common law or a formal trust agreement." Id.
None of the cases Lincoln General cites applies Texas law. Even if they did, bankruptcy is a unique situation from the instant case—bankruptcy courts often consider greater equitable and public policy concerns. See, e.g., Sun Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Koszuth (In re Koszuth), 43 B.R. 104 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1984). The Court is simply unconvinced that it should interpret bankruptcy courts' examinations of other states' common law to create a fiduciary duty under Texas law. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir.2002) (admonishing against judicial creation of legal duty previously unannounced under Texas tort law); Bren-Tex Tractor Co. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 155, 161 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (same).
Because Lincoln General has failed to persuade the Court as to any of its three legal bases for Doug Maxwell's owing a fiduciary duty to Lincoln General or State and County, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
Lincoln General alleges Doug Maxwell, Jim Maxwell, CSI, Alpha, and Santa Fe actively aided U.S. Auto's breach of fiduciary duties. (Pl.'s Original Compl. ¶¶ 104-107). As to Jim Maxwell, CSI, Alpha,
"It is settled as the law of [Texas] that where a third party knowingly participates in the breach of duty of a fiduciary, such third party becomes a joint tortfeasor with the fiduciary and is liable as such." Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1942). Neither party offers any case law defining the term third party; however, Defendants assert that the president of a company cannot aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duty by the company because corporate officers are not third-parties to their companies. (Defs.' Reply 15).
Under Texas law, corporate officers may be liable for the torts of their companies: "A corporate officer may be held individually liable for a corporation's tortious conduct if he knowingly participates in the conduct or has either actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious conduct." Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 701 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); see also Marken Enter.'s, Inc. v. State, No. 03-98-00352-CV, 1999 WL 162809, at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin, Mar. 25, 1999, no pet.) ("[A] n officer or agent of the corporation may be held liable for the tax receipts based on his own individual tortious conduct in instigating, aiding or abetting . . ."); Earthman's Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192, 206 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ) ("[W]here corporate directors and officers actively participate in the conversion of another's property by instigating, aiding or abetting the corporation, they may be held liable as joint tortfeasors with the corporation."). Thus, there is no reason to believe, as Defendants suggest, that corporate officers are given blanket immunity on the basis of their status within the corporation.
Because on the face of Lincoln General's Complaint Doug Maxwell's conduct might possibly establish him as a third-party that is subject to liability for aiding and abetting his company's breach of fiduciary duty, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to this claim is
Defendants also move to Dismiss Lincoln General's claims of alter ego liability against Doug Maxwell, Jim Maxwell, CSI, Alpha, and Santa Fe for U.S. Auto's breaches of contract, fiduciary duty, and conversion. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 26-27). Lincoln General, in its Response, withdrew these claims. (Pl.'s Resp. 38). Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to these claims is
Finally, Defendants also seek the dismissal of Lincoln General's claim for attorney's fees against Doug Maxwell, Jim Maxwell, Gamma, CSI, Alpha, and Santa Fe because those claims are in turn dependent upon Lincoln General's claims based on alter ego liability. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 8-9). Because Lincoln General has withdrawn those claims, to the extent it seeks attorney's fees from Defendants Doug Maxwell, Jim Maxwell, Gamma, CSI, Alpha, or Santa Fe based on an alter ego
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) is
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is hereby
If Lincoln General wishes to amend its claim against Doug Maxwell for breach of fiduciary duty, it must move for leave to do so