FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ, Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to Special Order No. 3-251, this case has been referred for pretrial management. Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion, filed March 24, 2014 (doc. 112), seeking to reopen his closed case. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion should be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2010, Mamadou Diallo (Plaintiff) filed a pro se complaint against Celestica LLC1 (Defendant) and Adecco USA, Inc.,2 alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a) (1964). (See doc. 1.) After Defendant answered, and the parties filed their scheduling proposals, the Court entered a scheduling order on January 4, 2012. (See doc. 77.) On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff sought to "withdraw charges" against Defendant due to his worsening health. (See docs. 99.) His request, which was filed before discovery was complete or summary judgment motions had been filed, was liberally construed as a motion to voluntarily dismiss his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). (See docs. 108, 110.) The Court denied Defendant's request for costs, granted the motion unconditionally, and dismissed the case without prejudice on August 26, 2013. (See doc. 110, 111.) On March 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a one-sentence motion seeking to reopen the case. (See doc. 112.)

II. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff's request to reopen his case may be liberally construed as seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Smith v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div. 79 Fed.App'x 61, 62 (5th Cir.2003) (construing prisoner's motion to reopen § 1983 civil rights action as arising under Rule 60(b)) (citing Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir.1998)); Heath v. Thomas, 3:99-CV-2277-D, 2007 WL 2229056, *1 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 2007) (construing pro se motion to reinstate and reopen case as a Rule 60(b) motion).1

Rule 60(b) provides that upon motion, a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered earlier; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or that applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) will only be granted in cases involving extraordinary circumstances. See Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir.2002).

Here, Plaintiff's one-sentence motion to reopen does not assert any of the bases for relief set forth in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). It also does not allege, much less show, exceptional or extraordinary circumstances such that denial of any motion under Rule 60(b)(6) would be "so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion." See Vafaiyan v. City of Wichita Falls, 398 Fed.App'x 989, 990 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Figgs v. Clay, 64 Fed. App'x 417 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking to reinstate case that was voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41(a)(2)). The motion provides no basis for relief under Rule 60(b).

III. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff's motion to reopen this case should be DENIED.

SO RECOMMENDED.