MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SAM A. LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court are: Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Doc. 18), filed October 14, 2014; Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30), filed May 1, 2015; Defendants' Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 36), filed May 28, 2015; Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines (Doc. 39), filed June 1, 2015; and Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed June 1, 2015 (Doc. 40). Having considered the motions,1 record, and applicable law, the court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; denies as moot Defendants' Motion for Protective Order; denies as moot Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines; and denies as moot Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff Early Ivan Sarmiento-Perez ("Plaintiff"), on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed this putative collective action seeking to recover unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Plaintiff alleges he, and others similarly situated, worked in excess of forty hours per week as warehouse workers and drivers for Defendants Las Colinas International, Inc. d/b/a Formosa Foods and Jesse Chang ("Defendants") but were not paid overtime in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, back wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs of court.

On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Doc. 18), asking the court to conditionally certify this FLSA case as a collective action, with the class comprised of warehouse workers and drivers employed by Defendants from May 24, 2011, to present. (Doc. 18). The motion further requests court-facilitated notice to potential class members and limited discovery. Id. Four individuals have filed opt-in consent forms, supported by affidavits, claiming to be similarly situated employees who were denied overtime by Defendants. See Pl.'s Notice of Filing Opt-In Consent Forms for Plaintiffs Catalino Rafael and J. Salud Jamaica at Exs. A and B (Docs. 16-1 and 16-2); Pl.'s Notice of Filing Opt-In Consent Forms for Plaintiff Juan F. Salas at Ex. A (Doc. 19-1); Pl.'s Notice of Filing Opt-In Consent Forms for Plaintiff Hugo Y. Castenada at Ex. A (Doc. 22-1). The court subsequently ratified these notices by electronic order. The court will refer to these four individual as the "Opt-In Plaintiffs." As already stated, see supra note 1, Defendants did not file a response to Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice, and did not oppose Plaintiff's request that the court ratify the consent forms of the Opt-In Plaintiffs.

On May 2, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In support, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's and Opt-In Plaintiffs' FLSA claims are mooted by offers of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 made after Plaintiff filed his Motion seeking conditional class certification.2 On May 22, 2015, Plaintiffs sought an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss, arguing that additional discovery was needed. (Doc. 31). On May 22, 2015, the court granted Plaintiffs an extension until June 1, 2015. (Doc. 35). On May 28, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 36), asking the court to stay discovery pending a ruling on their motion to dismiss. (Doc. 36). On June 1, 2015, Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines (Doc. 39) and Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 40).

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice

1. Legal Standard for FLSA Collective Action and Certification

Plaintiff seeks the conditional certification of this action as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, which provides:

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike class actions brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, classes under § 216(b) are opt-in classes, requiring any employee wishing to become a party to the action to "opt in" (rather than "opt-out") by filing his consent with the court in which the action is brought. See id.

Although the Fifth Circuit has not adopted a specific standard to be used in determining the propriety of class certification under the FLSA, it has recognized the two-step approach used by many courts consisting of (1) the notice stage and (2) the certification stage. See Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 916 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-16 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also Lee v. Metrocare Servs., 980 F.Supp.2d 754, 758 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (O'Connor, J.) (recognizing and applying two-stage test as prevailing test among federal courts); Valcho v. Dallas Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 574 F.Supp.2d 618, 621 (N.D. Tex 2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (noting that the Northern District of Texas federal courts apply the two-stage test "that prevails among federal courts.")

During the notice stage, the plaintiff must establish that there are other potential class members who are "similarly situated in their job requirements and pay provisions." Marshall v. Eyemasters of Tex., Ltd., 272 F.R.D. 447, 449 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). If a court is satisfied that a plaintiff has satisfied this test, the court may, in its discretion, decide to conditionally certify the class and facilitate notice of the lawsuit to potential class members. See Valcho, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22.

At stage two, the certification stage, the court determines whether the class should be maintained through trial. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214. This stage typically begins when the defendant moves to decertify the class after discovery is largely complete. Id. The collective action will proceed if the court finds the potential class members similarly situated, but the class will be decertified if discovery fails to adequately identify a pool of claimants that is similarly situated. Id.; see also Proctor v. Allsups Convenience Stores, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 278, 280 (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("At this second stage, the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the individual class members are similarly situated.").

Stage-one of the two-stage standard is "fairly lenient" and "typically results" in conditional certification. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214; see also Behnken v. Luminant Mining Co., LLC, 997 F.Supp.2d 511, 519 n.6 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Fitzwater, J.) ("Numerous courts have emphasized that the factual support necessary at this state is modest, and that the standard to be applied by the district court is quite lenient.") (collecting cases). The court will apply the two-stage test to determine the propriety of Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification.

2. Discussion

Plaintiff asks this court to conditionally certify a class consisting of "all warehouse workers and/or drivers who worked or performed work for Defendants during the time period [of] May 24, 2011 to the present[,]" and who worked over forty hours in any given work week, but were not paid overtime at a rate of time and one-half for all hours worked over forty. Pl.'s Mot. Cond. Cert. 7. Plaintiff was a warehouse worker and forklift operator employed by Defendants from June of 2011 to June 27, 2014. See id. Ex. A (Doc. 18-1). Plaintiff attests that he worked an average of 68 hours per week but was never paid overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. Id. Plaintiff attests that there were at least forty other workers who performed similar duties and who have not been paid overtime wages. Id. Plaintiff has provided his own affidavit, as well as affidavits of Opt-In Plaintiffs Catalino Rafael, J. Salud Jamaica, Juan F. Salas, and Hugo Y. Castenada, all attesting to similar job duties and pay practices by Defendants. Id. Exs. A, B and C (Docs. 18-1, 18-2, and 18-3); Notice of Filing Opt-In Forms (Docs. 16-1, 16-2, 19-1, 23-1).

Applying the two-stage test and noting that Defendants have failed to file a response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion, the court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently established at this stage that he and similarly situated individuals were denied pay owed under the FLSA.3 For these reasons, the court determines that conditional certification is warranted. See generally Walker v. Honghua Am., LLC, 870 F.Supp.2d 462, 465 (D. D. Tex. 2012) (holding that at the conditional certification stage, the court must determine whether there exists "some identifiable facts or legal nexus [that] binds the claims so that hearing the cases together promotes judicial efficiency."). The potential class of opt-in plaintiffs is defined as:

Plaintiff requires to identify potential opt-in class members. Plaintiff submitted a proposed notice letter and consent form with his Motion. See Ex. D to Pl.'s Mot. for Cond. Cert. (Doc. 18-4). Defendants have not filed any objections, and the court hereby authorizes use of the proposed notice letter and consent form in this litigation. See generally Vargas v. Richardson Trident Co., 2010 WL 730155, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2010) ("[T]he general rule is that absent reasonable objections to plaintiff['s] proposed class notice, the plaintiff[] should be allowed to use the language of [his] choice in drafting the notice.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).4

III. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

On May 1, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Plaintiff's and Opt-In Plaintiffs' FSLSA claims had been rendered moot by Rule 68 offers of judgment made by Defendants. In support, Defendants argue as follows:

Defs.' Mot. 1. Thus, to rule on Defendants' motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether these Rule 68 offers of judgment have mooted Plaintiff's and Opt-In Plaintiffs' claims such that dismissal is required. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the offers of judgment do not moot these claims, and Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied.

In a FLSA case pending in this District, the presiding judge was confronted with a nearly identical fact pattern, as well as a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant calling for the court to resolve the same issue herein presented, namely, whether a defendant may secure dismissal of a FLSA collective action through a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the FLSA plaintiff when a timely filed motion for conditional certification is pending before the court. See Reyes Cruz v. Wash Masters Management, LLC, 3:14-cv-04569-N, Order (Doc. 26) pp. 12-16 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2015) (Godbey, J.). After a thorough analysis of the current state of the law, United States District Judge David C. Godbey denied the defendant's motion, holding that when a FLSA plaintiff has filed a timely motion for conditional certification, a defendant cannot secure dismissal of the action through a Rule 68 offer of judgment made after the motion is filed. Id. at 16. In so holding, the court noted that "this issue has been the source of much attention across the circuits in recent years" and that on May 18, 2015, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, in which the Supreme Court will examine:

Id. at 12 (quoting Pet. Writ Cert. at i, Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, No. 14-857 (cert. granted May 18, 2015)). Rather than stay the case pending the Supreme Court's ruling, the court in Cruz conducted an exhaustive analysis of the current state of the law, ultimately concluding that it was bound to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the Fifth Circuit determined that "a suit brought as a class action should not be dismissed for mootness upon tender to the named plaintiffs of their personal claims, at least when, as here, there is pending before the district court a timely filed and diligently pursued motion for class certification." Cruz, 3:14-cv-04569-N, Order at 13-14 (quoting Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 1051) (emphasis added).5

The court agrees with Judge Godbey's cogent analysis regarding the current state of the law, and similarly agrees that staying this action pending the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell is not the appropriate course. Here, as in Cruz, Plaintiff filed a timely motion for conditional certification before the Rule 68 offers of judgment were made. Given that the motion for conditional certification was pending when the offers of judgment were made (and remains pending), the court concludes that the Rule 68 offers of judgment do not moot Plaintiff's or Opt-In Plaintiffs' FLSA claims or their ability to seek conditional certification of a collective action. See Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 1051; Cruz, 3:14-cv-04569-N, Order at 12-16.6 Otherwise stated, the issues presented are still "live," and the Plaintiff and Opt-In Plaintiffs have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1960) (holding that a case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome" of the litigation); see also Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, ___ U.S. ___. 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) ("A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.").

IV. Remaining Motions

Also before the court are: Defendants' Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 36); Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines (Doc. 39); and Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 40). These motions all relate to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to additional discovery prior to responding to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In light of the court's determination that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied as a matter of law, see supra Sec. III, the court need not consider any of the arguments raised in these motions. Accordingly, the court will deny the remaining motions as moot.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Doc. 18); denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30); denies as moot Defendants' Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 36); denies as moot Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines (Doc. 39); and denies as moot Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 40).

Having granted Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Class Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the court conditionally certifies class of:

Further, the court grants limited discovery and authorizes notice to potential plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court orders as follows:

In light of the time needed to allow notice to potential class members, an opt-in period, and class certification, the court hereby vacates its First Amended Scheduling Order, dated March 27, 2015 (Doc. 26). Finally, the court will refer this matter by separate document to United States Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney for pretrial management.

It is so ordered.