OPINION AND ORDER

REED C. O'CONNOR, District Judge.

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, Marvin Ray Yates, a state prisoner confined in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), against Lorie Davis, director of TDCJ, Respondent. After considering the pleadings and relief sought by Petitioner, the Court has concluded that the petition should be dismissed as time-barred.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement Petitioner pleaded guilty in the Criminal District Court Number Two of Tarrant County, Texas, to driving while intoxicated — felony repetition and true to two sentence-enhancement paragraphs in the indictment, and the trial court assessed his punishment at 25 years' imprisonment. State Habeas R., WR52-282-02, 68-75, ECF No. 9-3. Petitioner did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence. Pet. 3, ECF No. 1. On September 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a state habeas-corpus application, raising one or more of the claims presented herein, which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on October 28, 2015, without written order on the findings of the trial court.2 Id. at 18 & "Action Taken," ECF No. 9-2. Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition on January 11, 2016,3 wherein he raises the following grounds for relief:

Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 1. Respondent asserts the petition is time-barred under the federal statute of limitations.

II. DISCUSSION

Title 28, United States Code, § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Section 2244(d) provides:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).

Because Petitioner's claims relate to the 2009 Tarrant County plea proceedings and resulting judgment of conviction, subsection (A) is applicable to this case. Under that provision, the limitations period began to run on the date on which the judgment of conviction became final by the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. For purposes of this provision, the judgment of conviction became final and the one-year limitations period began to run upon expiration of the time Petitioner had for filing a timely notice of appeal on July 22, 2009, and closed one year later on July 22, 2010, absent any applicable tolling. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2; Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-02 (5th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner's state habeas application filed on September 1, 2015, more than five years after limitations had already expired did not operate to toll the limitations period under the statutory provision. Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Petitioner's petition filed on January 27, 2016, is untimely unless Petitioner can demonstrate that he is entitled to tolling as a matter of equity.

For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way" and prevented him from filing a timely petition or he can make a convincing showing that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)). Petitioner did not respond to Respondent's preliminary answer or otherwise explain his delay or make any reference to actual innocence in his petition. His lengthy delay further mitigates against equitable tolling.

Accordingly, Petitioner's federal petition was due on or before July 22, 2010. His petition filed on January 11, 2016, is therefore untimely.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DISMISSED as time-barred. Further, for the reasons discussed, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.