SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, District Judge.
Following a jury trial in this action alleging claims for unpaid overtime and retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., plaintiff and defendants move for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). For the reasons that follow, the court grants defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, grants in part plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment, and otherwise denies the motions. The court is filing today an amended judgment in accordance with these rulings.
Castro brought this putative collective action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against defendants Precision Demolition LLC and Precision Demolition, LP (collectively, "Precision Demolition"), Holfords Prairie Partners, LLC ("Holfords"), Raymond D. Rinker III
The parties tried the case to a jury, which returned a verdict partly in favor of Castro, and partly in favor of defendants. Regarding Castro's FLSA overtime claim, the jury found that Castro had proved the essential elements of this claim against Precision Demolition, Rinker, and Smith, but not against Holfords, and that Precision Demolition had willfully violated the FLSA. The jury found that Precision Demolition owed Castro $608.85 for unpaid overtime for travel time. Regarding Castro's FLSA retaliation claim, the jury found that Castro had proved all of the essential elements of this claim as to Precision Demolition and awarded him $13,300 in "Back pay."
The court entered judgment on the verdict, awarding Castro judgment against Precision Demolition in the principal sum of $13,908.85, together with liquidated damages in the sum of $608.85, and post-judgment interest on the foregoing sums at the rate of 0.57% per annum. The court also ordered that Castro recover from Precision Demolition such attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses as the court might thereafter award on timely motion. The court assessed the taxable costs of court of Holfords, Rinker, and Smith against Castro.
Castro now moves for judgment as a matter of law, contending that because Holfords is the general partner of the limited partnership that employed Castro (i.e., Precision Demolition), Holfords is a joint employer and is jointly and severally liable for Castro's damages. Castro also moves to alter or amend the judgment to impose liability for his claims on Holfords, Rinker, and Smith, and to award liquidated damages for his retaliation claim, contending that liquidated damages are mandatory by law, and that, even if an award of liquidated damages is discretionary, such an award is appropriate in this case to effectuate the purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA.
Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law, contending that Castro failed to prove that any defendant retaliated against him in violation of the FLSA, and to prove that he would have both been neither demoted nor terminated but for his participation in activity protected under the FLSA. Defendants move to alter or amend the judgment, contending that the jury's finding that any defendant retaliated against Castro is clearly erroneous, and that the jury's finding that Castro proved that he reasonably mitigated his damages is also clearly erroneous.
Before turning to the merits of the parties' motions, the court will address defendants' motion for leave to supplement their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Castro and defendants initially moved during trial for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). After the court entered the judgment, both sides filed renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, under Rule 50(b), and motions to alter or amend the judgment, under Rule 59(e). The parties then filed a joint motion to extend the deadlines to respond to the pending post-trial motions. Castro later moved for entry of a post-trial scheduling order. Although defendants initially objected, they later withdrew their objections, and the court granted Castro's motion, setting February 17, 2017 as the deadline for the parties to supplement their post-trial motions. Defendants did not supplement their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law by this deadline.
In Castro's response to defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, he asserts that the court should deny the motion because the pro forma renewed motion itself contains no supporting briefing, and defendants failed to file any supplemental briefing by the February 17, 2017 deadline. Alternatively, Castro argues that the court should deny defendants' motion for the same reasons it did so at trial.
Defendants maintain in reply that their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is sufficient to preserve all issues and requests for relief made in that motion. Alternatively, they request leave to supplement their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
In order to grant defendants' motion for leave to supplement, the court must decide whether to modify the February 17, 2017 deadline for the parties to supplement their post-trial motions. Although the time for filing a Rule 50(b) motion is governed, of course, by Rule 50(b) itself, a motion to supplement such a motion is governed by the court's scheduling order.
Rule 16(b)(4) states that "[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." "The `good cause' standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to modify the scheduling order." Cut-Heal Animal Care Prods., Inc. v. Agri-Sales Assocs., Inc., 2009 WL 305994, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.). Mere inadvertence on the part of the movant, and the absence of prejudice to the nonmovant, are insufficient to establish "good cause." Id.; Price v. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co., 2005 WL 265164, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (Fish, C.J.) (citing Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990)). "Instead, the movant must show that, despite [its] diligence, [it] could not reasonably have met the scheduling deadline." Matamoros v. Cooper Clinic, 2015 WL 4713201, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2015) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing S & W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)).
The court assesses four factors when deciding whether to modify a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4): "(1) the explanation for the failure to timely [file the supplement]; (2) the importance of the [supplement]; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the [supplement]; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice." S & W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). The court considers the four factors holistically and "does not mechanically count the number of factors that favor each side." EEOC v. Serv. Temps, Inc., 2009 WL 3294863, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.), aff'd, 679 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2012). When applying this multi-factor test, the court usually denies motions to amend the scheduling order when the moving party fails to demonstrate that, despite its diligence, it could not have reasonably met the scheduling deadline. See, e.g., id. (stating that court "remembers at all times that the good cause inquiry focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to modify the scheduling order," and finding that movant had failed to satisfy good cause standard of Rule 16(b)(4) where it had not provided plausible explanation for its delay, and that this failure to provide plausible explanation outweighed the other factors in the court's analysis).
Defendants' explanation for failing to timely supplement their Rule 50 motion consists of the following
The second factor considers the importance of the supplement. Defendants contend that "[t]he importance of granting Defendants' Motion is clear in that no other avenue is available by which no Defendant may file such briefing." Ds. 3/24/17 Br. at 5. Castro agrees that supplementing defendants' renewed Rule 50(b) motion with briefing and evidentiary support is important, and, in fact, "critical" to defendants' position, but he contends that "the very importance of properly supplementing the Renewed JMOL weighs against Defendants' request." P. 4/14/17 Br. at 4.
The court concludes that although the requested relief is important, this factor weighs only slightly in favor of modifying the scheduling order because, as defendants explain in their brief,
Ds. 3/24/17 Br. at 5. In other words, because the arguments in support of defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law are included in their motion to alter or amend the judgment
The third factor considers potential prejudice in allowing the supplement.
Castro contends that he will be prejudiced if defendants are granted leave to supplement their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law because permitting such supplementation will further delay any recovery of damages.
The court finds that this factor weighs against granting defendants' motion. Permitting supplemental briefing would require the court to postpone its decision on the pending post-trial motions, thereby prejudicing Castro. But as the court explains below, the court can consider the arguments, authorities, and evidence on which defendants rely in support of their Rule 59(e) motion when deciding their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendants will not be prejudiced by the court's denying their motion to supplement their renewed motion.
The fourth factor considers the availability of a continuance to cure any prejudice. To the extent that the concept of a continuance means a trial continuance, because this case has already been tried, this factor does not apply. If the concept of continuance is enlarged to include any type of continuance, the court concludes that postponing its decision on the pending post-trial motions would prejudice Castro.
The court now considers the four factors holistically. "It does not mechanically count the number of factors that favor each side. And it remembers at all times that the good cause inquiry focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to modify the scheduling order." Serv. Temps, 2009 WL 3294863, at *3.
Assessing the four factors together, the court concludes that defendants have not demonstrated good cause to modify the scheduling order. Defendants have failed to provide a plausible explanation for their delay, particularly given their awareness of, and failure to object to, the proposed post-trial scheduling order that specifically included the February 17, 2017 deadline for filing supplemental briefing and evidentiary support for renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, Castro will be prejudiced by the delay associated without permitting such supplementation, but defendants will not, because the supplementation is not important considering that defendants will be able to make their Rule 50(b) arguments in the context of their Rule 59(e) motion. And a continuance either is not available (because the case has already been tried) or will prejudice Castro.
Accordingly, because defendants have not demonstrated the good cause required by Rule 16(b)(4), the court denies their motion for leave to supplement their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The court now turns to the merits of defendants' motions.
In their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, defendants move for relief on the following ground:
Ds. 10/14/16 Br. at 2. As noted above, see supra § II(C)(2), although defendants have not supplemented their Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law with "detailed briefing setting forth the arguments, authorities, and evidence on which [they] rel[y]," Ds. 10/14/16 Br. at 2, they contend that they have briefed the "essence" of their arguments in connection with their Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because Castro has had an adequate opportunity to respond to defendants' Rule 59(e) motion and will not be prejudiced by the court's considering the arguments and evidence presented in the motion, and because the court is aware of no procedural rule that prohibits it from doing so,
"A motion for judgment as a matter of law `challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.'" Jacobs v. Tapscott, 516 F.Supp.2d 639, 643 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Hodges v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 474 F.3d 188, 195 (5th Cir. 2006)), aff'd, 277 Fed. Appx. 483 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. (quoting Brennan's Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2004)). The court will "`uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable [jurors] could not arrive at any verdict to the contrary.'" Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., 650 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001)). "In other words, the `jury verdict must be upheld unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did.'" Id. at 1039-40 (quoting Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008)).
Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on the jury's finding that Precision Demolition retaliated against Castro, in violation of the FLSA. They maintain that, to succeed on his retaliation claim, Castro was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Ds. 10/14/16 Br. at 4. Defendants maintain that, because there is no evidence in the record that Precision Demolition terminated Castro's employment, Castro failed to prove elements (b) and (c), and the jury's finding of retaliation is clearly erroneous.
Castro responds that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Precision Demolition terminated his employment: he was given the choice to sign the Reprimand and be suspended without pay indefinitely, or not sign the Reprimand, in which case his employment with Precision Demolition would end; he refused to sign the Reprimand because he believed it contained false allegations regarding his conduct; and as a result of his refusal to sign the Reprimand, his employment with Precision Demolition was terminated. Regarding causation, Castro contends that he testified at trial that, on or about the third week that he was on the job at the Robinson Center, he first complained to Hugo Martinez ("Martinez") and Leonardo Contreras ("Contreras") about Precision Demolition's failure to pay overtime. He maintains that the immediate response to his complaint was a threat to remove him as a machine operator; that although Martinez did not draft the Reprimand, Martinez acknowledged that he communicated with Dunbar shortly before the Reprimand was created; that although Martinez stated there were other reasons for the Reprimand (i.e., Castro's failure to follow instructions), none of these reasons is reflected in the Reprimand; that inconsistent explanations for an adverse employment action can be evidence that supports a finding that an employer retaliated; and that
P. 3/10/17 Br. at 6.
Defendants contend in reply that an analysis of the four corners of the Reprimand shows that every possible outcome "grow[s] out of Plaintiff's choices," Ds. 3/24/17 Reply at 3; that Castro has consistently testified regarding his awareness that no defendant ever terminated his employment with Precision Demolition; and that even though the Reprimand contained a typographical error, the content of the Reprimand is accurate regarding Castro's conduct and accurately represents Precision Demolition's intent to merely reassign, not terminate, Castro. Regarding causation, defendants argue that Dunbar was solely responsible for drafting the Reprimand; that Martinez informed Dunbar that Castro was no longer needed but also that he did not want Castro to be fired; and that there is therefore no support for Castro's assertion that he carried his burden on "but-for" causation. Defendants also dispute Castro's "inconsistent explanations" arguments and contend that the entire record is devoid of any evidence that anyone at Precision Demolition knew about Castro's overtime complaints, and that there is therefore no link between the Reprimand and Castro's purported complaint.
The court holds that a reasonable jury could not have found that Precision Demolition terminated Castro's employment. Castro testified and introduced evidence at trial that he was told during a January 9, 2015 telephone call that his supervisor (Martinez) did not want him on the job any longer; that when he arrived at Precision Demolition's main office on January 16, 2015 to pick up his paycheck, he was presented with a Reprimand; and that the Reprimand stated:
Ds. 10/14/16 App. at Ex. A.
Because a reasonable jury could not have found that Precision Demolition terminated Castro's employment, the court holds that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found that Precision Demolition retaliated against Castro.
The court now turns to Castro's motions for judgment as a matter of law and to alter or amend the judgment.
Castro moves for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that, as the general partner of Precision Demolition (the limited partnership that employed Castro), Holfords is Castro's employer, as defined by the FLSA. Castro moves to alter or amend the judgment to provide "that [Castro] shall recover his damages, jointly and severally, from [Precision Demolition], Holfords, and Mr. Rinker and Mr. Smith." P. 10/14/16 Br. at 5. He also contends that his costs should be taxed against each defendant and that no defendant's costs should be taxed against him. Defendants do not respond to these grounds of Castro's motions.
"Rule 59(e) motions serve the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Davila v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 1509303, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 2009 WL 129731, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.)). "Such motions are not the proper vehicle for rehashing old arguments or advancing theories of the case that could have been presented earlier." Arrieta, 2009 WL 129731, at *1 (quoting AMS Staff Leasing, NA, Ltd. v. Associated Contract Truckmen, Inc., 2005 WL 3148284, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2005) (Fitzwater, J.). The movant must demonstrate valid reasons to justify the court's reconsideration of a prior ruling. See Hearn v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 679030, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.).
While a district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case under Rule 59(e), reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. See Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). Rule 59(e) generally "favor[s] the denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment[.]" S. Constructors Grp., Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted).
The court begins with defendant Holfords. It is undisputed that Holfords is the general partner of Precision Demolition. Under Texas law, general partners of a limited partnership are jointly and severally liable with each other and with the partnership for partnership debts. Forney 921 Lot Dev. Partners I, L.P. v. Paul Taylor Homes, Ltd., 349 S.W.3d 258, 272-73 (Tex. App. 2011, pet. denied); see also Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 153.152(b) (West 2012) ("Except as provided by this chapter or the other limited partnership provisions, a general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners to a person other than the partnership and the other partners."). Accordingly, the court holds that Holfords is jointly and severally liable for Castro's unpaid overtime compensation under Texas law, without considering whether it also qualifies as Castro's employer under the FLSA.
Turning to Rinker and Smith, the jury found that Castro had proved each of the essential elements of his FLSA overtime claim as to these defendants. Defendants do not appear to oppose the court's altering or amending the judgment to reflect that, as Castro's employers, Rinker and Smith are jointly and severally liable for Castro's unpaid overtime compensation from Precision Demolition. Accordingly, the court holds that Rinker and Smith are also jointly and severally liable for Castro's FLSA unpaid overtime compensation.
The court therefore grants Castro's motion under Rule 59(e) to the extent he requests that the court alter or amend the judgment to provide that he recover for unpaid overtime, jointly and severally, from Precision Demolition, Holfords, Rinker, and Smith.
As a result of the jury verdict and the court's decisions today, Castro is recovering from defendants, jointly and severally, the modest sum of $608.85 in unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages of $608.85. He is not recovering against them on any other basis, including for retaliation. Accordingly, the court concludes in its discretion that each party should bear his or its own taxable costs of court. This does not preclude Castro from recovering such reasonable attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses as the court may hereafter award on timely motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law; denies as moot defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment; grants in part Castro's motion to alter or amend the judgment; and denies as moot Castro's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court is today entering an amended judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion and order.
P. 4/14/17 Br. at 5-6.
