LEE ANN RENO, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court are the following motions filed by defendant INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE [defendant USA]
For the following reasons, defendant USA's motions should be GRANTED.
On December 6, 2016, plaintiff FORREST LLOYD sold, pursuant to a Trustee's Sale, certain property owned by defendants MICHAEL EUGENE GALLAGHER and RHONDA LYNN GALLAGHER [defendants GALLAGHERS] to satisfy a Deed of Trust held by Wellington State Bank. After applying the proceeds of the sale in accordance with the Deed of Trust, a surplus of $120,802.81 remained. Plaintiff identified three (3) creditors with potential claims to the surplus proceeds: defendant USA, defendant TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION [defendant TWC], and defendant FDB POOLS, INC. d/b/a Amarillo Custom Pools [defendant POOLS]. On January 12, 2017, plaintiff initiated an interpleader action in the 31st Judicial District Court in Wheeler County, Texas, seeking a determination as to which of the above creditors is entitled to the excess sale proceeds and asserting entitlement to recovery of attorney fees and costs. On February 13, 2017, the state case was removed to this Court.
On March 9, 2017, defendant USA filed an answer in this case requesting the Court find the United States is entitled to the surplus funds, and that the Court deny plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees, the only answer filed by any of the defendants. On March 26, 2018, plaintiff signed a stipulation withdrawing his request for attorney's fees. [ECF 21-1 at 35-38]. On March 28, 2017, defendant USA notified the Court that defendants GALLAGHERS had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on March 20, 2017. Consequently, this case was stayed and subsequently administratively closed. On March 28, 2018, defendant USA notified this Court that the bankruptcy court had lifted the stay and requested this Court reopen the instant case to determine which creditor is entitled to the surplus funds from the sale. On April 2, 2018, this case was reopened and, on April 13, 2008, plaintiff deposited the surplus funds into the registry of the Court.
On April 16, 2018, defendant USA filed the instant motion for summary judgment against plaintiff and the other defendants, and the instant motion for default judgment against defendant TWC. No timely responses opposing the motions have been filed by any of the parties. On April 17, 2018, this case was referred to the undersigned for pretrial management.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides that default may be entered if a defendant has "failed to plead or otherwise defend" the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Default judgments "are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations." Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989). In accord with that policy, "[a] party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in default." Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). Rather, a default judgment is generally committed to the discretion of the district court. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). As further noted by defendant USA in its motion:
In its motion, defendant USA has set forth the following standard for granting summary judgment:
[ECF 20 at 5]. Further, defendant USA has set forth relevant authority to be applied by the Court in determining lien priority:
[ECF 20 at 6]. Defendant USA accurately notes that in this case, lien priority "is straightforward and can be determined by comparing the filing dates of the liens filed by each of the creditors." [ECF 20 at 7].
Applying the applicable standards and authorities, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Therefore, for the reasons set forth by defendant USA in its motions and as supported by its attachments, and for the reasons set out above, it is the opinion of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant USA against plaintiff and all other co-defendants should be granted, and the motion for default judgment against defendant TWC filed by defendant USA should be granted.
It is the RECOMMENDATION of the United States Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge that the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment Against Forrest Lloyd as Trustee, Michael Eugene Gallagher, Rhonda Lynn Gallagher, and FDB Pools, Inc. dba Amarillo Custom Pools filed April 16, 2018 be GRANTED, and the United States' Motion for Default Judgment Against the Texas Workforce Commission filed April 16, 2018 be GRANTED.
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of these Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the "entered" date directly above the signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled "Objections to the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation." Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A party's failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).