MEMORANDUM OPINION

EDUARDO V. RODRIGUEZ, Bankruptcy Judge.

Well-advised creditors have reason to be circumspect in filing an involuntary petition. In order to successfully force a debtor into bankruptcy, a petitioning creditor, inter alia, must establish that its particular claim is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, that its unsecured claims aggregate at least $16,750, and must demonstrate that the target debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due, unless they are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount. If unsuccessful, a petitioning creditor may find itself at the receiving end of an adverse award of attorney's fees, costs, and damages.

On May 20, 2019, HOUTEX Builders, LLC ("Houtex"), 2203 Looscan Lane, LLC ("Looscan Lane"), and 415 Shadywood, LLC ("Shadywood"), (collectively, "Petitioning Creditors") filed an involuntary petition against HL Builders, LLC, formally known as CD Homes, LLC ("Target Debtor"). The involuntary petition was subsequently amended on July 11, 2019 and is currently the live pleading before the Court ("Amended Involuntary Petition"). This Court conducted a trial over three days commencing July 16, 2019 and concluding on August 21, 2019. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Petitioning Creditors did not have standing to file the Amended Involuntary Petition. Although Petitioning Creditors' claims meet the statutorily required $16,750 in amount, Houtex's claim with respect to 5325 Lynbrook, Houston, Texas 77056 is contingent as to liability. Nevertheless, each of Petitioning Creditors' claims are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability and amount of the claims. Additionally, Petitioning Creditors failed to demonstrate that Target Debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due. Therefore, an order for relief will not be entered on the Amended Involuntary Petition, and the case is dismissed. Reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs will be awarded to Target Debtor and its counsel in an amount to be determined by this Court. A request for an award of damages and punitive damages is denied. Additionally, Petitioning Creditors' Emergency Motion for Joint Administration of Cases and Emergency Motion to Appoint a Chapter 11 Trustee are denied as moot.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

This Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, which incorporates Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 and 9014. To the extent that any finding of fact constitutes a conclusion of law, it is adopted as such. To the extent that any conclusion of law constitutes a finding of fact, it is adopted as such. This Court made certain oral findings and conclusions on the record. This memorandum opinion supplements those findings and conclusions. If there is an inconsistency, this memorandum opinion controls.

A. Background History

Target Debtor is a home construction company controlled, at least in part, by Robert Parker ("Parker").1 Each of the Petitioning Creditors are special purpose entities owned by Charles Foster ("Foster") set up to build one or more custom homes with Target Debtor (each a "Project").2 Parker and Foster began their business relationship in 2006.3 During 2013 and 2014, Petitioning Creditors entered into a set of contracts with Target Debtor.4 These contracts were in connection with four Projects:

Each of the contracts between Petitioning Creditors and Target Debtor include an investor agreement ("Investor Agreement").5 The Investor Agreements set forth how the Projects are to be financed and provide that there will be a construction loan and an equity loan in connection with each Project.6 The equity loan is to be provided by the Petitioning Creditor to fund the initial acquisition and equity for the Project.7 The construction loan is also to be provided by the Petitioning Creditor to cover the development and construction of the Project, and is personally guaranteed by Foster. Specifically, the Investor Agreements provide that the principal amounts of the equity loans of each Project are as follows:

Section 6 of the Investor Agreements provides that any payments in excess of the construction and equity loan for each Project are to be made by the Target Debtor.12

Furthermore, after a Project is constructed and completed, the Project is sold, the Investor Agreements establish how the net proceeds of the sale of each Project are to be distributed at closing.13 Section 8 of the Investor Agreements provide that the net proceeds are to be distributed in the following order:

Accordingly, under section 8 of the Investor Agreements, the required payments by Target Debtor include the amounts required under section 6 of the Investor Agreements (i.e., any funds over the construction Loan and the equity Loan) plus a $50,000 payment to the Petitioning Creditors upon the sale of a Project.14

As of the filing date of the Amended Involuntary Petition, 415 Shadywood, 2203 Looscan, and 3 Thornblade were sold.15 5325 Lynbrook is the only remaining asset held by Houtex.16 It is stipulated by both parties that at the closing of each Project, Target Debtor did not make a $50,000 payment.17

B. Filings

On May 20, 2019, Petitioning Creditors filed an involuntary petition ("Initial Petition").18 The Petitioning Creditors' representative in each instance was Foster. Petitioning Creditors are themselves voluntary Chapter 11 debtors in In re Houtex Builders, et al. ("Foster Entities' Bankruptcy").19 The Initial Petition was subsequently amended on July 11, 2019 and is currently the live pleading before the Court.20

C. Credibility of Witnesses

In determining whether Petitioning Creditors have established standing under § 303 to file the Amended Involuntary Petition, this Court must, inter alia, assess the credibility of the witnesses. The Fifth Circuit has focused on "an assessment of witnesses' credibilit[y] and other factual considerations" when reviewing the standing of petitioning creditors.21 At trial, Petitioning Creditors and Target Debtor each called one witness, Foster and Parker, respectively.22 In many respects, the testimony of the two directly conflicted. For example, Parker's position is that the Investor Agreements became unworkable, and through discussions between him and Foster, the Investor Agreements were materially modified.23 Foster, when asked, "did you ever agree to amend or modify the investor agreements associated with any of the petitioning creditors?" responded, "No. I don't remember any of those discussions of anything like that. No, not at all."24 Accordingly, much of this Court's decision relies on the credibility of Foster and Parker.

First, Parker was previously found to be "dishonest and disingenuous" as a witness.25 In that case, the court found that Parker was an unreliable witness where his counsel stated objections in a Rule 2004 examination and instructed Parker not to respond where it was baseless and without merit.26 In contrast, Parker answered all questions at trial without the assistance of counsel. This Court finds that Parker does not lack all credibility. Despite at times lacking in exactitude, Parker's testimony was forthcoming and knowledgeable with respect to his involvement with HL Builders. He recounted with some level of detail the reasons for which modifications to the Investor Agreements occurred, including the fact that Foster had lost money in previous projects the two were doing, and was unable to fund the equity as provided for under the original terms of the Investor Agreements.27 He testified to the increased involvement of Foster in the Projects, and recounted meetings between him, Foster, and the other investors such as Hmaiden.28 Parker's answers cannot be categorized as evasive or without merit. Consequently, although there is reason to be cautious, the Court finds the testimony of Parker to be credible.

Second, this Court must address the credibility of Petitioning Creditors' witness, Foster. While generally responsive, his lack of knowledge or naivete in Petitioning Creditors' business dealings is concerning to the Court. Foster testified, notwithstanding his background as an attorney and business relationship with Target Debtor, that he was unaware of the contents of documents that he himself signed and denied having met bankers that provided third party loans to the Projects.29 While the Court does not find Foster to be entirely lacking in credibility, Foster's testimony calls into question Petitioning Creditors' true motives for placing Target Debtor into an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding and as such is taken into account in this Court's analysis.

Therefore, this Court does not discredit the testimony of Foster or Parker. The contradictory statements made by each are evaluated in the Court's analysis.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction, Venue, and this Court's Constitutional Authority to Enter a Final Order

This Court holds jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and now exercises its jurisdiction in accordance with Southern District of Texas General Order 2012-6.30 This Court determines that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), the instant matter before the Court is a core proceeding arising under Title 11. The statutory authority for the contested matter before the court is 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). More specifically, this Court has been tasked with determining, inter alia, whether the claims of the Petitioning Creditors are contingent as to liability or are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount under § 303(b)(1), or whether an order for relief should be entered against Target Debtor. Consideration of the entry of an order for relief on an involuntary petition is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) & (O) over which this Court has the constitutional authority to enter a final order with respect thereto.

Finally, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408, 1409. Here, venue is proper because over the last 180 days before the filing of this Amended Involuntary Petition, Target Debtor had its domicile, principal place of business, or principal assets located in this district longer than in any other district.31

1. Jurisdictional Arguments

Petitioning Creditors' Initial Petition alleged "that the debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due, unless they are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount."32 On June 11, 2019, Target Debtor filed an answer to the Initial Petition.33 On July 11, 2019, however, Petitioning Creditors filed an Amended Involuntary Petition which is currently the live pleading before the Court.34 Curiously, the Amended Involuntary Petition fails to contain the same allegations made in paragraph 11 of the Initial Petition, "that debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due, unless they are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount." Nevertheless, Target Debtor failed to file an answer to the Amended Involuntary Petition.

Target Debtor contends that the Amended Involuntary Petition should be dismissed because of Petitioning Creditors' failure to declare an allegation under paragraph 11.35 However, those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. In response, Petitioning Creditors point out Target Debtor's own procedural deficiency, arguing that an order for relief should be entered for failure of the Target Debtor to file an answer to the Amended Involuntary Petition under § 303(h). As shown below, the jurisdictional arguments advanced by both parties fail by placing form over substance.

As for the Amended Involuntary Petition, Target Debtor asserts that Petitioning Creditors did not establish a jurisdictional basis for filing an involuntary petition when they failed to check the box under paragraph 11 asserting that "debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due, unless they are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount."36 Petitioning Creditors' failure to check the box, the argument goes, is dispositive in the Petitioning Creditors' standing to bring the involuntary petition because the allegation is a mandatory component of an involuntary petition under § 303.37 At the hearing held on August 15, 2019, Petitioning Creditors' counsel stated that the failure to check the box in the Amended Involuntary Petition "was just an oversight."38 Case law on the matter suggests, and this Court agrees, that Petitioning Creditors' failure to check the box in the Amended Involuntary Petition after checking the box in the Initial Petition has no impact on this Court's jurisdiction. Courts within the Fifth Circuit, as well as in other circuits, have held that the statutory requirements for an involuntary petition under § 303 are not jurisdictional.39 Rather, § 303's undisputed claims requirement goes to the merits, an element that must be established to sustain an involuntary petition. Petitioning creditors must still demonstrate that their claims are not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, nevertheless this Court is not without jurisdiction prior to that determination.40 Accordingly, this Court will not dismiss the Amended Involuntary Petition for lack of jurisdiction because it is immaterial that Petitioning Creditors' failed to check the same box in paragraph 11 of the Amended Involuntary Petition.

As for the failure of Target Debtor to answer the Amended Involuntary Petition, Petitioning Creditors request that this Court enter an order for relief against Target Debtor under § 303(h) because "[i]f the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief against the debtor . . ."41 Target Debtor did not file an answer to the Amended Involuntary Petition, the live pleading. Thus, as a technicality, the Amended Involuntary Petition is uncontroverted. This Court is unwilling to accept Petitioning Creditors' invitation to enter an order for relief based on Target Debtor's failure to answer the Amended Involuntary Petition because doing so would be exalting form over substance.

In Davenport v. Rodriguez, the district court held that when a complaint has been amended after the filing of a motion to dismiss, the court should consider the differences between the original and amended complaint, and apply the motion to dismiss to the amended pleading if the defects remain.42 The court in Matter of Young held that requiring the trustee to file a formal objection after already having filed a motion to compel prior to the debtor's amended schedules "would be putting form over substance."43

Similarly, this Court will not enter an order for relief for failure of the Target Debtor to file an answer to the Amended Involuntary Petition under § 303(h) because, for all intents and purposes, Target Debtor has responded to the claims made by Petitioning Creditors in the Amended Involuntary Petition. First, Target Debtor filed a timely answer to Petitioning Creditors' Initial Petition.44 In comparing the Initial Petition and Amended Involuntary Petition, no substantive changes were made that would render Target Debtor's answer insufficient. The Petitioning Creditors added a case number, added an Employer Identification Number, and switched the corresponding amount of two petitioner claims.45 To the satisfaction of this Court, Target Debtor's answer is still responsive to the Amended Involuntary Petition because no additional claims were made, nor any claims removed. Form should not be granted over substance where only stylistic and inconsequential changes were made in the Amended Involuntary Petition. Further, both parties appeared before this Court and made arguments on the merits for three days of hearings after the Amended Involuntary Petition was filed.46 This Court will not entertain the idea that Petitioning Creditors' Amended Involuntary Petition is uncontroverted because substantively, Target Debtor has answered and sufficiently responded to the claims made. Therefore, this Court declines Petitioning Creditors invitation to enter an order for relief against Target Debtor under § 303(h) for failure of Target Debtor to file an answer to the Amended Involuntary Petition.

B. Involuntary Petition

1. Commencing the Involuntary Petition

Prior to an involuntary petition under § 303, the target debtor must meet the minimal and malleable eligibility criteria under § 109(a), (b), and (d).47 Pursuant to these provisions, the target debtor must be a "person," whether natural48 (and neither a farmer nor a family farmer, as painstakingly defined in § 101)49 or a "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation."50

Once these prerequisites are met, an involuntary case starts once a petition is filed by:

Distilled, § 303(b) permits three categories of persons to file a petition: (1) unsecured creditors with undisputed, noncontingent claims, (2) general partners of a partnership debtor, and (3) foreign representatives of a debtor in a foreign proceeding.55

Once these facts have been established, the Code's standard for an order for relief in an involuntary case, specified in § 303(h), depends upon the target debtor's response. If the petition is not "timely controverted," i.e. contested, the bankruptcy court "shall order relief against the debtor . . . under the chapter under which the petition was filed."56 Otherwise, though only after a trial, relief will follow in one of two situations.57 First, "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount."58 Second, "within 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, was appointed or took possession."59

Read together, in the absence of a custodian's appointment, § 303(b) and (h) impose four obligations on the petitioning creditors, a quartet that must be proven at trial. In particular, the bankruptcy court must determine whether:

This Court must analyze Petitioning Creditors' Amended Involuntary Petition in light of the requirements set forth above.

a. Numerosity of Creditors and Dollar Amount

First, an involuntary petition under § 303 may be commenced only by three or more holders of qualifying claims; however, a single claimholder may file the petition if the alleged debtor has fewer than twelve creditors.60 Here, the Amended Involuntary Petition was filed by three petitioning creditors: Houtex, Shadywood, and Looscan Lane.61 Since the case was commenced by three creditors, this requirement is satisfied.

Next, the unsecured sum of creditors' claims must aggregate at least $16,750 against the target debtor.62 Here, Petitioning Creditors' claims as pled in the Amended Involuntary Petition against Target Debtor amount to $2,300,555.95.63 Petitioning Creditors presented evidence that the basis of their claims stem from third party loans used on each Project.64 At trial, deeds of trust against the Projects admitted into evidence and listed in the post-trial briefing support, to this Court's satisfaction, that the sum of Petitioning Creditors' unsecured claims against Target Debtor are at least $16,750.65 Accordingly, the dollar amount requirement under § 303 is met.

b. Whether Petitioning Creditors' Claims are Contingent as to Liability or the Subject of a Bona Fide Dispute as to Liability or Amount

Next, Petitioning Creditors' contend that the claims made in the Amended Involuntary Petition are not contingent as to liability or are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to either liability or amount. In response, Target Debtor argues that a bona fide dispute exists as to both liability and amount of the claims because circumstances necessitated material modifications to the Investor Agreements, and the parties had fundamentally changed their deal format.66

Under the Investor Agreement as written, each Project is to be financed through a construction loan and an equity loan.67 The equity loan is to be provided by the Petitioning Creditor to fund the initial acquisition and equity for each Project.68 Additionally, the construction loan is to be provided by the Petitioning Creditor to cover the development and construction of each Project, and is personally guaranteed by Foster. Under section 6 of the Investor Agreement, if any additional funds or costs exceeding the construction and equity loan are required for each Project, those payments are to be made by the Target Debtor.69

Here, Petitioning Creditors contend that Target Debtor caused Petitioning Creditors to use funds from third party loans for each Project, and Target Debtor is responsible for these loans under section 6 of the Investor Agreement because they are not construction loans nor equity loans.70 Specifically, Houtex entered into a loan with Spirit of Texas Bank ("SOTB") in the amount of $1.6 million ("$1.6 Million SOTB Note").71 The $1.6 Million SOTB Note was used as follows: (i) 3 Thornblade in the amount of $467,635.43, (ii) 6111 Crab Orchard ("Crab Orchard") in the amount of $535,596.50, (ii) 2203 Looscan in the amount of $20,000 (iii) 415 Shadywood in the amount of $406,323.41, (iv) 5669 Bordley ("Bordley") in the amount of $14,000.00, and (v) a CD in the amount of $160,000.00.72 Next, Houtex entered into a $500,000 line of credit from Spirit of Texas Bank ("SOTB LOC") which had $483,745.90 principal and interest outstanding as of the date Houtex filed its voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief and such loan is secured by 3 Thornblade.73 Subsequently, Houtex entered into a $387,254.71 loan from Great Southwest Financial Corp ("GSFC") that is secured by 3 Thornblade.74 In the Amended Involuntary Petition, Petitioning Creditors' claims against Target Debtor totaled $2,300,555.95.75 This figure consists of the funds used from the $1.6 Million SOTB Note, the remaining principal and interest of the SOTB LOC, and the loan from GSFC.76 Additionally, deeds of trust admitted at trial demonstrate that loans were made to the Projects from Pensco Trust, Jim Nored, and Hmaidan & Hmaidan.77

Section 8 of the Investor Agreement instructs how the net proceeds are to be distributed upon the sale of each Project.78 The net proceeds are distributed in a waterfall of sorts, beginning with a repayment of the construction loan, then a repayment of the equity loan, followed by a payment to the Petitioning Creditor of $50,000.79 If there are insufficient funds to make the waterfall of payments with the net proceeds, the Target Debtor is obligated to make up the shortfall and come up with the additional funds.80

The Investor Agreements provide that the principal amounts of the equity loans of each Project are as follows:

i. Whether Petitioning Creditors' Claims are Contingent as to Liability

A claim, as defined under the Bankruptcy Code, is a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."90 The Fifth Circuit has stated that a contingent claim is one where liability of "the debtor's legal duty to pay does not come into existence until triggered by the occurrence of a future event and such future occurrence was within the actual or presumed contemplation of the parties at the time the original relationship of the parties was created."91 The In re All Media Properties, Inc. court stated that "just because a claim is unliquidated, disputed or unmatured apparently does not mean it is contingent" and that "[o]nly holders of claims that are contingent as to liability are denied the right to be petitioning creditors."92 Thus, Petitioning Creditors must demonstrate that each of their claims are not contingent, without respect to the liquidated nature under the first prong of § 303(b)(1).93

For example, neither past due rental payments under a lease94 nor future rental payments95 are contingent as to liability. Promissory notes in default or invoices from trade creditors that are overdue are not claims that are contingent as to liability.96 An example of a claim that is contingent as to liability is that of a guarantor of payment; until it is clear that the principal obligor is unable to pay, the obligation of the guarantor remains contingent.97 Another example concerns a debtor who owes a sales agent commissions only if potential purchasers actually buy the goods in question.98 If no sales have been made as of the date the involuntary petition is filed, the debtor's obligation to the sales agent is contingent as to liability since commission payment hinges on the happening of a future event, namely a sale.99

Here, Petitioning Creditors have claims against Target Debtor with respect to four Projects: 415 Shadywood, 2203 Looscan, 3 Thornblade, and 5325 Lynbrook.100 When the Amended Involuntary Petition was filed, three of the four Projects were sold, and 5325 Lynbrook remained the only asset owned by Houtex.101 With respect to the claims against the three Projects sold, there is no contingency as to liability because under the Investor Agreements, the Target Debtor's legal duty to pay was triggered upon the sale of the Projects.102 Similar to the way in which a debtor's obligation to pay commission to a sales agent is contingent upon a sale, the future event contemplated by Target Debtor and Petitioning Creditors at the time the original relationship of the parties was created was the sale of the Projects.103

Under section 8 of the Investor Agreement, Target Debtor is to make the waterfall of payments to Petitioning Creditors using the net proceeds of the sale, beginning with a repayment of the construction loan, then a repayment of the equity loan, followed by a payment to the Petitioning Creditor of $50,000, plus any additional payments required under section 6.104 Petitioning Creditors' claims involving 415 Shadywood, 2203 Looscan, and 3 Thornblade are not contingent as to liability because the sale of these projects already occurred when the Amended Involuntary Petition was filed.105 There is no longer any outside or future event that would change the contingency status between Target Debtor and Petitioning Creditors regarding the three Projects. However, that is not to say that the duty to pay is not in dispute, or that Target Debtor is liable for Petitioning Creditors' claims. Target Debtor's argument that subsequent modifications of the Investor Agreement occurred only renders the debt a disputed one, it does not make it a contingent one.106 Accordingly, Petitioning Creditors' claims against Target Debtor with respect to 415 Shadywood, 2203 Looscan, and 3 Thornblade satisfy § 303's requirement because they are not contingent as to liability.

Houtex's 5325 Lynbrook project, on the other hand, was not sold when the Amended Involuntary Petition was filed.107 Because the Project remained unsold, the Target Debtor's legal duty to pay under the Investor Agreement has not been triggered. The sale, an outside or future occurrence, is necessary to bring Target Debtor's duty to pay the Petitioning Creditor into existence. Target Debtor is not obligated to make the payments under section 8 of the Investor Agreement absent a sale. Therefore, Petitioning Creditors' claims regarding 5325 Lynbrook are contingent as to liability, and cannot be used to support an involuntary petition against Target Debtor.

ii. Whether There Exists a Bona Fide Dispute as to Liability or Amount of the Petitioning Creditors' Claims

Now that the Court has determined that some of Petitioning Creditors' claims are not contingent as to liability, the next step is to determine whether Petitioning Creditors' claims are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount. If there is a bona fide dispute as to whether Target Debtor is liable for the loans taken out in connection with the Projects or the amount of such claims due under the Investor Agreements, this Court cannot hear or resolve the dispute.108 In considering this prohibition, "[t]he court's objective is to ascertain whether a dispute that is bona fide exists; the court is not to actually resolve the dispute."109 This Court may, however, conduct a limited analysis of the legal issues in order to ascertain whether there is an objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute as to the validity of the debt.110 Petitioning Creditors' claims must be evaluated, in large part, by an assessment of the witnesses' credibility as well as other factual considerations.111

Although "bona fide dispute" is not defined under the Bankruptcy Code, the Fifth Circuit has adopted an "objective standard" when determining whether a bona fide dispute exists.112 The Fifth Circuit holds that under the "objective standard" test, "neither the debtor's subjective intent nor his subjective belief is sufficient to meet [his] burden" of proving a bona fide dispute exists.113 Simply put, Target Debtor's subjective belief that the amount owed to Petitioning Creditors is uncertain or unknown is insufficient in proving that a bona fide dispute exists.114 This Court must therefore objectively determine that there are not substantial questions of fact and law regarding Petitioning Creditors' claims in order to meet the requirements of § 303(b)(1).115

The burden first falls on Petitioning Creditors to make a prima facie case that there is not a bona fide dispute as to either liability or amount of their claims.116 Petitioning Creditors must satisfy the requirements of § 303 by a preponderance of the evidence.117 This is not a very high burden. If satisfied, the burden then shifts to Target Debtor "to present evidence demonstrating that a bona fide dispute does exist."118

Here, Petitioning Creditors' aforementioned argument establishes a prima facie case that there is not a bona fide dispute as to their claims. Petitioning Creditors produced evidence of the Investor Agreements for each Project, deeds of trust showing third party loans taken out against the Projects, elicited testimony at trial that three of the four Projects were sold, and that Target Debtor did not make any payments at the closing of those Projects.119 The Court finds that the evidence provided by Petitioning Creditors is enough to shift the burden to the Target Debtor to present evidence that a bona fide dispute exists.

In the Amended Involuntary Petition, Petitioning Creditors allege that the $1.6 million SOTB Note, the remaining principal and interest of the SOTB LOC, and the loan from GSFC are owed by Target Debtor because these were funds obtained in contravention of the Investor Agreement.120 At trial, Petitioning Creditors argued that the deeds of trust obtained from Pensco Trust, Jim Nored, and Hmaidan & Hmaidan in connection with the Projects are not equity or construction loans, and Target Debtor is responsible for repaying these loans under section 6 of the Investor Agreement.121 Lastly, by failing to make any payments to Petitioning Creditors at the closing of the Projects sold, it is asserted that Target Debtor violated the waterfall provision in section 8 of the Investor Agreement.122 In post-trial briefing to this Court, Petitioning Creditors argue that even if the third party loans listed above are equity loans, Target Debtor still owes the funding in connection with each Project that exceeds the equity loan amounts set forth in the Investor Agreements.123

In response, Target Debtor contends, and this Court agrees, that the claims alleged by Petitioning Creditors in the Amended Involuntary Petition and at trial are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to both liability and amount. The history of the business relationship between Parker and Foster supports the proposition that modifications to the Investor Agreements were in fact established, creating a bona fide dispute as to whether Target Debtor is liable for the loans taken out in connection with the Projects or the amount of such claims due under the Investor Agreements.

First, contrary to what Petitioning Creditors have attempted to lead this Court to believe, the fact that Foster did not fund the equity for the Projects is relevant in showing that a modification to the Investor Agreements occurred.124 Since the inception of the business relationship between Foster and Target Debtor, the language of the Investor Agreements for each project remained the same.125 When Foster and Target Debtor began developing homes together in 2006, Foster would guarantee the credit and put in the equity for each project.126 For example, Foster guaranteed the debt and put in around $200,000 of equity in the first project with Target Debtor for a house on Cortland Street.127 This arrangement continued for several projects.128 However, despite having the same Investor Agreements for the Projects in this case, Foster did not fund the equity.129 At trial, Target Debtor proffered sufficient evidence demonstrating that Foster did not fund the equity in 415 Shadywood, 2203 Looscan Lane, 5325 Lynbrook, or 3 Thornblade after losing his money in two prior projects, Green Tree and Longmont.130 According to Parker, Foster funded those two projects with 100 percent equity, and subsequently ran out of money.131 Because Foster had run out of money, he was unable to fund any further projects and instructed Parker to find alternative sources of funding.132 Parker testified that at Foster's behest, the equity in all subsequent projects was funded from third party sources.133 As evidenced by the third party loans and deeds of trust, Petitioning Creditors did not fund the equity for the Projects in the manner contemplated by the Investor Agreements.134

If the parties modified their agreement to permit equity funding to come from third party lenders as opposed to coming from Petitioning Creditors, it would impact the liability and amounts owed by Target Debtor to Petitioning Creditors under the Investor Agreements. Foster's failure to provide equity to the Projects is highly probative of a modification to the Investor Agreements because over the course of the business relationship between Foster and Target Debtor the parties used the same written agreement, yet the actions of the parties changed over time. Petitioning Creditors cannot claim that it is undisputed that the Investor Agreements were not modified, while at the same time claim that the Petitioning Creditors did not have to fund the equity of the Projects as contemplated by the Investor Agreements. Petitioning Creditors cannot have it both ways.

In the post-trial briefing to this Court, Petitioning Creditors argue that since the Investor Agreements provide that the "Investor" make the equity loan, it is not inconsistent with the terms of the Investor Agreement for an investor other than Foster to make the equity loan.135 This rationale ignores the course of conduct between the parties. The Investor Agreement, quite clearly, is an agreement between the Petitioning Creditors and Target Debtor. The fact that Foster did not fund the equity for the Projects and the way in which the funding of the projects changed over time demonstrates more than a subjective belief that the amount owed to Petitioning Creditors is uncertain or unknown. Accordingly, this Court finds that a valid credible dispute exists as to whether a modification of the Investor Agreement occurred, placing the liability and amount owed by Target Debtor squarely at issue.136

Second, the delay of construction and sale of two projects between Foster and HL Builders before any construction began is indicative of a modification to the Investor Agreements. Target Debtor asserts that after Foster leveraged up with multiple and larger dollar projects in conjunction with the collapse of oil prices by late 2014 and into 2015, the parties had made modifications to the Investor Agreements.137 Foster testified that in 2014, Foster and Parker were involved in the purchase of at least four projects.138 At the same time these projects were purchased, Foster was already funding the equity in Green Tree and Longmont.139 In addition to this, the price for oil declined, and Parker testified that Foster was concerned about its impact on the market for homes.140 Consequently, Foster expressed "grave concern" to Parker because he may have "gotten in too far" and directed that the completion of the existing projects be delayed.141 A delay in construction would have been a modification to the agreement between parties. Pursuant to the contractor agreements for each Project, separate from the Investor Agreements, the Debtor was to substantially complete construction of each Project within one year.142 Therefore, Foster's instruction to delay construction runs contrary to the written agreement, representing a modification to the contracted performance of the parties.

According to Parker, the delay in construction caused enormous costs of carry between loans with interest and property taxes.143 Consequently, two projects owned by Houtex, Crab Orchard and Bordley, were sold at Foster's behest as undeveloped properties for a loss of approximately two million dollars.144 Each party's witness testified at trial that Crab Orchard and Bordley were sold prior to the commencement of any construction even though the original plan was for construction of those properties.145 Therefore, in light of the history of business dealings between Foster and Target Debtor, the Court finds that the precarious financial situation of Foster combined with the sale of two prior projects before the start of construction demonstrates that the parties had not always abided by the exact terms of the Investors Agreements.

Foster rejects the testimony and allegations made by Parker in almost every respect. Foster testified that there were no modifications to the terms of the deal between Petitioning Creditors and Target Debtor.146 He testified that section 6 of the Investor Agreement was never changed, and that if any other funds were required in the Projects, other than the construction or equity loans, those funds were to be provided by Target Debtor.147 Parker, on the other hand, stated on the record that Foster was well aware of negotiations with the third party lenders for the Projects such as Jim Nored, and attended meetings with a representative from Spirit of Texas Bank prior to signing for the $1.6 million SOTB Note.148 However, Foster adamantly disagreed by stating "I've never met or heard of or I never — of a Jim Nored, that person at all."149 Next, in response to whether Foster asked Parker to slow down construction on any Projects, Foster testified "No. I want to be very clear. It was just the opposite."150

Foster's testimony at trial directly conflicting with that of Parker's is not enough to remove the shadow cast in the form of a bona fide dispute upon Petitioning Creditors' claims. Foster has been an attorney for over 40 years, even advertised as a "super lawyer".151 Despite Foster's background as an attorney and experience in real estate, he testified that he was unaware of the nature of many legal documents that he signed. When asked whether he guaranteed the $1.6 million dollar loan at Spirit of Texas Bank, Foster testified, "Apparently so."152 He alleges that he was unaware that he guaranteed the $1.6 million Spirit of Texas loan.153 Foster also described his interactions with Parker as "he would ask me to sign documents, those little yellow things, and I would sign them. I was never aware ever of any conversation about an equity loan document."154 He was "surprised" to find out how the $1.6 million SOTB Note was used.155 It is difficult to imagine that documentation dealing with figures of such a high value would be taken so lightly by someone with his knowledge and experience. The evidence produced and testimony elicited at trial concerning Foster's alleged involvement in the decisions to acquire third party funding as well as delay of the construction of Projects is at a minimum, in dispute.

It is important to emphasize here that the bankruptcy court's job under § 303(b) is not to conduct a through trial and determine the proper legal result.156 The bankruptcy court should only determine, objectively, whether there is a bona fide dispute.157 After a three day trial, nearly every aspect of the Petitioning Creditors' claims has been vehemently contested and controverted through live witness testimony and documentary evidence. This Court could not possibly determine whether Target Debtor is liable for the amounts claimed in the Amended Involuntary Petition by Petitioning Creditors or whether the Investor Agreements were modified to eliminate Target Debtor's liability in making the payments under sections 6 and 8 to Petitioning Creditors without conducting a full trial on the merits. The Court's decision regarding the instant dispute certainly does not determine the actual liability of or amounts due by the parties, only that the claims are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount. Accordingly, this Court finds that Petitioning Creditors lack standing to bring the Amended Involuntary Petition because their claims are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability and amount.

c. Whether Target Debtor is Generally Not Paying its Debts as They Become Due

In order for the Court to enter an order granting the Amended Involuntary Petition, Petitioning Creditors must demonstrate that Target Debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due, unless those debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.158 The determination of whether the debtor is generally paying its debts as they become due is made as of the filing date of the involuntary petition.159 While the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "generally not paying" its debts, courts consider the following factors: the number of debts; the amount of the delinquency; the materiality of the nonpayment; and the nature and conduct of the debtor's business.160 No one factor is more meritorious than another; what is most relevant depends on the facts of each case.161 Courts have held that "generally not paying debts" includes regularly missing a significant number of payments, regularly missing payments which are significant in amount in relation to the size of the debtor's operation, or any debt which the target debtor is not current on as of the petition date.162

Here, Petitioning Creditors assert that Target Debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due in connection with the Projects.163 The argument is similar to that as made above: because Target Debtor failed to make payments to Petitioning Creditors at the closing of the Projects, Target Debtor owes Petitioning Creditors the amounts due under sections 6 and 8 of the Investor Agreements.164 Petitioning Creditors argue that the amount of debt is substantial, the debt is significant because the funds relate directly to the Target Debtor's principal business activity, and the Target Debtor is mismanaging its business.165 However, the Court need not evaluate Petitioning Creditors' arguments advanced under § 303(h) any further because as this Court has already held, the debts that Target Debtor is allegedly not paying as they become due are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability and amount. As noted, this Court could not possibly determine whether Target Debtor is responsible for the amounts claimed by Petitioning Creditors or whether the Investor Agreements were modified to eliminate Target Debtor's liability in making the payments under sections 6 and 8 of the Investor Agreements to Petitioning Creditors without conducting a full trial on the merits. Accordingly, an order for relief against Target Debtor under § 303(i) will not be entered because Target Debtor's debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability and amount.

2. Award of Attorney's Fees, Costs, Damages, or Punitive Damages Under § 303(i).

i. Whether Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs Should Be Awarded

If warranted under § 303(i), this Court has discretion to order that Petitioning Creditors pay costs, reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, damages, and punitive damages caused by the filing upon the dismissal of the involuntary case.166 Such remedies are only available when the dismissal of the involuntary case was without the consent of petitioning creditors and target debtor, and the target debtor has not waived the right to judgment under § 303(i).167 While the Court may award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs upon the dismissal of the involuntary petition alone, the Court must also find that the petitioning creditors filed the involuntary petition in bad faith before any damages, including punitive damages, may be awarded.168 However, a finding of bad faith by petitioning creditors is not required for an award of attorney's fees and costs against them following dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.169 Accordingly, this Court retains jurisdiction under § 303(i) to award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by this Court.

Here, the parties have neither consented to the dismissal of the Amended Involuntary Petition nor has Target Debtor waived its right to judgment under § 303(i). In post-trial briefing, Target Debtor requested an award of fees and sanctions.170 Therefore, upon the dismissal of the instant Amended Involuntary Petition, the Court invites Target Debtor's counsel to file an application for and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs pursuant to § 303(i)(1) because there is neither consent of the parties nor any waiver by Target Debtor.

ii. Whether the Amended Involuntary Petition was Filed in Bad Faith Permittin the Awarding of Damages and Punitive Damages

Next, the Court must determine if Petitioning Creditors filed the Amended Involuntary Petition in bad faith to ascertain whether damages, including punitive damages, should be awarded to Target Debtor. The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define "bad faith" under § 303(i)(2).171 Although the standard for what constitutes bad faith varies from circuit to circuit, the Fifth Circuit in In re Sims has stated that the criteria for bad faith is a motivation to file by "ill will, malice or for the purpose of embarrassing or harassing the debtors."172 In that case, the Fifth Circuit also found that an involuntary petition was not filed in bad faith because the creditor conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law prior to filing the petition as required by Bankruptcy Rule 9011.173 Thus, the Fifth Circuit considers both subjective and objective factors in determining whether an involuntary petition was filed in bad faith.174

Here, Target Debtor raised the issue of bad faith in post-trial briefing, and requests the Court to award appropriate damages caused by Petitioning Creditors' alleged bad faith filing of the Amended Involuntary Petition pursuant to § 303(i)(2).175 The burden is on Target Debtor in proving that an involuntary petition was filed in bad faith.176 Target Debtor contends that Petitioning Creditors' misused the involuntary bankruptcy mechanism to collect a purported debt from HL Builders among other indicia of bad faith.177 At trial, during cross-examination by Target Debtor's counsel, Foster testified as follows:

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Involuntary Petition is dismissed, HL Builders, LLC's counsel, within thirty days of the issuance of this Court's order, is invited to file an application for reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1), and the Emergency Motion for Joint Administration of Cases along with the Emergency Motion to Appoint a Chapter 11 Trustee is denied as moot.181

A Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered on the docket simultaneously herewith.