MELINDA HARMON, District Judge.
Pending before the Court in the above referenced class action alleging unlawful reduction of pension benefits, grounded in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, are (1) Defendants United Way of the Texas Gulf Coast and United Way of the Texas Gulf Coast Cash Balance Plan's (collectively, "United Way's") Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively motion for reconsideration, or alternatively motion for new trial (instrument #180) and (2) Plaintiff/Class Representative Ann W. Humphrey's ("Plaintiff's" or "Humphrey's") Rule 54 motion (# 179) for common-fund costs and fees and additional costs and attorneys' fees owed to Plaintiffs under ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
The Court entered final summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on December 9, 2010 (# 171), triggering the fourteen-day period for filing a motion for costs and attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).
A Rule 59(e) motion "calls into question the correctness of a judgment." Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir.2004). "A motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) `must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence' and `cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.'" Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863-64 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir.1990)). It also cannot be used to re-litigate issues "that simply have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction." In re Self, 172 F.Supp.2d 813, 816 (W.D.La.2001). Altering, amending or reconsidering a judgment is an extraordinary measure that should rarely be granted and only when there is (1) an intervening or change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice. Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir.2003). A court has considerable discretion in determining whether to reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir.1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air
Arguing that manifest errors of fact or law exist in the orders and opinions that form the basis of the final judgment so that "it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record [and] that substantial justice has not been done,"
This Court has expended extensive time and effort in addressing the issues as they were initially presented and as they have evolved over the pendency of this action. After yet another careful review, it stands by its earlier orders. Moreover the Court finds that once again Plaintiff has persuasively responded to the many rehashed and few new arguments, both legal and factual, raised in Defendants' Rule 59 motion. The Court fully concurs with Plaintiff and denies Defendants' Rule 59 motion.
With supporting affidavits, records, and documentation, Plaintiff seeks to recover (1) common-fund costs and fees and (2) an additional award of costs and fees incurred since April 22, 2008 under ERISA § 502(g), in other words since the Court's previous November 20, 2008, 2008 WL 5070057, award (# 148, clarified # 169 at 12-13).
She then urges that the 29.8% benchmark should be upwardly adjusted for the following Johnson factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the complexity and difficulty of interrelated issues; (3) the unique skills required to litigate an ERISA class action; (4) the preclusion of other employment; (5) the firm's customary 33 and 1/3% contingent fee; (6) the risk of nonpayment in common fund cases; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (8) the undesirability of the case; and (9) awards made in similar cases, with specific examples listed. Humphrey therefore seeks an upward adjustment to 33 and 1/3%, the percentage fee which courts have typically awarded in other class actions for pension benefits under a defined benefit plan.
For the lodestar cross-check, Plaintiff states that she cannot obtain supporting affidavits from Houston ERISA attorneys of comparable skill, experience and reputation in the Houston community because no hourly rates exist since class actions are nearly always prosecuted on a contingent fee basis. Instead she cites to cases in which hourly rates were awarded in the past two years to attorneys who handled employment, benefits, or complex cases in the Southern District of Texas and presents a chart of their awards. She concludes that a reasonable hourly rate for her law firm's
As for the number of hours, given the Court's reductions in the previous fee award, for the period from April 23, 2008 to January 2, 2011 Plaintiff maintains that for purposes of the cross-check the firm has written off hours
After writeoffs, summarizes Humphrey, the total reasonable hours for both the pre-4/23/08 period
Cantarella 2,130.34 hours Schram 266.81 hours Geller 323.30 hours McLeod 54.17 hours Howes 69.23 hours Rayment 28.81 hours
Humphrey maintains that the law firm's significant use of partners is justified because it is more efficient to have an experienced ERISA partner handle most aspects
Cantarella $ 905,394.50
Schram $ 113,394.25
Geller $ 137,402.50
McLeod $ 12,188.25
Howes $ 8,653.75
Rayment $ 3,601.25
_____________
TOTAL $1,180,634.50
Claiming as appropriate a multiplier of 2.0 after consideration of the Johnson factors, which she discusses, she arrives at a total figure of $2,343,961.50 for an upwardly adjusted benchmark percentage lodestar cross-check. # 179 at 47.
Plaintiff asserts that a reasonable common fund fee percentage of 33 and 1/3% should apply here: one third of $8,469,454.15, the total benefit to the Class as of November 30, 2010, would be $2,823.151.38. That amount is only 20% greater than the amount produced using the lodestar cross-check above. Therefore Humphrey requests a fee award of 33 and 1/3% of the total benefit conferred upon the Class Members.
Plaintiff also argues that the Fifth Circuit has determined that the district court may award attorneys' fees upon a finding on a non-Bowen factor, i.e., that defendants abused their discretion. Lain v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 279 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir.2002), abrogated on other grounds, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117-18, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008); Vega v. National Life Ins. Servs. Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 302 (5th Cir.1999).
Humphrey further claims class counsel's entitlement to an award of costs, which she lists by category, as totaling $55,677.11 for the period through April 22, 2008, and $26,596.83 from April 23, 2008 through December 31, 2010. # 179 at 50-51. Thus counsel's total costs for prosecuting this litigation through December 31, 2010 amount to $82,273.94, which should be awarded out of the common fund.
Finally Humphrey also seeks a case contribution or "incentive" award for her efforts on behalf of the class in the amount of $10,000.
In addition, under ERISA § 502(g), Bowen, and Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir.1980), Humphrey contends that the class is also entitled to additional costs and fees incurred after April 22, 2008, i.e., the time after the previous award. In the Fifth Circuit, the lodestar method is used to determine an award under ERISA § 502(g). Lain, 279 F.3d at 348. This Court, in granting summary judgment for Humphrey, previously determined that Defendants abused their discretion. As indicated above, she requests an award based on the total lodestar of $301,368.75. She seeks no enhancement relating to her request under ERISA § 502(g) for costs and fees incurred after April 22, 2008. She presents documentation for costs after that date in the amount of $26,596.83, most of which represents actuarial fees in verifying damages of each class subgroup.
In sum, under the common fund doctrine Plaintiff seeks from the net benefit to the Class (including the costs and fees previously awarded to the Class under ERISA § 502(g)), 33 and 1/3% of that net benefit to Humphrey's attorneys and an incentive fee of $10,000 to Humphrey for her contributions to the case. She further
In her Reply (# 185), leaving aside a lot of posturing and bravado rhetoric, Humphrey argues that Defendants have no interest in how the common fund might be apportioned between class members and class counsel and therefore lack standing to object to her request for common fund fees. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 482 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) ("The judgment stripped Boeing of any present interest in the fund. Thus, Boeing had no cognizable interest in further litigation between the class and its lawyers over the amount of the fees ultimately awarded from money belonging to the class.").
Humphrey further contends that the Court's prior statutory fee award to the class does not control the common fund fee due to class counsel. She is not seeking an enhancement of § 502(g) attorney's fees award under the fee-shifting statute for the period after the Court's ruling, and in calculating the lodestar crosscheck she has excluded those Johnson factors excluded by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit. In contrast, the lodestar may be and often is enhanced when awarding common fund fees. She insists that the amount that may be awarded to a plaintiff or to the class under the fee-shifting statute is distinct from the amount that may be awarded to an attorney from the common fund for a successful result in the litigation.
Because an award of attorneys' fees is within the sound discretion of the Court, although the Court has considered all of Defendants' objections, rather than summarizing them the Court addresses the factors on which it bases its fee and costs award decision.
Although Defendants argue that common fund fees cannot be awarded here because the case proceeded to judgment and the common fund doctrine is typically confined to cases that settle, the Court finds that courts have recognized the applicability of the doctrine to judgment cases. See, e.g., Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478, 482 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 745; United States ex rel. Bogart v. King Pharmaceuticals, 493 F.3d 323, 329 (3d Cir.2007) ("In the `classic' common fund case, like a class action, the litigation generates a pool of money, either through a judgment or settlement, to which the beneficiaries are entitled to claim a portion."). See also 4 William B. Rubenstein, Alba Conte, and Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 14:6 (4th ed. Database updated June 2011) ("The common fund doctrine allows a court to distribute attorney's fees from the common fund that is created for the satisfaction of class members' claims when a class action reaches settlement or judgment.").
Nevertheless the Court concludes that permitting Plaintiff to recover under both the statute and the common fund doctrine would give Plaintiff a windfall (since she/the class would receive the lodestar award under ERISA § 502, but would not need to use it to pay for attorneys' fees if the fee award from the common fund is also granted to counsel). The Court finds no justification for such a double award. See, e.g., Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir.2000) (affirming district court's discretionary decision to award fees under the statute, which provided reasonable compensation, and deny additional fees to counsel under the common fund doctrine because allowing recovery under both would be "to award counsel duplicative recovery, a goal not contemplated by either the fee-shifting provision or the common fund theory.")
Furthermore, as discussed infra, ERISA's alienation statute would bar much of Plaintiff's recovery from a common fund.
Citing Kickham Hanley, P.C. v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan, 558 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that a law firm's claim for attorney's fees that will be paid out of undistributed, vested benefits of a pension plan violates the anti-alienation provision of ERISA, Section 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1),
Plaintiff responds that in Boeing, only 47% of the class members claimed their judgment benefit, but the Court found that the award of attorney's fees from the entire judgment fund was "a proper application of the common-fund doctrine." 444 U.S. at 476 & n. 4 and 480-81, 100 S.Ct. 745. The unjust enrichment rationale for this equitable doctrine is that "unless absentee members of the class contribute to payment of attorney's fees incurred on their behalves, they will pay nothing for the creation of the fund and their representatives may bear additional costs"; an award of fees from the judgment fund "rectifies this inequity by requiring every member of the class to share attorney's fees to the same extent he can share the recovery." Id. at 480, 100 S.Ct. 745. Moreover Plaintiff argues (1) that Boeing is federal common law, (2) that ERISA, including the anti-alienation provision, supersedes state law relating to an employee benefit plan, but does not bar federal common law claims, and (3) that under Boeing it does not impair this Court's ability to award common-fund fees to her attorneys.
Boeing, which addressed recovery of fees in a class action under the common fund doctrine generally, not specifically under ERISA, was issued in 1980. Kickham relies on a Supreme Court's decision issued ten years later, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 110 S.Ct. 680, 107 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990), addressing the specific anti-alienation provision unique to ERISA; the Court concludes that on this issue it controls. In Guidry, the high court focused for the first time on ERISA's anti-alienation provision and held that section 206(d)(1) bars any attempts to garnish ERISA pension plan benefits to satisfy a judgment, even if the beneficiary participated in criminal actions. Id. at 376, 110 S.Ct. 680. See also Martorana v. Board of Trustees of Steamfitters Local Union 420, 404 F.3d 797, 802-03 (3d Cir.2005). The Guidry court opined,
Id. at 376-77, 110 S.Ct. 680 (noting, as an example of Congressional action, Section 104(a) of the Retirement Equality Act of 1984, where Congress required that the anti-alienation provision should not apply to a "qualified domestic relations order").
Plaintiff argues that under the Second Circuit's reasoning in Kickham, an award of common fund fees does not violate ERISA's anti-alienation provision because the claims were "contested." 558 F.3d at 213. The Second Circuit distinguished a "pension entitlement" that arises under terms of the pension plan from a "contested pension claim" that arises under a settlement agreement; it concluded, "While pension entitlements are subject to the anti-alienation provision, contested pension claims are not and may be knowingly and voluntarily released as part of a settlement resolving an actual or potential dispute over pension benefits." Id. The Court would point out that there was no settlement agreement here negotiated by Class members and Defendants and by which Class members' claims were voluntarily released and they waived their rights to participate in the ERISA plan.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the anti-alienation provision would preclude Humphrey from receiving fees from that portion of a common fund comprised of undistributed and/or only potential future benefits.
Thus the Court examines Plaintiff's request for fees and costs incurred since April 26, 2008 under ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
In a recent opinion the United States Supreme Court addressed the lodestar method of calculating fees under fee-shifting statutes, in that civil rights case, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Perdue v. Kenny A., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). Criticizing the use of the Johnson factors alone as referencing "`a series of sometimes subjective factors plac[ing] unlimited discretion in trial judges and produc[ing] disparate results,'" the Supreme Court opined that while the lodestar approach "is not perfect," it has significant advantages: in accordance with the goal of fee-shifting statutes, it "looks to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community'" and "produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case." Id. at 1672, quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, and Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). Moreover it is "readily administrable" and "objective, and thus cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results." Id.
The high court summarized "six important rules" established by earlier cases addressing federal fee-shifting statutes: (1) a "reasonable fee" is one that is adequate to induce a competent attorney to undertake the case, but "not produce windfalls to attorneys"; (2) there is a "strong presumption" that the lodestar method's resulting fee is reasonable and is sufficient to induce a competent attorney to take the case; (3) enhancements of the lodestar may be awarded only in "rare" and "exceptional" circumstances; (4) the lodestar subsumes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a reasonable fee, and an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor that is included within the lodestar calculation; (5) the fee applicant must prove that an enhancement is necessary; and (6) the fee applicant seeking an enhancement must produce "specific evidence"
Moreover, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the novelty and complexity of a case generally are subsumed in the lodestar and not grounds for enhancement of a reasonable fee under a fee-shifting statute. Id. at 1673. The same is true regarding the quality of an attorney's performance
For an award under the fee shifting statute, apparently recognizing the increasing restrictions on enhancement of the lodestar, Plaintiff asks for no enhancement under § 502 for the additional costs and fees incurred after the last award, i.e., since April 22, 2008. # 179 at 60.
Plaintiff asks for a $25 increase in hourly rates since the Court's 2008 award (currently, for Hertz Schram, PC's partners, $425, for associates, $225, and for paralegals, $125). She presents a chart (# 179 at 37-38) to demonstrate that these increased rates are well within the range of the hourly rates in 2008 for attorneys, associates and paralegals who handle employment, benefits or complex cases in the Southern District of Texas and within those opposing counsel represented in his earlier affidavit (# 138-1), as well as within hourly rates in numerous similar cases in this district, many of which were higher than the increased rates requested by Humphrey for work since April 22, 2008. Defendants object that counsel does not provide a reasonable justification for the increase other than "passage of time," and urge that if the Court grants the increase, it should not apply to work performed by Humphrey's law firm in 2008, for which the Court previously determined the market rate. The Court finds the requested increase to be modest and reasonable since three years have passed since the last fee award. Moreover, it is well established that where there is a significant delay between the time legal services are rendered and an award of fees, a district court can either award a delay enhancement or make the award on current market rates. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989); Walker v. U.S. Dep't of HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 773 (5th Cir.1996); Paris v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:97-CV-0208, 2004 WL 2100227, *11 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 21, 2004). This Court chooses the latter option.
In its previous award
Partners: Cantarella $ 227.523.75 ($425 × 535.35 hours) Shram $ 17,510.00 ($425 × 41.20 hours) Geller $ 49,342.00 ($425 × 116.10 hours)Associate: McLeod $ 2,430.00 ($225 × 10.80 hours)Paralegal: Howes $ 4,562.50 ($125 × 36.50 hours) __________________________________________________TOTAL: $ 301,368.25
The Court finds that documentation adequately describes the service(s) provided in the entries in the Time Record. There is some impermissible block billing
In this second motion for award of fees, Plaintiff has addressed billing judgment, which requires the applicant to provide "documentation of hours charged and of the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant.'" Fralick v. Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund, Civ. A. No. 3:09-CV-0752-D, 2011 WL 487754, *3 (N.D.Tex. Feb. 11, 2011), citing Walker v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir.1996), and quoting Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir.2006). "[B]ald assertions regarding the exercise of billing judgment are insufficient." Id. Plaintiff has indicated Hertz Shram PC's exercise of billing judgment in this action by marking those entries written off as "WO" in the Time Records for the designated period. From the description of the service provided in each, viewed in the context of the other entries, the Court finds that the selected writeoffs appear to be redundant of other entries and are appropriately deleted from the fee request. Counsel have demonstrated billing judgment.
Nor are the entries in the Time Records too vague—counsel standardly and adequately identify the particular legal issue, document, purpose of telephone calls and conferences, or service for which they are billing.
On rare occasion, work identified in counsel's entries is clerical, e.g., e-filing documents or Fed-Ex-ing, but the Court finds the few references are too minimal to warrant a reduction.
Defendants have objected to the request for an award for 139.45 hours relating to preparation of the Rule 54 motion, which is more than they spent to prepare the original motion for fees and costs up to April 22, 2008. Defendants point out that most of the time was spent on Plaintiff's flawed common-fund request for fees, while the remainder is "a regurgitation of the arguments Humphrey made in support of her Original Fee Application, [which] it should have taken Humphrey's counsel no more that a few hours to prepare...." # 183 at 18. The Court rejects this argument. Humphrey certainly has legal justification for requesting a common fund fee and cost award, for which there is substantial legal precedent. This Court in its discretion chooses to deny that request in light of all the circumstances in favor of ERISA statutory fees based on equitable concerns. Plaintiff's counsel should not be denied fees that were justifiably expended in seeking a common fund award for their efforts.
Defendants complain that the requested statutory fees are excessive because virtually of the work had already been accomplished to enable Humphrey to file a proposed final judgment (class certification, clarification of the class definition, summary judgment on all liability issues, and submission of the original fee application). They assert, "most of the work Humphrey's counsel undertook after April 22, 2008 could have been avoided if Humphrey had simply filed, in April 2008, a proposed judgment that left blanks for statutory attorney's fees and costs the Court subsequently awarded in its November 20, 2008 Opinion & Order." # 183 at 11.
The Court disagrees with United Way. A substantial portion of the remaining litigation was necessitated mainly by Defendants' zealous defense or by the Court,
The Court finds that most of Plaintiff's request for fees for these services is justified. Complained of reiteration of earlier issues falls largely at the feet of Defendants.
Nevertheless the Court does find merit in Defendants' objection as highly inflated the 33 hours
For the period after April 22, 2008 Plaintiff requests additional costs in the amount of $26,596.83. Expense Records PX 103. The specific costs requested by Plaintiff from post April 23, 2008 through December 31, 2010 (#179 at 51) are for copies, $1371.80; Federal Express Charges, $279.78; actuarial fees, $24,881.50; and postage, $63.75. Most of this sum was based on actuarial fees to check damages of each of the Class subgroups and to calculate prejudgment interest.
In the Fifth Circuit, unlike an award of attorneys' fees, an award of costs
Plaintiff has prevailed on virtually every issue in this litigation.
Nevertheless Defendants rightly insist that the award of costs after April 23, 2008 may not include amounts paid to the actuary ($24,881.50). ERISA allows a prevailing party to recover her "costs of action." 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The Fifth Circuit has held that an award of costs in an ERISA case is limited to those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Plaintiff has requested an incentive award of $10,000 for Humphrey's efforts in this litigation. Incentive awards are discretionary and "are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and sometimes to recognize their willingness to act as private attorney general." Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir.2009). Federal courts have approved incentive awards to compensate class representatives for the services they provide
In determining whether to make such an award, the court may consider such factors as "the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those additions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation." Id. In Cook v. Niedert the Seventh Circuit found an incentive award warranted because the named plaintiff
Id. In Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D.Cal.1995), like Rodriguez cited for relevant factors, the court identified the following non-exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an incentive award is appropriate: "1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; 2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; 3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; 4) the duration of the litigation; and 5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation."
"On the other hand such an award can be abused where an unjustified award is made to a plaintiff at the expense of other class members." Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 959 n. 4 (observing that in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Congress found, "Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where ... (B) unjustified awards are made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members."), citing Pub.L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4.
While Plaintiff has requested an incentive award of $10,000, significantly she has not provided any details nor documentary support demonstrating the nature of her contribution, the hours she put in, the time consulting with counsel, time spent in discovery proceedings, or what information she provided to counsel. Indeed
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court
ORDERS that United Way's" Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively motion for reconsideration, or alternatively motion for new trial (instrument # 180) is DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's Rule 54 motion (# 179) for common-fund costs and fees is DENIED, but her motion for additional costs and attorneys' fees and costs under ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), incurred from April 23, 2008 through December 31, 2010 is GRANTED to the extent indicated in this Opinion and Order. The total award for fees and costs under ERISA § 502 is $277,667.06 and $1,715.33, respectively. In addition, the Court
ORDERS that Plaintiff's request for an incentive award is DENIED. Finally, Plaintiff stated that after the Court has ruled on these remaining issues, she would prepare an Amended Final Judgment incorporating all relevant rulings. # 179 at 61. Accordingly, the Court
ORDERS that within two weeks of receipt of this Opinion and Order, Humphrey shall submit an Amended Final Judgment that is consistent with the rulings in this case. Any objections to it shall be made by Defendants within seven days of receipt of that proposed judgment.
A reasonable hourly rate for an attorney is the prevailing market rate in the district where the court sits for attorneys of comparable experience employed in cases of similar complexity. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541.
Cantarella 535.35 hours Shram 41.20 hours Geller 116.10 hours McLeod 10.80 hours Howes 36.50 hours
