SIM LAKE, District Judge.
HRD Corporation d/b/a Marcus Oil & Chemical ("HRD") brings this action against Dr. Ebrahim Bagherzadeh seeking
This action concerns a dispute over whether Bagherzadeh's contributions to the development of certain technologies earned him the right to be a named inventor on the patents covering those technologies. HRD is a Texas corporation involved in the development and commercialization of innovative technologies.
During Bagherzadeh's tenure HRD submitted a number of patent applications, each one naming several inventors, including Bagherzadeh.
HRD alleges that in the course of the arbitration proceeding that preceded this action Bagherzadeh "was ordered to highlight his contribution[s] to numerous patent applications that listed him as an inventor," and that when deposed, Bagherzadeh stated that he had done so and that he had been given adequate time to review the applications.
On March 25, 2011, after Bagherzadeh refused to consent to a joint effort to remove his name from the HRD Patents,
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires the court to "accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true and [to] view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Chauvin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir.2007) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir.2004)).
In reaching its conclusion "the court may consider documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which judicial notice may be taken," United States ex. rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir.2003), including "[m]atters of public record [and] items appearing in the record of the case," Meador v. Oryx Energy Co., 87 F.Supp.2d 658, 661 (E.D.Tex. 2000); see also Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 n. 14 (5th Cir.1997) (incorporating by reference the district court's 12(b)(6) analysis, which determined that the court could take judicial notice of the contents of public records).
The parties dispute whether HRD has alleged a claim on which relief may be granted under 35 U.S.C. § 256, which provides that
Bagherzadeh interprets these provisions to mean that a party can only obtain a court-ordered correction of a named inventor
Both parties argue that their positions are reinforced by the language in the federal regulation implementing § 256, which provides that
37 C.F.R. § 1.324(a). Bagherzadeh argues that the regulation, like the statute, requires that all parties and assignees consent to the request for a correction,
The court concludes that HRD's reading of the statute is correct. Under the express language of the statute, the requirement that "all of the parties and assignees" file a joint application for a correction of a named inventor pertains to situations where "the Director ... issues a certificate correcting [an] error." 35 U.S.C. § 256. The sentence that empowers the Director to make such a correction is found in the statute's first paragraph and bears no mention of a party requesting a correction through a court order. Id. The sentence empowering a court to order a correction of a named inventor is found in a separate paragraph and is conditioned only on the "notice and hearing of all parties concerned." Id.; see also MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1989) ("In the event consensus is not attained [between all patentees and assignees], however, the second paragraph of [§] 256 permits redress in federal court.").
The notion that the prerequisites for corrections issued by the Director are distinct from those issued by court order is reinforced by the language in the regulation, which arranges them disjunctively: "the Director ... may, on application of all the parties and assignees, or on order of a court before which such matter is called in question ...." 37 C.F.R. § 1.324(a) (emphasis added). The regulation makes clear that a party seeking a correction through a court order is not required to first obtain the consent of all the parties and assignees. Id. Accordingly, HRD was not required to obtain consensus from all of the parties and assignees before filing its complaint.
Bagherzadeh argues that HRD nonetheless fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted because under 37 C.F.R. § 1.324(b), all requests for the removal of a named inventor must be accompanied
The relevant statute, § 256, does not require a party seeking removal of a named inventor by court order to first obtain the consent of all of the named inventors currently listed on the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 256. The statute permits parties to pursue correction of inventorship in one of two ways: on application to the Director if inventorship is uncontested and all parties are in agreement, or through a judicial proceeding. See id.; MCV, Inc., 870 F.2d at 1570.
The court therefore concludes that HRD did not have to procure permissive statements from all current named inventors in order to request a court order removing one of the named inventors. Such a requirement would only apply if HRD's request was submitted to the Director.
For the reasons explained above, the court concludes that Bagherzadeh has not demonstrated that HRD failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss