JASON B. LIBBY, Magistrate Judge.
This is a civil rights case brought by a Texas inmate of the Native American faith. On February 9, 2016, the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. (D.E. 58). Plaintiff has filed a "Motion of Opposition" construed as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. (D.E. 59). Based on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Davis v. Davis, No. 14-40339, 2016 WL 3269089 (5th Cir. June 14, 2016), the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's motion be
The Court has federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for case management, ruling on non-dispositive motions and furnishing a recommendation on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appearing pro se, inmate William Casey brought this civil rights action challenging certain policies and practices of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). Plaintiff alleged these policies conflict with his right to practice his Native American faith in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and the First Amendment. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the TDCJ-CID, by and through Defendant William Stephens in his official capacity only, to allow Plaintiff to: (1) grow his hair long and/or wear a kouplock; (2) wear his medicine bag at all times; and (3) possess and smoke a personal prayer pipe. (See D.E. 1, p. 7).
On February 9, 2016, relying on applicable precedent, the District Judge granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. (D.E. 58). On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion of Opposition to the District Judge's Ruling on Summary Judgment, which the undersigned construes as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 7, 2016, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff's motion.
Effective December 1, 2009, any motion asking the Court to revisit its judgment filed within twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment is considered made pursuant to Rule 59(e). Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Bass v. Dep't of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000); Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, the Court granted summary judgment in Defendant's favor on February 9, 2016. (D.E. 58). Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was received by the Court on March 3, 2016, well within the twenty-eight days authorized by Rule 59(e). (D.E. 59). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is properly considered under Rule 59(e).
A motion to alter or amend judgment must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence. Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004). A Rule 59(e) motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment. Id. Importantly, a Rule 59(e) motion is not proper to re-litigate matters that have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction and a party cannot attempt to obtain "a second bite at the apple" on issues that were previously addressed by the parties and the Court. N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2010 WL 2245075 at * 1 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 2, 2010) (unpublished). Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
The Fifth Circuit decided Davis v. Davis, No. 14-40339, 2016 WL 3269089 (5th Cir. June 14, 2016) after the Court entered summary judgment in the defendant's favor. Davis involved a Texas inmate of the Native American faith with claims similar to Plaintiff Casey. In Davis, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's First Amendment claim, medicine-bag RLUIPA claim, and pipe ceremony RLUIPA claim. Davis, WL 3269089 at *9. However, the Court vacated and remanded Plaintiff Davis' kouplock grooming-policy RLUIPA claim for a number of reasons
On the present record, there is little to distinguish the claims in the Davis case from that of Plaintiff William Casey. Both Plaintiffs alleged TDCJ policies infringed on their right to practice their Native American religion in violation of RLUIPA with regard to their being denied the right to wear a kouplock, a medicine bag and participate in pipe smoking ceremonies. Both cases arrive out of the McConnell Unit, a TDCJ facility in Beeville, Texas. In fact, Plaintiff Casey states that Plaintiff Davis assisted Casey in preparing and filing this lawsuit, "I mean Davis did litigate this entire lawsuit for William Casey as his jail house lawyer." (D.E. 59, p. 6). Further, Plaintiff Casey in his response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, like Davis, references the testimony of witnesses in the Odneal case, including the testimony of expert witnesses George Sullivan. (D.E. 51, pp. 20-29). The similarities between the instant case and the Davis case warrant the Court conducting additional proceedings and reconsidering Plaintiff's kouplock grooming-policy RLUIPA claim in light of Davis.
The undersigned respectfully recommends the Court