FRANCES H. STACY, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, Erma J. Anderson ("Anderson") brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). Anderson argues that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), William B. Howard, committed errors of law when he found Anderson was not disabled. Anderson argues that the ALJ's credibility determination was improper and that his residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. Anderson seeks an order reversing the ALJ's decision, and awarding benefits, or in the alternative, remanding her claim for further consideration. The Commissioner responds that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision that Anderson was not disabled, that the decision comports with applicable law, and that the decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
On January 14, 2013, Anderson filed for SSI claiming she has been disabled since January 14, 2013, due to diabetes, sciatica, and back and leg problems. (Tr. 238-243).
Anderson sought review by the Appeals Council of the ALJ's adverse decision. (Tr.6-8). The Appeals Council will grant a request to review an ALJ's decision if any of the following circumstances are present: (1) it appears that the ALJ abused his discretion; (2) the ALJ made an error of law in reaching his conclusion; (3) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's actions, findings, or conclusions; (4) a broad policy issue may affect the public interest or (5) there is new and material evidence and the decision is contrary to the weight of all the record evidence. After considering Anderson's contentions in light of the applicable regulations and evidence, the Appeals Council, on June 18, 2015, concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant Anderson's request for review. (Tr. 1-3). The ALJ's findings and decision thus became final.
Anderson has timely filed her appeal of the ALJ's decision. The Commissioner has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 14). Likewise, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 27). This appeal is now ripe for ruling.
The evidence is set forth in the transcript, pages 1 through 721. (Document Nos. 8 & 9). There is no dispute as to the facts contained therein.
The court, in its review of a denial of disability benefits, is only "to [determine] (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether the Commissioner's decision comports with relevant legal standards." Jones v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 692, 693 (5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, Title 42, Section 405(g) limits judicial review of the Commissioner's decision as follows: "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act specifically grants the district court the power to enter judgment, upon the pleadings, and transcript, "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security with or without remanding the case for a rehearing" when not supported by substantial evidence. Id. While it is incumbent upon the court to examine the record in its entirety to decide whether the decision is supportable, Simmons v. Harris, 602 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), the court may not "reweigh the evidence in the record nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute its judgment" for that of the Commissioner even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Chaparo v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1009 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Jones at 693; Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 1985). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992).
The United States Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence," as used in the Act, to be "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance." Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). The evidence must create more than "a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, but no `substantial evidence' will be found only where there is a `conspicuous absence of credible choices' or `no contrary medical evidence.'" Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Hemphill v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1973)).
An individual claiming entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Act has the burden of proving her disability. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1988). The Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be proven through medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Id. § 423(d)(3). The impairment must be so severe as to limit the claimant in the following manner:
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). The mere presence of an impairment is not enough to establish that one is suffering from a disability. Rather, a claimant is disabled only if she is "incapable of engaging in any substantial gainful activity." Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Milan v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1986)).
The Commissioner applies a five-step sequential process to determine disability status:
Id., 954 F.2d at 293; see also Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995); Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991). Under this formula, the claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps of the analysis to establish that a disability exists. If successful, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, at step five, to show that the claimant can perform other work. McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1999). Once the Commissioner demonstrates that other jobs are available, the burden shifts, again, to the claimant to rebut this finding. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). If, at any step in the process, the Commissioner determines that the claimant is or is not disabled, the evaluation ends. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 563.
In the instant action, the ALJ determined, in his August 11, 2014, decision that Anderson was not disabled at step five. In particular, the ALJ determined that Anderson had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 27, 2012 (step one); that Anderson's hypertension, disorders of the back, diabetes, obesity and degenerative joint disease of the shoulder were severe impairments (step two); that Anderson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 of the regulations (step three); that Anderson had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. In particular,
The ALJ further found that Anderson has no past relevant work (step four); and that based on Anderson's RFC, age, limited education, no past relevant work experience, and the testimony of a vocational expert, that Anderson could perform work as an officer helper, a storage facility rental clerk, and a courier, and that Anderson was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (step five). As a result, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's step five finding.
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court weighs four factors: (1) the objective medical facts; (2) the diagnosis and expert opinions of treating, examining and consultative physicians on subsidiary questions of fact; (3) subjective evidence as testified to by the plaintiff and corroborated by family and neighbors; and (4) the plaintiff's educational background, work history, and present age. Wren, 925 F.2d at 126.
The objective medical evidence shows that Anderson has been treated for hypertension, diabetes, and back and shoulder problems. She is obese.
The medical records from the relevant period of time, December 27, 2012, through August 11, 2014, show that Anderson received medical care at the Squatty-Lyons Clinic in Houston, Texas
Anderson returned to the clinic on January 25, 2013. (Tr. 451-453, 590-592). Again, she complained of back pain. With respect to the examination of Anderson's back, Dr. Sidhu wrote:
Dr. Sidhu ordered x-rays of the lumbar spine. The x-rays were taken on January 28, 2013, and were compared to x-rays taken on April 7, 2011 of the lumbar spine. The radiologist opined that Anderson has moderate to severe degenerative disc disease at L4-L5, progressed compared with 2011. X-rays were also taken of the hip. (Tr. 454-455, 593, 627). The x-rays showed moderate circumferential bilateral hip joint space narrowing.
Anderson returned to the Squatty-Lyons Clinic on February 15, 2013, for a follow up appointment with Dr. Sidhu. (Tr. 445-448, 583-589). According to the progress notes, Dr. Sidhu discussed the x-rays results with Anderson. The examination note shows that neurologically Anderson was intact. As for her back examination, Dr. Sidhu noted that Anderson had an "antalgic gait, limited range of motion, and pain with motion noted during exam." (Tr. 448, 587).
The record further shows that on March 19, 2013, Anderson had an MRI of the lumbar spine. (Tr. 433-434, 622). The MRI showed the following:
Based on the above findings, the radiologist opined that Anderson has no significant spinal stenosis.
Anderson returned to the Squatty-Lyons Clinic on April 1, 2013. (Tr. 441-444, 577-582). The exam results were unchanged from the previous month. Dr. Sidhu recommended that Anderson undergo additional testing (an EMG) but she declined.
Anderson returned to the Squatty-Lyons Clinic on April 29, 2013, for a diabetes check with Dr. Sidhu. (Tr. 572-576). Dr. Sidhu noted that Anderson had a normal range of motion. She was also seen by Dr. Sidhu on August 2, 2013. (Tr. 717-720). Anderson returned to the Squatty-Lyons Clinic on December 18, 2013, and was seen by a new physician, Kelley W. Carroll, M.D. for a diabetes check. (Tr. 636-637, 708-716). Dr. Carroll noted that Anderson had no edema and was neurologically intact. Anderson returned to the clinic on February 3, 2014 (Tr. 697-707), and on March 3, 2014. (Tr. 643-644, 682-691). Anderson described her pain as "moderate" and that standing makes it worse. She was referred for steroid injections. At her March 12, 2014, appointment at the Squatty-Lyons Clinic, for a diabetes check, she weighed 240 pounds and reported poor nutrition. (Tr. 647-648, 671-680). The progress note from Anderson's March 27, 2014, office visit shows she had a normal range of motion with no pain noted. (Tr. 652-653, 667-669). The final treatment note from the Squatty-Lyons Clinic is from Anderson's April 14, 2014, office visit for treatment of diabetes. (Tr. 657-666).
A disability determination unit physician, Jeanie Kwun, M.D., completed a RFC assessment on April 8, 2013. Based on her review of the objective medical evidence, Dr. Kwun opined that Anderson could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk 2 hours, sit about 6 hours in an 8 hour work-day, and unlimited push/pull. Dr. Kwun further opined that Anderson has no postural, manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitations. (Tr. 57-58).
A second disability determination unit physician, Robin Rosenstock, M.D., reviewed Anderson's records and reached a slightly different RFC. Dr. Rosenstock opined that Anderson would occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She was limited in her ability to push and/or pull. As for postural limitation, Dr. Rosenstock opined that Anderson could occasionally climb ramps/stair and never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. She could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Dr. Rosenstock found that Anderson has no manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. (Tr. 66-67).
In connection with her SSI application, Anderson completed a Function Report on July 9, 2011. (Tr. 261-268). Anderson described her impairments as follows: "My torn sciatic nerve makes it hard to me to stand, drive, and sit for long periods of time. My diabetes also randomly sometimes put me in a state of un-activity. My diabetes medicine also makes me lose appetite, have stomach pains, diarrhea, and causes weakness." (Tr. 261). Anderson described a typical day as waking up, taking her nephew to school, taking her medicine, eating, laying in bed, napping, picking her nephew up from school, fixing something to eat, taking medicine, showering, praying, and going to bed. (Tr. 262). The types of meals prepared by Anderson include sandwiches and microwave meals. (Tr. 263). With respect to household chores, Anderson stated that she makes her bed, cleans her personal bathroom, and puts dishes in the dishwasher. (Tr. 263). Anderson's hobbies include reading the Bible, watching television and listening to music. (Tr. 285). Anderson stated that she has problems lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, and kneeling. She estimated she could lift 7 to 9 pounds. She uses a cane when walking, all the time. (Tr. 267).
Anderson completed a second function report on March 14, 2013. (Tr. 281-288). Anderson wrote that she cannot work "due to neuropathy in my leg/side area, and a torn sciatic nerve, standing, sitting, and driving become things that are very difficult or close to impossible to do. My nerve and diabetic medicine also cause side effects such as diarrhea, loss of appetite and weakness." (Tr. 281). Most of Anderson's responses concerning her hobbies and functional limitations are identical to the first Function Report. (Tr. 285-286). She wrote that she has difficulty cooking on the stove. (Tr. 285).
Anderson testified at the June 19, 2014, hearing. Anderson testified that she sometimes uses a cane. Anderson noted that she uses the cane when going downstairs or coming upstairs but otherwise walks without a cane because it "kind of trips me." She added that she did not bring the cane to the hearing. (Tr. 38). Anderson stated that had not worked in a long time. (Tr. 39). When questioned about her daily activities, Anderson testified that she spends the day either laying down or sitting in a chair, and watching television, if she is not sleeping. (Tr. 39, 47). As for cooking, Anderson stated that she makes a sandwich or prepares meals in the microwave such as Hormel meals and Spaghettios. (Tr. 39-40, 42). She also testified that she eats fruits as well as vegetables, which can be cooked in the microwave. (Tr. 42, 48). Anderson testified that "it it's hard trying to sit up at the stove and cook." (Tr. 48). Anderson denied washing dishes. She loads them in the dishwasher. (Tr. 40). She also stated she is able to do laundry in the apartment complex where she resides. (Tr. 40). As for cleaning, Anderson testified she dusts but does not sweep and occassionally vacuums. (Tr. 40). Anderson denied any hobbies. (Tr. 41). She added that she used to walk but no longer exercises. (Tr. 41). For fun, Anderson watches television or listens to music. (Tr. 41). She also attends church. (Tr. 41). Anderson testified that she could not lift a twenty pound sack of potatoes and was unsure whether she could pick up a ten pound baby. (Tr. 42-43). She also testified that she can lift her left arm above her head but not her right arm. (Tr. 43, 46). She further testified that she can reach onto the desk with either arm. (Tr. 43, 46). She estimated that she could stand for four or five minutes. (Tr. 44). Anderson testified that she is 5 feet eight inches tall and weighs 239 pounds. (Tr. 43). Anderson testified that she knows the types of food she should eat as a diabetic. (Tr. 48). She acknowledged that she has not been one hundred percent compliant taking her medication but estimated she is eighty-five percent compliant. (Tr. 48).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Anderson's hypertension, disorders of the back, diabetes, obesity, and degenerative joint disease of the shoulder were severe impairments at step two, and that such impairments at step three, individually or in combination, did not meet or equal a listed impairment. Substantial evidence supports this determination.
RFC is what an individual can still do despite her limitations. It reflects the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activity in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (SSA July 2, 1996). The responsibility for determining a claimant's RFC is with the ALJ. see Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1023-24 (5
Anderson argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Anderson contends that her impairments are more limited than indicated by the ALJ's RFC. Anderson points to the objective evidence that she walks with an antalgic gait, sometimes requires the use of cane, that her hip and back pain limits her ability to stand or move around. She also notes that she has been diagnosed with "frozen shoulder" and that this affects her ability to lift small amounts of weight. Finally, she notes that the side effects of her medication include drowsiness, which the ALJ did not consider in his RFC determination.
Contrary to Anderson's arguments, the ALJ's discussion of the record shows that he noted that she walks with an antalgic gait, uses a cane on occasion, takes medication "with the noted side effect of drowsiness" and her ability to reach but not lift. (Tr. 17). The ALJ carefully considered all of the medical evidence in formulating an RFC that addressed Anderson's physical impairments. The ALJ, based on the totality of the evidence, concluded that Anderson could perform light work restricted to the extent that she never be required to climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, and perform overhead reaching with the dominant upper extremity, and could occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, and negotiate stairs and ramps. The limitations take into account her obesity, and shoulder and back problems that the ALJ found supported by the record as a whole. The ALJ gave specific reasons in support of this determination. This factor weighs in favor of the ALJ's decision.
The second element considered is the diagnosis and expert opinions of treating and examining physicians on subsidiary questions of fact. The law is clear that "a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of a patient's impairment will be given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with . . . other substantial evidence." Newton, 209 F.3d at 455. The ALJ may give little or no weight to a treating source's opinion, however, if good cause is shown. Id. at 455-56. The Fifth Circuit in Newton described good cause as where the treating physician's evidence is conclusory, is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory, or diagnostic techniques, or in otherwise unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 456. "[A]bsent reliable medical evidence from a treating or examining physician controverting the claimant's treating specialist, an ALJ may reject the opinion of the treating physician only if the ALJ performs a detailed analysis of the treating physician's views under the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)." Id. at 453. The six factors that must be considered by the ALJ before giving less than controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source are: (1) the length of treatment relationship; (2) frequency of examination; (3) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) the support of the source's opinion afforded by the medical evidence of record; (5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and (6) the specialization of the source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Newton, 209 F.3d at 456. An ALJ does not have to consider the six factors "where there is competing first-hand medical evidence and the ALJ finds as a factual matter that one doctor's opinion is more well-founded than another," and where the ALJ weighs the treating physician's opinion on disability against the medical opinion of other physicians who have treated or examined the claimant and have specific medical bases for a contrary opinion." Id. at 458; Alejandro v. Barnhart, 291 F.Supp.2d 497, 507-11 (S.D.Tex. 2003). Further, regardless of the opinions and diagnoses of medical sources, "the ALJ has sole responsibility for determining a claimant's disability status." Martinez, 64 F.3d at 176. "The ALJ's decision must stand or fall with the reasons set forth in the ALJ's decision, as adopted by the Appeals Council." Id. at 455; see also Cole v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 2002) ("It is well-established that we may only affirm the Commissioner's decision on the grounds which he stated for doing so."). However, perfection in administrative proceedings is not required. See Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988).
With respect to the opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians and medical sources, the ALJ wrote:
Here, the thoroughness of the ALJ's decision shows that he carefully considered the medical records and testimony, and that his determination reflects those findings accurately. The ALJ summarized the evidence and set forth specific reasons concerning the weight given to the opinions of the medical sources. The Court concludes that the diagnosis and expert opinion factor also supports the ALJ's decision.
The next element to be weighed is the subjective evidence of pain, including the claimant's testimony and corroboration by family and friends. Not all pain is disabling, and the fact that a claimant cannot work without some pain or discomfort will not render him disabled. Cook, 750 F.2d at 395. The proper standard for evaluating pain is codified in the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 423. The statute provides that allegations of pain do not constitute conclusive evidence of disability. There must be objective medical evidence showing the existence of a physical or mental impairment which could reasonably be expected to cause pain. Statements made by the individual or his physician as to the severity of the plaintiff's pain must be reasonably consistent with the objective medical evidence on the record. 42 U.S.C. § 423. The regulations provide a two-step process to evaluate a claimant's alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. First, the ALJ must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's symptoms, such as pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. Second, the ALJ evaluates the intensity, persistence of the symptoms, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the claimant's ability to do basic work related activities. Id. This evaluation entails the ALJ considering the record, including medical and laboratory findings, the opinions of treating and non-treating medical sources, and other factors relevant to the claimant's symptoms such as daily activities; location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain and other symptoms; and measures taken (such as medication, treatment or home remedies) to alleviate those symptoms, factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms, the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms, treatment, other than medication, which the claimant receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms, any measures other than treatment the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms, and any other factors concerning the claimant's functional capacity, limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). A claimant's testimony must be consistent with the objective medical evidence, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). "Pain constitutes a disabling condition under the SSA only when it is `constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.'" Selders, 914 F.2d at 618-19 (citing Farrell v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1988)). Pain may also constitute a non-exertional impairment which can limit the range of jobs a claimant would otherwise be able to perform. See Scott v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1994). The Act requires this Court's findings to be deferential. The evaluation of evidence concerning subjective symptoms is a task particularly within the province of the ALL, who has had the opportunity to observe the claimant. Hames, 707 F.2d at 166. Thus the ALJ's evaluation of the claimant's subjective complaints is entitled to deference if supported by substantial evidence. See Newton, 209 F.3d. at 459.
Here, the ALJ concluded that Anderson's complaints concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible. The ALJ wrote:
On March 16, 2016, SSR 96-7p was superseded by Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1020935, at *1 (S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016). SSR 96-7p was in effect when the ALJ issued his decision. Absent explicit language to the contrary, administrative rules do not ordinarily apply retroactively. see, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result."). SSR 16-3p does not explicitly state that it applies retroactively. Courts that have compared SSR 96-7p and SSR 16-3p have found that the new ruling was designed to clarify rather than change existing law. See Mayberry v. Colvin, G-15-330, 2016 WL 7686850 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 28, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 86880 (Jan. 10, 2017) citing to cases that have reached the same conclusion, i.e., Rockwood v. Colvin, No. 15 C 192, 2016 WL 2622325, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2016); Burnstad v. Colvin, Case No. 6-15-cv-921-SI, 2016 WL 4134535, at 11 n.9 (D.Or. Aug. 2, 2016); Dooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 656 Fed. App 113, 119 n.1 (6
Here, the ALJ applied SSR 96-7p, and evaluated the objective evidence in light of Anderson's subjective complaints. Notwithstanding the ALJ's use of the term "credibility," the ALJ's decision shows that he did not discount Anderson's subjective symptoms based on her character or veracity but cited to specific evidence in the record, which the ALJ found undermined Anderson's subjective complaints. See Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 163-64 (5
The final element to be weighed is the claimant's educational background, work history and present age. A claimant will be determined to be under disability only if the claimant's physical or mental impairments are of such severity that she is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering her age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The record shows that the ALJ questioned Norman C. Hooge, Ph.D., a vocational expert ("VE"), at the hearing. "A vocational expert is called to testify because of his familiarity with job requirements and working conditions. `The value of a vocational expert is that he is familiar with the specific requirements of a particular occupation, including working conditions and the attributes and skills needed.'" Vaughan v. Shalala, 58 F.3d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1986)). It is well settled that a vocational expert's testimony, based on a properly phrased hypothetical question, constitutes substantial evidence. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1994). A hypothetical question is sufficient when it incorporates the impairments which the ALJ has recognized to be supported by the whole record. Beyond the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ, the ALJ must give the claimant the "opportunity to correct deficiencies in the ALJ's hypothetical questions (including additional disabilities not recognized by the ALJ's findings and disabilities recognized but omitted from the question)." Bowling, 36 F.3d at 436.
The ALJ posed the following comprehensive hypothetical questions to the VE:
Anderson's counsel declined to question the VE. (Tr. 51). A hypothetical question is sufficient when it incorporates the impairments which the ALJ has recognized to be supported by the whole record. Upon this record, there is an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the ALJ's conclusion that Anderson was not disabled. Based on the testimony of the vocational expert and the medical records, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Anderson could perform work as an officer helper, a storage facility rental clerk, and a courier. The Court concludes that the ALJ's reliance on the vocational testimony was proper, and that the vocational expert's testimony, along with the medical evidence, constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Anderson was not disabled within the meaning of the Act and therefore was not entitled to benefits. Further, it is clear from the record that the proper legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence presented. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of the ALJ's decision.
Considering the record as a whole, the Court is of the opinion that the ALJ and the Commissioner properly used the guidelines propounded by the Social Security Administration, which direct a finding that Strauss was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, that substantial evidence supports the ALL's decision, and that the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed. As such, it is
ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No.27), is DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 14) is GRANTED, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.
