MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRAY H. MILLER, District Judge.

Pending before the court are motions to dismiss filed by defendants Mayne Pharma Inc., individually and as successor to Libertas Pharma, Inc. (Dkt. 22), Sandoz Inc. (Dkt. 25), Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Dkt. 27), and Taro Phamaceuticals (USA), Inc. (Dkt. 49) (collectively, "Defendants").1 Plaintiff Albert Martinez responded. Dkts. 28-29, 32, 50. Defendants replied. Dkt. 39, 40, 46, 57. Defendants supplemented their motions with additional authority. Dkts. 56, 61. Having considered the motions, responses, replies, and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motions should be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a pharmaceutical case.2 Dkt. 1 at 2. Defendants manufacture, market, and sell amiodarone, a generic medication. Id. The United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved amiodarone "only as a treatment of last resort for life-threatening ventricular fibrillation or ventricular tachycardia that could not be controlled with any other FDA approved option." Id. "[E]ach consumer [must] receive an FDA-approved Medication guide each time an [a]miodarone prescription is filled." Id. at 13. According to Martinez, Defendants "did not validate the efficacy of their Medication Guide distribution process, and knew or should have known that their Medication Guides were not reaching patients like [him]." Id. at 10.

Two doctors prescribed amiodarone to Martinez "for a use never approved by the FDA." Id. at 2, 9. Martinez filled the prescription and received amiodarone manufactured by each of the four defendants. Id. at 2. He ingested the drug every day from September 26, 2015, to April 4, 2016. Id. at 8. He never received a Medication Guide. Id. at 8. If he had received one when he filled his prescription, "he would have read it, understood the risks of [a]miodarone [as well as] the approved uses of [a]miodranone, and would not have taken [it]." Id.

Martinez alleges he did not receive a Medication Guide because Defendants negligently designed, implemented, and validated a process for distributing those guides. Id. at 9. According to Martinez, Defendants "failed to take reasonable measures to provide [him] or his dispenser with the Medication Guides for [a]miodarone as required by federal and parallel state law" each time he filled his prescription.3 Id. at 9, 15. He alleges that amiodarone proximately caused his injuries, including: pulmonary toxicity, Parkinson's disease, visual disturbances, vocal disturbances, and muscle weakness. Id. at 2. Martinez sued Defendants to recover in negligence and gross negligence. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts accept the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true. Kaiser, 677 F.2d at 1050. The court does not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). The factual allegations must be: (1) enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level"; and (2) plausible—enough to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal further supporting evidence. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Martinez's claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants attack Martinez's claims as: (1) preempted; (2) barred by the learned intermediary doctrine; and (3) failing to allege sufficient facts. Because each of these grounds fail, the court DENIES each of the motions.

A. Preemption

Defendants argue that Martinez's claims are impliedly preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Dkt. 22 at 4-6; Dkt. 25 at 6, 10; Dkt. 27 at 15-27; Dkt. 49 at 18. They argue that Martinez's claims impermissibly intrude on the FDA's exclusive authority to enforce its medication guide regulation because his claims arise solely by virtue of those regulations. See, e.g., Dkt. 22 at 4-6 (relying on Buckman Co. v. Pls.' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352, 121 S.Ct. 1012 (2001)); Dkt. 49 at 18 (relying on Perdue v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 209 F.Supp.3d 846, 850-54 (E.D.N.C. 2016)).

Martinez relies on two recent Texas federal district court cases to argue that his claims are not preempted: Monk v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 5-16-cv-1273-XR, 2017 WL 2063008, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (Rodriguez, J.), and Mitchell v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-574-LY, 2017 WL 7361750, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2017) (Yeakel, J.) (adopting magistrate judge's recommendation). See Dkt. 28 at 7-11. Both of those amiodarone cases analyzed and rejected arguments that are almost identical to those the Defendants advance here. Compare Monk, 2017 WL 2063008, at *1, and Mitchell, 2017 WL 7361750, at *1, with Dkt. 22 at 4-6, and Dkt. 25 at 6, 10, and Dkt. 27 at 15-27, and Dkt. 49 at 18. And both cases relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Eckhardt v. Qualitest Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated, 751 F.3d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 2014). See Monk, 2017 WL 2063008, at *2; see also Mitchell, 2017 WL 7361750, at *5-7.

Monk determined that an estate's negligence and gross negligence claims were not preempted. 2017 WL 2063008, at *4. Like Martinez, the Monk doctors prescribed amiodarone for an off-label use and the decedent-patient never received a Medication Guide. See id. at *1. And, just like Martinez, the Monk patient "did not know . . . the risks of taking amiodarone, the Medication Guide would have given him this information, and he would not have taken amiodarone had he been fully informed." Id.

Monk analyzed Buckman and Eckhardt to determine that the estate's claims were not preempted. Id. Monk reasoned that: (1) Buckman does not preempt parallel claims;4 and (2) Eckhardt "found that claims for failing to provide FDA approved warnings (like the Plaintiff's here) are indeed parallel claims."5 Id. at *4, *6. Monk cited Mitchell and two other district court cases as following Eckhardt.6 Id. at *5 (citing Mitchell, 2017 WL 7361750, at *5-7, and Priest v. Sandoz Inc., 1-15-cv-822-ML-LY, 2017 WL 8896188, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017) (adopting magistrate judge's report and recommendation), and Rusk v. Wyeth-Ayerherst Labs., No. 1-14-cv-549-LY, 2015 WL 11050913, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2015) (Yeakel, J.) (same)). The Monk court explained that it took "the simple step of connecting the rule of Buckman with the finding of Eckhardt." Id. at *7.

Defendants repeat the challenges the Monk defendants advanced against Eckhardt. Compare id., with Dkt. 27 at 20, and Dkt. 57 at 5-8. But just as Monk explained: "Defendants ignore . . . that regardless of the explanation in Eckhardt, this Court is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, which expressly recognizes that a claim for failure to provide FDA-approved warnings alleges a violation of both [Texas] and federal law and that such a claim is a parallel claim that is not preempted."7 2017 WL 2063008, at *6 (citing Eckhardt, 751 F.3d at 679) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Dkt. 63 (supplementing with McDaniel v. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., 893 F.3d 941, 942 (6th Cir. 2018)); Dkt. 56 (supplementing with Small v. Amgen, Inc., 723 F. App'x 722, 723 (11th Cir. 2018)). To the extent that Defendants ask this court to disregard Eckhardt, the court declines.

B. Learned intermediary doctrine

Defendants argue that the Texas's learned intermediary doctrine bars Martinez's claims. See Dkt. 22 at 7; Dkt. 27 at 9; Dkt. 40 at 7; Dkt. 49 at 7-8, 15-17. "Under Texas law, to prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a legal duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach." Fret v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 708 F. App'x 824, 827 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Under the learned intermediary doctrine, "the manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product satisfies its duty to warn the end user of its product's potential risks by providing an adequate warning to a `learned intermediary,' who then assumes the duty to pass on the necessary warnings to the end user." Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 158 (Tex. 2012).

Defendants argue that the learned intermediary doctrine precludes the existence of duty and thus bars Martinez's claims. See Dkt. 22 at 7; Dkt. 27 at 9; Dkt. 40 at 7; Dkt. 49 at 7-8, 15-17. Martinez disagrees by relying on Centocor. Dkt. 28 at 12-13 (citing 372 S.W.3d at 158); Dkt. 32 at 6 (same).

Monk determined that the learned intermediary doctrine did not bar the plaintiff's claims. 2017 WL 2063008, at *7. The Monk court explained that "[w]here warnings to a learned intermediary are adequate, a drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn end users of its products under Texas law, but this result occurs only if the drug manufacturer provided adequate warnings." Id. (learned intermediary doctrine did not bar plaintiff's claims). In that case, the "[p]laintiff . . . pled that Defendants failed to provide adequate warnings of the danger of their products, and under Texas law, this sufficiently states a claim." Id.

Just as in Monk, Martinez has pled that Defendants did not provide adequate warnings of the risks of taking amiodarone by failing to ensure that Medication Guides reached him and patients like him. Compare id., with Dkt. 1 at 2, 8-9. Accordingly, the learned intermediary doctrine does not bar Martinez's claims at this stage. Cf. Monk, 2017 WL 2063008, at *7 ("Whether those warnings were in fact adequate—such that the learned intermediary doctrine would shield Defendants from liability—can be considered at the summary judgment phase after the parties have conduct discovery on the issue.").

C. Pleading deficiencies8

Defendants argue that Martinez fails to allege sufficient facts to survive Rule 8(b)(2). See, e.g., Dkt. 22 at 3; Dkt. 49 at 19; Dkt. 57 at 12. Because Martinez's allegations raise a right to relief above a speculative level, the court disagrees. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Kaiser, 677 F.2d at 1050. Namely, Martinez alleges that: (1) the Medication Guide gave information about the risks of taking amiodarone; (2) he never received a Medication Guide; (3) had he received one, he would not have taken amiodarone; and (4) he suffered injuries because he took amiodarone. See Dkt. 1 at 2, 8-9. He also alleges that Defendants knew or should have known that patients like him:

(1) were receiving off-label prescriptions; and (2) were not receiving Medication Guides. Id. And he alleges that Defendants did not ensure that pharmacies had enough Medication Guides to give to patients like Martinez. Id. These allegations satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkts. 22, 25, 27, 49) are DENIED.