NELVA GONZALES RAMOS, District Judge.
Defendant/Movant Michael Rene Hernandez filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Court recharacterized as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. D.E. 221, D.E. 222.
On March 3, 2006, Movant was sentenced to 77 months' imprisonment by the Western District of Texas for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in Cause No. SA-05-CR-499-1. While he was serving his sentence at the Federal Correctional Institute in Three Rivers, Texas, Movant and a group of fellow Mexican Mafia gang members murdered Servando Rodriguez, a member of the rival Paisa prison gang.
On December 3, 2008, Movant received a Bureau of Prisons Incident Report charging him with Code 100, Killing; Code 104, Possessing a Dangerous Weapon; and Code 316, Being in an Unauthorized Area. Following a hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer found Movant committed the acts of Killing (Attempted) and Possessing a Dangerous Weapon. Movant was sanctioned to 41 days' loss of good conduct time (GCT), forfeiture of 21 days' non-vested GCT, 60 days' disciplinary segregation, and 365 days' loss of phone and visiting privileges.
Giving rise to the above-captioned case, on March 13, 2013, Movant and four others were charged with conspiracy to murder Servando Rodriguez, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1117. Movant pled guilty on May 30, 2013. He was sentenced to 200 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay $12,000 in restitution to Rodriguez' family. Judgment was entered December 10, 2013. Movant did not appeal. He filed the present motion on December 5, 2017.
Movant claims his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder is void because it violates the double jeopardy clause. Specifically, he contends that because he was previously sanctioned by the Bureau of Prisons for the same acts, he cannot also be criminally prosecuted.
There are four cognizable grounds upon which a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence: (1) constitutional issues, (2) challenges to the district court's jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) challenges to the length of a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, and (4) claims that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). In addition, "a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982).
A motion made under § 2255 is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, which, in most cases, begins to run when the judgment becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
Movant's conviction became final on the last day to file a timely notice of appeal, that is, 14 days after the judgment was entered on the docket. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). Judgment was entered on December 10, 2013. Movant's conviction therefore became final on December 24, 2013. Movant did not file his § 2255 motion until December 5, 2017, roughly three years after the statute of limitation expired.
Equitable tolling may allow for a late-filed motion, but such exceptions to limitations are rare. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002). The party seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating that tolling is appropriate. United States v. Petty, 530 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2008). To satisfy his burden, Movant must show that (1) he has diligently pursued his rights, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Petty, 530 F.3d at 365. Movant has presented no facts that would suggest that he has diligently pursued his rights or that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing his § 2255 motion.
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Movant has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the § 2255 Rules instruct this Court to "issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Rule 11, § 2255 RULES.
A Certificate of Appealability (COA) "may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "The COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). To warrant a grant of the certificate as to claims that the district court rejects solely on procedural grounds, the movant must show that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Court concludes that Movant cannot establish at least one of the Slack criteria. Specifically, jurists of reasons would not find this Court's procedural rulings debatable. Accordingly, Movant is not entitled to a COA as to his claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 232) is
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).