ANDREW S. HANEN, District Judge.
This Court has before it Defendant Timothy Boris' First Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 5), Defendant Bill Bradfield's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10), Defendant AnswerNet, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22), and Defendant AnswerNet Education Services, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 23). After considering the motions, responses, and applicable law, for the reasons detailed below the Court grants the motions to dismiss.
This case involves a large number of Plaintiffs
Greenwood Hall, according to Plaintiffs' Complaint, is a corporation incorporated in Nevada with its principal place of business in California. (Id. ¶ 4.44). The corporation acted as a call center for universities around the nation, which provided its customers with outsourced solutions for generating new students and/or helping students with financial aid for traditional and non-traditional online educational programs. Plaintiffs were employed by Greenwood Hall at its Bryan, Texas facility. Plaintiffs allege that on December 1, 2017, Greenwood Hall announced that it would close its entire location immediately and terminated all employees of that location. (Id. ¶¶ 5.1-5.3).
As a result of the sudden closing, Plaintiffs allege that they were not paid at least minimum wage by Greenwood Hall in order to compensate them for the last two paychecks
Shortly before Greenwood Hall's employees were terminated, the company was in the middle of financial difficulty, as it was facing an asset foreclosure by its secured lender. Eventually Greenwood Hall's senior secured lender foreclosed on the company's assets and sold those assets to third parties. According to Plaintiffs, AnswerNet purchased Greenwood Hall's assets, allegedly to save at least part of the company and focus its efforts on a smaller geographical region of call centers and clients. (See Doc. No. 33). AnswerNet then created AES allegedly to continue the business and operations of Greenwood Hall. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 4.58).
As part of the allegations concerning the actual basis of dispute between the Parties, Plaintiffs include factual allegations presumably intended to support its claim that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. In their Complaint and Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs made no specific legal arguments in support of this Court's jurisdiction over the four Defendants at issue, only factual allegations. While those alleged contacts are discussed in more detail in the following section, the broad summary is that, according to Plaintiffs, the individual Defendants were allegedly employed as executives of Greenwood Hall at the time the company was shuttered, and therefore must have been involved in the decision to close the Bryan plant, and therefore must be liable under the causes of action described above. With regard to the entity Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants conducted business within Texas, that AnswerNet and AES purchased Greenwood Hall's assets, and were aware or should have been aware of the closure of the Bryan plant. The Court will describe each Defendants' alleged contacts in more detail below.
Prior to discussing the precedents guiding this Court's decision and an application of that law to the facts herein, the Court finds that the most efficient way to address these issues is to set out the Texas contacts, if any, of each Defendant as taken from the Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc No. 1), as well as from their Response (Doc. No. 33) to Defendants' various motions to dismiss.
Plaintiffs' Complaint and/or Response allege:
Defendants not only contest many of these factual allegations but also whether the actual facts give rise to jurisdiction.
Defendants add for consideration the following facts (supported by sworn declarations):
Plaintiffs' reply to Defendants' factual contentions was brief, and all of their factual allegations are included in the first list above. Attached to their reply, Plaintiffs included three exhibits: a copy of Timothy Boris' declaration, which he had submitted along with his motion to dismiss; an unidentified letter—which neither identified the sender nor recipients—discussing the circumstances of Greenwood Hall's closure and AnswerNet's purchase of its assets; and an unauthenticated asset purchase agreement involving the sale of Greenwood Hall and PCS Link, Inc.'s assets by Moriah Education Management LLC, the lender, to AES, the purchaser (Id., Exs. 1-3).
Given these "facts," the Court must decide if the Defendants' contacts with Texas are of such a nature and extent to justify one or more of these foreign individuals and entities being sued in Texas. Phrased differently, the legal question before the Court is straightforward: Does this Court have personal jurisdiction over one or more of the Defendants who have moved for dismissal? That question breaks down into two different categorical analyses: whether this Court may exercise general or specific jurisdiction over any Defendant.
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a district court's jurisdiction over a nonresident, but it need only make a prima facie case if the district court rules without an evidentiary hearing. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not required. Bullion, 895 F.2d at 217 (citing D.J. Invs., Inc., 754 F.2d at 545-46). Moreover, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted, non-conclusory allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists. Id. (quoting D.J. Invs., Inc., 754 F.2d at 546); see also Central Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transp. Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The court shall accept as true [the party seeking to assert jurisdiction's] uncontroverted allegations (so long as the allegations are not merely conclusory)...."). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court "may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1998).
Notwithstanding this, the Fifth Circuit has explained "that the prima-facie-case does not require the court to credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted." Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.2d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1996)); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.1998) ("[T]he law does not require us to struthiously to credit conclusory [jurisdictional] allegations or draw farfetched inferences.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, where sworn affidavit testimony controverts conclusory jurisdictional allegations, the Court is not required to resolve conflicts in favor of the party relying on those allegations.
A federal court sitting in diversity may assert jurisdiction if (1) the state's long-arm statute applies, as interpreted by the state's courts; and (2) if due process is satisfied under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir. 1989). A district court must determine whether both the forum state's long-arm statute and federal due process permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Since the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal due process, the two-step inquiry collapses into one federal due process analysis. See Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647 (citations omitted). Federal due process requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) that the non-resident purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with the state; and (2) that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 647 (quotations and citations omitted).
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is consistent with due process when the defendant has established "minimum contacts" with the forum state and the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609 (quoting Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994)).
"Minimum contacts" can give rise to either specific personal jurisdiction or general personal jurisdiction. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). Specific jurisdiction exists if the asserted claims arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Cent. Freight Lines Inc., 322 F.3d at 381. The contacts must indicate that the nonresident defendant "purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the forum state." See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Brown v. Flowers Indus. Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 1982). In contrast, general jurisdiction exists for any cause of action if the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum are so substantial, continuous and systematic that the defendant is essentially "at home" in the forum. See Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). While the courts accept well-pleaded facts, they do not accept as true all conclusions and inferences made in the pleadings.
Panda Brandywine, 253 F.3d at 868-69 (emphasis added).
Many consider the concept of general jurisdiction to be the area of jurisdictional law that has experienced the most radical changes over the past five years. Although Plaintiffs do not explicitly state their argument, their briefing suggests that Plaintiffs believe that they have alleged enough facts to establish that Defendants are essentially "at home" in Texas, while Defendants strongly disagree. Some Defendants cited Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), in support of their positions.
It is not surprising to this Court that the Defendants might seek to align themselves with the Supreme Court's opinion in Daimler, which is widely considered to be a landmark case currently inspiring (or inciting) most legal commentators to analyze its effects and most judges to adjust their approach to weighing general jurisdiction arguments.
In Daimler the Supreme Court held that despite any number of contacts with California, Daimler could not be sued there in connection with claims that arose in South America. Despite prior jurisprudence dealing with general jurisdiction, the Court found that a non-resident forum court could only find a defendant subject to general jurisdiction in states where it was "at home."
Id. at 137.
Prior to Daimler, most lawyers, commentators, and jurists alike agreed with the above statement as a general proposition, but felt that the case law supported the conclusion that a corporation, for example, could be sued in any jurisdiction in which it engaged in a substantial continuous and systematic course of dealing. Daimler can only be interpreted as severely undermining this school of thought. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has, based upon Daimler, specifically agreed that Daimler has narrowed the application of general jurisdiction. Monkton Ins. Servs. Ltd., 768 F.3d at 429; Patterson v. Aker Solutions, Inc., 826 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2016). It has instructed both district courts and practitioners alike that finding general jurisdiction based upon any factors not described in Daimler is virtually impossible absent exceptional circumstances.
Monkton Ins. Servs. Ltd., 768 F.3d at 432.
According to Daimler an individual is at home in his or her domicile—which in this case is South Carolina for Bradfield and California for Boris. AnswerNet is incorporated in Delaware, AES is incorporated in Pennsylvania, and both have their principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, Bradfield is "at home" in South Carolina, Boris is "at home" in California, AnswerNet is "at home" either in Pennsylvania or Delaware, and AES is "at home" in Pennsylvania. Obviously, this is a "sea-change" in the way district courts judge jurisdictional claims, especially for business entities.
Thus, while made more difficult by the Supreme Court, this Court will still consider the pleadings in effect using the traditional factors to determine if this is a case in which exceptions to the general "at home" rule should apply. Although Plaintiffs make few if any arguments, their filing of claims against the Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs believe Defendants have continuous and systematic contacts in Texas sufficient to subject Defendants to this Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, assuming arguendo that there remains some vitality in the concept that a substantial continuous and systematic presence in a state gives rise to general jurisdiction, regardless of an entity's residency, the Court will analyze that concept in view of the relevant pleadings.
McFadin v. Geber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009). In order for these systematic contacts to establish general jurisdiction they must demonstrate that these defendants are "at home" in Texas. That being the case, this Court will analyze each of the Plaintiffs' claims of general jurisdiction and rule accordingly as to each Defendant.
Given the pleaded "facts," the most favorable interpretation for the Plaintiffs shows that Boris was an executive officer of Greenwood Hall, the company whose Texas office closed while Plaintiffs were employed at that location, and that Boris conducted business within this judicial district. Including facts supplied by Boris, Boris participated in approximately ten calls and ten emails sent to Texas regarding Greenwood Hall operational matters.
Given the pleaded "facts," the most favorable interpretation for the Plaintiffs shows that Bradfield was the CEO of Greenwood Hall, the company whose Texas office closed while Plaintiffs were employed there, at the time when the company closed without providing notice or final paychecks, and has conducted business within this judicial district. According to Plaintiffs, Bradfield sent a communication to the Bryan location to inform employees that the office was closing. Including facts from Bradfield, Bradfield spoke on one occasion with a Greenwood Hall manager who was based at the Bryan location—although their conversation occurred out of Texas. Bradfield also sent an email firmwide that included the Bryan office employees as recipients.
Given the pleaded "facts," the most favorable interpretation for the Plaintiffs shows that AnswerNet alleged purchased the assets of Greenwood Hall, the company whose Texas office closed while Plaintiffs were employed at that location, and that AnswerNet conducted business within this judicial district.
Given the pleaded "facts," the most favorable interpretation for the Plaintiffs shows that AES or one of its predecessor or affiliates purchased the assets of Greenwood Hall, the company whose Texas office closed while Plaintiffs were employed at that location, and that AES conducted business within this judicial district.
As stated above, for general jurisdiction to attach to the Defendants, Daimler dictates that they must be "at home." Clearly neither of the Defendant entities are incorporated in Texas, nor is Texas their principal place of business. Neither Bradfield nor Boris are domiciled in Texas. Some commentators have theorized that Daimler has, as a practical matter, essentially limited general jurisdiction to these factors. Whether practical or not, the Daimler opinion specifically makes a point of holding that there may be an exceptional case where a foreign corporation (or citizen) has so many contacts either significant in number or nature (or both) with a jurisdiction that it may be "at home" in a non-resident state. The Supreme Court cited Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), as just such a case.
The Supreme Court did not delineate a test for courts to utilize to make this determination in a post-Daimler world. Since it did not outline a test, this Court will utilize the pre-Daimler factors to determine if the Defendants here are at home in Texas. Prior to Daimler, courts traditionally used the general jurisdiction test that evolved after the Supreme Court's decisions in Perkins and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). As previously stated, courts analyzed a person's or entity's contacts, both in terms of quality and quantity, with a state to determine if they were so substantial, continuous, and systematic that (to borrow Daimler's language) it was or they were, in effect, "at home." This Court finds that regardless of whether one uses the pre-Daimler standards or "heightened" post-Daimler standards,
The only factors cited by Plaintiffs and provided in their pleadings (as opposed to provided by the Defendants) that might support the argument that the Defendants directed contact toward Texas are the following:
These are the totality of the alleged Texas contacts for each individual/entity. As Defendants have explained, Boris and Bradfield each participated in occasional communications with Texas. While Greenwood Hall, the company whose assets were sold to the entity Defendants, did conduct business in Texas and operated the Bryan office, Defendants AnswerNet and AES have no offices in Texas, no employees in Texas, and provide no services in Texas. Plaintiffs offer no further theories for why these scant contacts with Texas, even if true, are sufficient to establish the Defendants as "at home" in Texas.
Nevertheless, one could attempt to discern the legal theories upon which Plaintiffs seek to establish jurisdiction. Most likely Plaintiffs claim jurisdiction because they experienced damage in Texas, that Defendants communicated occasionally with entities or individuals in Texas, and that one or both of the entity Defendants purchased Greenwood Hall's assets.
Out of state phone calls, emails, and/or texts do not establish one is "at home" in the recipient's jurisdiction. Communications to Texas have been held to be merely fortuitous and insufficient to constitute purposeful availment of the jurisdiction. Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd., 768 F.3d at 433; Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1986); Patterson v. Dietze, Inc., 764 F.2d 1145, 1147 (5th Cir. 1985). Further, the out-of-state receipt of bank funds or assets, regardless of whether completed by check or wire transfer or some other means, does not establish "residency" by the out-of-state Defendant in the home of the transferring financial institution.
The next apparent justification for jurisdiction is that Defendants AnswerNet and AES purchased the assets of Greenwood Hall, which conducted business in Texas and previously employed the Plaintiffs. As the Court noted in footnote 3, AnswerNet argues that only AES was involved in the asset purchase. Further, the assets were not purchased from Greenwood Hall directly but rather from a company in Delaware. Plaintiffs' argument would require the Court to impute jurisdiction of one entity to its purchaser simply by virtue of an out-of-state transaction with a third party. Courts presume the institutional independence of even related corporations, such as a parent and its subsidiary, when they determine if one corporation's contacts with a forum can be the basis of jurisdiction over the related corporation. Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1999). It is well established in the Fifth Circuit that when "a wholly owned subsidiary is operated as a distinct corporation, its contacts with the forum cannot be imputed to the parent." Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1988). To fuse two companies for jurisdictional purposes, there must be "proof of control by the parent over the internal business operations and affairs of the subsidiary." Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983). The theory is that because—in that instance—the two companies are the same entity, "the jurisdictional contacts of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for purposes of International Shoe due process analysis." Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir. 2002).
No such facts are at work here between AnswetNet or AES and Greenwood Hall. Unlike a parent corporation and a subsidiary, Greenwood Hall was an unrelated corporation who did not directly interact in any manner with AES. AES purchased Greenwood Hall's assets from a third party, the secured lender. Once AES purchased the assets, it did not begin to operate offices or have employees in Texas. Further, there is no relationship between Greenwood Hall and AES. They are separate and distinct entities, with no element of control between them. The Court notes that the relationship between AnswerNet and AES appears to be much more of the kind anticipated by the Fifth Circuit for purposes of imputing jurisdiction. The AES's purchase of Greenwood Hall's assets cannot subject it or AnswerNet to jurisdiction in a forum state in which they would not otherwise be subject to jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the Court has already detailed above, the transfer of funds or payments to and from Texas does not make a defendant "at home" in Texas. Johnston, 523 F.3d at 610. The facts here are even less indicative of Texas contacts as those considered in Johnston. Greenwood Hall was not a Texas corporation and did not have its principal place of business in Texas, albeit it did have a location in Bryan, Texas. When its assets were foreclosed upon, the secured lender which did the foreclosure was Moriah Education Management LLC—a third party—which was a Delaware limited liability company. That LLC then sold and transferred the purchased assets to AES, as shown in the Asset Purchase Agreement, which is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. No part of this chain of transactions involved Texas, except to the extent that Greenwood Hall owned some assets in Texas prior to its foreclosure. These facts are insufficient to establish availment of Texas, much less purposeful availment of the forum state.
Furthermore, that fact that Plaintiffs were injured in Texas because of alleged actions of Defendants does not make the Defendants "at home" in Texas. Even assuming arguendo that violations of the WARN Act or FLSA could be considered tortious actions toward the Plaintiffs, the record as pled does not necessarily show that these Defendants were involved in the allegedly harmful acts or that these Defendants intended those acts to be directed toward Texas. Although Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco, 188 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 1999), stand for the proposition that a tortfeasor who commits a tort in one state can be sued in another if an individual in that state is damaged, that proposition is true only if the action is directed toward the forum state:
Panda Brandywine, 253 F.3d at 869; see also McFadin, 587 F.3d at 762; Southmark Corp., 851 F.2d at 773 ("Nothing in the record indicates that USLICO expressly aimed its allegedly tortious activities at Texas, or that Texas is even the focal point of USLICO's tortious conduct"). Similarly no Defendant herein aimed any activity towards Texas.
Finally, even if Defendants had some business contact with entities in Texas—which has not been established through the record—occasional business contact is not enough. In Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 2008), the defendant actually worked in Texas for 37 days out of a 3-year period (far more contact with the state than any of the Defendants in a 17-year period). The Fifth Circuit described this level of contact as "lacking the substance and regularity to establish general jurisdiction." Id. at 611; see also Patterson v. Aker Solutions Incorporated, 826 F.3d 231, 236-37 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding no general jurisdiction where defendant had six employees in Texas, other employees trained in Texas, employees were processed in Texas, and defendant paid unemployment and franchise taxes in Texas).
As pleaded, Plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations premised on Defendants conducting business in Texas and having ties to Greenwood Hall are conclusory, provide no specific claims upon which to attach jurisdiction, and are unreliable. Accordingly, the Court considers the sworn declarations from Defendants when they contradict these conclusory allegations. This Court finds no exceptional circumstances to distinguish this case from Daimler or Hall or any of myriad number of Fifth Circuit cases finding no general jurisdiction. Even if these allegations are accurate, none indicate the Defendants were at home in Texas. Their activities are not regular and very few have substance. They are not continuous and certainly not systematic. In this case, there is no general jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.
Again, while Plaintiffs have not explained the reasoning for their assumption that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, the Court assumes that Plaintiffs also believe that Defendants are subject to the specific jurisdiction of this Court. There have been no recent upheavals in the law of specific jurisdiction. While it is highly fact determinative, the law which sets the standards is well-developed:
McFadin, 587 F.3d at 759-60 (citations omitted).
All of the pleaded facts applicable to specific jurisdiction have been discussed in great detail above. They are conclusory and unsupported by facts. In summary, Plaintiffs' briefing seems to suggest that their claims to jurisdiction rest heavily on the allegations that AnswerNet and AES purchased assets from Greenwood Hall, that the individual Defendants were officers of Greenwood Hall, and that Boris and Bradfield occasionally communicated with persons in Texas.
This Court will not recount all the factors or analyze the alleged contacts a second time. The Defendants' sole contacts with Texas in this regard were Boris and Bradfield's occasional communications with Greenwood Hall employees in Texas. Only the alleged harms happened in Texas. Defendants never set foot in Texas in connection with any purchased assets or alleged legal violations. They never directed any action toward Texas.
Specific jurisdiction requires a link between the defendant's contacts and the specific claim asserted. It is a claim-specific injury. Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2006). The only contacts with Texas in the instant case were those of the Plaintiffs and/or Greenwood Hall. Courts have consistently held that a plaintiff's contacts or an unaffiliated defendant's contacts with the forum state are not imputed to another defendant.
Plaintiffs' remaining possible premise could again be boiled down to this theme: because Plaintiffs are located in Texas and damaged there, the resulting damage is enough to subject the Defendants to the jurisdiction of this Court. If taken to its logical end, Plaintiffs' argument suggests that if Plaintiffs had been located in Iowa or New Mexico, the Defendants could be sued there—regardless of where Defendants were when the alleged misconduct took place and regardless of whether they had ever been to either state.
The Fifth Circuit has held time and again that "economic consequences or other miscellaneous fall out" do not give rise to specific jurisdiction. Jobe v. ATR Mktg., Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753-55 (5th Cir. 1996). This Court holds that the Plaintiffs have not established that specific jurisdiction exists in this case over any of the Defendants. They did not establish that Defendants had minimum contacts or that the cause of action arose out of those contacts. Even if it had under the facts of this case, the exercise of jurisdiction would not be fair and reasonable. The Fifth Circuit in Panda Brandywine summed up its situation with a conclusion equally applicable here:
Panda Brandywine, 253 F.3d at 870.
Therefore, specific jurisdiction cannot be a basis for the maintenance of this lawsuit.
Although Plaintiffs may well be right that certain statutory rights were violated in the manner in which they were dismissed from employment and paid, these four Defendants are not properly before this Court. None of the Defendants' alleged acts were aimed at Texas. Nothing in their business decisions or purchase of assets connected the Defendants with Texas in sufficient ways as to give rise to specific jurisdiction. Finally, given the minimal number of contacts with Texas, especially with regard to the Defendants' alleged connections to this case, Defendants cannot be held subject to the general jurisdiction of this State, even under the pre-Daimler standards. Clearly, in the post-Daimler world, they are not "at home" in Texas.
Accordingly, it is hereby
