FRED BIERY, Chief Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Opposed Motion to Remand (docket #4), Defendant BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (docket # 7), and Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Opposed Motion to Remand (docket # 9). Plaintiff asserts this Court lacks jurisdiction over his case because it does not arise under federal law and the amount in controversy requirement has not been met for diversity jurisdiction purposes. Defendant contends the only dispute in this matter is whether the value of the home is the proper legal measure of the amount in controversy. Although defendant removed the case on federal question and diversity grounds, defendant states the Court need not reach the federal question issue because jurisdiction based on diversity is present. In
Plaintiffs filed suit in the 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas, along with an application for a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction and permanent injunction. Plaintiff asserts he received a federally insured loan in the amount of $86,166 from BSM Financial, LP to purchase a home in St. Hedwig, Texas. The Deed of Trust provided that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (hereinafter MERS) was the beneficiary and nominee for the lender and lender's successors and assigns. The loan servicing rights were transferred to Taylor Bean and Whitaker Mortgage Company (hereinafter TBW) shortly after the origination of the loan.
In February of 2009, plaintiff was laid off from his job as a mechanic. He contacted TBW to discuss his options to prevent foreclosure. In response, a TBW representative sent plaintiff an application for a loan modification. Plaintiff completed the application and returned it on May 5, 2009. He resubmitted the application on May 27, 2009, after failing to receive a response from the prior submission. In lieu of a response, plaintiff received a letter, in July of 2009, from TBW stating "The mortgage for the property in which you are living is about to be foreclosed." On August 4, 2009, the Federal Housing Administration suspended TBW and several weeks later TBW filed for bankruptcy. On August 13, 2009, plaintiff received a Notice of Trustee's Sale listing TBW as the mortgage servicer and MERS as the mortgagee. The notice set the sale date for October 6, 2009.
Plaintiff states that on or around August 31, 2009, in response to the collapse of TBW, the Government National Mortgage Association (hereinafter "Ginnie Mae") published materials for borrowers with loans it had "securitized." The materials explained FHA insured loans were likely included in a Ginnie Mae mortgage backed security, and Bank of America, Ginnie Mae's master sub-servicer, had taken over the servicing of those TBW loans. Borrowers whose servicing had been transferred to Bank of America were to expect to receive a letter from BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP.
Plaintiff further states he did not receive a letter from BAC but rather a Notice of Trustee's Sale listing BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP as the mortgage servicer and BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP as the current mortgagee. The date for the trustee's sale was set for November 3, 2009. Plaintiff, in mid-October, found new employment and contacted the defendant again to apply for a loan modification, but defendant's representative denied him the opportunity to do so. Plaintiff asserts that on or about September 25, 2009, defendant recorded an instrument in the Bexar County Real Property Records "purporting to assign the Note and Deed of Trust associated with this loan out of the MERS system to `BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP.'"
Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for breach of contract claiming neither TBW nor BAC complied with the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and therefore, foreclosure is not an available remedy at
Plaintiff maintains the only loss mitigation effort undertaken by TBW was to send plaintiff the loan modification application. TBW did not inform plaintiff of other loss mitigation options or make any effort to hold a face-to-face interview.
Plaintiff contends BAC, as TBW's successor, also failed to undertake any of the required loss mitigation efforts. Defendant BAC did provide plaintiffs counsel with the address and phone number of its loss mitigation department on October 15, 2009, but plaintiff was not given an opportunity, when he called the number, to submit written documentation of his qualifications after providing defendant information about his income and expenses. Plaintiff asserts BAC has not met a condition precedent to foreclosure of his loan.
Plaintiff also asserts section 3.301 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code has been violated. It is plaintiffs belief the holder of his note is Ginnie Mae and not defendant BAC. Therefore, BAC's mere possession of the deed of trust without the authority to enforce the note does not give BAC authority to foreclose on his property. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting defendant from foreclosing on his home. The temporary restraining order was granted while the case was pending in state court.
In the motion to remand, plaintiff maintains his claim does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction because it is a simple state law breach of contract claim. Although defendant recognized in its notice of removal that plaintiffs claim is a state law breach of contract claim which turns on a construction of federal law, plaintiff argues courts faced with similar claims have remanded the cases. Buis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 401 F.Supp.2d 612 (N.D.Tex.2005); Leggette v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A, No. 3:03-CV-2909-D, 2005 WL 2679699 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2005). Therefore, jurisdiction cannot be based on a federal question.
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff contends the amount in controversy is not stated in the petition and is not present in this case. Although defendant alleges the value of plaintiffs home is in excess of $75,000, this valuation of the case is incorrect. Plaintiff states the correct amount in controversy is the value of the property from the plaintiffs viewpoint, or in other words, plaintiffs equity in the property. Plaintiff is not seeking to void defendant's lien on the property but is trying to save his home by receiving the benefit of all required loss mitigation requirements. Plaintiff explains:
Plaintiffs Opposed Motion to Remand, docket # 4 at pages 7-8, numbered items 22 and 23.
In response, defendant explains that although removal was based on federal question and diversity grounds, this Court need not reach the federal question issue because diversity jurisdiction exists. Defendant admits the petition in this case does not allege a specific amount of damages, and therefore, defendant has the burden of proving the amount in controversy element is satisfied. Defendant believes this burden is satisfied based on Leininger v. Leininger, 705 F.2d 727 (5th Cir.1983), which stands for the proposition that the amount in controversy in an action seeking injunctive relief is the value of the object of the litigation. Here the value of plaintiff's home (i.e. the object of the litigation) exceeds the $75,000 threshold, and plaintiff has all but conceded the truth of this fact by acknowledging, in his motion to remand, his home is worth at least $85,230. Plaintiff's primary contention—that the amount of equity in his home is the proper measure of the amount in controversy—is without support. The proper measure of the amount in controversy is the value of the property at issue when the right the plaintiff seeks to protect or enforce is the right to peaceful possession of a home.
Plaintiff in this case is seeking to enjoin the defendant from foreclosing his home and as a result is seeking to protect his rights to his property not his right to home equity. The cases plaintiff relies on to support his home equity theory do not involve the enjoining of a foreclosure. Plaintiffs attempt to characterize the object of his suit as one to receive the benefit of required loss mitigation activities also fails because he does not request that relief in his petition and he cites no authority to support his assertion that only one right can be valued for purposes of the amount in controversy. The bottom line is plaintiff is seeking to protect his right to the "quiet and continued enjoyment of his property," and the best way to measure the value of that right, at least for determining the amount in controversy, is the fair market value of the property.
In reply, plaintiff continues to maintain that because he does not seek to void the existing lien on his property, the value, for amount in controversy purposes, is his equity in the home. Plaintiff contends the only Fifth Circuit authority cited by the defendant, Frontera Transp. Co. v. Abaunza, 271 F. 199 (5th Cir.1921), actually supports his position while defendant's Ninth Circuit authority is inapplicable, and the district court cases from Pennsylvania, Alabama and Minnesota are distinguishable. Plaintiff argues Texas law should be applied where the measure of damages in a suit for wrongful foreclosure is the difference between the value of the property on the date of foreclosure and the remaining balance due on the indebtedness, i.e.
On September 20, 2010, defendant filed a supplement to its response to plaintiffs motion to remand (docket # 13). The response was filed to direct this Court's attention to a more recent Fifth Circuit decision which defendant claims supports its position—Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Knox, No. 08-60887, 351 Fed.Appx. 844 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2009). Defendant explains the court rejected the plaintiff's argument in that case that the amount in controversy was not satisfied. The court found "`the value of the property controls the amount in controversy.'" Supplement, docket # 13 at pages 1-2. Defendant maintains the logic of Nationstar Mortgage requires the plaintiffs motion to remand be denied.
It is well established in actions in which declaratory or injunctive relief is sought, the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes is measured by the direct pecuniary value of the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce or protect or the value of the object which is the subject matter of the suit. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adv. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Martin, 244 F.2d 329, 331 (5th Cir.1957); Burks v. Texas Co., 211 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir.1954); see also Hartford Ins. Group v. Lou-Con Inc., 293 F.3d 908, 910 (5th Cir.2002) ("The amount is controversy is `the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented.'") (quoting Leininger v. Leininger, 705 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1983)). "[W]hen the validity of a contract or a right to property is called into question in its entirety, the value of the property controls the amount in controversy." Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Knox, 351 Fed. Appx. 844 848 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting Waller v. Prof'l Ins. Corp., 296 F.2d 545, 547-48 (5th Cir.1961)).
When the plaintiff does not allege in the state court petition a specific amount of damages, as is the case here, the defendant removing the case must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the value of the plaintiffs claim meets the jurisdictional requirement. Garcia v. Koch Oil Co., 351 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir.2003); DeAguilar v. Boeing, 47 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 180, 133 L.Ed.2d 119 (1995). The defendant's burden may be satisfied in two ways:
Once this burden is satisfied, the only way a plaintiff can then effectuate a remand to state court on amount in controversy grounds is to show as a matter of law it is certain his recovery will not reach the jurisdictional minimum for removal. DeAguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412.
The plaintiff can show his claims are actually less than the jurisdictional amount by filing a binding stipulation or affidavit with the petition prior to removal stating he does not seek and will not accept any award in excess of the jurisdictional amount. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335; DeAguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412. Such a stipulation will limit the amount in controversy in his case in an unambiguous manner.
As set forth previously, plaintiff asserts a breach of contract cause of action claiming foreclosure is prohibited when a lender has not complied with HUD regulations, in this case HUD regulated loss mitigation strategies prior to acceleration and foreclosure. Plaintiff also alleges it is Ginnie Mae and not the defendant who holds the note and therefore, BAC cannot foreclose on his property. Plaintiff does not seek to set aside the deed of trust and does not ask for monetary damages. Instead, the only relief sought by plaintiff is an injunction prohibiting foreclosure. Plaintiff asserts:
Plaintiff's Original Petition at page 8 attached to the Notice of Removal. This assertion is followed by plaintiff requesting the following relief:
Id.
Had plaintiff brought suit for wrongful foreclosure, there is no question the measure of damages would be "the difference between the value of the property in question at the date of foreclosure and the remaining balance due on the indebtedness." Farrell v. Hunt, 714 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex.1986); Houston Omni v. Southtrust Bank Corp., No. 01-07-00433-CV, 2009 WL 1161860 at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2009, no pet.) ("the measure of damages for wrongful foreclosure is lost equity, that is, the difference between the value of the property in question at the date of foreclosure and the remaining balance due on the indebtedness"); C & K Invests. v. Fiesta Group, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 234, 254 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (return of the property or damages may be requested when improper foreclosure occurs; "correct measure of damages is the difference between the value of the property in question at the date of foreclosure and the remaining balance due on the indebtedness"). However, such an event has not occurred nor can plaintiff recover under this theory. Baker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0916-B, 2009 WL 1810336 at *4 (N.D.Tex. Jun. 24, 2009) (recognizing lost equity as the measure of damages for a wrongful foreclosure based on "a tort theory of recovery to compensate the aggrieved for his lost possession of the property"; "Because recovery is premised upon one's lack of possession of real property, individuals never losing possession
In his motion to remand, plaintiff contends the "extent of the injury presented from the viewpoint of plaintiff is the injury that would arise from losing his ownership rights in the property without having received the benefit of required loss mitigation activities. His ownership rights are subject to a lien on the property, and Plaintiff does not seek to void that lien on the property." Plaintiffs Opposed Motion to Remand, docket # 4 at page 6. Plaintiff also asserts, in his reply in support of his motion to remand, that the only Fifth Circuit authority cited by BAC, Frontera Transp. Co. v. Abaunza, 271 F. 199 (5th Cir.1921), actually supports his loss of equity position.
In Frontera, the transportation company sought to restrain the "enforcement of a mortgage executed by it to Gonzalo Abaunza, covering certain property worth much more than $3,000, to declare said mortgage canceled as constituting a cloud on the title to the property described therein, and for general relief." Id. at 199. It was alleged the mortgage had been paid except for the principal which was 42,279.50 in Mexican pesos. It was further alleged the debtor could pay the debt in American money at the rate of exchange quoted, and that the debtor had tendered $600 in American money which was equivalent to the amount of Mexican pesos then due but the defendant had refused the tender. Id. at 199-200. The court then explained:
Id. at 201. The court found the district court had "correctly found that no sufficient
Based on this holding, plaintiff argues here that equity is the correct valuation because had the plaintiff in Frontera been successful, its equity in the land would have been the full value of the property because its debt would have been paid in full, and the court agreed this valuation was the proper measure of the amount in controversy. Unlike Frontera however, plaintiff states his homestead remains subject to an encumbrance, and he has not sought to void the lien in its entirety. Plaintiff claims he is merely seeking to compel loss mitigation required by the terms of his deed of trust and to ensure the only entity seeking foreclosure is the owner of the debt. However, as set forth above and as argued by the defendant, this is not what plaintiff asserts in his petition. There, plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction which "prohibits Defendant or any of their attorneys, agents, officers, employees, or contractors from foreclosing on Plaintiff's home." It appears plaintiff is seeking to protect his entire property and not just his equity.
In Berry v. Chase Home Fin., No. 09-116, 2009 WL 2868224 at *3 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 27, 2009), the court was faced with a challenge to the amount in controversy in a suit which sought, in part, injunctive relief prohibiting the defendant from foreclosing on the plaintiffs property. In reaching its conclusion on valuation of the suit, the court explained:
(Citations to docket omitted.)
Similarly, a more recent decision concurs in part with the foregoing analysis. Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C.-10-01667 JCS, 2010 WL 2629785 (N.D.Cal. Jun. 29, 2010). After citing the well-established standard set forth in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, that the amount in controversy is "`measured by the value of the object of the litigation,'" the court further explained:
Id. at *4-6 (citations omitted). The court found that the fair market value of the property as well as the amount remaining unpaid on the loan both exceeded the amount-in-controversy minimum.
Id. at *6.
A district court in Alabama also addressed this issue and the insistence by the plaintiff that the amount in controversy was the equity in the property. Mapp v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 3:08-CV-695-WKW, 2009 WL 3664118 (M.D.Ala. Oct. 28, 2009). The court noted that not only was plaintiffs ownership interest at stake in the litigation but also the value of that interest as well. The court further provided:
The court then explained the nature of foreclosure sale:
"The most appropriate way to measure the value of th[e rights at stake when a foreclosure is at issue] is the value of the property itself. This circuit has long recognized this principle. See Frontera Transp. Co. v. Abaunza, 271 F. 199, 201 (5th Cir.1921) (holding, in a suit to cancel a mortgage and remove the mortgage as a cloud on title, that "the value of the lands, not the amount required to redeem, is the amount in controversy").
* * * * *
At least one of the bundle of property rights that Mapp is seeking to enforce or protect through this litigation is his right to peacefully possess and enjoy his home. He is not seeking merely to delay Defendants' foreclosure action or to obtain the value of the equity in his home. Foreclosure will require him to vacate his home and will cost him its title. From Mapp's perspective then, it is the whole title and its "bundle of rights" at issue.
Id. at *3-4 (citations other than to Frontera Transp. omitted); see Green Oaks, LLC v. U.S. Bank Custodian-Sass Muni, No. 1:09CV221 LG-RHW, 2009 WL 2019060 at *2 (S.D.Miss. Jul. 8, 2009) (relying on Frontera Transportation, court found "the amount in controversy here is not the amount necessary to pay the unpaid taxes and redeem the property, but the value of the property itself. The only evidence of the value provided to the Court is an appraisal showing a value of $955,000, which is well above the jurisdictional amount.")
On the other hand, the district courts in Alabama issued two decisions, prior to that in Mapp, which support plaintiffs equity position. James v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:09cv247-MHT, 2009 WL 2170045 (M.D.Ala. Jul. 17, 2009); Sanders v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, No. 2:08-C369-MEF, 2009 WL 1151868 (M.D.Ala. Apr. 29, 2009). In James, the plaintiffs
In Sanders, "[t]he heart of the complaint [was] the unspecified damages Sanders seeks as a result of the mortgage contract and as a result of the alleged negligence, fraud, and coercion associated with the sale of the mortgage product to him by Homecomings." Sanders, 2009 WL 1151868 at *3. The court found the amount of the mortgage was not in issue concerning the first seven counts alleged because damages were sought for the wrongful conduct by Homecomings in the original transaction. The eighth count requested a temporary restraining order and was found unable to support jurisdiction despite the original mortgage value being in excess of $75,000. Recognizing "`[T]he value of the requested injunctive relief is the monetary value of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the injunction were granted,'" the court explained:
Id. at *3-4. The court did not set forth authority for its equity interest position, and this Court is mindful that the relief requested on the eighth count was a temporary restraining order. See Carstarphen v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 08-0511-WS-M, 2009 WL 1537861 at *4-6 & n. 11 (S.D.Ala. Jun. 1, 2009) ("The key point on valuation ... is that the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint is temporary, not permanent, in nature"; "The temporal scope of the injunctive relief sought is crucial to an assessment of its valuation from Carstarphen's perspective for amount-in-controversy purposes"; "What is the value to Carstarphen of a temporary restraining order forestalling Deutsche Bank's foreclosure sale for an abbreviated period of time? It is surely much lower than the value of permanent injunction of that foreclosure sale. In the former circumstance, she could still lose her home to Deutsche Bank once the TRO expired, while remaining obligated to pay her mortgage to a third party. In the latter, however, she could never lose her home to Deutsche Bank, although she would continue being obligated to pay her mortgage to a third party"; when a permanent injunction is sought, "the value of the injunctive relief would be the value of the home because the only effect of the injunction would be to allow Carstarphen to keep her home by blocking Deutsche Bank's foreclosure efforts, without altering or eliminating her mortgage payment responsibilities to a third party. If, as the Motion to Reconsider posits, the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint is not permanent, but merely temporary, the alternatives cannot be framed so starkly. In that event, the applicable comparison would be between a situation in which Carstarphen loses her home today and remains obligated to pay the mortgage (if injunctive relief is denied), and one in which she may still lose her home to Deutsche Bank in a matter of days or weeks upon expiration of the TRO and remains obligated to pay the mortgage to the third party (if injunctive relief is granted)"; "Because the benefit to a homeowner of a permanent injunction blocking a foreclosure sale is far greater than that of an ephemeral TRO prohibiting the same conduct for mere days or weeks, the jurisdictional impacts of this distinction are profound"; "the proper inquiry for valuation of the injunctive relief sought is the value to Carstarphen of being insulated from foreclosure by Deutsche Bank during a fleeting, transitory span. Defendants make no arguments that might warrant equating the value of a brief postponement of foreclosure proceedings with the full $86,000 value of the home").
This Court is mindful that plaintiffs case is unlike most of the decisions discussed herein because he claims to seek the benefit of mitigation measures and to confirm the holder of his note and nothing more. However, the Court cannot overlook the fact plaintiff seeks both a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from foreclosing on his home. This request for relief leads the Court to agree the object of the litigation is plaintiffs home and the fair market value of his home is the proper measure of the amount in controversy. Moreover, plaintiff asserts the injury from his view-point is "losing his ownership rights in the property without having received the benefit of the required loss mitigation activities." Therefore, the declaration by the plaintiff which asserts the value of the home is in excess of $75,000 leads this
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ODERED that Plaintiffs Opposed Motion to Remand (docket # 4) is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.