ORDER

ANDREW W. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court are Plaintiff Hunt's Motion to Allocate Deposition Time (Dkt. No. 135); Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Response in Opposition and Cobb Mechanical Contractors, Inc.'s Joinder (Dkt. Nos. 139, 140); and Hunt's Reply (Dkt. No. 142). The motion has been referred to the undersigned for resolution.

The Court refers to its numerous prior orders for the factual background of this case. The issue raised here is how time should be allocated among the parties for a deposition.1 Plaintiff Hunt moves for an allocation of one-half of the time for the depositions of non-party deponents Robert Petrossian and Manchester Texas Financial Group, LLC. Hunt was the general contractor for the Fairmont Austin Hotel construction project. On July 20, 2015, Hunt entered into a subcontract with Defendant Cobb. Pursuant to the Subcontract, Cobb obtained a performance bond from Liberty with Hunt as the obligee. Manchester Texas Financial Group, LLC is described as the Project's "Owner" in the contract and the entity with and for whom Hunt contracted to build the hotel. Mr. Petrossian is MTFG's designated corporate representative related to this litigation pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6), and Hunt has also subpoenaed him for a personal deposition.

MTFG and Mr. Petrossian agreed to appear and give depositions in San Diego, California on December 7, 2018. Mr. Petrossian appeared and testified in his individual capacity on that date. Hunt asserts that Cobb and Liberty questioned Mr. Petrossian in his individual capacity for a combined total of four hours and 28 minutes, while Hunt received only one hour and 39 minutes of this time, and did not finish its questioning. Dkt. No. 142 at 2. Counsel for Mr. Petrossian and MTFG agreed to present Mr. Petrossian for a second day for another seven hours for both his individual and his Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, stating that with regard to that seven hours, "I don't care how you [Hunt, Cobb and Liberty] split it up." Dkt. No. 142-1 at 3:16-25. According to Hunt, the second deposition has yet to be scheduled.

Hunt moves for an allocation of half of the total time of Mr. Petrossian's deposition. It argues that Cobb and Liberty's interests align for essentially all issues of substance in the case, Relying on Rules 30(d)(1), 26(b)(1) and (2) and 30(a)(2)(A)(i), Hunt requests fifty percent of the deposition time for its questioning, and asks that Liberty and Cobb be required to share the remaining fifty percent. Liberty opposes the motion, pointing out that it was filed three days before the deposition was scheduled, and the deposition is now complete, making the motion moot.2 Liberty asserts that Hunt already received "equal time" for the deposition of Mr. Petrossian, as each party received one-third of the deposition time. Dkt. No. 139 at 4. Hunt responds it did not receive a one-third share, as Mr. Petrossian's deposition has not been completed. Dkt. No. 142 at 3. Additionally, Liberty points out that Petrossian has agreed to give a second, seven hour deposition. Because Mr. Petrossian will be deposed for an additional seven hours, the motion to allocate deposition time is not moot.

Liberty argues that Hunt misconstrues Federal Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i) as requiring the division of time "per side," when in reality the Federal Rules divide the number of depositions per side. While Liberty is correct that Rule 30 refers to the number of depositions and not the time allocated to each side, Hunt relies on other rules, namely Rule 26(b)(2)(a), for the notion that the Court is empowered to alter the limitations on the length and number of depositions allowed under Rule 30. Thus, in a multi-party case, the Court is not constrained by Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i) from finding that the parties to a case should receive unequal divisions of deposition time. To the extent Liberty contends otherwise, it is mistaken.

Liberty also argues that Hunt mischaracterizes the alignment of issues shared by Liberty and Cobb to support its argument for fifty percent of the deposition time. Liberty maintains that the Court should deny Hunt's Motion, or alternatively, the Court should order that deposition time will be allocated equally among Hunt, Cobb and Liberty, as each of them have independent facts to develop to support their independent claims and defenses. In particular, Liberty points out that while Hunt's claim of breach of contract under the Subcontract is relevant to Liberty as one of several required pieces for Liberty's Performance Bond contract claim, that is the sole shared issue between Cobb and Liberty. Liberty argues, and Hunt concedes, that Cobb is involved in disputes with Hunt which do not involve Liberty and are not relevant to the claims between Liberty and Hunt.3 Liberty notes that Hunt also brings a cause of action against Liberty for breach of the Performance Bond, which does not involve Cobb. Liberty agrees that Hunt's claim under the Performance Bond will depend on proof that Cobb breached the Subcontract, but points out that Liberty has also asserted that Hunt failed to comply with the conditions precedent in the Performance Bond, failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Performance Bond, failed to mitigate its damages, and failed to give proper notice of default— defenses asserted by Liberty that relate solely to the Performance Bond, and are independent of the issues related to any breach of the Subcontract by Cobb. Additionally, Liberty argues it has asserted a multitude of counterclaims against Hunt which contain issues arising under the Performance Bond rather than the subcontract between Hunt and Cobb.

Hunt replies that the majority of the arguments presented by Cobb and Liberty overlap. Dkt. No. 142 at 4 (listing seven shared defensive theories). Additionally, Hunt argues that because Cobb is required to indemnify Liberty against any payments Liberty makes under the bond, these parties share an interest in the outcome of Liberty's lack of notice under the Bond defense, even if Cobb does not share the defense. Hunt argues that any differences between Liberty's and Cobb's positions against Hunt arising from other claims and counterclaims are trivial.

While the Court is not convinced by Hunt's argument that Cobb and Liberty are completely aligned in all their arguments and interests, it is also not convinced that Cobb and Liberty's defenses are completely independent, as Cobb and Liberty plainly have many aligned interests. Allocating deposition time in equal one-third allotments would thus be inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court finds that Hunt should be afforded 40% percent of Mr. Petrossian's deposition time and Cobb and Liberty should be afforded 60%, to be shared in any way Cobb and Liberty deem appropriate. In the event Cobb and Liberty cannot agree on an allocation, then they shall each receive 30% of the time. This ruling applies to the Petrossian deposition that has already occurred, so that Hunt should receive any additional time required to raise its percentage of the total time to 40%.

Accordingly Plaintiff Hunt's Motion to Allocate Deposition Time (Dkt. No. 135) is GRANTED IN PART as set forth above.