ORDER

MARIAN BLANK HORN, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Jay B. Stammerjohan filed a handwritten complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging tortious conduct and omissions by the City of Los Angeles, California and the California State Department of Transportation, including personal injuries to his wrist and foot, and denial of his federal Social Security benefits. Plaintiff's complaint is confused, hard to follow, and in part, hard to read. Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint states, in part:

Plaintiffs complaint also includes a "list of lost's," in which he outlines the recovery he seeks:

Plaintiff indicates that he is fifty-six years old, and, therefore, requests twenty-four years of payments of approximately $25,000.00 per month, that is, approximately $7,200,000.00 in monetary relief, in addition to an immediate payment of $2,000,000.00.

Plaintiff includes five attachments to his complaint. First, he includes a hand drawn map of where he alleges the negligent actions and omissions occurred, stating "Since when Doe's caltran's put cone's on a OW ramp maybe 100 Feet From top no sigh on street that day." Plaintiff also includes a radiological diagnostic report concerning his ankle and foot, from the university of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center. Additionally, he includes a UCLA, outpatient rehabilitation plan, which identifies pain and instability in plaintiffs ankle and recommends six weeks of physical therapy. Plaintiff also includes a response he received from the Office of the District Attorney for Los Angeles County, California, explaining its "inability to assist [him] with this. . . wholly . . . civil matter" and that he "would best be served by hiring a civil attorney," or that he should "consult one of the city's many Legal Aid offices." As a final attachment, plaintiff includes a letter from the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, California, thanking him for "taking the time to contact my office to express your views and concerns," on the bottom of which letter are handwritten, the words, "NO Help."

In his Application to Proceed ln Forma Pauperis, filed on the same day he filed his complaint, Mr. Stammerjohan repeats his claim for missing Social Security payments. He states that he was receiving "[$]236" every two weeks from the United States Social Security Administration, but that those payments terminated on November 17, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that "they cut me Lose" and that the amount paid thus far "is short as They owe Me One more Payment." In his Application to Proceed ln Forma Pauperis, plaintiff states that he is unable to pay the requisite filing fee, and lists as assets $17.00 in a bank account and a scooter worth $2,500.00.

After defendant filed a motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted a handwritten letter, which repeats the allegations stated in his earlier complaint:

As noted above, the United States filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) (2013), alleging that plaintiff's claims sound in tort and that his claims are against a party other than the United States. to date, plaintiff has not responded to the government's motion to dismiss, although plaintiff has been allotted more time than provided to do so under the court's Rules.

When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972). see also Erickson v. Pardus 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 4-49 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). "However, "`[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff) has not spelled out in his [or her) pleading."'" Lenden v. United States 100 Fed Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scouin v. United States. 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co. 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011)" Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed, Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.") reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)): see also Harris v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiffs pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency `with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.'" (quoting Minehan v. United States 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007))).

As indicated above, plaintiffs Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis indicates that he has been unemployed since December of 2010, has no source of income, and has not received any gifts, inheritances, pensions, annuities, life insurance, rents, interest or dividends in the last twelve months. He also claims he does not own real estate, stock, or bonds, but indicates that he has $17.00 in a savings or checking account, and a vehicle worth $2.500.00. In order to provide access to this court to those who cannot pay the filing fees mandated by RCFC 77.1(c), the statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006) permits a court to allow plaintiffs to file a complaint without payment of fees or security, under specific circumstances. The standard in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is "unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." Determination of what constitutes `unable to pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and therefore, whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis is left to the discretion of the presiding judge, based on the information submitted by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. See e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony Unit II Men's Advisory Council 506 U.S. 194, 217-18 (1993); Fuentes v. United States 100 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2011). In Fiebelkorn v. United States, the United States Court of Federal Claims indicated:

Fiebelkorn v. United States. 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Haves v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 369 (2006). Plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status. As is discussed below, however, his complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in this court.

It is well established that "`subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). a[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press." Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki. 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010) ("Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. 546 U.S. at 514)); Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc.  269 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[A] court has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case." (citing Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc. 918 F.2d 160, 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts must always look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties raise the issue or not."). "The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction ... may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment" Arbauqh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; see also Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States. 521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]ny party may challenge, or the court may raise sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time." (oiling Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. 546 U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en ban denied (Fed. Cir. 2004) cert. denied 545 U.S. 1127 (2005); and Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United States 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 76, appeal dismissed 425 F. App'x 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In fact, [s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even where ... . neither party has raised this issue." Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile Prods., Inc, v. Mead Corp.  134 F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied and en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1998)), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert granted in part 546 U.S. 975 (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted 548 U.S. 124 (2006)

Pursuant to the RCFC and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only state in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction." and "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2013) see also Ashcroft v. lqbal 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)). "Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiffs claim, independent of any defense that may be interposed." Holley v. United States  124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States 97 Fed. Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-McCaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 713 (2010). "Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to support a claim." Bradley v. Chiron Corp. 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also NcZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (3d ed. 2004)). 'A plaintiff's factual allegations must `raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross the line from conceivable to plausible." Three S Consulting v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As stated in Ashcroft v. lqbal, "[a] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement'" Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. at 555).

When deciding a case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)))" Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), recognized by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States 464 F.3d 1325. 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States  296 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir.) reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002) cert. denied 538 U.S. 906 (2003).

The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchel/ 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

`Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the United States . . . ." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114. 1116 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 259 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v. United States 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009)" Rick's Mushroom Sent Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d at 1343 ("[P]laintiff must . . . identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money damages against the United States."). In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The court wrote:

Ontario Power Generation. Inc. v. United States 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101. 106 (2012).

to prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "`can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.'"United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan 424 U.S. at 400): see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 472; United Stales v. Mitchell 463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co. LLC v. United States 533 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act itself See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The Tucker Act does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). "`If the statute is not money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'" Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin. 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cntv., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d at 876). Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is "fatal to the court's jurisdiction under the Tucker Act"): Peoples v. United States 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

Although plaintiff's complaint lists this case as filed against the United States, plaintiff also is asserting claims for money damages against the City of Los Angeles and the California Department of Transportation, an agency of the State of California. This court has no jurisdiction to recover claims for money damages sought against private parties, or local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies. Pursuant to RCFC 10(a), all claims in the United States Court of Federal Claims must have "the United States designated as the party defendant." RCFC 10(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)(1) (2006). The United States Supreme Court has indicated, for suits filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors, "[i]f the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (citations omitted). Stated differently, "the only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual." Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Sherwood 312 U.S. at 588; Hover v. United States 113 Fed. Cl. 295, 296 (2013); May v. United States 80 Fed. Cl. 442, 444 ("Jurisdiction, then, is limited to suits against the United States.") aff'd, 293 F. App'x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2008). This court has no jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims against state entities or private parties. See Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. 497 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 640, 649 (2009) ("When a plaintiff's complaint names private parties, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies, this court has no jurisdiction to hear those allegations." (quoting Shalhoub v. United States. 75 Fed. Cl. 584, 585 (2007))). Therefore, to the extent that the plaintiff is bringing a claim against a defendant other than the United States, as appears to be the case in the complaint filed in this court by Mr. Stammerjohan, the complaint must be dismissed.

Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff requests any relief from conduct sounding in tort, as a result of any physical injuries to his wrist and ankle, related medical expenses, and impairment of earning capacity, the Tucker Act expressly excludes tort claims from the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1): see also Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States 521 F.3d at 1343; Alves v. United States 133 F.3d 1454, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brown v. United States 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States 15 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.8 (Fed. Cir.) reh'g denied, en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 513 U.S. 961 (1994); Trevino v. United States 113 Fed. Cl. 204, 209 (2013); May v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 278, 281 (2012), aff'd, 2013 WL 3964993 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Hempel v. United States 97 Fed. Cl. 235, 238, aff'd, 429 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed. 132 S.Ct. 1105 (2012); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. at 650; McCullough v. United States 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006); Agee v. United States 72 Fed. CI. 284, 290 (2006); Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 732, 739, aff'd, 204 F. App'x 885 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied, (Fed. Cir. 2006).

In addition to plaintiffs complaint for money damages from the City of Los Angeles and the California Department of Transportation, plaintiff asks the court to direct the state of California to issue bin a new driver's license. This court, however, does not have the authority to grant the type of equitable or declaratory relief plaintiff requests. The United States Court of Federal Claims has limited, specific jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that:

Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. United States, 160 F.3d 714, 716-17 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also United States v. to hono O'Odham Nation, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 1729 (2011) (The United States Court of Federal Claims "has no general power to provide equitable relief against the Government or its officers)." Massie v. United States 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Except in strictly limited circumstances, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2), there is no provision in the Tucker Act authorizing the Court of Federal Claims to order equitable relief." (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) ("cases seeking relief other than money damages from the court of claims have never been `within its jurisdiction") and Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1990))): James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Fite Court of Federal Claims has no power to grant affirmative non-monetary relief unless it is tied and subordinate to a money judgment." (quoting Austin v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719, 723 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 911 (1975)) reh'g denied (1999)" Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 177, 192 (2013) Halim v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 677, 685 (2012); Smalls v. United States 87 Fed. Cl. 300, 307 (2009) Pryor v. United States 85 Fed. Cl. 97, 103 (2008) (Apart from ordering relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(2) or (o)(2), the Court of Federal Claims has no power to grant a declaratory judgment. . . . The Court of Federal Claims cannot adjudicate a complaint that seeks only declaratory relief." (citing Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Assn v. United States, 160 F.3d at 717)). None of the exceptions which permit the United States Court of Federal Claims to grant declaratory and equitable relief apply to plaintiff's claims. This court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction to grant plaintiff the kind of declaratory relief, in the form of a driver's license, that he requests.

Mr Stammerjohan also alleges that the United States Social Security Administration wrongfully ended payments to him, and, consequently, he is owed money by the United States. Plaintiff states that he had been receiving $236.00 every two weeks from the United States Social Security Administration, but that such payments stopped on November 17, 2012. Plaintiff does not provide any other relevant information on the matter, relying on the statement that he lost his "chance" for Social Security benefits. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized in Marcus v. United States, the United States Court of Federal Claims "has no jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) . . . over claims to social security benefits." Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-67 (1975) for the proposition that "42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h) (1982) require that acton for Social Security benefits must be brought in district court"); cf. Alabama Hospital Assn v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 176. 656 F.2d 606 (1981)); see also Treece v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 226, 230 (2010); Addams-More v. United States 81 Fed. Cl. 312, 315 (2008). Because 42 U.S.C. § 405 does not list the United States Court of Federal Claims as a court which can review a claim seeking "judicial review of the Commissioners final decision," this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs Social Security claim.

CONCLUSION

Because the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain any of plaintiff's claims, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.