GEORGE L. HASTINGS, Jr., Special Master.
In this case under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (hereinafter the Program"), Richard and Christina Young ("Petitioners") seek, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e),
This case concerning KLY is one of more than 5000 cases filed under the Program in which it has been alleged that a child's disorder known as "autism," or a similar disorder, was caused by one or more vaccinations. A brief summary of that proceeding follows.
In anticipation of dealing with such a large group of cases involving a common factual issue—i.e., whether vaccinations can cause autism—the Office of Special Masters ("OSM") devised special procedures. On July 3, 2002, the Chief Special Master, acting on behalf of the OSM, issued a document entitled the Autism General Order # 1,
Ultimately, the PSC elected to present two different theories concerning the causation of autism. The first theory alleged that the measles portion of the MMR vaccine can cause autism, in situations in which it was alleged that thimerosal-containing vaccines previously weakened an infant's immune system. That theory was presented in three separate Program "test cases," during several weeks of trial in 2007. The second theory alleged that the mercury contained in the thimerosal-containing vaccines can directly affect an infant's brain, thereby substantially contributing to the development of autism. The second theory was presented in three additional "test cases" during several weeks of trial in 2008.
On February 12, 2009, decisions were issued concerning the three "test cases" pertaining to the PSC's first theory. In each of those three decisions, the petitioners' causation theories were rejected. I issued the decision in Cedillo v. HHS, No. 98-916V, 2009 WL 331968 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 12, 2009). Special Master Patricia Campbell-Smith issued the decision in Hazlehurst v. HHS, No. 03-654V, 2009 WL 332306 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 12, 2009). Special Master Denise Vowell issued the decision in Snyder v. HHS, No. 01-162V, 2009 WL 332044 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 12, 2009).
Those three decisions were later each affirmed in three different rulings, by three different judges of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Hazlehurst v. HHS, 88 Fed. Cl. 473 (2009); Snyder v. HHS, 88 Fed. Cl. 706 (2009); Cedillo v. HHS, 89 Fed. Cl. 158 (2009). Two of those three rulings were then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again resulting in affirmances of the decisions denying the petitioners' claims. Hazlehurst v. HHS, 604 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Cedillo v. HHS, 617 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
On March 12, 2010, the same three special masters issued decisions concerning three separate "test cases" pertaining to the PSC's second causation theory. Again, the Petitioners' causation theories were rejected in all three cases. King v. HHS, No. 03-584V, 2010 WL 892296 (Fed.Cl.Spec.Mstr. Mar. 12, 2010); Mead v. HHS, No. 03-215V, 2010 WL 892248 (Fed.Cl.Spec.Mstr. Mar. 12, 2010); Dwyer v. HHS, No. 03-1202V, 2010 WL 892250 (Fed.Cl.Spec.Mstr. Mar.12, 2010). None of the petitioners elected to seek review any of those three decisions.
Thereafter, petitioners remaining in the OAP were required to file amended petitions and submit case-specific expert reports in support of their claim if they elected to pursue their petitions for vaccine compensation. (See Autism Master File, Autism Update filed Jan. 12, 2011 at 4.)
On February 10, 2005, Petitioners filed a "Short-Form Autism Petition for Vaccine Compensation," on behalf of KLY under the Vaccine Act. (Pet. at 1.) Petitioners thereby alleged that KLY's autism was vaccine-caused, but provided no further details regarding the nature of the alleged vaccine-related injury. (Id.)
During the pendency of the OAP, Petitioners filed the required medical records, as ordered by the court in anticipation of the rulings from the test cases. (See Pet. Exs. 1-22.) On July 27, 2010, Respondent filed a Statement indicating that Petitioners' claim was timely filed within the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations, and involved a diagnosed autism disorder. (Notice, ECF No. 43.)
Subsequent to the conclusion of the OAP test cases, Petitioners on August 15, 2011, filed an Amended Petition, alleging that KLY's MMR vaccination of August 8, 2002, caused him to develop an encephalopathy. Petitioners were ordered on August 26, 2011, to file an expert report in support of their Amended Petition by no later than November 28, 2011. (Order, ECF No. 48.) For over one year thereafter, Petitioners' counsel filed status reports indicating that counsel had sent KLY's medical records to an expert for "his" review and that additional time would be required for the expert to review the material and ascertain if "he" could prepare an expert report. (See Status Report, ECF No. 49, Nov. 28, 2011; Status Report, ECF No. 50, Jan. 27, 2012; Status Report, ECF No. 51, Mar. 27, 2012; Status Report, ECF No. 52, May 30, 2012; Status Report, ECF No. 53, July 30, 2012; Status Report, ECF No. 54, Sept. 28, 2012.)
On November 2, 2012, I expressed my concern that case this was not proceeding to resolution more quickly, and ordered Petitioners to identify their medical expert and explain the delay in producing their expert report. (See Order, ECF No. 55.). On January 18, 2013, Petitioners filed a motion for a further enlargement of time, indicating that the expert who was reviewing their case and preparing an expert report was Theresa A. Deisher, Ph.D. (Motion, ECF No. 56.)
On April 22 and July 29, 2013, I granted Petitioners further extensions of time to file Dr. Deisher's expert report specific to this case, since, according to Petitioners' motions, Dr. Deisher had been unable to prepare her report due to clinical commitments. However, in light of the protracted proceedings in this case, in the Order of July 29, 2013, I warned Petitioners that if their expert report was not filed within the next three months, absent good cause shown, I would dismiss this case for failure to prosecute.
Petitioners have yet to file a case-specific expert report in support of their claim, despite being under court order for more than two and one-half years to do so.
On August 15, 2013, Petitioners filed a motion that both sought another extension of time to file Dr. Deisher's report, and also constituted an application for interim costs. (Hereinafter, "Pet. App.") Petitioners' application sought $5000 to cover the cost of a retainer charged by their expert Dr. Deisher, plus $2,400 for the prepayment of costs for certain medical testing ordered by Dr. Deisher. Respondent opposed Petitioners' application for interim costs. ("R. Resp.," filed on Sep. 20, 2013.) Petitioners then filed another memorandum concerning the fee application on October 11, 2013. ("Pet. Reply.")
Special masters have the authority to award "reasonable" attorneys' fees and litigation costs in Vaccine Act cases. § 300aa-15(e)(1). This is true even when a petitioner is unsuccessful on the merits of the case, if the petition was filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Id. "The determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees [and costs] is within the special master=s discretion." Saxton v. HHS, 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Shaw v. HHS, 609 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Further, as to all aspects of a claim for attorneys' fees and costs, the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the attorneys' fees claimed are "reasonable." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Sabella v. HHS, 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 215 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Rupert v. HHS, 52 Fed.Cl. 684, 686 (2002); Wilcox v. HHS, No. 90-991V, 1997 WL 101572, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 14, 1997). The petitioner's burden of proof to demonstrate "reasonableness" applies equally to costs as well as attorneys' fees. Perreira v. HHS, 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff'd 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
In Avera v. HHS, 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit indicated that an award of "interim" fees and costs—that is, an award prior to the entry of a final judgment on the initial question of whether the Petitioner is entitled to compensation for the alleged vaccine injury—can be appropriate in Vaccine Act cases. Id. at 1352. The Avera court did not specify in what particular circumstances such an award might appropriately be issued, but the court made it clear that such "interim" awards can be appropriate. Id. The Federal Circuit gave the same indication again in Shaw. Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1374.
In Avera v. HHS, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit indicated that an award of "interim fees"—that is, an award of fees prior to the entry of a final judgment on account of the alleged vaccine injury—can be appropriate in Vaccine Act cases. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. However, the Avera court did not specify in what particular circumstances such an award might appropriately be issued. Id. In this case, Respondent first raises a legal argument that an "interim" award is appropriate only in a very narrow set of circumstances—i.e., either after an award of compensation resulting from the alleged vaccine injury has been made to the Petitioners, or after a judgment denying such compensation has been entered by the court. (R. Resp., pp 5-9.)
I reject Respondent's legal argument. Avera clearly held that interim awards are permissible. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. Further, the Federal Circuit's opinion in Shaw stated unequivocally that the Avera court had rejected "the government's argument that a fee award is only permissible after judgment under §300aa-15." Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1374 (emphasis added). Thus, the Shaw court explicitly interpreted the Avera court to have rejected the very argument that Respondent raises here, that a fee award Ais only permissible after judgment. Id. I and other Special Masters have found on numerous occasions that an award of interim fees is permissible prior to the entry of judgment or an award of compensation resulting from the alleged vaccine injury. See, e.g. Bender v. HHS, No. 11-693V, 2014 WL 448860, at *2-4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 15, 2014). Special masters, rather, clearly have discretion to consider whether an interim award is appropriate in a specific case. Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1520.
I have reviewed and carefully considered Petitioners' Application, as well as all the filings from both parties concerning Petitioners' Application. I find that the circumstances of this case clearly do not justify an award for the interim costs sought by Petitioners at this time. I will not reiterate each of the many deficiencies in Petitioners' application, which were set forth in Respondent's Response. I will instead discuss the major weaknesses that prevent me from awarding interim costs in this claim at this time: 1) Petitioners have not established that a reasonable basis exists to proceed in the prosecution of this claim; and 2) Petitioners have not established that the costs sought are reasonable.
As discussed above, under the Vaccine Act, Petitioners may recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs even if they have not established entitlement to compensation for their injury, if their petition was filed in good faith, possessed a reasonable basis, and the requested fees and costs are reasonable.
Since Petitioners' claim is still pending, an award of interim costs is permissible only if Petitioners can demonstrate that their claim possesses a reasonable basis. Perreia, 27 Fed. Cl. at 34. While a claim may possess a reasonable basis at the time of its filing, the reasonableness of further pursuing the claim may come into question later in the proceeding through either the introduction of new evidence or an inability to demonstrate supporting evidence. Id. at 33. Petitioners assert that a reasonable basis exists for the prosecution of this claim because they have filed a complete set of medical records, and they have an "expert willing to testify." (Pet. Reply at 4.) However, a reasonable basis to proceed in the prosecution of this claim requires more than the filing of medical records and retaining an "expert willing to testify."
As an initial matter, the medical records filed to date do not demonstrate or even suggest vaccine causation. Accordingly, I cannot find a reasonable basis based on the medical records alone.
Additionally, while Petitioners' have filed a somewhat vague general affidavit of their expert Dr. Deisher, concerning herself and her work, Dr. Deisher has yet to offer a case-specific expert opinion in this case. Dr. Deisher has never, to my knowledge, testified in a claim before the Office of Special Masters. Nor is she a medical doctor. Accordingly, I do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that this claim possesses a reasonable basis to proceed, based merely upon counsel's assertion that Dr. Deisher might in the future offer a case-specific opinion favorable to Petitioners in this case. While Dr. Deisher may eventually offer a reliable opinion regarding causation in this matter, sufficient to establish a reasonable basis to proceed in the prosecution of this claim, at this time she has yet to do so. Perreia, 33 F.3d at 1377 ("Congress must not have intended that every claimant, whether being compensated or not under the Vaccine Act, collect attorney fees and costs by merely having an expert state an unsupported opinion that the vaccine was the cause in-fact of the injury"). Accordingly, at this time, Petitioners have not demonstrated a reasonable basis to proceed with the prosecution of this claim, and therefore I may not award interim costs.
Petitioners seek $5000 to pay Dr. Deisher's retainer, as well as $2,400 for medical testing to be performed at the recommendation of Dr. Deisher. The Vaccine Act indicates that reasonable costs may be awarded to Petitioners. § 300aa-15(e)(1). However, at this stage of the proceedings I cannot determine, for a number of reasons, whether or not the costs Petitioners seek are reasonable.
As an initial matter, as discussed above, Dr. Deisher has yet to offer a medical expert opinion in this case, she has not testified in previous vaccine cases, she has been subject to criticism in the scientific community,
Additionally, Petitioners did not submit the retainer agreement that they allegedly signed agreeing to pay Dr. Deisher $5000 for her expert services in this case. Nor did Petitioners submit documentation regarding any of the following: the hourly rate that Dr. Deisher will charge for her services in this case, the rate Dr. Deisher typically charges for her expert services, the customary rate for an expert with Dr. Deisher's qualifications, the number of hours Dr. Deisher anticipates expending in this case, and the types of tasks she intends to undertake in proffering her medical opinion on behalf of Petitioners.
Finally, Petitioners have submitted no invoice evidencing the costs for the medical tests ordered by Dr. Deisher,
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I deny Petitioners' Application for interim costs.
