BRIAN H. CORCORAN, Special Master.
In his petition, Marvin Setness seeks to establish that the influenza ("flu") vaccine he received on December 1, 2010, caused him to develop Guillain-Barré syndrome ("GBS"). In tandem with her Rule 4(c) report, Respondent has moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Mr. Setness's claim is time-barred by the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations. Having reviewed the parties' briefs, I defer a ruling on Respondent's Motion until an onset hearing can be held in order to determine the date Petitioner's symptoms began.
Mr. Setness received the flu vaccine on December 1, 2010. Pet'r's Ex. 2. On December 17, 2010, he presented to the St. Rose Dominican Hospital Emergency Department in Las Vegas, Nevada and was subsequently diagnosed with GBS after several days of hospitalization. He was then transferred to a rehabilitation facility on January 4, 2011, where he remained until January 15, 2011. Pet'r's Ex. 5 at 109. At Petitioner's two-year follow-up doctor's visit, a repeat EMG/NCV
The medical records and affidavit submitted in connection with Mr. Setness's claim reveal a factual dispute as to the precise onset of his symptoms. In his affidavit, Mr. Setness asserts that he was healthy before his initial hospital visit on December 17, 2010 — making that the actual date of onset. Pet'r's Ex. 1 at 1. A neurology consultation note prepared on December 18, 2010, indicated that Petitioner had been experiencing symptoms for the past two days, thus corroborating onset on December 17, 2010. Pet'r's Ex. 9. There is also a conspicuous lack of notation in the Emergency Department Treatment Record and in Petitioner's discharge summary memorializing any symptoms prior to Petitioner's hospital admission. Pet'r's Ex. 9.
There is contrary record proof, however, suggesting that onset occurred before December 17, 2010. Mr. Setness initially reported to his first treaters "numbness and weakness of his left lower leg for the past 2 days" — suggesting that onset of his symptoms would have occurred on December 15, 2010. Pet'r's Ex. 9 at 257-58. Other medical records support an onset of December 16th. On December 20, 2010, while still in the hospital, the records indicate that Mr. Setness told a treating doctor that he was fine on December 15th, but then woke up on December 16th with a headache and some weakness in his lower extremities. Id. at 382. On January 4, 2011, Mr. Setness similarly stated to a different physician that his symptoms of left lower extremity weakness began "a day or two prior" to his initial hospital admission on December 17, 2010, (Pet'r's Ex. 5 at 113) — a statement that could support the 16th or even the 15th as the date of onset of symptoms.
On December 17, 2013, Mr. Setness filed this petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the "Vaccine Program").
Respondent's Motion asserts that Mr. Setness's claim is time-barred because it was filed at least one day after the thirty-six-month statutory limitations period expired. Resp't's Rule 4 Report at 6. Respondent contends that evidence in the record indicates onset was actually December 16, 2010 — prior to the start of Petitioner's December 17, 2010, hospitalization. Id. As a result, Petitioner had until December 16, 2013, to file his claim, but failed to do so in that time period. Id. at 7. Relying primarily on Cloer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.3d 1322, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Respondent asserts that the thirty-six-month statute of limitations period for Vaccine Program Cases begins running on the date of onset. Respondent acknowledges that in some instances the limitations period governing Vaccine Program claims has been computed in a manner that begins counting from the day after onset, but asserts that the Vaccine Rule invoked in favor of this computation approach (Vaccine Rule 19(a))
Mr. Setness opposed Respondent's Motion on November 24, 2014 (ECF No. 21) ("Response"), acknowledging that there is conflicting evidence on the record about onset, but maintaining that there is sufficient evidence to support December 17th as the actual date of onset. Petitioner also distinguishes evidence of symptoms prior to his hospitalization, arguing that they are more likely attributable to one of his pre-existing conditions, including Gastroesophageal reflex disease, hypertension, asbestosis, osteoarthritis in the knee and pelvis, and sleep apnea; and therefore are unrelated to his subsequent GBS diagnosis. Response at 4-5. Alternatively, Petitioner argues that the earliest onset could have been was December 16th, but applying Vaccine Rule 19(a), his claim would still be timely. Id. at 6.
Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner's Response, and so the Motion is now ready to be decided.
Respondent's Motion asks that I dismiss this case based upon certain disputed record evidence. Under such circumstances, it is appropriate that (as would be done with a motion for summary judgment) I infer the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. The standard of review when ruling on a motion to dismiss is similar to that of a summary judgment motion: the "court must presume all undisputed factual allegations to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Four Rivers Inv., Inc. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 592, 594 (2007), aff'd, 330 F. App'x 919 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1982)); see also Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Xiangdong He v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-207V, 2012 WL 1185686, at *3 n.14 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 12, 2012) (applying summary judgment standard of Rule 56 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims to decide motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations).
The statute of limitations prescribed by the Vaccine Act is thirty-six months. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2). The period in which to bring a Program claim terminates "after the expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom of manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such injury." Id. In determining the terminal date for filing a Vaccine Program claim using months as the unit of measure, special masters have frequently followed the common sense approach of starting from the date of accrual "to a day of the corresponding number" in the final month. See, e.g., Castaldi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-300V, 119 Fed. Cl. 407 (2014); Powell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-417V, 2014 WL 2584192 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 19, 2014); see also 86 C.J.S. Time § 8 (2015). As a result, because this action was filed on December 17, 2013, it could be considered untimely if this cause of action had accrued earlier than December 17, 2010, as Respondent argues the record indicates. Special masters have in fact dismissed cases that were filed outside the limitations period, even by a single day or two. See, e.g., Spohn v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-0460V, 1996 WL 532610 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 5, 1996) (dismissing case filed one day beyond thirty-six-month limitations period), mot. for review denied, (Fed. Cl. Jan. 10, 1997), aff'd, 132 F.3d 52 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
As the Petitioner notes, there is a Vaccine Rule
Mr. Setness argues that application of Rule 19(a) effectively provides an additional day in which to file a Vaccine Program claim. Even if his symptoms began on December 16, 2010, the action would still be timely if filed by December 17, 2013, because the counting of months for purposes of determining the limitations period would not begin until the day
Respondent contends that a more restrictive computational method should be applied that does not take into account Vaccine Rule 19(a). In support, she points to language from the Federal Circuit's decision in Mahaffey for the proposition that "a procedural rule such as . . . [Vaccine] Rule 19 cannot extend a statutory period of limitation." Mahaffey, 368 F.3d at 1378; Resp't's Rule 4(c) Report at 8. But Mahaffey is distinguishable for several reasons. First, Mahaffey related to the timeliness of a petitioner's motion for review of a special master's denial of an entitlement award. Id. at 1379. The Mahaffey Petitioner-Appellant argued that under a different subsection of Vaccine Rule 19 (Rule 19(c)), the 30-day period for seeking review was automatically extended by the three-day extension set forth in that provision of Rule 19 applying to service by mail. Id. at 1380-81. As evident in its title, however, Vaccine Rule 19 addresses two matters: how to compute time, and also the circumstances under which a party's time to act can be extended, whether automatically or upon a party's request. Mahaffey does not involve the Act's limitations period for bringing claims, it does not address Rule 19(a), and Respondent offers no legal explanation for why Vaccine Rules 19(a) and 19(c) should be equated under the circumstances.
Second, Mahaffey's admonition against using the Vaccine Program rules to impermissibly expand the Court's jurisdiction does not accurately capture what occurs when Vaccine Rule 19 is applied to the Act's limitations period. Resp't's Rule 4(c) Report at 8 (citing Mahaffey, 368 F.3d at 1381). As noted above, Rule 19 fills an omission in the statute by providing a computational methodology. Nor is it accurate to suggest that the Court's jurisdiction is in play when measuring the limitations period — for, as the Federal Circuit itself has held, "the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional . . . ." Cloer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Cloer, 654 F.3d at 1322). Indeed, federal courts (when faced with similar objections) consistently recognize that computing time under a defined limitations period is itself merely a procedural matter. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass'n, v. Attalla, 363 F.3d 1085, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004); Salvador-Calleros v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Bartlik v. U.S. Dep't. of Labor, 62 F.3d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1995). As a result, applying Vaccine Rule 19(a) to the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations provision does not amount to the usurpation of authority Respondent suggests.
Despite the unpersuasiveness of such arguments, however, there is other legal support for Respondent's position regarding calculation of the limitations period for Vaccine Act claims. Vaccine Rule 19(a) is structured similarly to Rule 6(a) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims and Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — making cases interpreting those analogous rules relevant. In United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 383 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the Federal Circuit (interpreting Rule 6(a) of the Court of International Trade (which is also parallel to Rule 19(a)) held that the "anniversary date method" of computing a limitations period applied. Inn Foods, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1322. Under this method, the statute of limitations was to be calculated beginning the day after the triggering or claim accrual event (consistent with Rule 6(a) and 19(a)), but the relevant statute of limitations expired on the anniversary calendar date of the triggering event rather than the anniversary calendar date for the first day from which the limitations period was calculated (the day after the triggering event). Id.
The Spohn decision provides an example of application of this computational approach to the Act's thirty-six-month limitations period. The special master in Spohn considered whether Vaccine Rule 19(a) applied, as petitioners urged, in permitting a case to go forward that was filed a day beyond the literal expiration of the thirty-six-month period. Spohn, 1996 WL 532610, at *3. In calculating the statute of limitations, the special master excluded the date of onset consistent with Rule 19(a), but ultimately held that this computation method did not assist the petitioners' claim because the limitations period ended at midnight on the night before the petition was in fact filed — that date being the thirty-six month anniversary of the accrual of their Vaccine Act claim. Id.
I find that the approach set forth in Spohn is persuasive, as it properly takes into account Rule 19(a), but is consistent with the view of the majority of special masters about measuring the Act's limitations period. See, e.g., Shortnacy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-827V, 2014 WL 5269958, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 15, 2014) (citing Spohn in determining that case filed on December 2, 2010, would be untimely if onset of symptoms had occurred prior to December 2, 2007, even though limitations period was calculated beginning day after onset). Thus, for Mr. Setness's claim to be timely in this case, onset of his symptoms arising from his vaccination must have occurred no later than December 17, 2010; even if the Vaccine Act's limitations period was calculated beginning the next day (December 18, 2010), it would have expired at midnight on December 17, 2013.
As noted above, there is a factual dispute as to when onset of Petitioner's symptoms began. Because I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Petitioner, I cannot decide Respondent's motion based only on the papers, as there exists record proof supporting the conclusion that onset began on December 17, 2010. However, should Respondent be able to establish that onset more likely occurred on an earlier date, her motion would be well-founded. Resolving this factual dispute will require an onset evidentiary hearing.
Based upon the above, I
