CHARLES F. LETTOW, Judge.
Plaintiff Robert Lee Manning, Jr., seeks monetary damages of more than a trillion dollars from the United States for infringement of "intellectual property," fraud, and discrimination. Compl. ¶ 33.
Section 1915 of Title 28 enables federal courts to allow a person to commence an action without prepayment of court fees, so long as the person provides a sworn affidavit establishing his or her inability to pay:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Nonetheless, the scope of the statute becomes evident upon an examination of the origin and chain of amendments made to the text over time.
The current version of Section 1915 is the product of several amendments made by Congress as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
When Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it did not re-write Section 1915 but instead amended it to add rules for prisoner filings. See Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1996) (Newman, J.) (providing a line-by-line listing of the 1995 Act's revisions to the text of Section 1915). The 1995 Act inserted the phrase "such prisoner possesses" into Paragraph 1915(a)(1) while also leaving intact the requirement in the original 1948 Act that "a person" file an "affidavit" regarding his or her inability to pay. Id. In the Second Circuit's opinion in Lacy, the court even inserted a notation of "sic" next to the phrase "such prisoner" in the court's quotation of Paragraph 1915(a)(1), signaling that the court thought that the reference to "such prisoner" was an error. Id.; see also Schagene, 37 Fed. Cl. at 662 n.2 (commenting that there are actually two errors in Paragraph 1915(a)(1) because "such prisoner" was an error and the word "and" should appear after the word "possesses" in the statute). As other courts have observed, "the purpose of the [Prison Litigation Reform Act], as reflected by its title, is to curtail inmate litigation," implying that Congress did not intend to affect filings by non-prisoners. Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-378, at 166, for the proposition that the act was intended "to discourage frivolous and abusive prison lawsuits").
In light of this evolution of Section 1915, it would be improper to assume that by adding the phrase "such prisoner" in Paragraph 1915(a)(1), Congress intended to repeal by implication the century-old authorization for in forma pauperis filing by persons generally. See Powell v. Hoover, 956 F.Supp. 564, 566 (M.D. Pa. 1997) ("The appearance of the phrase `such prisoner,' without more, cannot reasonably be interpreted as effecting such a sweeping change.").
Although Section 1915 removes the burden of paying filing fees in appropriate cases, it imposes limitations affecting certain types of claims. Of relevance here, a "court shall dismiss the case at any time" if the action or appeal to be filed in forma pauperis "is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). In contrast to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which requires the court to assume the truth of allegations in the complaint, Clause 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) gives courts "the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Judy v. Obama, 601 Fed. Appx. 620, 623 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)); Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 Fed. Appx. 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (same). A "finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible." Jackson, 2015 WL 2343625, at *2 (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)) (affirming dismissal of a complaint "seeking $10 billion from the United States for the use of [plaintiff's] purported hurricane prevention device."). Claims of this sort rest on "allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional." Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 543, 545-46 (2015) (dismissing a frivolous claim by a prisoner, based upon screening conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006) (dismissing a factually frivolous claim by a non-prisoner).
The court may not, however, dismiss a complaint merely because the allegations are "improbable" or "unlikely." Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; see also Neal v. United States, No. 13-31C, 2013 WL 1801673, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 29, 2013) ("[T]he court must exercise caution, and cannot dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint `simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely.'") (quoting McCullough, 76 Fed. Cl. at 3 (in turn quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 33)).
Courts are split as to whether an in forma pauperis application should be granted or denied if the court finds the filing is frivolous. Compare Kenney v. Prime Recruitors Trucking Co., 611 Fed. Appx. 370 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing district court's denial of application because of frivolous claims), with Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., Cnty. Court, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[A] district judge should deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis if an action is frivolous or malicious.").
The text of the statute, however, requires that the court deny an in forma pauperis application if, in connection with or prior to ruling on the application, the court finds the case is frivolous. Paragraph 1915(e)(2) provides plainly the court "shall" dismiss the case "at any time" if the court determines the complaint is "frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The phrase "at any time" indicates that the court is not restricted as to when the case may be dismissed. The only condition is that the court find the action to be frivolous. And, the court has no discretion once it determines a filing is frivolous because a frivolous case "shall" be dismissed. The Federal Circuit has emphasized this "obligat[ion] to dismiss" complaints that are factually frivolous. Jackson, 2015 WL 2343625, at *2 (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (1989)).
This result is supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Neitzke, which observed that "[d]ismissals on these [frivolousness] grounds are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. Paragraph 1915(e)(2) thus serves as a screening mechanism to preserve public resources, because if the application "is granted and the complaint filed, the matter cannot be dismissed until summons has issued." Wartman, 510 F.2d at 134.
Consequently, the court is not persuaded by the Eighth Circuit's holding in Kenney, 611 Fed. Appx. at 370, that the in forma pauperis application must be decided prior to examining the complaint for frivolousness. Kenney cites Forester v. Calif. Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975) for support, but the Forester opinion is inapposite because it interpreted the 1948 version of Section 1915, which provided merely that courts "may" dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis cases. Forester concluded that the 1948 Act gave courts "discretion" and thus that the "better practice" was to grant the application first, so that an appellate record could be developed. See Forester, 510 F.2d at 60. But today, Paragraph 1915(e)(2) provides that courts "shall" dismiss an in forma pauperis filing if it is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or is against an immune defendant. It leaves little room for discretion.
Section 1915 applies to all in forma pauperis filings, not only prisoner filings. If at any time the court determines the case to be frivolous or malicious, it must dismiss the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). And if the in forma pauperis application has not already been granted, the court cannot grant the application after finding the case to be frivolous or malicious. Instead, it must deny the application and dismiss the case. If the court cannot make an initial determination of frivolousness, it may be appropriate to grant the in forma pauperis application, only to dismiss the case later upon making such a finding. But if the application is pending when the court determines the case is frivolous, it may not be granted.
Mr. Manning generally alleges that he has invented an interstellar spaceship and that the United States has somehow taken or infringed upon his intellectual property, citing tax returns as evidence of the spaceship. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 10, 16. The complaint also alleges that Mr. Manning has built a "weather machine" that the United States has used without compensating him. Compl. ¶ 12. These allegations are factually frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Jackson, 2015 WL 2343625, at *2 (dismissing case as frivolous when complaint alleged ownership of device that prevents hurricanes). Similarly, Mr. Manning's allegations of fraud on the part of governmental actors in connection with this purported intellectual property are without any factual foundation, as is his claim of discrimination based on his race.
Because the court finds that Mr. Manning's claims are frivolous, it is obligated to dismiss the case and to deny his application to proceed in forma pauperis.
For the reasons stated, the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and the complaint is DISMISSED. The clerk shall enter judgment in accord with this disposition.
No costs.
It is so
