ORDER

MARIAN BLANK HORN, Judge.

On October 22, 2015, pro se plaintiff, Robert Cotner, filed pro se, "FALSE-CLAIMS-ACT-SUIT QUI-TAM-SUIT-FOR-U.S. GOVERNMENT."2 Plaintiffs complaint begins: "This case involves fraud against the United States, a continuing wrong suit, in-behalf-of the United States. Plaintiff alleges that

Plaintiff claims that "a total of more than $1.29 billion dollars (up to $2.29 billion) is owed the United States Government by Defendants, their agents, unknown Co-Defendants, and Co-Conspirators, to-date, including fraudulent military contracts, state wide." For example, plaintiff claims that "100% of the multi-state class-action tobacco settlement with Okla. and funds paid Okla., were based on false, fraudulent documentation, and have been stolen from the class-plaintiffs, misused, misspent, by false and fraudulent documentations provided to this U.S. Government Court. (One billion is in trust, owed to the U.S. Government)." Elsewhere in his complaint, plaintiff alleges that "this case will prove that the United States paid to Defendants fraudulent claims of from $500 million dollars, to more than 1.7 billion dollars, to which Defendants were not entitled, and plaintiffs seek refunds, damages, and penalties totaling more than $5 billion dollars, under the False Claims Act, and under other legal theories."

Finally, plaintiff seeks "in behalf of the United-States-Government, Relator Robert Cotner, request this case be fully investigated, and set for a jury trial, without delay, before Defendants can cause his death (they tried in May 2014. and twice in 2015)."3

DISCUSSION

The court recognizes that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, without the assistance of counsel. When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, 524, aff'd, 603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.). cert. denied 135 S.Ct. 1909 (2015). "However, "`[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading.'"" Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, affd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofsky v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[W]hile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court `does not excuse [a complaint's] failures.'" (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiffs pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency `with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.'" (quoting Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. at 253).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

It is well established that "`subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.'" Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press." Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648 (2012) ("When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented."), Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) ("Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 514)); Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA. Inc., 269 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[A] court has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case." (citing Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 918 F.2d 160, 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); View Eng'g. Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts must always look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties raise the issue or not."). "Objections to a tribunal's jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy." Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. 817, 824 (2013); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506 ("The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment."); Cent. Pines Land Co., LLC. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360, 1364 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("An objection to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party or the court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of judgment." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506-07)); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]ny party may challenge, or the court may raise sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert, denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005); and Fanning. Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 76. appeal dismissed, 425 F. App'x 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In fact, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even where . . . neither party has raised this issue." Metabolite Labs, Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied and en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir.), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998)). reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted in part sub. nom Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005). cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006): see also Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir.) ("This court must always determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case before it, even when the parties do not raise or contest the issue."), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 614 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert, denied, 131 S.Ct. 909 (2011).

Pursuant to the RCFC and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only state in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," and "a snort and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2015); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)). "Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiffs claim, independent of any defense that may be interposed." Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-McCaullev Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 713 (2010). "Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to support a claim." Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998): see also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (3d ed. 2004)). "A plaintiff's factual allegations must `raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross `the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Three S Consulting v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), affd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.). reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2014). As stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "[a] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' [Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly], 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Greenlee Cnty., Ariz, v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008): Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

As noted above, plaintiff's complaint is titled: "FALSE-CLAIMS-ACT-SUIT QUI-TAM-SUIT-FOR-U.S. GOVERNMENT." The United States Court of Federal Claims does not jurisdiction over qui tarn suits, "because qui tarn suits may only be heard in the district courts." LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Meschokow v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 637, 645 (2013); Capelouto v. United States. 99 Fed. Cl. 682, 690 (2011) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d at 1031) ("It is clear . . . that all qui tam suits brought under the False Claims Act must be filed in the district courts."). Likewise, as noted by a Judge of this court,

After plaintiff filed his complaint, both plaintiff and defendant submitted documents which were not in compliance with the RCFC. Plaintiff first submitted a DEATH BED AFFIDAVIT" and "First Draft PRSS RELEASE," which the Clerk's Office did not file and which the court ordered returned to the plaintiff because the court was unsure as to the intention of plaintiffs submission and it was not clear as to which of his claims, or to what provision of the RCFC, the submission was responsive. Subsequently, plaintiff again submitted a "DEATH-BED-AFFIDAVIT IN-SUPPORT-OF CLAIMS," which, once again, the Clerk's Office did not file the submission, as there is no provision in the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims for plaintiffs attempted filing. At the same time, plaintiff provided a separate notice, titled "NOTICE-TO-JUDGE-HORN-AND-REQUEST." Plaintiff stated that "Cotner is not suing the United States, Cotner is helping the United States sue the State of Okla. There is no filing fee when the United States sues the State of Okla." The court instructs the Clerk's Office to return as unfiled plaintiffs "DEATH-BED-AFFIDAVIT IN-SUPPORT-OF CLAIMS," and plaintiffs "NOTICE-TO-JUDGE-HORN-AND-REQUEST." Subsequently, the Clerk's Office also received from plaintiff a submission titled: "EMERGENCY MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL-MASTER AND EMERGENCY-IN-CAMERA DISCLOSURE — § 70(h)-HEARING." Like many of plaintiffs other submissions, plaintiff submitted only an original version of his motion and is it not clear to the court to which provision of the RCFC the submission was responsive. Pursuant to RCFC 5.5(d)(2) (2015), a party must file an original and two copies. Therefore, the court instructs the Clerk's Office to return the emergency motion to plaintiff as unfiled.

Plaintiff also submitted a "MOTION-FOR-NUNC-PRO-TUNC-AND-NOTICE-TO-COURT." Plaintiff motion states:

NOTICE

The court ORDERS the Clerk's Office to file plaintiffs "MOTION-FOR-NUNC-PRO-TUNC-AND-NOTICE-TO-COURT. The court denies the motion as MOOT, as the court has concluded this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint and, therefore, has dismissed plaintiffs complaint. Additionally, as noted above, plaintiff is not a co-plaintiff with the United States, nor the "lead common law attorney co-plaintiff."

In between the flurry of submissions by plaintiff, defendant submitted to this court a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Like plaintiff's submissions, defendant's submission was not submitted in accordance with the RCFC, defendant provided only one copy of the motion. Moreover, in a pro se case, a signature is required. Counsel for defendant, however, only submitted the motion with a "/s/" on the signature line. A pro se case is not an electronic case, and defendant's counsel should take care to follow the proper format when submitting a filing in a paper case. The Clerk's Office shall return defendant's motion as unfiled.

In Forma Pauperis

Along with plaintiffs October 22, 2015 complaint, plaintiff attached an "Affidavit-for-Forma-Pauperis" which stated in full:

In the court's November 16, 2015 Order, the court noted that plaintiffs October 22, 2015 "Affidavit-for-Forma-Pauperis" was insufficient as an application to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Federal Claims and ordered plaintiff to pay the required filing fee of $400.00 or complete a proper application to proceed in forma pauperis by December 1, 2015. Plaintiff did neither, submitting an out of time application to proceed in forma pauperis5 on December 7, 2015, and did not reflect that the application had been served on defendant. Subsequent to plaintiff's out of time submission, the court discovered that plaintiff has had more than three actions dismissed as frivolous, and a prior application by plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis had been denied by another Judge of this court in a previous action. In an unpublished Order, that Judge noted that "application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 bars plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he demonstrates he is under "`imminent danger of serious physical injury.'" Cotner v. United States, No. 13-407C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 22, 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012)).6 The Judge concluded plaintiffs "complaint is bereft of sufficient facts to `plausibly suggest' he is in imminent danger." (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In the case currently before this court, plaintiffs complaint likewise did not suggest plaintiff is in imminent danger, although plaintiff sought for the case to be resolved expeditiously "before Defendants can cause his death (they tried in May 2014, and twice in 2015)." Although plaintiff subsequently submitted improper filings to the court titled "DEATH BED AFFIDAVIT," "DEATH-BED-AFFIDAVIT IN-SUPPORT-OF CLAIMS," and "EMERGENCY MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL-MASTER AND EMERGENCY-IN-CAMERA DISCLOSURE — § 70(h)-HEARING," this court finds that plaintiff's submissions lack sufficient facts to plausibly establish that plaintiff is in imminent danger. Moreover, plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis, even if timely filed, would have been denied as plaintiff remains barred from filing in this court. As plaintiff has been barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, the court INSTRUCTS the Clerk's Office to require the filing fee payment before accepting any further complaints from plaintiff, absent a substantiated showing that plaintiff is in imminent danger.

For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.