ORDER OF DISMISSAL

MARY ELLEN COSTER WILLIAMS, Judge.

This matter cornes before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

Background

Plaintiff is a current resident of Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff states that she is a disabled Army veteran, and that she was formerly an intelligence officer in the military with a top secret clearance. Resp. Ex. A at 1. Plaintiff was arrested for aggravated assauli in Glynn County, Georgia, in 2009, and as a condition of her bond, Plaintiff was required to pay $35.00 per month in supervisory fees to a private probation seryice. Id. at 10. Plaintiff cla]ms that foiowing her anest, she was banished from Glynn County, Georgia. Id. at 5, 9. Plaintiffalleges that ihe was falsely anested, that her signature on a Glynn County property bond was forged, and that her banishment from Glynn County was unconstitutional. Id. at 1.

on September 13,2011, Plaintiff was divorced from Nathaniel Hickman. Id. at 4. Prior to the divorce, Plaintiff received an apportionment award of Mr. Hickman's VA compensation benefits. Id. When Plaintiff's apportionment was terminated as a result of her divorce, Plaintiff advised the VA that her divorce was invalid because the United States Department of Justice "disqualified" the judge who presided over her divorce proceedings and that the newjudge was a "pro hac vice lawyer[]." Id. at 2, 4. Plaintiff claims that, following her unsuccessful attempts to challenge the divorce and banishment, the federal courts and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") engaged in a conspiracy to violate her civil and human rights. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 6-9, 11.

Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of $200,000,000 against the United States for "intentional discrimination, collusion, and conspiracies" against her. Id. at ¶ 5.

Discussion

Sub iect-Matter Jurisdiction

Before the Court may proceed to the merits of any action, the plaintiff must first establish subject-matter jurisdiction. See Hardie v. United States, 367 F.3d 1288, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Court assutnes all factual allegations as true, and will construe the complaint in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff. Pennineton Seed Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir.2006). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Although pro se litigants are held to "less stringent standards than . . . lawyers," they still bear the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction. Naskar v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 319, 320 (2008) (intemal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Tindle v. United States, 56 Fed. cl. 337, 341 (2003).

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). The Tucker Act does not create a substantive right for money damages against the United States, but rather is a jurisdictional statute. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). A plaintiff must show that he or she is entitled to money damages from an additional source of substantive law. Jan's Helicopter serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The substantive right to money damages must extend from the Constitutional provisiorl statute, or regulation giving rise to the claim. See United states v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) ("[T]he claimant must demonstrate tlat the source of substantive law he relies upon'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Govemrnent for the damages sustained.'" (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400).

Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff purports to invoke this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1 However, this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as that statute gmnts federal question jurisdiction exclusively to the district courts. Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hemandez v. United States, 38 Fed. Ct.532,537-38 (1997).

In her complaint, Plaintiff first alleges that the FBI's Brunswick field office and the United States Attomey in Savannah, Georgi4 "colluded to violate Plaintiff's civil rights as state actors under the color of law." Compl. ¶ 2. It is well established that exclusive jurisdiction to hear civil rights claims resides in the federal district courts and that jurisdiction over such claims does not lie in Court of Federal Claims. See. e.g., Terry v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 645, 656 (2012); Del Rio v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 536, 540 (2009); Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005).

Plaintiff fruther alleges that Defendant violated her Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection by entering and "ransacking" her house without a warrant, auctioning the contents of her house, and failing to prevent the dissolution of her marriage. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11. Plaintiff alleges that the FBI further violated her Constitutional rights by refusing to investigate Plaintiff's allegations of fraud, collusion, and public comrption due to her race. Id. at ¶ 7, 8, 11. These claims cannot be addressed in this Court. LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that "alleg[ed] violations of [plaintiff's] rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, [and] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" are not "a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the Govemment"); Mullenberq v. United States, 857 F.2d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution do not obligate the United States to pay money damages, and do not trigger Tucker Act jurisdiction in the courts); Cox v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl.213,217 (2012) (recognizing that the Due Process Clause is not money-mandating, and does "not provide a basis for jurisdiction in this Court."). This Court also lacks jurisdiction over claims of racial discrimination. See Tavlor v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (2013).

Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant conspired under the color of law as a state actor to suppressRICO [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] activities in Glynn County[,] Georgia," and claims that the United States "intentionally ignored Plaintiff's complaints of false police reports, forgeries, conspiracies, collusion and extortion" and "conceal[ed] Plaintiff's many complaints of judicial com.rption and RICO among federal employees based in Brunswick, Savannah, and Atlanta[,] Georgia." Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the FBI and federal judiciary engaged in "collusion, fraud, conspiracy," and "public comrption." Compl. ¶ 5. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that a procedural order in Hickman v. Hickman, et al., No. 2:12-cv-00034 (S.D. Ga. filed Feb.9,2012) was "made in fraud." Resp. 1. This court does not possess jurisdiction over criminal claims, including those arising under RICO. Dumont v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl.425, 430 aff'd, 345 F. App'x 586 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Nor does the Court have jurisdiction over claims that "defendant engaged in negligent, fraudulent, or other wrongful conduct when discharging its official duties." Cottrell v. United states, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149 (1998).2

Conclusion

Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of zubject-marer jurisdiction is GRANTED. All other pending motions are dimissed as moot The Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss the Complaint.