MARGARET M. SWEENEY, District Judge.
Before the court is the March 31, 2016 joint motion filed by Perry Capital LLC, Arrowood Indemnity Co., Joseph Cacciapalle et al., and plaintiffs in the above-captioned case ("Perry Capital appellants") to "Remove the `Protected Information' Designations From Documents Filed in the D.C. Circuit Cited in the Merits Briefing, and, in the Alternative, Joint Motion to Modify the Protective Order to Permit Reference to these Materials at Oral Argument" ("Perry Capital appellants' joint motion to de-designate"). On April 8, 2016, the government filed Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designations From Documents Filed in the D.C. Circuit and, in the Alternative, to Modify the Protective Order, and Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief of Professor John Yoo" ("Def.'s Opp.").
By way of background, on July 29, 2015, Fairholme Funds, Inc. ("Fairholme"), with this court's permission, filed protected information under seal in the above-captioned case with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit") as part of a motion requesting that the D.C. Circuit take judicial notice of the protected information filed in
The D.C. Circuit scheduled oral argument in
Specifically, Perry Capital appellants jointly renew six of Fairholme's prior motions, seeking to remove protected information designations from a total of seven documents produced or generated in this case. Those six motions are: (1) Plaintiffs' Sealed Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designation from the Depositions of Edward DeMarco and Mario Ugoletti; (2) Plaintiffs' Sealed Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designation from Certain Grant Thornton Documents; (3) Plaintiffs' Sealed Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designation from Certain Treasury and FHFA Documents; (4) Plaintiffs' Sealed Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designation from Certain Unredacted Information in Documents Produced by Deloitte; (5) Plaintiffs' Sealed Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designation from Certain Unredacted Information in Documents Produced by Fannie Mae; and (6) Plaintiffs' Sealed Motion to Remove the "Protected Information" Designation from Certain Unredacted Information in Documents Produced by Freddie Mac. Perry Capital appellants have attached the seven documents to the instant motion, and again, renew plaintiffs' prior motions to de-designate other documents.
Defendant opposes Perry Capital appellants' request, arguing that it is premature because: (1) the seven documents at issue are not part of the judicial record, Def.'s Opp. 2-3; (2) Perry Capital appellants are not prejudiced by the designations of the protected information,
After careful consideration of the parties' competing arguments, the court finds that Perry Capital appellants' request is reasonable and that defendant's opposition is not well-founded. As a preliminary matter, the court finds that, in light of the oral argument in
At issue here are excerpts from three deposition transcripts, as well as excerpts from four documents that are more than three years old. As a result, the government's continued reliance on the May 29, 2014 declaration of Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA") Director Melvin L. Watt no longer retains the same potency that it did when originally supplied to the court in support of the entry of a protective order. Nevertheless, the government reiterates its original arguments when it asserts that "the futures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are still uncertain and subject of vigorous debate," Def.'s Opp. 5, once again relying on the Declarations of Melvin L. Watt and Michael A. Stegman, the Director of the FHFA and Former Counselor to the Treasury Secretary for Housing Finance Policy at the United States Department of the Treasury, respectively. While the court recognizes that protection of the Nation's financial markets and fledgling financial institutions were legitimate goals when the court first entered its order, with the passage of time, the potential for harm to the Nation's markets and then-fledgling financial institutions no longer exists. Instead of harm to the Nation resulting from disclosure, the only "harm" presented is the potential for criticism of an agency, institution, and the decision-makers of those entities. The court will not condone the misuse of a protective order as a shield to insulate public officials from criticism in the way they execute their public duties. Thus, avoidance of "second-guessing" an agency's decisions several years after the fact, as described by Mr. Watt, is, with the passage of time no longer a legitimate basis to maintain documents under a protective order. The court notes that from the inception of this litigation, the government has consistently maintained that the court lacks jurisdiction over this case because the United States had no control over the enterprises. Taking the government at its word, it is surprising that defendant is concerned with the unsealing of government officials' deposition testimony.
Moreover, there can be no serious dispute that it is extremely rare for a document filed under seal in a civil case to remain so for all time. There is no suggestion that the documents subject to the protective order are classified as relating to national security. Nor do these documents contain trade secrets or proprietary information. However, even cases in which trade secrets and proprietary information are filed under seal and subject to a protective order, it is not unusual that after the passage of time, that same information is eventually unsealed because the protective order has outlived its usefulness. Indeed, because the government does not argue that information that it requests remain protected concerns matters involving national security, trade secrets, or proprietary information, or that specific privileges attach to any of the seven documents, it is clear that there is no longer a need to maintain the protected designation for them.
Ultimately, there is nothing contained in these documents that gives the court pause regarding de-designation. Although defendant seeks to preserve the status quo and maintain the protected status of all of the documents at issue, proposing that discussion of protected material could be conducted in a closed session at the end of the oral argument, the information contained within the seven documents no longer needs to be subject to the protective order. Further, as Perry Capital appellants assert, preventing them from discussing the documents during other parts of the oral argument would potentially undermine their ability to fully prosecute their case, as these documents may be relevant to all aspects of their appeal. Consequently, this court does not deem it necessary to constrain that proceeding in the manner that defendant suggests.
Accordingly, Perry Capital appellants' motion to de-designate the seven documents attached thereto is