BRIAN H. CORCORAN, Special Master.
On February 11, 2015, Julie Reiling filed a petition on behalf of her minor child, G.R., seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.
Petitioner requests an interim award of attorney's fees and costs in the combined amount of $17,133.79. Fees App. at 1. Respondent opposes the request, arguing that an interim award is inappropriate. See Resp't's Response to Interim Request, dated May 9, 2016 (ECF No. 28).
Thereafter, on June 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a supplement to her Fees Application. Pet'r's Supplement to the Application for Final Attorney's Fees and Costs (ECF No. 30) ("Supp. Fees App."). In it, Petitioner requested an award of attorney's fees and costs (based on the same rates relied on in the Fees Application) for the additional work that was required to review and response to Respondent's objections to her initial Fees Application (representing a total of $4,192.09). Accordingly, Petitioner is now requesting an interim award of attorney's fees and costs in the combined amount of $21,325.88.
Based on my review of the case record, I find that an interim award is appropriate, especially given Mr. Downing's pending withdrawal motion. Counsel withdrawing from a matter have often been awarded their fees in the form of an interim award. See, e.g., Woods v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012) (upholding special master's decision to grant petitioner an interim fee award despite counsel's withdrawal); Terrell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-334V, 2013 WL 4828593, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Aug. 20, 2013).
I also find that the requested rates are reasonable, in light of prior decisions discussing the appropriate rate for Mr. Downing, his associates, and his paralegals. See generally Al-Uffi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015); see also McCulloch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). Nor do I find that the amount of time expended on the matter was unreasonable. And Respondent for her part effectively, if not literally, has conceded the same. Counsel's costs are also reasonable.
Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of attorney's fees and costs awards, and based on the foregoing, I