VICTOR J. WOLSKI, Judge.
The matter before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion is
Plaintiff Syteria Hephzibah filed a complaint with this court on March 24, 2016. Plaintiff's pleadings address events arising from the government's prosecution of criminal charges against her. See United States v. Hephzibah, M.D. Fla. No. 3:15-cr-0016-MMH-MCR, Verdict, (April 27, 2016) ECF No. 141. Plaintiff asks this court to order a district court to transfer a civil case to this venue, to conduct an appellate review of an order of a district court, and to conduct an administrative review of an order of a district court. Plaintiff also appears to request that this court address some of the substantive issues underlying her procedural requests and award plaintiff money damages for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. Finally, plaintiff requests that this court enjoin a criminal trial against her. The government moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On February 6, 2015, federal agents arrested Ms. Hephzibah on suspicion of attempting to obtain a United States passport by fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. Hephzibah, M.D. Fla. No. 3:15-cr-0016-MMH-MCR, ECF No. 1-2. The government subsequently indicted her in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Indictment (Feb. 18, 2015) ECF No. 8. On March 15, 2016, Ms. Hephzibah filed a civil case in that court asking it to enjoin the criminal trial against her and to award her money damages for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. Hephzibah v. De Leon, M.D. Fla. No. 3:16-cv-00248-TJC-MCR, ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff contended that during her arrest and subsequent detention, agents subjected her to an unlawful search and seizure as well as falsely imprisoned her. Id. Plaintiff argued these actions violated her First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, claimed money damages of $4,433,000. Id. On March 18, 2016, the district court dismissed plaintiff's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Order (March 18, 2016) ECF No. 5. On April 27, 2016, the jury in the criminal case against Ms. Hephzibah found plaintiff guilty. Hephzibah, M.D. Fla. No. 3:15-cr-0016-MMH-MCR, ECF No. 141. Plaintiff's appeal of the verdict is currently pending, and plaintiff has not yet been sentenced. Minute Entry (August 15, 2016) ECF No. 180.
On March 24, 2016, Ms. Hephzibah filed three documents with this court, which were filed together as her complaint. Compl. First, in a document titled "Notice of Appeal," plaintiff asks this court to review the district court's dismissal of her civil claims. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff does not cite any statute or case law as the basis for this claim. Id. Second, in a document titled "Petition to Transfer to Cure Want of Jurisdiction and for Leave to File under RCFC Rule 3.1," plaintiff seems to ask this court to order the district court to transfer her civil claims to this court. Id. at 5-10. Plaintiff contends that our authority to issue such an order derives from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1631, 1491, 1292(d)(4)(B), and 2344, as well as RCFC 3.1. Id. Third, in a document titled "Petition for Review of Administrative Action," Ms. Hephzibah appears to ask this court to administratively review the district court's dismissal of her claim based on the same statutes upon which her "Petition to Transfer" is grounded. Id at 15-20.
The captions of the above three pleadings were addressed to the district court. Id. at 1, 5, 15. Furthermore, plaintiff has previously submitted to that court pleadings identical to the above documents and titled them "Petition to Transfer to Cure Want of Jurisdiction and for Leave to File under RCFC Rule 3.1" and "Petition for Review of Administrative Action." See Hephzibah, M.D. Fla. No. 3:16-cv-00248-TJC-MCR, ECF No. 6, 9. By sending these pleadings to us, however, Ms. Hephzibah appears to request action by this court. Compl. at 1-2, 5-10, 15-20. Thus, the Court will construe the pleadings as directed to it.
Plaintiff also submitted to this court copies of her request that the district court award her monetary damages for violations of her constitutional rights. Id. at 37-54. By submitting this document, titled "Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties Infringement Complaint," plaintiff appears to be asking this court to directly address these claims. Id.
On March 30, 2016, Ms. Hephzibah filed a document titled, "AMENDED Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" (Emerg. Petition). Plaintiff argues that she has copyrighted and trademarked her name and that district court officials and the government violated these rights when it used plaintiff's name in the criminal trial against her. Id. at 4-9. To prevent this infringement, Ms. Hephzibah asks this court to enjoin the criminal trial against her. Id. at 9. Alternatively, plaintiff appears to be asking this court to enjoin the government and district court from using her name in that trial. Id. at 9. Plaintiff contends our authority to issue such an order derives from Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — which we construe to mean the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims — Article VI of the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1. The government opposed plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, arguing that our court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's requests. Def.'s Resp. to Emerg. Petition (April 18, 2016) ECF No. 6.
The government moved to dismiss the case on May 23, 2016. It argues that plaintiff's requests that our court review the decision of the district court, order the district court to transfer the case, and issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the criminal case do not fall under our court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus, under RCFC 12(b)(l), the case must be dismissed. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (Def.'s Mot.). The government's motion does not address plaintiff's constitutional claims. See id. at 1-4.
On June 22, 2016, Ms. Hephzibah filed a response to the government's motion to dismiss the case. Plaintiff argues that the court should enter judgment against the government because defendant "is in Default for failure to timely answer and rebut point-by-point" Ms. Hephzibah's assertions. Pl.'s Resp. at 1-2. Plaintiff also argues that the parties have consented to jurisdiction. Id. at 3. In a response filed on July 5, 2016, the government argues that default judgment is not warranted because our "rules allow defendant to respond to a complaint with either an answer or a motion to dismiss." Def.'s Reply at 2. The government also argues that it did not consent to jurisdiction and that even if it did, this court "cannot exercise jurisdiction by the consent of the parties." Id.
Under RCFC 12(b)(1), this court must dismiss claims that do not fall within its subject-matter jurisdiction. When considering a motion to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, courts will accept as true all factual allegations the non-movant made and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to that party. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring that on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction this court views "the alleged facts in the complaint as true, and if the facts reveal any reasonable basis upon which the non-movant may prevail, dismissal is inappropriate"); CBY Design Builders v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 303, 325 (2012).
While a pro se plaintiff's filings are to be liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), this lenient standard cannot save claims which are outside this court's jurisdiction from being dismissed. See, e.g., Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The party invoking a court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it and must ultimately do so by a preponderance of the evidence. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
As an initial matter, Ms. Hephzibah appears to bring her claims against individual federal officers rather than against the United States. See e.g., Compl. at 1 (plaintiff names fourteen defendants "in their individual capacities"). To the extent that Ms. Hephzibah is bringing claims against any of the named individuals, these pleadings do not meet the requirements of the Tucker Act and must be dismissed. See Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) ("[T]he only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual." (emphasis omitted)). Taking plaintiff's prose status into account, however, the Court construes her complaint liberally so as to be against the United States. Even so, the Court still finds that none of her claims fall within our jurisdiction.
The government correctly points out that this court does not have jurisdiction to review a district court order. Def.'s Mot. at 3. Our court "does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts . . . relating to proceedings before those courts." Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff asks
Plaintiff also cites as authority 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 2344, and 1292(d)(4)(B), as well as RCFC 3.1. Compl. at 10. None of these authorities provide us the power to order a district court to transfer a case. While 28 U.S.C. § 1491 defines this court's jurisdiction, it does not authorize us to order a district court to transfer a case. Section 2344 discusses the process by which parties aggrieved by a final administrative order can challenge it before an appellate court; nowhere does this statute mention our court. Though 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(B) outlines the rules for transferring actions from district court to our court, it does not enable this court to order such transfer. And finally, RCFC 3.1 merely establishes the filing requirements for transferring parties. For these reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction to order the district court to transfer plaintiff's civil claim here.
Plaintiff claims that the government violated her First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights and requests money damages of $4,433,000. Compl. at 37-54. The court's jurisdiction, under the Tucker Act, requires that a plaintiff identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). But none of these amendments are money-mandating. See Betz u. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 286, 293 (1998) (Fifth Amendment's Self-incrimination Clause); Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause);
Plaintiff also argues that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1391 create a right to sue for money damages. Compl. at 40. But these statutes prescribe jurisdictional and venue rules for the federal district courts. Although this court is a federal court, it is not a federal district court. See Warren v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 507, 512 (2012). Thus, these statutes have nothing to do with our court's jurisdiction over any matter, much less Ms. Hephzibah's claims.
Plaintiff also maintains that she has a right to redress under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. at 40. Our court, however, "does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts." Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005); see also Bowles v. United States, No. 14-1241C, 2015 WL 4710258, at *3 (Fed. Cl. July 31, 2015).
Finally, plaintiff alleges that 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 provide a right to sue for money damages. Compl. at 51-52. This is incorrect. Section 241 provides for criminal penalties for those conspiring against the exercise of rights, and Section 242 sets the criminal punishments for actions under color of law that deprive one of rights based on a person's status as an alien or by reason of color or race. These statutes "are criminal statutes that provide no basis for a civil action in any court." Clarke v. United States, No. 10-283C, 2010 WL 2143675, at *2 (Fed. Cl. May 24, 2010). The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to entertain criminal matters. Joshua, 17 F.3d at 379; Jones v. United States, 440 F. App'x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Stanwyck v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 308, 313-15 (2016).
For the above-stated reasons, plaintiff's constitutional and statutory claims fall outside this court's jurisdiction.
Nothing contained in plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief establishes our court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of her claims. Plaintiff alleges she has copyright and trademark rights to her name. Emerg. Petition, at 4-9. To prevent the government from allegedly infringing these rights by using her name during the criminal trial against her, Ms. Hephzibah asks this Court to issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction staying those proceedings. Id. Plaintiff argues that such relief is authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 502, Rule 65 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, and Article VI of the United States Constitution. Id. at 2-4.
Under plaintiff's trademark infringement theory, her request fails for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Tucker Act, this court cannot grant equitable relief unless such relief is "incident of and collateral to" a money judgment that this court can issue. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(2); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding this court has "no power to grant affirmative non-monetary relief unless it is tied and subordinate to a money judgment."). But under the Tucker Act, this court lacks jurisdiction over claims that sound in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Trademark infringement sounds in tort, and thus has not been placed within our jurisdiction. See Lockridge v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 687, 688-90 (1978).
Under plaintiff's copyright theory, her request similarly fails for lack of jurisdiction. Section 1498 of Title 28 grants this court jurisdiction to hear a limited range of copyright disputes. Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 1369, 1374-73 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But in order to sue for copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) requires that a plaintiff establish that the copyright is registered or that the Copyright Office has refused to register the copyright. Jennette v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 126, 132 (2007). As names are not by law copyrightable, 37 C.F.R. § 202. l(a), plaintiff is unable to establish a necessary condition to sue for copyright infringement. See Miles v. United States, No. 14-416C, 2014 WL 5020574, at *3-4 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 6, 2014). Thus, we have no authority to grant Ms. Hephzibah's injunctive request under her copyright theory.
Plaintiff argues that the court should enter default judgment against the government because defendant has not answered her assertions, Pl.'s Resp. at 1-2, and that subject-matter jurisdiction exists because the parties have consented to it, id. at 3. Plaintiff's first argument fails because, as the government notes, RCFC 12(b) allows defendant to respond to a complaint with either an answer or a motion to dismiss. Thus, default judgment in Ms. Hephzibah's favor is not warranted. Plaintiff's second argument fails because the government did not consent to jurisdiction in this court and, even if it did, consent of the parties to a suit does not establish jurisdiction. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("[N]o action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant."); cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-36 (2008) (discussing the inability of the government to waive the statute of limitations in this court as it is a jurisdictional bar). Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist over plaintiff's claims. In any event, if the government failed to move to dismiss plaintiff's case, the Court would be required to dismiss the case on its own, under RCFC 12(h)(3), because all of plaintiff's claims are plainly outside our jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss this case, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), is
