NORA BETH DORSEY, Chief Special Master.
On February 26, 2015, petitioners filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,
On April 15, 2016, petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to petitioner's counsel, Black McLaren Jones Ryland & Griffee, P.C., of Memphis, Tennessee (hereinafter "the McLaren firm"). (ECF No. 32.) Petitioner's motion requested total compensation of $44,318.72. (ECF No. 32-2, p. 18; ECF No. 33-3.) This includes charges for 124.10 hours of work performed by various attorneys and staff at the McLaren firm as well as $8,094.72 in advances and expenses. (ECF No. 32-2, p. 18.) Additionally, in compliance with General Order #9, petitioner has filed a signed statement indicating petitioner incurred $500.00 in out-of-pocket expenses. (ECF No. 32-3.)
On May 3, 2016, respondent filed a response to petitioner's motion in which she noted that petitioner had met the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys' fees and costs, but declined to further address the specifics of petitioner's request, instead deferring to the special master's discretion. (ECF No. 33, p. 2.) Citing a lack of resources necessary to make detailed objections, respondent disclaimed any role in resolving petitioner's request for an award of fees and costs. (ECF No. 33, p. 1; p. 3, fn. 1.) Nonetheless, respondent "assert[ed] that a reasonable amount for fees and costs in the present case would fall between $18,000.00 to $21,000.00." (ECF No. 33, p. 3.) Respondent provided little basis or explanation for how she arrived at this proposed range, citing only three prior GBS cases. (Id.)
In a reply filed on May 6, 2016, petitioner contended that respondent's proposed range should be considered to "carry no persuasive value." (ECF No. 34, p. 1.) Petitioner noted that there is no way for petitioner to gauge respondent's claim that the cited cases are, in fact, similar. (Id., p. 2.)
Upon review of the billing records filed in this case, the undersigned finds no cause to reduce either the costs or number of hours billed. The undersigned notes, however, that Mr. Webb billed 9.5 hours for travel time on April 8, 2015, 1.3 hours for travel on April 9, 2015, 15 hours for travel on April 10, 2015, and 5.5 hours for travel on April 11, 2015, amounting to billing of $9,233.50. (ECF No. 32-2, pp. 7-8.) Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Webb was noted to be working on case review en route, the undersigned reduces these hours by 50%. See, e.g., Hocraffer v. HHS, No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153, at *24 (noting that "Special masters consistently award compensation for travel time at 50% of the billing rate in the Vaccine Program."). This results in a reduction of $4,616.75.
The undersigned is aware that in other cases the parties are litigating the appropriate hourly rate for the attorneys at the McLaren firm. However, in light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly including the history of expedited resolution within the Special Processing Unit, the undersigned finds that, notwithstanding the above reduction, the overall amount sought for attorneys' fees and costs is otherwise reasonable. Further analysis is not warranted. Special Masters are entitled to rely on their own experience and understanding of the issues raised. Wasson v. HHS, 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (Fed. Cl. 1991) aff'd in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed.Cir.1993) (per curiam). J.B. v. HHS, No. 15-67V, 2016 WL 4046871 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 8, 2016) (addressing attorneys' fees and costs in the context of a history of attorneys' fees and costs awards in over 300 similarly situated SPU cases.). The undersigned need not determine in this instance whether the law firm of Black McLaren Jones Ryland & Griffee is entitled to forum rates set forth in McCulloch v. Sec'y of HHS, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1227 (Sept. 1, 2015).
Based on all of the above, the undersigned finds that petitioner's counsel is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as follows:
The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. § 15(e). Based on the reasonableness of petitioner's request, the undersigned
The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.