NORA BETH DORSEY, Chief Special Master.
On August 21, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,
Currently, before the undersigned is petitioner's motion for attorneys' fees and costs filed on April 5, 2017. (ECF No. 49). Petitioner requests a total award of attorneys' fees and costs of $40,926.54. (Id. at 2-3).
On April 5, 2017, petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. (ECF No. 49.) Petitioner requested attorneys' fees in the amount of $37,618.05 and attorneys' costs in the amount of $840.37 associated with work performed by petitioner's counsel of record, Curtis R. Webb. (ECF No. 49 at 1, ECF No. 58 at 2.) Petitioner also requested $1,551.88 in attorneys' fees and $916.24 in attorneys' litigation costs associated with work performed by Michael Noone and Sheba Abraham of Goldberg, Racila, D'Alessandro & Noone, LLC. (ECF No. 49 at 2, ECF No. 58 at 2-3.) In compliance with General Order #9, petitioner filed a signed statement indicating that petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. Thus, the total amount requested is $40,926.54.
On April 24, 2017, respondent filed a response to petitioner's motion. (ECF No. 50.) Respondent argues that "[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys' fees and costs." Id. at 1. Respondent adds, however, that he "is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys' fees and costs are met in this case." Id. at 2. Respondent "respectfully recommends that the special master exercise [her] discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys' fees and costs." Id. at 3.
Petitioner filed no reply.
Since the petition for compensation was successful, the undersigned is required to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to petitioner. § 15(e)(1) (emphasis added). Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in Vaccine Act cases are determined using the lodestar approach. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008.)
The determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the special master's discretion. See, e.g. Saxton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special Masters have "wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys' fees and costs." Hines v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (Fed. Cl. 1991). Moreover, Special Masters are entitled to rely on their own experience and understanding of the issues raised. Wasson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (Fed. Cl. 1991) aff'd in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed.Cir.1993) (per curiam). The Special Master's determination is subject to review for abuse of that discretion. Id.
The appropriate hourly rate for counsel in Vaccine Act litigation is the forum rate, unless the so-called "Davis exception" applies. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349 (citing Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. EPA, 169 F.3d 755 (D.C.Cir.1999)); see also Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2011) (affirming a determination of the forum rate in Vaccine Act cases).
In accordance with Garrison v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-0762 2016 WL 3022076 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2016), aff'd, 128 Fed. Cl. 99, 2016 WL 4784054 (Aug. 17, 2016), the undersigned finds the rates requested by Mr. Webb reasonable and appropriate. Additionally, the undersigned finds the rates requested by Mr. Noone and his associate, Ms. Abraham, reasonable and appropriate.
In determining the amount of reasonable hours, a special master has discretion to exclude hours expended that are "`excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary' based on his or her experience or judgment." Hocraffer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL 6292218, at *3 (Fed. Cl. 2011). The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting hours that are reasonable and the special master is not obligated to evaluate a fees petition on a line-by-line basis. Id. at *3, 13. Rather, particularly where billing entries are cryptic or inadequately described,
Petitioner "bears the burden of establishing the hours expended" and the reasonableness of the requested fee award. Wasson, 24 Cl. Ct. at 484. Notwithstanding respondent's failure to raise any specific objections to petitioners' fee application, "the Special Master has an independent responsibility to satisfy [herself] that the fee award is appropriate and [is] not limited to endorsing or rejecting respondent's critique." Duncan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 2008 WL 4743493, at *1 (Fed. Cl. 2008). Furthermore, "the Special Master [has] no additional obligation to warn petitioners that [she] might go beyond the particularized list of respondent's challenges." Id.
The undersigned finds that a reduction in the number of hours billed by Mr. Webb is necessary for two reasons. First, petitioner's counsel requests compensation at an attorney's hourly rate for work that is more accurately characterized as paralegal tasks. Second, certain billing entries are vague and do not sufficiently detail or explain the time billed.
It is well established that attorneys who bill for performing non-attorney level work must appropriately reduce their hourly rate to reflect that of a paralegal. Mostovoy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-10V, 2016 WL 720969, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2016). After carefully reviewing petitioner's application for fees and costs, the undersigned finds that certain entries reflect paralegal tasks but are billed at the full attorney hourly rate. For example, on October 20, 2015, Mr. Webb billed 1.00 hours for "Review medical records; Prepare exhibits 1-7", and on November 12, 2015, Mr. Webb billed 0.3 hours for "Review exhibits, prepare for filing." (ECF No. 49-1 at 4, 5.)
The undersigned also notes that the billing records are often too vague to determine whether the task being performed is attorney or paralegal work. For example, an entry on October 21, 2015, Mr. Webb billed 2.7 hours to "Prepare medical records (Exh. No. 1-7); File exhibits; Conferred by phone with client (msg); Review correspondence re: affidavit". ECF No. 49-1 at 4. In another entry on January 26, 2017, Mr. Webb billed 1.5 hours, and listed as a description of the work "Received letter from Florida Medicaid re: lien; Reviewed and organized materials on lien and civil action; Prepared exhibits on lien and civil action; Prepared Status Report on lien." (ECF No. 49-1 at 9.)
Ordinarily, when attorneys bill for work which could have been done by a paralegal, the hours are accepted, but the rates are reduced to paralegal rates. See, e.g. Riggins. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 99-382V, 2009 WL 3319818, at *20 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 15, 2009), aff'd 406 Fed. Appx. 479 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Turpin v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-535V, 2008 WL 5747914, at *5-7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 23, 2008). In this case, however, it is impossible to do so, not only because of the vague billing entries, but also because petitioner's counsel has grouped multiple activities into single time entries. This is frowned upon and makes a line-by-line analysis nearly impossible. See, e.g. Riggins, 2009 WL 3319818 at *23-24. The undersigned notes that Mr. Webb has been warned about this behavior in the past. For example, in C.B. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., Mr. Webb was cautioned that "[t]he undersigned may reduce any future request by Mr. Webb for attorneys' fees where he continues to engage in this practice of grouping multiple activities into the same single time entry." C.B. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-563V, 2017 WL 6276461, at *4 n.7 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 20, 2017).
Upon review, Mr. Webb's billing records include 13.5 hours in 2015, .9 hours in 2016, and 1.5 hours in 2017 with descriptions that include tasks that are more accurately characterized as paralegal activities. This results in a total amount billed of $6,235.35 at Mr. Webb's hourly rate. If these hours were billed at the paralegal rate of $145 per hour for 2015 and 2016, and $148 per hour for 2017, the requested fees would be $2,310.00. Accordingly, Mr. Webb's total fees are reduced by $3,925.35.
The undersigned has reviewed the billing records submitted with petitioner's request with regard to hours expended by Mr. Noone and Ms. Abraham. In the undersigned's experience, the request appears reasonable, and the undersigned finds no cause to reduce the requested hours.
Petitioner has requested litigation costs in the amount of $1,756.61, consisting of $840.37 for costs incurred by Mr. Webb (ECF No. 49 at 1, ECF No. 58 at 2), and $916.24 in costs incurred by Mr. Noone and Ms. Abraham of Goldberg, Racila, D'Alessandro & Noone, LLC. (ECF No. 49 at 2, ECF No. 58 at 2-3.) The undersigned finds no cause to reduce the requested costs. Therefore, petitioner is awarded $1,756.61 in litigation costs.
The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. § 15(e). The undersigned finds that petitioners are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as described above.
The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.