ORDER OF DISMISSAL

EDWARD J. DAMICH, Senior Judge.

On May 21, 2018, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint in this Court. Plaintiff also submitted an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. After review, it appears that Plaintiff is indigent, and the Court therefore GRANTS this Application.1 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was unjustly convicted in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ("EDNC"), and he seeks $50,000 for every 12-month period he was incarcerated. On July 17, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). For the reasons discussed below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's motion.

I. Background

A. Plaintiffs Prison Sentences

In 2004, Plaintiff pleaded guilty in a North Carolina state court to possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana. See United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 619 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Midgette I"). North Carolina classified this crime as a Class I felony, with a maximum prison sentence of ten months. Id.

Then in 2005, Plaintiff pleaded guilty in the EDNC of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to forty six months' imprisonment. Midgette v. United States, No. 4:04-CR-54-FL-1; No. 4:12-CV-8-FL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7845 at *2 (E.D.N.C. 2013) ("Midgette III"). Plaintiff's 2004 state conviction was the predicate felony for this conviction.

While he was on supervised release, Plaintiff was again charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he again pleaded guilty in 2011. Id. at 1. He was sentenced to forty six months' imprisonment for a second time. Id. Plaintiff's 2005 conviction was the predicate felony for this conviction.

B. Vacatur of Plaintiff's 2005 Sentence

In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the predicate felony for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) must be punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 244 (4th Cir. 2011). Following this decision, Plaintiff moved to vacate both of his felon-in-possession convictions on the grounds that, if his 2005 conviction was vacated, there was no sufficient predicate felony to support his 2011 conviction. Midgette v. United States, No. 4:10-CR-13-D; No. 4:12-CV-9-D, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107538 at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2012) ("Midgette II"), at *3-4.

The EDNC dismissed his motion to vacate the 2011 sentence, holding that even if the 2005 conviction was vacated later, it was valid in 2011 as a predicate felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Midgette at *3-4 (citing United States v. Kahoe, 134 F.3d 1230 (4th Cir. 1998)). Later, pursuant to the decision in Simmons, the EDNC vacated Plaintiff's 2005 conviction, because his 2004 conviction did not have a maximum possible prison sentence of more than one year. See Midgette III, at *6.

II. Discussion

Whether a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter in every case, which may be challenged at any time. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); see also Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). If the Court determines at any time that it lacks jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff alleges subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1495, which grants this Court jurisdiction over "any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned." 28 U.S.C. 1495. However, for the Court to have jurisdiction under § 1495, a complainant "must submit a court certificate or a pardon stating certain facts," as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2513. Humphrey v. United States, 60 Fed. App'x. 292, 294 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This statute requires:

(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.

28 U.S.C. § 2513. "The unjust conviction statute has always been strictly construed." Vincin v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 762, 766 (1972). For a court Order to satisfy this requirement, it must "strictly comport with all of the recitals required by the statute." Wood v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 569, 576 (2009) (citing Humphrey, 60 Fed. App'x 292). The Order vacating Plaintiff's 2005 conviction does not do so. It neither states that "he did not commit any of the acts charged," nor that "his acts . . . constituted no offense," and it also does not state that he did not cause his own prosecution by misconduct or neglect. See Pl.'s Compl. Attach. A; see also Humphrey, 60 Fed. App'x at 295. Such an Order is not sufficient to meet the requirements of § 2513. Id.; see also Freeman v. United States, 568 Fed. App'x. 892, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Further, Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of § 2513. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did in fact commit at least one of the acts — possessing a firearm — charged under his 2005 conviction. So, he cannot invoke the first prong of § 2513(a)(2). Additionally, as Plaintiff was a convicted felon in North Carolina when he possessed the firearm, this act was, in fact, a violation of that State's law.2 See § 2513(a)(2) (requiring proof that "his acts in connection . . . constitute no offense against the United States, or any State.") (emphasis added). So, Plaintiff also cannot fulfill the second prong of § 2513(a)(2).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES this case. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.