BRIAN H. CORCORAN, Special Master.
On June 28, 2017, Gladys Highfield ("Petitioner") filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ("Vaccine Program").
Petitioner has now filed a motion requesting final attorneys' fees and costs, dated February 18, 2019 (ECF No. 31) ("Fees App."), requesting a total award of $22,806.23 (representing $20,619.50 in attorneys' fees, plus $2,186.73 in costs). Fees App. at 3. Counsel also warrants that pursuant to General Order No. 9, Petitioner has not incurred any additional fees or costs related to the litigation of this case. Id. Respondent reacted to the motion on March 1, 2019, indicating that he is satisfied that the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys' fees and costs are met in this case, and deferring to my discretion to determine the amount to be awarded. Response, ECF No. 32, at 2-3. Petitioner did not file a reply thereafter.
For the reasons set forth below, I hereby
Vaccine Program attorneys are entitled to a fees award in successful cases like this one. Determining the appropriate
Petitioner requests the following rates of compensation for her attorneys: for Mr. Jeffrey Pop, $420.00 per hour for all work performed; for Ms. Kristina Grigorian, $250.00 per hour for all work performed; for Ms. Alexandra Pop, $225.00 per hour for all work performed; and for law clerks, $125.00 per hour for all work performed. Fees App. Ex. 1 at 2. These rates are identical to what Mr. Pop and his associates have consistently been awarded by myself and other special masters. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-526V, 2017 WL 6889720 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 28, 2017); Hagans v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-1068, 2017 WL 9517593 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 15, 2017). Therefore, no adjustment to the requested rates is necessary.
I next find the hours expended on this matter as reflected in the billing entries to be reasonable. The billing entries describe with sufficient detail the task being performed and the time spent on each task. Respondent has not identified any particular entries as objectionable and upon review, I did not find any entries to be objectionable either. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to the full amount of attorneys' fees sought,
I will next turn to costs. Just as they are required to establish the reasonableness of requested fees, petitioners must also demonstrate that requested litigation costs are reasonable. Perreira v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (Fed. Cl. 1992); Presault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (Fed. Cl. 2002). Reasonable costs include the costs of obtaining medical records and expert time incurred while working on a case. Fester v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-243V, 2013 WL 5367670, at *16 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 27, 2013). When petitioners fail to carry their burden, such as by not providing appropriate documentation to substantiate a requested cost, special masters have refrained from awarding compensation. See, e.g., Gardner-Cook v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-480V, 2005 WL 6122520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 2005).
Petitioner requests $2,186.73 in overall costs. This amount is comprised of acquiring medical records, postage charges, and the Court's filing fee. Fees App. Ex. 2 at 2. All of these costs are typical of Vaccine Program litigation, and Petitioner has provided adequate documentation supporting all of the requested costs. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to recover the full amount of attorneys' costs sought,
The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). Accordingly, I award a total of
In some cases, determining the proper hourly rate for a particular attorney requires consideration of whether there is a significant disparity between the forum rate applicable to the Vaccine Program generally and the geographic forum in which the attorney practices, in order to adjust the rate used for the lodestar calculation. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349, (citing Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. EPA, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).