ELAINE D. KAPLAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Mission1st Group, Inc. ("Mission1st") brings this post-award bid protest to challenge a decision by the United States Army Contracting Command — Aberdeen Proving Ground ("the Army" or "the agency"), which deemed Mission1st ineligible for award of a Responsive Strategic Sourcing for Services ("RS3") IDIQ contract. Mission1st contends: (1) that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Army to find it ineligible for award based on an inconsistency between its cost narrative and its cost proposal; and (2) that the Army abused its discretion by failing to seek clarification of the inconsistency, which Mission1st characterizes as a mere clerical error.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Mission1st's arguments lack merit. Accordingly, Mission1st's motion for judgment on the administrative record is
The Army issued Solicitation No. W15P7T-15-R-0008 ("the Solicitation") on March 25, 2015. Admin. R. ("AR") Tab 3 at 242 (conformed Solicitation). The Solicitation anticipated the award of multiple IDIQ contracts to provide agency "customers, other Program Executive Offices[,] other Department of Defense [] agencies, and other federal agencies with knowledge based support services for requirements with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) related needs."
The ceiling amount on the contract was $37.4 billion, including a five-year base ordering period and an option period extending another five years.
Under the Solicitation, offerors were required to use a spreadsheet that the Army supplied as Attachment 1 to format their cost proposals.
Particularly relevant to the present protest, the Solicitation cautioned that both the direct labor rates and indirect expense rates listed in the cost narrative and supporting documentation "should exactly match the [] rates in the proposal."
The Solicitation provided that the total evaluated cost used in the award determination would be the total proposed cost that the offeror set forth in Attachment 1, subject to cost realism adjustments.
Under the terms of the Solicitation, where the proposed cost did not equal the government's probable cost, the probable cost would be used to rank the offeror's proposal.
The Solicitation provided that contracts could be awarded in two phases. During Phase 1, the Army would consider for award only offerors who had, among other things, proposed costs for the sample labor categories that were "fair, reasonable, and realistic."
If the Army was unable to award a sufficient number of contracts during Phase 1, "proposals that d[id] not meet the criteria for award in Phase 1 [could] be considered for award in Phase 2."
The Army conducted Phase 1 of the procurement between March 25, 2015 and May 16, 2017. AR Tab 42 at 841. A total of 388 offerors submitted proposals and the Army made fifty-six awards.
Mission1st submitted its proposal for consideration on May 6, 2015.
The CO instructed Mission1st that if it wished to be considered for award in Phase 2, it should "carefully review" the discussion questions and "submit a revised proposal addressing the items identified by the Government."
The Army sent Phase 2 discussion letters to a total of 331 offerors. AR Tab 42 at 841. Of these, 298 offerors—including Mission1st—submitted timely revised proposals.
During Phase 2, the Army "used a two standard deviation analysis in establishing a floor for cost realism and price reasonableness."
One hundred of the 298 offerors evaluated during Phase 2, including Mission1st, were found ineligible for award because they did not meet the minimum requirements of the Solicitation.
The CO's rationale is contained in an evaluation notice that the Army drafted for the purpose of "track[ing] and identify[ing] the aspects of the Phase 2 proposal that are not compliant with solicitation requirements."
In short, the Army found a discrepancy between the formula that Mission1st had employed in Attachment 1 and the one described in Mission1st's cost narrative and supporting documentation. Had Mission1st applied the formula described in its narrative, it would have reflected an overhead cost of $[***] on its spreadsheet, rather than $[***] (indicated in the table below), thereby increasing the amount of Mission1st's total cost proposal by 2%. Pl.'s Mot. for J. on the Admin. R. ("Pl.'s MJAR") at 10, ECF No. 18 (citing AR Tab 33 at 682).
The Army issued its Phase 2 source selection decision on October 2, 2018. AR Tab 42 at 838. Mission1st requested a debriefing on October 22, 2018. AR Tab 1 at 7. That debriefing was held on October 24, 2018. AR Tab 43 at 987-1011 (debriefing presentation).
During the debriefing, Mission1st was advised that because of the inconsistencies described above, its cost proposal was "not compliant with Solicitation requirements." AR Tab 43 at 1008 (using the same language contained in the draft evaluation notice). As a result, the agency characterized the total evaluated cost of Mission1st's proposal as "Undetermined."
After the debriefing presentation, Mission1st submitted several additional questions regarding the evaluation of its proposal.
In its responses, the Army explained that the calculations in Mission1st's cost proposal could not be verified "[b]ecause the formula for calculating O/H cost in your cost proposal does not match your disclosed accounting practices."
The Army also rejected Mission1st's suggestion that the error that the Army had identified was immaterial or not "statistically significant" because "[i]f the O/H formula stated in the cost narrative was applied to the Cost Proposal dated 061417, [the] total proposed cost would have increased . . . from $[***] to $[***], a less than 2% difference."
Mission1st filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") on November 5, 2018. AR Tab 1 at 1. It contended that the agency's evaluation "deviated from well-settled regulations and principles in cost-type procurements like this one, and imposed a draconian standard nowhere found in the Solicitation to exclude Mission1st's highly-rated and competitively-priced proposal based on a minor—and readily identifiable—clerical error that had no meaningful impact on Mission1st's probable overall cost."
Relatedly, Mission1st contended that the agency violated the terms of the Solicitation by not completing a cost realism analysis of its proposal.
GAO denied Mission1st's protest on February 12, 2019. AR Tab 49 at 1044. It found that "the agency reasonably concluded that a cost realism analysis could not be performed, and therefore was unable to determine the proposal's most probable cost."
Mission1st filed the present bid protest on March 4, 2019. ECF No. 1. In its complaint, Mission1st presses essentially the same arguments that it made to GAO. Mission1st contends that the Army violated the terms of the Solicitation when it rejected Mission1st's proposal based on what it characterizes as essentially a clerical error.
After the administrative record was filed on March 20, 2019, Mission1st filed its MJAR on April 5, 2019.
During oral argument, the government advised that—contrary to representations made in its filings—during Phase 2 the Army had issued eight clarification requests to other offerors. June 11, 2019 Hr'g ("Hr'g") at 3:27:20-50; Pl.'s Mot. to Complete the Admin. R. & Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for J. upon the Admin. R. ("Mot. to Complete AR") at 2, ECF No. 31 (stating documents show that agency conducted clarifications for eight proposals). Counsel for Mission1st requested copies of these requests and the opportunity to move for their inclusion in the administrative record. Hr'g at 3:32:55-37:20. The Court issued a scheduling order the same day, directing the government to produce the documents by June 12, 2019. ECF No. 30. On June 18, 2019, Mission1st filed a motion to complete the administrative record and a supplemental brief addressing the new documents.
The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over bid protests in accordance with the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, as amended by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 § 12 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)). Specifically, the Court has the authority "to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1);
A party invoking this Court's bid protest jurisdiction "bears the burden of establishing [the] elements [of standing]."
In post-award protests, like this one, a plaintiff may demonstrate competitive injury or prejudice by showing that it would have had a "substantial chance" of winning the award "but for the alleged error in the procurement process."
Mission1st was an actual offeror in this procurement. It contends that the Army's decision to reject its cost proposal and/or its decision not to request clarification of the discrepancy between that proposal and the cost narrative was arbitrary and capricious. Taking the allegations of error in the complaint to be true—as it must to determine standing—the Court finds that, had the Army requested clarifications and/or not rejected the proposal based on the discrepancy, there is a substantial chance that Mission1st would have been awarded an IDIQ contract. Accordingly, Mission1st is an interested party and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over its claim.
Parties may move for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to Rule 52.1 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). Pursuant to RCFC 52.1, the Court reviews an agency's procurement decision based on the administrative record.
The Court reviews challenges to procurement decisions under the same standards used to evaluate agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
This "highly deferential" standard of review "requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors."
In short, a disappointed offeror "bears a heavy burden" in attempting to show that a procuring agency's decision lacked a rational basis.
Mission1st presents two interrelated grounds for its protest. First, it argues that the Army acted arbitrarily when it failed to complete a cost realism analysis of Mission1st's proposal. Specifically, it contends that the Army should have recognized that the calculation of overhead costs Mission1st supplied in Attachment 1 was the product of clerical error.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Mission1st's contentions are without merit.
As noted, Mission1st claims that the Army acted arbitrarily when it rejected Mission1st's proposal based on the discrepancy between (1) the method for calculating overhead costs described in its cost narrative and supporting documentation, and (2) the method that it employed to calculate those costs in its cost proposal (i.e., in Attachment 1). It contends that the rejection of its proposal on this basis was inconsistent with the terms of the Solicitation and with FAR 15.404-1(d)(2), which it claims required the Army to make probable cost adjustments to reconcile the cost proposal with the narrative and supporting documentation as part of its cost realism analysis.
FAR 15.404-1(d)(2) provides that "cost realism analyses shall be performed on cost-reimbursement contracts to determine the probable cost of performance for each offeror."
In Mission1st's view, it should have been obvious to the Army: (1) that the formulas Mission1st inserted to calculate overhead costs in the Attachment 1 spreadsheet were the product of an inadvertent error; and (2) that Mission1st intended to propose costs consistent with the formula described in the cost narrative. Further, according to Mission1st, the Army could have— and should have—made a probable cost adjustment to Mission1st's cost proposal because the agency had all the information it needed to adjust the costs to comport with the formula prescribed in the cost narrative (i.e., it knew Mission1st's proposed direct labor, fringe, overhead, G&A, and fee rates). "All the Army needed to do to get the correct amount for O/H Cost," Mission1st contends, "was to add the Fringe number to the Direct Labor number before multiplying by the O/H rate . . . [which was] plainly addressed in Mission1st's cost proposal narrative." Pl.'s MJAR at 24. Mission1st asserts that "[t]his is precisely the sort of probable cost adjustment that is contemplated by the FAR provision governing the required [cost] realism analysis."
Mission1st's assertions are unpersuasive. It is well established that contracting agencies have broad discretion regarding the "nature and extent" of a cost realism analysis, "unless the agency commits itself to a particular methodology in a solicitation."
Mission1st's contention—that it was irrational for the agency not to correct the calculation of overhead cost contained in the cost proposal as part of its cost realism analysis— lacks merit. For one thing, nothing in the Solicitation or the FAR requires an agency to make a probable cost adjustment when performing a cost realism analysis. To the contrary, the Solicitation uses permissive language with respect to probable cost adjustments, stating that "[t]he Government probable cost
Further, and more importantly, the Army faced a threshold problem when it undertook its cost realism analysis of Mission1st's cost proposal during Phase 2. It could not be certain precisely what Mission1st was proposing with respect to its indirect expenses and fee. Nor could it verify those cost elements because the proposal itself, as submitted, did not conform to the cost narrative and supporting documentation. A probable cost adjustment is not a vehicle for resolving uncertainties regarding an offeror's intent. It is a vehicle for adjusting either upwards or downwards the costs that the agency understands the offeror to have proposed so that those proposed costs reflect the government's best estimate of the likely actual costs of the proposal.
The Court is also unpersuaded by Mission1st's argument that the Army had to have known that Mission1st intended overhead costs to be calculated based on the methodology set forth in the cost narrative, and not on the basis of the formulas used in the spreadsheets. To the contrary, there were two ways the agency might reasonably have interpreted the discrepancies in Mission1st's proposal. First, it might have concluded—as Mission1st argues—that Mission1st personnel committed an inadvertent error when they entered the formulas for overhead costs on the spreadsheet. But that was not the only possible interpretation of Mission1st's intent. Alternatively, the Army might reasonably have expected that Mission1st would have exercised particular care in preparing the spreadsheet, given that it had been disqualified from receiving an award during Phase 1 based in part on its failure to use the proper format in presenting its cost proposal. The agency might further have found it significant that the revised formula had to be entered manually for each of the six separate labor categories, one by one, making it less likely that an inadvertent error had been made in the cost proposal. The agency might have instead reasonably concluded that the error was in a failure to modify the cost narrative used during Phase 1.
The Court is unpersuaded by Mission1st's reliance on the language of the draft evaluation notice the Army prepared to provide evidence that the Army in fact somehow knew that the overhead costs set forth in Attachment 1 were the product of inadvertent error. Describing the content of Attachment 1, the notice stated that "Mission1st did not edit the formula for calculating overhead (O/H) costs to comply with its disclosure information in the supporting documentation, or the correct formula in the Phase 1 cost proposal." Pl.'s MJAR at 23 (citing AR Tab 63 at 2992 (draft EN for Mission1st's Phase 2 proposal)). This language merely explains how the discrepancy occurred, reflecting the Army's recognition that in Attachment 1 Mission1st had used a formula for calculating overhead costs that did not comply with the formula described in its cost narrative and used in its Phase 1 cost proposal. The EN does not purport to draw conclusions about what Mission1st intended.
It is axiomatic that the burden is on the offeror "to submit a well-written proposal with adequately detailed information that allows for a meaningful review by the procuring agency."
In fact, the Solicitation required that cost proposals be consistent with the cost narrative and supporting documentation and stated that the Army's proposal evaluation "will be limited to the information provided and nothing will be assumed." AR Tab 3 at 353-54, 362. Further, the discussion letter sent to Mission1st reinforced these requirements, warning that unlike in Phase 1, "[p]roposals with an omission or unclear or uncertain proposals may not be considered for award" during Phase 2. AR Tab 14 at 402.
The Court also rejects Mission1st's argument that its cost proposal was not materially noncompliant with the Solicitation because the difference between the total costs set forth in its cost proposal and those that would have been derived from the methodology set forth in its cost narrative was a relatively small one (2%). An error is material if it "(1) violates an express provision of the [solicitation] and (2) the [solicitation] provision violated serves a substantive purpose in the evaluation process."
Finally, the Court notes that Mission1st's briefs include claims that the cost realism analysis process the Army employed with respect to all of the proposals before it was a "sham" because, among other things, the Army ultimately did not make probable cost adjustments to any of the proposals submitted, and because it deemed realistic and reasonable any proposed costs that were within two standard deviations below or above the mean cost of the proposals. Pl.'s MJAR at 20. The result of these standards, Mission1st argues, was that all of the cost proposals were found reasonable and realistic, including two that were actually above the cutoff.
The Court declines to consider these claims because Mission1st lacks standing to assert them. The Army's use of a more rigorous cost realism analysis would not have changed the outcome of the procurement for Mission1st. It was found ineligible for award because, as a result of the conflicting information in its submission, its proposed costs could not be determined and verified. Because it was reasonable for the agency to disqualify Mission1st on that basis, the Court declines to consider its other broader contentions.
Mission1st contends that the Army subjected it to unfair or unequal treatment when it declined to correct Mission1st's proposal while it performed what Mission1st calls "de facto probable cost adjustments" of five other cost proposals that allegedly contained similar errors or omissions.
The first example of alleged unequal treatment is based on the Army's handling of Fibertek's proposal. In its cost narrative, Fibertek proposed that its "option period direct labor rates [would be] escalated by [***]% annually for five years over the base period direct labor rates." AR Tab 63 at 3427 (Fibertek Phase 2 cost evaluation). The Army concluded that when it applied this methodology, it resulted in a labor rate of $[***] for the Electrical Engineer, Intermediate direct labor category. Def.'s MJAR at 30-31. Fibertek's proposal, however, supplied a direct labor rate of $[***]. AR Tab 63 at 3427. In its brief, the government attributes the two-cent disparity to a difference in the methods that Fibertek and the government used when rounding the numbers that resulted from the application of the [***]% annual escalator. Def.'s MJAR at 31.
Unlike this case, the Army did not conclude that Fibertek's direct labor rate was inconsistent with its supporting documentation. The Army also did not conclude that the $[***] rate was an error; it merely noted the discrepancy in passing, finding that it was not material. There were no other discrepancies between the formulas set forth in Fibertek's cost narrative and the calculation of its costs. Further, the agency did not adjust Fibertek's proposal to reflect the $[***] rate and the two-cent difference had no effect on any of the cost elements.
The other examples of errors or omissions that Mission1st cites are also distinguishable from the error contained in Mission1st's proposal. For example, Karthik Consulting's ("Karthik") error was to not include direct labor
Another similar example cited by Mission1st concerns the evaluation of a proposal by offeror ACET. During its Phase 2 evaluation, the Army noted that "ACET's proposed costs in its Excel spreadsheet included (as required) a direct
Likewise, during the Phase 2 cost evaluation the Army found that the direct labor rates in the proposal submitted by InteliTrac did not exactly match the direct labor rates set forth in the supporting documentation. AR Tab 63 at 3575. Specifically, the proposed hourly rates were equivalent to hourly rates that were within the [***] quartile range from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Mission1st's final example of alleged disparate treatment concerns the Army's evaluation of a proposal by offeror Glacier Technologies ("Glacier"). Glacier's cost narrative stated that "its base period direct labor rates are `based on the DOL [Department of Labor] [***] rate by metropolitan area tables ([***]) using [***].'" AR Tab 63 at 3478 (Glacier Technologies Phase 2 evaluation quoting proposal's text). Glacier's supporting documentation also included rates within the [***] and [***] percentile ranges from that salary data.
In short, the five examples upon which Mission1st relies are inapposite. Better analogies to the treatment of Mission1st's proposal may be found in other proposals that the Army rejected for essentially identical reasons, including those submitted by Offeror A and Offeror B. Like Mission1st, Offeror A's proposal was rejected when its fee could not be verified because "the calculation of the proposed indirect costs [was] not in accordance with the application of Overhead (O/H) and General & Administrative (G&A) rates disclosed in the supporting documentation." AR Tab 63 at 2860 (Offeror A Phase 2 cost evaluation);
As is readily apparent, the difference between Mission1st's proposal and the five examples it cites is that resolving the apparent omissions or discrepancies in the examples did not require the Army to make subjective judgments about the intent of the offerors, as did the discrepancies in the proposals of Mission1st, Offeror A, and Offeror B. In Mission1st's case, it is undisputed that the cost narrative and the cost proposal are irreconcilable. In the case of the five examples at issue, on the other hand, the cost realism of the figures contained in the cost proposals could be verified by reference to the supporting documentation. In no instance did the Army do for the other offerors what Mission1st states it was required to do for it—change the numbers contained in its cost proposal. The Court, accordingly, rejects Mission1st's disparate treatment claim.
FAR 15.306(a)(2) provides that when contract awards are made without discussions, "offerors may be given the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of proposals (e.g., the relevance of an offeror's past performance information and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not previously had an opportunity to respond) or to resolve minor or clerical errors." Mission1st contends that its error was "minor, obvious, and immaterial" and so the Army should have requested clarification of the discrepancy between its cost narrative and cost proposal. Pl.'s MJAR at 30. The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
Clarifications are "limited exchanges, between the Government and offerors, that may occur when award without discussions is contemplated." FAR 15.306(a)(1). The decision whether to request clarifications lies within the discretion of the CO.
As the court of appeals has observed, clarifications "are not to be used to cure proposal deficiencies or material omissions, materially alter the technical or cost elements of the proposal, or otherwise revise the proposal."
In this case, as explained above, Mission1st's proposal was noncompliant with requirements critical to the Army's evaluation process—for example, the instruction to "submit a cost narrative with sufficient documentation necessary to adequately support and explain the costs proposed." AR Tab 3 at 353. Further, and again contrary to the Solicitation, Mission1st's indirect expense rates did not exactly match its supporting documentation and it did not "provide adequate detail explaining how the proposed indirect expense rates are realistic."
The CO's decision not to request clarifications was also reasonable because such clarifications "may not provide new information or alter already provided information." ManTech, 141 Fed. Cl. at 507. Correcting the errors in Mission1st's cost proposal would result in the material alteration of a number of its cost elements, starting with the overhead costs and cascading down to the proposed fee.
Moreover, "a critical component of evaluating a CO's decision to not seek clarification is whether the CO should have discerned that the protestor made an error rather than a deliberate decision."
The Army's decision not to request clarifications is also supported by the posture of the procurement in this case. The Army had originally anticipated receiving fifty proposals in response to the Solicitation, Def.'s Reply in Supp. of its Cross-Mot. for J. Upon the Admin. R. at 19, ECF No. 28 (citing AR Tab 3 at 362), but it ultimately received 388, AR Tab 42 at 841. The evaluations were conducted in two phases. There were 198 offerors in Phase 2 whose proposals met the award criteria, including 148 small businesses. AR Tab 42 at 845. The Army held rounds of discussions with offerors whose proposals were found deficient during Phase 1.
The source selection authority decided not to engage in another round of discussions during Phase 2 because the high number of awardees ensured enough technical skillsets and competition at the task order level. AR Tab 42 at 843. Under these circumstances, it was hardly irrational for the Army to decide that it would not be worthwhile to allow Mission1st (along with other similarly situated offerors) yet another opportunity to make themselves eligible for an award by giving them an opportunity to explain discrepancies in their proposals.
At the oral argument in this case, the government acknowledged that—contrary to the statements in its brief that no clarifications were requested during Phase 2—the agency in fact requested clarifications as to eight proposals. Mission1st's motion to include these eight requests in the record is
Six of the eight clarifications involved typographical errors in the CAGE or DUNS code listings.
Unlike Mission1st's error, where the agency had no way of knowing which overheard formula was correct, all eight of the clarifications involved minor typographical errors, which the Army verified using information at its disposal. Furthermore, none of the clarifications required the agency to alter material terms of the proposal, such as price. If the agency verified that the formula in Mission1st's narrative was correct, it would then have needed to recalculate Mission1st's total proposed cost. This is precisely the type of proposal revision that cannot be done through clarification.
For the foregoing reasons, Mission1st's motion to complete the administrative record (ECF No. 31) is