CHARLES F. LETTOW, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff Tad A. Patterson has brought suit seeking $610,111.96 against the United States Department of the Treasury for unspecified injuries related ostensibly to unpaid individual income taxes. Compl. at 1-2, ECF No. 1; see also Compl. Attach. 1 (cover sheet), ECF No. 1-1.
Because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Patterson's claim, the government's motion to dismiss his complaint is GRANTED.
In support of his claims, Mr. Patterson provided a Department of Justice standard form for a "Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death" ("DOJ Claim Form"), Compl. Attach. 2 at 1-2, ECF No. 1-2, and five exhibits ("PX"), Compl. Attach. 2 at 3-69.
The government provided five exhibits ("DX") in support of its motion to dismiss. See Def.'s Mot.
Against this background, Mr. Patterson's complaint provides little additional information. His complaint alleges that the government "damaged [him] in the amount of $610,111.96 for taking [his] assets without jurisdiction," a lack of jurisdiction evident from a "United States Court judgment for dismissal for lack of [j]urisdiction." Compl. at 1. The remainder of the complaint provides the conclusory statement that the "[government] is involved knowingly and maliciously against [him] [and] therefore [the government is] violating [its] own policies and procedures." Compl. at 2. Mr. Patterson provides no explanation of the tax years at issue, whether he has paid any taxes for those years, or whether he requested a refund from the IRS. He provides no information regarding the relevance of his exhibits, except that his requested damages are derived by totaling each lien, levy, and billing statement provided in his exhibits. Compl. at 1.
The IRS has assessed Mr. Patterson an unpaid tax liability for 2007 through 2012, and has sent multiple letters since 2008. See generally PX D. The latest IRS notices provided to Mr. Patterson, i.e., those from December 2018, show that the IRS seeks $64,975.70 for tax years 2007, 2008, and 2010 through 2012. See PX D at 62-66. The only notice for 2009 dates to July 2013. PX D at 45. Further, the IRS placed a levy of $5,102.40 on Mr. Patterson's bank account in 2010 and recorded liens with Lane County and the Oregon Secretary of State for tax years 2007, 2008, and 2011. PXs C, E. On several of the billing notices, Mr. Patterson hand wrote "accepted for value [and] exempt from levy," provided his social security number as his "exemption ID [number]," and asked for "deposit to the US Treasury and charge the same to [Mr. Patterson]." E.g., PX D at 29 (capitalization removed). It appears that these notes were written shortly after receipt and were returned (or were intended to be returned) to the Treasury. See, e.g., id. The Treasury appears not to have accepted these notes in satisfaction of Mr. Patterson's tax liability. See generally DXs D, E.
IRS transcripts for Mr. Patterson's individual tax returns for 2007 through 2012 show that Mr. Patterson has outstanding balances, including principal, interest, and penalties, as of June 2019 for all six years. For 2007, Mr. Patterson owes $38,381.23 in tax liability. DX D at 22. For 2008, he has no remaining tax balance but owes $1,256.82 for a civil penalty. DX D at 27, DX Eat 45. For 2009, his tax balance is $410.15. DX D at 30. For 2010, he owes $10,808.26 in tax liability. DX D at 34. His 2011 tax balance is $5,840.15. DX D at 39. And for 2012, he owes $8,734.40 in taxes, DX D at 43. Mr. Patterson does not appear to have made any payments towards the outstanding balances for any of these years except for $1.00 towards 2007, DX D at 15, and $187.98 towards 2008 obtained via levy in January 2013, DX D at 26. Separately, the IRS obtained a total of $4,316.26 via levy in July 2010 and January 2013, both of which were applied against the 2008 civil penalty. DX E at 45-46.
Mr. Patterson appears to believe that each of the 41 notices, four liens, and one levy represents a separate assessment of tax liability. See Compl. at 1. The 41 notices reflect, however, periodic updates to an overdue balance for each tax year. See, e.g., IRS, Understanding your CP503 Notice (June 13, 2019), www.irs.gov/individuals/understanding-your-CP503-Notice (explaining, for example, that the CP503 notice means that the IRS "ha[s] not heard from you and you still have an unpaid balance"). Letters for the same tax years are not cumulative. All three liens filed in 2011 reflect the same deficiencies, but were filed with different recording agencies or updated for a higher balance. The liens and levy are meant to collect the outstanding tax liabilities, and are not new assessments. Accordingly, the $610,111.96 Mr. Patterson calculates greatly exceeds what the IRS claims he owes or has levied, as noted by the government. See also Def.'s Mot. at 4-5. In actuality, for tax years 2007 through 2012 as of June 2019, the IRS has levied $4,504.24 and claims that Mr. Patterson still owes $65,431.01 in taxes, interest, and penalties. DXs D, E.
Mr. Patterson filed a petition with the Tax Court in March 2019 contesting whether the IRS followed proper collection procedures for tax years 2000 through 2018. DX A at 2. The Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the IRS has not issued any Notices of Deficiency or Determination for tax years 2000 through 2018 "that would confer jurisdiction." PX A at 4 (emphasis added). No Notices of Deficiency have been issued for tax years 2007 through 2012, PX B at 10, and while two Notices of Determination were sent with regard to tax years 2007 and 2008, Mr. Patterson's subsequent petitions appear to have been untimely by many years, PX B at 11-12; see also PX A at 4 (Tax Court's order adopting the reasons set forth in the government's motion). Thus, the Tax Court held it lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Patterson's claim. PX A at 4. The Tax Court also contemplated imposing a penalty up to $25,000 on Mr. Patterson for filing a frivolous claim, but instead "admonished" him. Id. at 4-5.
The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). To invoke this court's Tucker Act jurisdiction, "a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). If a plaintiff fails to raise a claim under a money-mandating provision, this court "should [dismiss] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
A claim in this court is "barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501. This six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional and is not susceptible to equitable tolling or any of the other doctrines that would excuse an untimely claim. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134-38 (2008).
Mr. Patterson, as plaintiff, must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Patterson's complaint because Mr. Patterson did "not attach proof of any refund claim filed with the IRS for any of tax years 1979 through 2009 and 2012 through 2018" and has not paid fully his tax liability for 2010 and 2011. Def.'s Mot. at 7. The government also suggests that Mr. Patterson misunderstands the Tax Court's ruling, as that court's lack of jurisdiction to hear his claim does not mean that the United States lacks authority to tax Mr. Patterson. Id. at 5-6.
Mr. Patterson does not specifically address jurisdiction in his complaint but argues the government "admitted not having jurisdiction" to take his assets and that this court "has a legal duty to keep the [government] honest and . . . [to] hold the [government] to the law." Compl. at 1-2. Mr. Patterson's avers that jurisdiction lies under the Tucker Act because "[a]buse of authority by the [government] is a matter within the jurisdiction of this court." Pl.'s Resp. at 3-4. The abuse of authority relates to the IRS filing liens and issuing billing statements "without jurisdiction." Id. at 4. Mr. Patterson also asserts that he argues neither a tax refund nor a taking because either theory requires the legality of the government's underlying action. Id. at 3-4.
The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction to hear a claim for a refund of federal taxes. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008). The Tucker Act also provides this court with jurisdiction to hear a takings claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); U.S. Const. amend. V. But the Tucker Act does not grant this court jurisdiction to hear generalized "abuse of authority" claims. Mr. Patterson must provide a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision entitling him to money. E.g., Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172. He cites none and the court is not aware of any that would touch upon his "abuse of authority" allegation except for the tax refund or taking claims that he disclaims.
While Mr. Patterson asserts that he is not making a claim for tax refund or alleging a taking claim, because Mr. Patterson is a pro se plaintiff, the court will nevertheless look past his deficient pleadings to evaluate whether jurisdiction would be proper under these two theories. See McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356. The Tucker Act does provide this court with jurisdiction to hear suits for refund of federal taxes, i.e., where the taxpayer argues he has paid taxes in excess of what was legally required. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 4. This court's jurisdiction, however, hinges upon Mr. Patterson meeting several requirements. Pertinent here, Mr. Patterson must have filed a claim for a refund with the IRS within three years of filing the tax return or within two years of paying the tax. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511(a), 7422(a); see also Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 4. Further, he must have paid fully the tax assessed for any year in which he claims a refund prior to filing the complaint in this court. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 72-75 (1958), aff'd on reh'g, 362 U.S. 145 (1960); see also, e.g., Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Jurisdiction based on a Fifth Amendment takings theory, see Compl. at 1 ("taking [ ] assets without jurisdiction"), would also be improper. Although the Tucker Act does confer this court with jurisdiction to hear a takings claim, the only assets "taken" from Mr. Patterson were three levies totaling $4,504.24. DX D at 26; DX E at 45-46. Two occurred in January 2013 and the third occurred July 2010. DX D at 26; DX E at 45-46.
For the reasons stated, the government's motion to dismiss Mr. Patterson's complaint is GRANTED. The court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Patterson's claims.
No costs.
It is so ORDERED.
Additionally, the court has special pleading requirements for tax refund suits, such as requiring plaintiffs to document the claim for refund. RCFC 9(m). Mr. Patterson has not met these requirements. This court has previously held that these pleading requirements go to jurisdiction. E.g., Jackson v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 242, 246 (2019).
