DANIEL T. HORNER, Special Master.
On September 16, 2019, petitioner moved for an award of interim attorneys' fees and costs. (ECF No. 24.) In response, respondent deferred to the special master regarding the amount and appropriateness of an award of interim fees and costs. (ECF No. 25.) Respondent is satisfied however, that the statutory requirements for such an award have been met in this case. (Id. at 2.) For the reasons discussed below, I award petitioner interim attorneys' fees and costs in the reduced amount of $63,486.39.
Petitioner filed this claim on January 8, 2018 alleging that her diagnosis of transverse myelitis was caused by the influenza vaccination she received on January 19, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) This case was originally assigned to Special Master Millman. (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner filed a Statement of Completion on March 7, 2018 (ECF No. 7) and after a status conference before Special Master Millman, respondent was ordered to file a status report on his position. (ECF No. 8.) Respondent filed a status report on November 19, 2018, indicating that he intended to defend the case. (ECF No. 15.) Respondent also requested additional medical records which were filed on April 17, 2019. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.)
Initially, petitioner filed a brief, one-page, expert report (by Jack Burks, M.D.) with her petition. (ECF No. 1-7; Ex. 5.) After respondent filed his responsive Rule 4 report on March 5, 2019, petitioner filed a supplemental expert report responding to certain points raised by respondent. (ECF Nos. 16, 19.) Subsequently, upon Special Master Millman's retirement, this case was reassigned to my docket on June 5, 2019. (ECF No. 21.)
Respondent filed his responsive expert report on July 24, 2019. (ECF No. 23.) Thereafter, I provided petitioner an opportunity to file a further report responding to respondent's expert. Subsequently, petitioner then filed this Motion for Interim Attorneys' Fees and Costs on September 16, 2019, followed by an expert report from a newly retained expert (Dr. Levy) on October 16, 2019. (ECF Nos. 24, 26.) Petitioner explained that her original expert had retired. (ECF No. 27.)
Respondent filed his response to petitioner's motion on September 30, 2019 (ECF No. 25); however, upon initial review I determined that petitioner had not provided documentation supporting her request for $27,522.55 in litigation costs and ordered her to do so. (ECF No. 29.) On December 18, 2019, petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion for Interim Attorneys' Fees and Costs with additional documentation supporting her request for attorneys' costs.
This motion is now ripe for resolution.
Section 15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act allows for the special master to award "reasonable attorneys' fees, and other costs." § 300aa-15(e)(1)(A)-(B). Petitioners are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if they are entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act, or, even if they are unsuccessful, if the special master finds that the petition was filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In his response, respondent indicated that he is satisfied this statutory standard has been met in this case. (ECF No. 25, p. 2.) I agree.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit has concluded that interim fee awards are permissible and appropriate under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, "[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained." Id. In Shaw, the Federal Circuit clarified that "where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys' fees." 609 F.3d at 1375.
More specifically, petitioner cites the prior decision Chinea v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, No. 15-95V, 2019 WL 3206829 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 11, 2019). In that decision, the special master observed three factors that have been considered when exercising discretion to award interim attorney's fees include: (1) whether the fee request exceeds $30,000, (2) whether the expert costs exceed $15,000, and (3) whether the case has been pending for over 18 months. Chinea, 2019 WL 3206829, at *2 (citing Knorr v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1169V, 2017 WL 2461375 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 17, 2017)).
In light of the above, I exercise my discretion to allow an award of interim fees and costs. This petition was filed on January 8, 2018, about eighteen months before the filing of the motion for interim fees. (ECF No. 1.) In that time, petitioner filed an expert report and responded to discovery. The total sought for fees and costs exceed the $30,000.00 and $15,000.00 figures cited in Chinea. Moreover, respondent has not objected, but instead deferred to my discretion as to whether the standard for an interim award of fees and costs is met in this case. (ECF No. 25, p. 2.)
Petitioner is advised, however, that multiple requests for interim attorneys' fees and costs within the same case are disfavored. See, e.g., Patel v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-848V, 2019 WL 2296818, at n.3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 11, 2019) (one special master noting "it is not my practice to allow multiple interim fee awards of fees and costs . . . and [petitioner] should therefore refrain from requesting another interim award again until he case fully concludes."). Accordingly, I will not entertain a second interim fee request absent compelling circumstances. See, e.g., Kottenstette v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1016V, 2019 WL 5709372, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 11, 2019) (the undersigned granting a second interim fee award where the Court of Federal Claims entertained a stay of respondent's motion for review).
The determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the special master's discretion. See, e.g. Saxton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special Masters have "wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys' fees and costs." Hines v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (Fed. Cl. 1991). Moreover, special masters are entitled to rely on their own experience and understanding of the issues raised. Wasson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (Fed. Cl. 1991) aff'd in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Special Masters use the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes reasonable attorneys' fees under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The lodestar approach involves first determining "an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys' fee by `multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.'" Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Once a court makes that initial calculation, it may then make an upward or downward departure to the fee award based on other specific findings. Id.
Petitioner "bears the burden of establishing the hours expended" and the reasonableness of the requested fee award. Wasson, 24 Cl. Ct. at 484. Notwithstanding that respondent has not raised any specific objections to petitioner's fee application, "the Special Master has an independent responsibility to satisfy himself that the fee award is appropriate and [is] not limited to endorsing or rejecting respondent's critique." Duncan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-455V, 2008 WL 4743493 (Fed. Cl. 2008); see also McIntosh v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 139 Fed Cl. 238, 250 (2018) (finding that the special master "abused his discretion by failing to independently review the petitioner's counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of case costs to determine if the requested fees and costs were reasonable."). Furthermore, "the Special Master [has] no additional obligation to warn petitioners that he might go beyond the particularized list of respondent's challenges." Duncan, 2008 WL 4743493.
As an initial matter, I note that a significant portion of the costs claimed by petitioner's counsel include costs incurred during travel, specifically to meet with the expert, Dr. Burks. Petitioner's counsel indicates that one attorney working on this case, Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., traveled to Florida to meet with Dr. Burks on three separate occasions, while Dr. Burks traveled to Texas on one additional occasion to meet with petitioner's counsel and provide an in-person evaluation for petitioner. The requested travel expenses are as follows:
In addition to these costs, Mr. Vasquez billed 11.5 hours from October 20-23, 2017; 1.25 hours from December 26-31, 2018; 3.75 hours from March 14-16, 2019; and 3 hours from April 4-6, 2019. (ECF No. 24-4, pp. 5-10.) These hours are devoted to preparing for these expert meetings and conferring with petitioner's expert. Counsel of record, David N. Calvillo, billed 8.75 hours on April 5, 2019, preparing for and attending Dr. Burks's meeting with petitioner. (ECF No. 24-4, p. 11.) Of the hours Dr. Burks billed in this case, eight hours were attributable to "4/5-4/6: Houston Trip: Strategy with Juan/David. Final review of medical records and government document . . . Neurological evaluation on Mrs. Smith with medical report . . . Post patient case evaluation, Strategy planning." (ECF No. 32-1, p. 11.) (All involved seem to have refrained from billing actual travel time as a matter of billing judgment.)
Petitioner's counsel indicates that "[t]he travel costs presented in this request should be considered a part of the expert costs. The costs reflected herein for hotel and airfare was incurred specifically to personally confer with Dr. Burks on a time-sensitive basis. The appointment attended to by Mr. Vasquez involved a review of the medical records, an explanation of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and an explanation of the type of report required in this instance." (ECF No. 24, p. 6.) However, this amount of travel in a case of this nature is unusual. In the context of this case, given the stage of the case, and the facts alleged, the costs incurred for these in-person meetings both in hours billed and travel expenses are excessive and out of proportion to the claim presented.
"One test of the `reasonableness' of a fee or cost item is whether a hypothetical petitioner, who had to use his own resources to pay his attorney for Vaccine Act representation would be willing to pay for such expenditure." Hardy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-108V, 2016 WL 4729530 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 16, 2016) (citing Riggins v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-382V, 2009 WL 3319819, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 15, 2009); Sabella v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-1627, 2008 WL 4426040, at *28 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 29, 2008)). The Federal Circuit has ruled that "[h]ours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority." Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521. Additionally, counsel have an obligation to monitor expert fees and costs. Simon v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 05-941V, 2008 WL 623833, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 21, 2008).
I have reviewed Dr. Burks's reports filed in this case. Nothing presented in either of these reports reflects any basis for in-person meeting. Dr. Burks's first report filed with the petition was a single page, included only a perfunctory explanation of petitioner's theory of causation, and evidenced no specific understanding of the legal requirements of this program.
Moreover, while petitioner's counsel provided receipts for flights and hotel for Miami, Florida, during the months of October 2017 and December 2018, Dr. Burks's invoice does not reflect any meeting with petitioner's counsel in October or December of any year. (ECF No. 32-1, p. 11.) Petitioner requests reimbursement for two hotel rooms, food, and tolls in Miami during March 2019; however, Dr. Burks' invoice only notes "extensive analysis of medical records" for March 15th through 29th of an unknown year. (Id.)
Additionally, petitioner has likewise failed to substantiated why it was necessary for Dr. Burks to travel to Houston to visit petitioner in person. By the time of this trip, respondent had filed his Rule 4 report which acknowledged petitioner's transverse myelitis diagnosis and confirmed that the case was being defended with regard to the question of whether petitioner's vaccination was the cause of that transverse myelitis. (ECF No. 16.) Accordingly, travel to Houston for an in-person exam of petitioner was not reasonable as her current condition or diagnosis was not then at issue in the case. Despite this, counsel's billing records reflect that Dr. Burks's meeting with petitioner was with regard to her diagnosis. (ECF No. 24-4, p. 10.)
In light of the above, I find that none of these requested travel costs, totaling $4,462.53, are reimbursable.
A reasonable hourly rate is "the prevailing market rate defined as the rate prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (citation and quotation omitted). In Avera, the Federal Circuit found that in Vaccine Act cases, the special master should use the rate prevailing in the forum, i.e., Washington, D.C., in determining an award of attorneys' fees unless the bulk of the work is completed outside of the forum and there is a "very significant difference" between the forum hourly rate and the local hourly rate. 515 F.3d at 1349 (citing Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Spec. Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
Petitioner's counsel practices in Houston, Texas. Houston attorneys have previously been awarded forum rates. See Hudson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-114V, 2016 WL 3571709, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 3, 2016); Johnson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-254V, 2017 WL 2927307, at *3 (Fed. Cl. June 6, 2017); Garrett v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-17V, 2014 WL 6237497, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 27, 2014).
For attorneys receiving forum rates, the decision in McCulloch v. Secretary of Health & Human Services provides a further framework for consideration of appropriate ranges for attorneys' fees based upon the experience of the practicing attorney.
Petitioner requests compensation for Mr. Calvillo at $425 per hour for work performed in 2017, 2018 and 2019.
Petitioner requests compensation for Mr. Vasquez at the rate of $595 for work performed in 2017, $625 for work performed in 2018, and $650 for for work performed in 2019.
The paralegal rates requested by petitioner's counsel also exceed the forum rates typically allowed in this program. Specifically, Ms. Villegas has billed at a rate of $215 per hour for work mostly completed in 2017. Her rate is reduced to $148 to conform to the Attorneys' Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule for 2017. Mr. Cain billed $215 per hour for work performed in 2018 and $230 per hour for work performed in 2019. (ECF No. 24-4, p. 13.) The maximum paralegal rates for these years under the Attorneys' Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule are $153 and $156 respectively. Mr. Cain's rates are reduced accordingly.
A third staff member, Theresa Adkins, also worked on this case. (ECF No. 24-4, p. 12.) She billed 3.85 hours in 2017 and 1 hour in 2018 at a rate of $195 per hour and is identified as "other legal staff." (Id.) However, unlike other staff, the basis for her requested rate was not discussed. (ECF No. 24-1.) In an informal communication to chambers, petitioner's counsel represented that the work Ms. Adkins billed in this case was paralegal in nature. Upon my review of the billing records, I agree. Accordingly, consistent with the above, her hourly rate will be reduced to $148 for 2017 and $153 for 2018.
Special masters may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Program to determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Wasson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1991), rev'd on other grounds and aff'd in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special masters have previously reduced the fees paid to petitioners due to excessive and duplicative billing. See Ericzon v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-103V, 2016 WL 447770 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 15, 2016) (reduced overall fee award by 10 percent due to excessive and duplicative billing); Raymo v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-654V, 2016 WL 7212323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 2, 2016) (reduced overall fee award by 20 percent), mot. for rev. denied, 129 Fed. Cl. 691 (2016). Petitioner's counsel "should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission." Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
After reviewing the billing records, counsel included entries that I find to be excessive and unreasonable, along with some entries that are too vague to assess their reasonableness. This court has consistently held that an application for fees and costs must sufficiently detail and explain the time billed so that a special master may determine, from the application and the case file, whether the amount requested is reasonable. Bell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 18 Cl. Ct. 751, 760 (1989).
Upon my review, Mr. Calvillo's billing is reasonable overall. However, he has requested 6.5 hours for time spent in 2017 and 4 hours for time spent in 2018 researching the vaccine program.
More significant reductions are required with respect to Mr. Vasquez's billing. On sixteen separate occasions, and for 5.5 hours, Mr. Vasquez billed for conferral without describing who he was conferring with or providing detail regarding what he was conferring about.
Additionally, Mr. Vasquez included entries which constitute block billing. The Vaccine Program's Guidelines for Practice explain that "[e]ach task should have its own line entry indicating the amount of time spent on that task. Lumping together several unrelated tasks in the same time entry frustrates the court's ability to assess the reasonableness of the request."
I further stress that, notwithstanding his travel to meet with experts, Mr. Vasquez's involvement in this case is not well substantiated. In this program assigning multiple attorneys to work on a case is disfavored due to the inefficiencies created in what are not typically procedurally complex cases. See Sabella, 86 Fed. Cl. at 214-15; Austin v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-362V, 2013 WL 659574, at *14 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 31, 2013); Soto v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-897V, 2011 WL 2269423, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 7, 2011); Carcamo v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 97-483V, 2011 WL 2413345, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 20, 2011). This is especially notable in this case, because the allegations presented are not complicated by the standards of this program and petitioner's counsel of record is a seasoned trial attorney unlikely to require supervision. Moreover, Mr. Vasquez has no more experience in this program than does Mr. Calvillo and also lacks Mr. Calvillo's prior experience in injury litigation. Additionally, many if not most, of his billing records lack sufficient specificity to evidence the nature of Mr. Vasquez's role in the case or determine how efforts were coordinated between the attorneys. Accordingly, in addition to the specific reductions above, I reduce Mr. Vasquez's remaining hours in this case by a further 25%.
Finally, this program does not pay for tasks which are secretarial in nature. Guy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 408 (1997) (denying compensation for office overhead including office supplies, administrative or clerical staff, and secretarial support.) Counsel requests 1.5 hours for work done by an administrative assistant, "LKR." These non-reimbursable administrative fees total $187.50. However, I find no cause to reduce the paralegal hours billed in this case.
On December 18, 2019, petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs including itemized receipts for their requested costs. (ECF No. 32.) Attorneys' costs are subject to the same reasonableness requirements as attorneys' fees. See Perriera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff'd, 33 F.3d 1375.
Petitioner's counsel requested a total of $26,976.12 in costs, $22,150.00 of which constitute expert and consultation fees. (ECF No. 32.) The bulk of that amount represents fees by Dr. Jack Burks, a physician with qualifications in neurology and immunology. Dr. Burks charged an hourly rate of $650 for 25 hours for a total of $16,250.00. (ECF No. 32-1, p. 11.) Dr. Burks also charges a minimum review and report fee of $5,000.00 (for which he did not provide itemized billing), bringing his total bill to $21,250.00. (Id. at 10.) His hourly rate has not previously been addressed in this program.
Reasonable expert costs are calculated using the same lodestar method as is used when calculating attorneys' fees. Masias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-697V, 2009 WL 1838979, at *37 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 12, 2009). Regarding expert fees, "[t]he question is not whether [the expert] expended the numbers of hours claimed, but whether it was necessary or reasonable for him to do so." Baker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-653V, 2005 WL 6122529, at *4 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 2005) (quoting Wasson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-208V,1991 WL 135015, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 5, 1991), remanded, 24. Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (1991), aff'd, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). An expert retained by the petitioner in the Vaccine Program will only be compensated at a reasonable hourly rate, and the petitioners have the burden of demonstrating that the expert costs incurred were reasonable. Ceballos v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-97V, 2004 WL 784910, at *13 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 25, 2004).
Many Vaccine Program cases provide a framework for determining the appropriate rate for experts in this program at a range between $250 and $500 an hour. See O'Neill v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *17 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015) (awarding an hourly rate of $400 to an expert in neurology); Dingle v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-579V, 2014 WL 630473, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 24, 2014) (expert did not have "specialized knowledge and experience" in the case to justify his requested hourly rate of $500 and, accordingly, rate was reduced to $400 per hour); Allen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-051V, 2013 WL 5229796, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 23, 2013) (approving a rate of $500 per hour for an expert in neurology and immunology and who also had expertise in a pertinent area to the issue in the case); Chen Bou v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1329V, 2007 WL 924495, at *10, *16 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 9, 2007) (awarding an expert a rate of $350 per hour based in part on his poor performance in testifying at hearing, but noting that "[b]ased upon the information submitted [ ], with the appropriate set of facts the undersigned would have no issue with awarding the $500 requested by petitioner")). Notably, these rates include experts in areas of study similar to Dr. Burks. E.g., Allen, supra.
The previously-accepted rate of $500 per hour does not constitute an absolute ceiling on the reimbursement of reasonable expert costs. Rather, the reasonableness of any given expert's hourly rate will be based on individual factors such as credentials, particular expertise, efficiency, and effectiveness. However, petitioner has not established $650 as a reasonable hourly rate for Dr. Burks. Dr. Burks's biography confirms that his qualifications and experience are relevant to the facts of this case; however, especially in light of his inexperience in the program, the hours expended in this case, and his work product, petitioner has not provided a compelling reason to allow a higher than usual rate of reimbursement.
Dr. Burks's billing agreement indicates that his fees "will be paid with an initial minimum review and report fee of $5,000.00, payment of which will be due upon the execution of this agreement. Thereafter, once the initial payment is utilized, fee statement for my services will be invoiced on a schedule determined by my schedule, and as approved by you." (ECF No. 32-1, p. 10.) Although the agreement referenced an hourly rate of $750 per hour, the invoice reflects that an hourly rate of $650 per hour was actually charged. (Id. at 11.) At a rate of $650 per hour, Dr. Burks's initial retainer would account for approximately 7.7 hours of work. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, Dr. Burks's bill is understood to represent 32.7 hours of work billed at $650 per hour. However, as describe in Section IV, above, I disallowed four hours of billing from Dr. Burks's invoice, resulting in total hours of 28.7.
Petitioner's counsel also requested other miscellaneous fees including "professional fees" paid to "JLE Ltd FR" ($34.99) and "Taylor & Francis FL" ($54.00). (ECF No. 24-4, p. 12; ECF No. 32-1, pp. 31-32.) The purpose of these charges cannot be determined on their face and they have not otherwise been explained. Accordingly, they will not be reimbursed. Additionally, Mr. Calvillo seeks reimbursement of $54.24 for a "working meal" identified as a meeting with his client occurring May 31, 2017. (ECF No. 24-4, p. 12.) Absent circumstances such as necessary hearing travel, I do not find meal reimbursement to be a reasonable expense chargeable to this program. Moreover, the billing records submitted indicate that no attorney time was billed on that date. (ECF No. 24-4, p. 4.) The total of these miscellaneous expenses is $143.23.
In light of all of the above, attorneys' fees are calculated as follows:
In addition to the fees delineated above, petitioner requested costs amounting to $27,522.55. Of this amount, $21,250.00 represented the costs associated with the work of Dr. Burks. For the reasons discussed in Section VI(a) above, I reduce that amount to $14,350.00 ($500 per hour x 28.7 hours), a reduction of $6,900.00. Additionally, in Section IV, I identified $4,462.53 in travel expenses that will not be reimbursed. And, finally, in Section VI(b), I identified a further $143.23 in other expenses that will not be reimbursed. Accordingly, petitioner is awarded costs as follows:
Thus, the total amount awarded in reasonable interim attorneys' fees and costs is $63,486.39, representing $47,469.60 in attorneys' fees and $16,016.79 in costs.
In light of the above, petitioner's application for interim attorneys' fees and costs is
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment herewith.
Interim Attorneys' Fees and Costs; Excessive Travel Costs; Reasonable Rates; Vague Billing; Excessive Billing; Expert Costs.
