On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Chance Robinson was charged with unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance based on the presence of methamphetamine in his bloodstream. The charge was grounded on provision of the Utah Controlled Substances Act that make it unlawful for any person to "knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body."1 We are asked to determine whether this "measurable amount" provision violates the Utah or the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not and affirm the decision of the district court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On August 10, 2007, Mr. Robinson was stopped by Lehi City police officers on suspicion of driving without insurance. Because Mr. Robinson had difficulty speaking and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, one of the officers administered multiple sobriety tests. After Mr. Robinson failed the sobriety tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence.

¶ 3 At the police station, Mr. Robinson admitted using heroin twelve hours earlier. He also submitted to breath, urine, and blood tests. The urinalysis tested positive for cocaine and benzodiazepine. The blood analysis tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶ 4 Mr. Robinson was charged initially with various offenses not at issue in this appeal.2 The State subsequently added a charge of possession or use of methamphetamine after Mr. Robinson's blood tested positive for methamphetamine. The charge was based on a provision of the Utah Controlled Substances Act that makes it unlawful for any person to "knowingly and intentionally"3 have "any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body."4

¶ 5 At the preliminary hearing on the methamphetamine charge, Mr. Robinson argued that the "measurable amount" provision was an unconstitutional "status offense" under Robinson v. California.5 The district court found probable cause to bind over as to the methamphetamine charge, but allowed Mr. Robinson to file a motion to quash the bindover based on his constitutional arguments. After both parties briefed and argued the constitutional issues,6 the district court held that the measurable amount provision was not unconstitutional under Robinson and denied Mr. Robinson's motion to quash the bindover order for the methamphetamine charge.

¶ 6 Mr. Robinson subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession or use of methamphetamine and driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in his body. As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Robinson reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to quash the bindover order for the methamphetamine charge,7 which he now exercises. On appeal, Mr. Robinson contends that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the Utah and United States Constitutions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (Supp.2010).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for correctness."8

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful "for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance" in Utah without a valid prescription.9 "`Possession' or `use'" includes "the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption" of a controlled substance.10 "Consumption" is defined, in turn, as "ingesting or having any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body."11 When read together, the "measurable amount" provision of the Act makes it unlawful for any person to "knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body."12

¶ 9 Mr. Robinson contends that the measurable amount provision violates the due process and the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. Next, he argues that the measurable amount provision violates the constitutional principles set forth under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California.13 For the reasons that follow, we hold that the measurable amount provision does not violate the Utah or the United States Constitution.14

I. THE MEASURABLE AMOUNT PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS OR THE UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

¶ 10 Mr. Robinson contends that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the due process and the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. We disagree and address each argument in turn.

A. The Measurable Amount Provision Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution

¶ 11 Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."15 Mr. Robinson contends that the measurable amount provision violates the due process clause because it exposes a person to criminal liability for unintentional or involuntary conduct. This argument relies on Mr. Robinson's erroneous belief that a defendant can be convicted under the measurable amount provision based solely on the presence of a controlled substance in his body. For instance, Mr. Robinson argues that a defendant can be convicted even if a third party injects a controlled substance into the defendant's body while he is asleep or over his objection. Likewise, Mr. Robinson argues that a defendant would be subject to prosecution after unintentionally inhaling secondhand marijuana smoke from another person.

¶ 12 None of Mr. Robinson's hypothetical applications of the measurable amount provision are plausible. The measurable amount provision makes it unlawful for any person to "knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body."16 A person cannot "knowingly and intentionally" have a controlled substance in his body unless he first introduces the substance into his body voluntarily. Thus, the State cannot convict a defendant under the measurable amount provision by simply presenting evidence that the illegal substance was present in the defendant's body; it must also prove that the defendant "knowingly and intentionally" introduced the substance into his body.

¶ 13 Next, Mr. Robinson argues that his conviction violates his due process rights because the State did not present any evidence that he "actually ingested the methamphetamine into his body in a voluntary or knowing manner." Mr. Robinson misapprehends the nature of his conviction. Mr. Robinson pled guilty to "knowingly and intentionally" possessing or using methamphetamine and admitted that methamphetamine was present in his blood at the time of arrest. By pleading guilty, he relieved the State of its burden to prove the elements of the crime charged.17 As we previously explained, one of those elements is that the defendant "knowingly and intentionally" introduced the illegal substance into his body. Thus, contrary to his assertions, Mr. Robinson pled guilty to having "ingested methamphetamine into his body in a voluntary [and] knowing manner," and the State was thereby relieved from presenting any evidence to that effect.

¶ 14 Finally, Mr. Robinson argues that his conviction under the measurable amount provision violates his due process rights because, even if he knowingly and intentionally ingested methamphetamine, "there [was] nothing [he] could do to conform his actions to the requirements of [the measurable amount provision]" but "wait until his body's natural metabolic processes cleansed his system." Mr. Robinson claims that this situation is particularly egregious because the ingestion could have occurred in a jurisdiction where methamphetamine is subject to lesser penalties.

¶ 15 Mr. Robinson's only attempt to anchor this argument to any legal authority is his assertion that "if due process [under the Utah Constitution] is to mean anything beyond notice and a hearing, it has to mean that a person cannot be prosecuted and convicted for something beyond his ability to control." And his only support for this assertion is a bald citation to Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services18 and Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.19 But these cases simply hold that due process requires that a person be given "a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute."20 We conclude that the measurable amount provision meets this standard.

¶ 16 To start, the measurable amount provision provides clear notice that it is unlawful for any person to have a controlled substance in his body while he is in Utah so long as he "knowingly and intentionally" introduced the substance into his body.21 Accordingly, Mr. Robinson could have complied with the measurable amount provision by refusing to introduce methamphetamine into his body in the first place. And even if Mr. Robinson introduced the methamphetamine into his body in another jurisdiction, he could have complied with the measurable amount provision by choosing to remain outside Utah's borders until the methamphetamine22 was no longer present in his body.23 We therefore reject Mr. Robinson's contention that the measurable amount provision violates the due process clause of the Utah Constitution.

B. The Measurable Amount Provision Does Not Violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution

¶ 17 Mr. Robinson also contends that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."24 To determine whether a statute violates the uniform operation of laws, we apply a three-step analysis: (1) whether the statute creates any classifications; (2) whether the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated; and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether "`the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.'"25 The first two steps are threshold inquiries; we address the third step only if we find that the statute both creates classifications and imposes disparate treatment among persons similarly situated within those classifications.26

¶ 18 Here, the measurable amount provision classifies individuals based on whether they use controlled substances in Utah. The provision reaches only those persons who knowingly and intentionally use controlled substances and excludes those persons who do not knowingly and intentionally use controlled substances or who use controlled substances with a valid prescription.

¶ 19 Mr. Robinson argues that the measurable amount provision does not apply equally to all persons similarly situated within this class of unlawful drug users. He argues that the law does not apply equally because two persons who each ingest an equal amount of a controlled substance at the same time may be subject to prosecution for varying amounts of time depending on how fast each person's body metabolizes the drug. We are not persuaded.

¶ 20 Within the class of unlawful drug users generally, the measurable amount provision has uniform application. It imposes criminal penalties on all persons who "knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled substance" in their bodies.27 It is irrelevant, therefore, whether an unlawful drug user is subject to prosecution for a longer period of time simply because his body cannot metabolize a controlled substance as quickly as another user's. The crime being punished is the act of using or being under the influence of a controlled substance, not the amount of the substance in the body. And the measurable amount provision punishes anyone guilty of that criminal act.

¶ 21 Mr. Robinson also argues that the measurable amount provision imposes disparate treatment on persons similarly situated within the class of unlawful drug users because the use of marijuana is classified as a class B misdemeanor,28 while the use of methamphetamine, heroin, or cocaine are all punished as third degree felonies.29 This argument has merit. Although the measurable amount provision has uniform application among the class of unlawful drug users generally, it does create sub-classifications that are subject to different penalties. The measurable amount provision makes it unlawful for any person to have any controlled substance in his body, but then imposes different criminal penalties depending on the type of controlled substance used. Particularly because the measurable amount provision itself defines the class as unlawful users of "any measurable amount of a controlled substance,"30 we conclude that such unlawful drug users are similarly situated yet subject to disparate treatment based on the type of controlled substance used.

¶ 22 Having concluded that the measurable amount provision discriminates among persons similarly situated, we must next determine whether the legislature had reasonable objectives to warrant the disparate treatment. This question involves a subsidiary three-part inquiry: (1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose.31 Because Mr. Robinson has not argued that there is a fundamental right or suspect class at issue, we proceed under a rational basis review.32

¶ 23 "Broad deference is given to the legislature when assessing `the reasonableness of its classifications and their relationship to legitimate legislative purposes.'"33 The legislature has decided to punish the use of marijuana less severely than the use of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and other Schedule I or II drugs. We conclude that this classification is reasonable. For instance, it is widely accepted that the use of marijuana is less dangerous and less addictive than the use of methamphetamine, cocaine, or heroin. And the legislative guidelines for scheduling controlled substances reflect this understanding by requiring the advisory committee to classify each substance according to (1) its potential for abuse, (2) whether an accepted standard has been established for safe use in treatment for medical purposes, (3) the level of psychological or physiological dependence resulting from abuse of the substance, and (4) how the substance is classified under federal law.34

¶ 24 We next determine whether the legislative objectives are legitimate. To answer this question, "we are not limited to considering those purposes that can be plainly shown to have been held by some or all legislators. We will sustain a classification if we can reasonably conceive of facts which would justify the distinctions."35 Here, the legislature determined, or could have reasonably determined, that compared to marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine have more potential for abuse, are less likely to be used safely in treatment for medical purposes, and are more addictive, either psychologically or physiologically. Accordingly, the legislature has chosen to punish the use of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor, while punishing the use of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine as third degree felonies. This difference in classification is legitimate.

¶ 25 Finally, we must address whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes. The State has a legitimate interest in preventing individuals from using or being under the influence of controlled substances while in Utah. That interest increases as the relative harm that a controlled substance presents to society increases. Here, the legislature has concluded that the harm presented by the use of marijuana is less than the harm presented by the use of heroin, methamphetamine, or cocaine. The different criminal penalties reflect these relative harms. We conclude, therefore, that a reasonable relationship exists between the criminal classifications and the legislative objectives.

¶ 26 Mr. Robinson also contends that the measurable amount provision violates the uniform operation of laws clause because it exposes a marijuana user to prosecution for a longer period of time than a felony-level substance user since "marijuana remains in the body of a user for a period much longer than do[es] heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine." He argues that this situation creates a classification that "treats marijuana use more harshly than the use of other controlled substances, even though it is clearly the legislatively-enacted policy of this state that marijuana use is a less serious violation." We disagree. Mr. Robinson provides no evidence that marijuana remains in the body longer than other drugs. But even assuming the veracity of this assertion, the criminal punishment imposed for the use of marijuana is less severe than the punishment imposed for the use of felony-level substances. This decreased punishment would account for any increased period of time that marijuana remains in the body and would, therefore, be reasonably related to the legitimate legislative objectives.

¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that the measurable amount provision does not violate the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution.

II. THE MEASURABLE AMOUNT PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA

¶ 28 The majority of Mr. Robinson's brief argues that Utah's measurable amount provision is unconstitutional under Robinson v. California.36 In Robinson, the United States Supreme Court considered a California statute that made it a criminal offense to "be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics."37 The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because the addiction portion did not punish "a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration. . . [but r]ather, makes the `status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted at any time before he reforms."38

¶ 29 Because the Court found narcotic addiction was an "illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily," it held that the statute punished a mere "status," which inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.39

¶ 30 Mr. Robinson contends that, like the California statute at issue in Robinson, Utah's measurable amount provision inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that rather than punish a voluntary act, such as ingestion of a controlled substance, the measurable amount provision criminalizes "simply the status of having been affected by a controlled substance at some previous time." In contrast, the State argues that the measurable amount provision criminalizes the actual use of illegal narcotics. It reasons that "the ongoing consumption of a drug in the body is the quintessential use of that drug" and the stage of use that "is most hazardous to the user and those around him." We agree with the State.

¶ 31 Robinson stands for the proposition that a state cannot make "the `status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense";40 it does not prevent a state from criminalizing the act of using or being under the influence of illegal drugs.41 Utah's measurable amount provision criminalizes the act of using or being under the influence of a controlled substance in Utah. Although the "use" of a controlled substance clearly begins at ingestion, that "use" continues until the user is no longer under the influence of the drug. In other words, use stops and a user is no longer under the influence of drugs when the user no longer has a measurable amount of the drug in his or her body. For instance, after drinking alcohol, a person clearly continues to use or be under the influence of alcohol until no alcohol remains in his body. Likewise, after introducing methamphetamine into the body, a person continues to use or be under the influence of methamphetamine until it is no longer present in his body. We conclude, therefore, that the measurable amount provision does not criminalize the "status" of having previously been affected by a controlled substance as Mr. Robinson argues.

¶ 32 Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the measurable amount provision does not make it a crime for a person to have "the metabolite of a controlled substance" in his body.42 A metabolite of a controlled substance is a byproduct created when the controlled substance is metabolized by the body;43 thus, having the metabolite of a controlled substance in the body only indicates that the controlled substance was ingested at some prior point in time.44 In other words, simply having the metabolite of a controlled substance in the body is similar to a "status" of having previously ingested the controlled substance. Thus, if Utah's measurable amount provision criminalized the presence of metabolites in a person's body, Mr. Robinson's argument might have merit. But the measurable amount provision clearly precludes prosecution based on the presence of such metabolites.

¶ 33 Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Robinson's blood tested positive for methamphetamine, not a metabolite of methamphetamine. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "[p]eak blood methamphetamine concentrations occur shortly after injection, a few minutes after smoking, and around 3 hours after oral dosing."45 Moreover, the mean elimination half-life of methamphetamine is 10.1 hours following oral administration and 12.2 hours following intravenous injection.46 Accordingly, Mr. Robinson was charged with actively using or being under the influence of methamphetamine while in Utah, not with having previously ingested methamphetamine. The State has a legitimate interest in preventing illegal drug use precisely because of the intoxicating effects experienced by the user while the drug is being metabolized by the body. It is during this period of intoxication that a person is most dangerous to himself and others. Indeed, if a particular substance did not produce an intoxicating effect on the user, it would be difficult to understand why the State would make the use of that substance illegal in the first place. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in State v. Margo,

¶ 34 Mr. Robinson also contends that the measurable amount provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.48 His arguments, however, are substantively the same as those made under his state due process claim.49 The only notable difference is an additional citation to Brockert v. Skornicka50 and United States v. Sherpix, Inc.51 in support of his assertion that due process "means that the State may not punish someone for something that is beyond that person's ability to control." But these cases hold that due process requires notice of what the law requires and a reasonable opportunity to comply with those requirements.52 As we explained under our state due process analysis, the measurable amount provision meets this standard. We therefore reject Mr. Robinson's federal due process claim.

¶ 35 Accordingly, we hold that Utah's measurable amount provision does not violate the constitutional principles set forth in Robinson. Rather than punish a person's "status" or "something beyond a person's ability to control," the measurable amount provision criminalizes the voluntary act of using a controlled substance when a person "knowingly and intentionally" has "any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body."53 Nothing in Robinson forbids the State from punishing such behavior.

CONCLUSION

¶ 36 We hold that the measurable amount provision of the Utah Controlled Substances Act does not violate the Utah or the United States Constitution. First, the measurable amount provision does not violate the due process or the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. Second, the measurable amount provision does not violate the constitutional principles set forth in Robinson v. California54 because it punishes the act of using or being under the influence of a controlled substance while in Utah and requires the State to prove that such use was knowing and intentional. Finally, the measurable amount provision does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court.

¶ 37 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Judge PEULER concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.

¶ 38 Due to his retirement, Justice WILKINS did not participate herein. District Court Judge SANDRA N. PEULER sat.

¶ 39 Justice THOMAS R. LEE became a member of the Court on July 19, 2010, after oral argument in this matter, and accordingly did not participate.