Associate Chief Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 This case involves a challenge by relatives of Mr. Kenneth Vanderwerff to an action for a posthumous declaration of unsolemnized marriage brought by Mr. Vanderwerff's romantic partner and personal representative of his estate-Ms. Janetta Gardiner. We are asked to determine when and how service of process is to be made in the unusual circumstance where a petitioner seeks a declaration of marriage between herself and someone who has died. This case was certified to us by the court of appeals and comes to us with a complicated procedural history. Ms. Gardiner appeals from the court's sua sponte order dismissing the case approximately two years after the petition was granted for untimely service under rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, Ms. Gardiner challenges the grant of intervention to Mr. Vanderwerff's four cousins, the setting aside of the declaration of marriage under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court's subsequent dismissal of the marriage case. We reverse on all three issues and reinstate the declaration of marriage.
¶ 2 Appellant Ms. Gardiner and the late Mr. Vanderwerff were in a romantic relationship from approximately November 2007 until Mr. Vanderwerff's death at age 78 on April 22, 2010. Ms. Gardiner and Mr. Vanderwerff's relationship was not solemnized as a marriage in any state during Mr. Vanderwerff's lifetime. Mr. Vanderwerff had no children. About a month after Mr. Vanderwerff's death, on May 18, 2010, Ms. Gardiner filed a petition for a "judicial declaration of common law marriage" under Utah Code section 30-1-4.5 (marriage case). The following day, William Francis, Mr. Vanderwerff's step-grandson (a descendant of Mr. Vanderwerff's first wife), filed a probate action concerning Mr. Vanderwerff's estate (probate case). That same day, Mr. Francis was appointed special administrator of the estate. After Ms. Gardiner was served with notice of the probate action on May 20, 2010, she sought to have Mr. Francis removed from his position as special administrator and to have herself appointed as the estate's personal representative.
¶ 4 Subsequently, in the probate case, on August 2, 2010, the court held a hearing on Ms. Gardiner's motion to remove Mr. Francis as the special administrator. Ms. Gardiner produced a copy of Mr. Vanderwerff's will. Based on the terms of the will, Mr. Francis and Ms. Gardiner stipulated to Mr. Francis's removal and Ms. Gardiner's appointment as personal representative of the estate.
¶ 5 That September, the court held a hearing in the marriage case. The hearing was held without formal notice to Mr. Francis or any members of Mr. Vanderwerff's family. The only individuals present were Ms. Gardiner, her counsel, and Ms. Gardiner's two witnesses. The court granted the marriage declaration the same day.
¶ 6 Two months later, on November 9, 2010, Mr. Francis moved to set aside the declaration of marriage under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) on the basis of surprise, fraud, and "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Mr. Francis's primary argument under rule 60(b) was that he had not been served with notice of the original petition or of the hearing.
¶ 7 Instead, on March 10, 2011, the court concluded that Mr. Francis had no standing to move to set aside the marriage determination. In so deciding, the court noted that Mr. Francis is a "step grandson not having been adopted by decedent [Mr. Vanderwerff] nor is he a child or adopted child of a natural child [of] the decedent." "As such," the court continued, Mr. Francis "lacks standing to contest the determination by the court as to whether the relationship between Kenneth J. Vanderwer[ff] and Janetta J. Gardiner constituted a marriage at common law."
¶ 8 Then in August 2011, four of Mr. Vanderwerff's cousins, Nedra Taufer, Janice Dobbins, Connie Morgan, and John Vanderwerff (Cousins), moved to set aside the judgment under rule 60(b) on grounds of surprise, fraud, and for "any other reason justifying relief." In an affidavit accompanying the motion, one of the Cousins, Ms. Taufer, declared that she "was aware of [Mr. Francis's] petition to be appointed special administrator, as well as his agreement that Janetta Gardiner would be appointed as personal representative of the estate." She went on to say that she "was also aware of Ms. Gardiner's petition to be made a common law spouse." Ms. Gardiner filed a motion to strike and argued that the Cousins, as nonparties, could not make a motion in the case.
¶ 9 On February 27, 2012, the court heard oral argument on the motions. At the hearing, the court orally granted a "limited" motion to intervene and provisionally set aside the declaration of marriage to take further evidence on the issue of whether Ms. Gardiner and Mr. Vanderwerff's relationship satisfied the statutory elements for a determination of marriage. The Cousins submitted a proposed order setting aside the determination of marriage and granting the motion to intervene. Ms. Gardiner objected to the proposed order, in part because she was never given an opportunity to brief the merits of her opposition to the Cousins' rule 60(b) motion to set aside the declaration of marriage.
¶ 11 Then, about a month later, on April 18, 2012, the court, on its own initiative, ordered the marriage case dismissed in its entirety and without prejudice under rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of Ms. Gardiner's alleged failure to serve process within 120 days of the filing of the marriage petition.
¶ 12 On May 21, 2012, Ms. Gardiner filed a motion to extend her time to appeal under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court granted the motion and Ms. Gardiner timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b).
¶ 13 The Cousins challenge our jurisdiction on appeal. They argue that we lack jurisdiction because the district court abused its discretion when it granted Ms. Gardiner a time extension under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e). "Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal."
¶ 14 As a threshold matter, we address the Cousins' contention that we lack jurisdiction on appeal. The Cousins argue that the district court abused its discretion when it granted Ms. Gardiner a time extension to file her notice of appeal. They contend that "confusion, advanced age, and a desire for more time ... do not constitute good cause," and thus the district court abused its discretion when it granted Ms. Gardiner extra time to file her appeal under rule 4(e). A party may move to dismiss an appeal at any time "on the basis that the appellate court lacks jurisdiction."
¶ 15 The district court's discretion to grant a party additional time to file an appeal is "very broad and fundamentally equitable in nature."
¶ 16 Ms. Gardiner argues that the district court erred when it granted the Cousins' motion to intervene because they failed to satisfy the elements of rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs intervention of right. At the time the parties submitted briefing, State v. Bosh established our standard of review concerning the propriety of a grant of intervention of right.
¶ 17 A party attempting to intervene under rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure must establish four elements:
¶ 18 In this case, the district court's order granting the motion to intervene did not state the basis for the court's decision, nor did the court make findings on the rule 24(a) elements at the February 27, 2012, hearing.
¶ 19 In this case, the Cousins sought intervention over a year after the marriage declaration was entered, even though it appears that at least one of them was aware of the marriage proceeding at the time it occurred.
¶ 20 We stop short of weighing in on the question of whether, assuming their motion was timely, the Cousins could have shown, as a matter of law, that they had an "interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action."
¶ 21 Ms. Gardiner argues that the court improperly set aside the marriage declaration and then dismissed the marriage case sua sponte under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(i) for failure of service.
¶ 22 We now turn to the court's decision to set aside the declaration of marriage.
¶ 23 District courts are typically granted broad discretion to issue rulings on rule 60(b) motions "because most are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review."
¶ 24 As explained in Part II.B.2, infra, service was not improper because Ms. Gardiner was the personal representative of the estate and timely waived service on the estate. Because service was properly waived, the district court had no reason to set aside the marriage determination for lack of proper service. Accordingly, the district court erred when it set aside the marriage determination.
¶ 25 Ms. Gardiner first argues that the court erred when it dismissed the marriage action without giving her the opportunity to raise defenses. Second, she argues that service was not improper and the district court should not have dismissed the action under rule 4(b)(i) for three reasons: (1) Mr. Francis, in his capacity as special administrator, waived service when he filed a motion to intervene in the marriage case; (2) Mr.
¶ 26 On April 18, 2012, the district court dismissed the probate case "upon its own initiative" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(i). It dismissed the case because it found that Ms. Gardiner had "not served process on anyone since filing her petition for determination of common law marriage" and therefore the action had to be "dismissed, without prejudice."
¶ 27 There is some tension between Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b)(i) and 4(e)(3). Rule 4(b)(i) states, "[i]f the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's own initiative."
¶ 28 Rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in every action, a "summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint."
¶ 29 At the time Ms. Gardiner filed the marriage petition, Mr. Francis had been appointed the special administrator of Mr. Vanderwerff's estate, and Ms. Gardiner was aware of that appointment. Ms. Gardiner did not serve the petition upon Mr. Francis — though she should have. Nevertheless, Mr. Francis had actual knowledge of the marriage petition, and attempted to intervene both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as the estate's special administrator. In addition to his motion to intervene, Mr. Francis filed a memorandum objecting to Ms. Gardiner's marriage petition — and at no point raised a challenge to the sufficiency of service. The court never ruled on Mr. Francis's motion, however, because it was never submitted for decision. Then one month before the adjudication of the marriage, and within 120 days from the filing of the marriage petition, Mr. Francis stipulated to his own removal as special administrator and Ms. Gardiner's appointment as personal representative of the estate.
¶ 30 As a result, at that point in the marriage case, Ms. Gardiner, as personal representative of the estate, would have been required to serve herself with her own marriage petition.
¶ 31 While we recognize the Cousins' public policy concerns, we note that being a personal representative and a potential beneficiary of a will does not create a per se conflict of interest that constitutes fraud.
¶ 33 The district court erred when it dismissed the action on its own initiative under rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without notice to Ms. Gardiner and without affording her the opportunity to object — and the court erred because service was in fact proper. Because Mr. Vanderwerff was deceased at the time of the petition, Ms. Gardiner was required to effectuate service of process on — or obtain a waiver of service from — his estate. Ms. Gardiner waived service on the estate in her capacity as personal representative before the expiration of 120 days from the filing of the marriage petition, and therefore service was valid.
¶ 34 In sum, we hold that the district court erred when it allowed the Cousins to intervene, set aside the declaration of marriage, and then dismissed the case. Where a petitioner seeks a posthumous determination of an unsolemnized marriage, he or she must serve process upon the estate of the deceased. In this case, Ms. Gardiner waived service on behalf of the estate as the personal representative of Mr. Vanderwerff. The court erroneously concluded that Ms. Gardiner failed to validly effectuate service. Because the court allowed the Cousins to intervene, granted their rule 60(b) motion to set aside the marriage declaration, and then dismissed the case on its own initiative all on the basis of that error, we reverse those decisions and reinstate the September 13, 2010, declaration of marriage between Ms. Gardiner and Mr. Vanderwerff.
